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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism since the onset of the reforms 
in China in 1979 and the impact of this resurgence on the legitimacy of the Chinese state. The period 
of reform has witnessed the revival of nationalist sentiments not only o f the Mongols, but also of the 
Han Chinese (and other national minorities).
This development has given rise to two related issues: first, what accounts for the resurgence 
itself; and second, does it challenge the basis of China’s national identity and of the legitimacy of the 
state as these concepts have previously been understood. During the period under examination (1979- 
1993), an important shift in the basis of the legitimization of the Chinese State occurred. This shift 
paralleled the decline in significance of the Communist ideology both in China and worldwide and the 
corresponding rise of Chinese nationalism officially designated as patriotism (ai guo zhu yi). These 
developments have shaped the re-emergence of Mongolian nationalism in China, which in turn 
challenges aspects of the basis of China’s statehood.
In order to chart the complex inter-relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese state, 
it is necessary to adopt an historical perspective. The history of Mongolian self-rule, the struggle for 
autonomy, and the titular regional autonomy are reviewed to show that the resurgence of Mongolian 
nationalism is closely linked to the deterioration of the political and economic situation of Mongols in 
China. During the period of reform, the political ideal of a socialist nation that had unified ethnic and 
non-ethnic Chinese in the early years o f the People’s Republic was weakened. In opposition to the 
ideal of socialist unity, the traditional view of the identity of the Chinese nation that stresses cultural, 
ethnic, and historical ties has been strengthened. These developments have weakened the authority 
that the Chinese government exercise over what the Chinese call “national minorities” (shao shu min 
zu). This weakening of authority may be seen as an example o f the problem that arises when the 
power of coercion replaces political authority.
In terms of foreign relations, Mongolian nationalism has complicated important dimensions 
for China’s relations with other countries of northeast Asia, especially in the post-cold war era. 
Moreover, the increasing nationalistic basis on which the identity of Chinese people is based, together 
with the problems this raises in regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan, have profound implications for the 
international identity of the Chinese state. Consequently, the way in which Chinese “national 
minorities” have emerged as a problem within China also has clear international implications.
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that the rise of Inner Mongolian nationalism threatens to 
undermine the concept of an unitary Chinese nation (for example in the guise of a supposed Chinese 
family). As a result, Mongolian nationalism weakens the basis of Chinese statehood as presently 
conceived. Furthermore, the challenge of non-Chinese nationalism to Chinese statehood suggests the 
problems of nationalism as state legitimisation in general.
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NOTES ON NAME SPELLING AND HANYU PINYIN
The pin yin system, the official romanisation system in the PRC, has been 
adopted by the UN and other international organisations. It has become the system 
most universally used in Scholarship and journalism in the West1. However, we 
should notice that pinyin is called han yu pin yin in its full name, which designed to 
Romanise the Chinese language only. There are many other non-Chinese languages 
in China as well, which have different pronunciation systems. Most of these non- 
Chinese languages use alphabets, and have a more direct way of romanisation than 
Chinese.
In recent years, there has been more and more evidence that to use han yu pin 
yin to spell words from non-Chinese languages implies an assimilationist tendency. 
Inner Mongolia was spelt as Nei Monggu in hanyupinyin , in my thesis, non- 
Chinese names are spelt in their own language or in well-known English spellings, 
such as Uighurs, Ulanhu, Ordos, Hohhot etc.. In my thesis, the hanyu pinyin system 
is only used to spell Chinese names. However, some well-known Chinese names of 
places and people are exceptions because they are more easily recognised in the old 
way, such as Hong Kong, Confucius, Chiang Kaishek, Sun Yatsen, etc.
1 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, “Preface”, Lowell in Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, ed. China’s 
Quest fo r National Identity (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993)
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1. CCP
2. COMINTERN
3. IM
4. IMAR
5. IMKMT
6. IMPRP
7. KMT
8. MPR
9. MPRP
10. NIMPRP
11. OM
12. PLA
13. PRC
14. SEZ
ABBREVIATIONS
Chinese Communist Party 
The 3rd Communist International 
Inner Mongolia
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region 
Inner Mongolian Kuomintang 
Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party 
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
Mongolian People’s Republic
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
Outer Mongolia
People’s Liberation Army
People’s Republic of China
Special Economic Zone
»
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the challenge posed to the legitimacy of the Chinese state by the resurgence of 
Mongolian nationalism since the onset of the reforms in China in 1979. Nationalism in nature is a 
legitimation principle. Nationalism, by Ernest Gellner’s definition, is a political principle by which 
“the cultural and the political units should be congruent.5,1 Nationalism is often justify itself with 
national self determination which is in accordance with the generally accepted international norm that 
the sovereignty is vested in the people of a given territory.
Nationalism as a political principle of national self-determination is clear and less controversial, but to 
decide which group is a nation and thus entitled to self-determination is a difficult issue. Since most 
states within their current territorial bounds have been formed on the basis of succession to a previous 
authority2, problems can and do arise when such states include within their borders peoples with 
claims to belong to diverse nations.
In such cases problems may become acute when the predominant national group uses its nationalism 
as the principle for state legitimacy in such a way as to use the instruments o f statehood to assert that 
others belong to the same nation irrespective of their own declared views. Problems may also become 
manifest when smaller national groups claim the right of secession on the basis of the nationalist 
principle.
Chinese nationalism or state nationalism (“ai guo zhu yi” in Chinese) is an such example in which 
nationalism is used as a state legitimation principle. The key point of Chinese state nationalism(“ai 
guo zhu yi”) is its emphasis upon the state rather than upon the nation: Since all peoples live in one 
state, therefore they are of one nation, and by the nationalist principle, they should be loyal to state.
However, nationalism as a legitimation principle is a two-pronged sword. While nationalism can be 
used to justify state legitimacy, it can be also used to defy a state and justify a separatist movement.
Chinese state legitimacy has many origins: the imperial legacy, the nationalist past and Marxist 
ideological influences. For example, Chinese state nationalism partly originates from the sino-centric 
past and culturalism3, assimilationism before 1949 and it also finds justification in historical 
materialism.
1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell, 1983) p.l.
2
James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.25.
3
Joseph Levenson referred to pre-modem Chinese centrism as culturalism to distinguish it from 
modem nationalism. See Joseph R. Levenson. Confucian China and its Modern Fate: the Problem o f  
Intellectual Continuity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p.96.
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The relationship between Nationalism and state legitimacy arguably has been an important source of 
tension in international relations since the 19th century. But it has acquired even greater saliency in the 
1990s following the end of the Cold War. Most of the international conflicts have stemmed from 
intra-state rather than inter-state wars. And these conflicts have hinged on which national groups has 
the right to exercise state power or what should be the territorial basis for new states upon the break­
up of multi-national states. These issues have acquired greater significance. Firstly, because the end of 
bipolarity has removed the constraints exercised by great powers involvement in local conflicts. 
Secondly, the collapse of Communism as an alternative economic system and as radical ideology has 
removed a system that once ever-rode national divisions for much of the Eurasian peoples, 
significance.
China too has not been exempt from these changing currents. During the period of reform since 1979, 
an important shift occurred in the basis on which the legitimization of the Chinese State. This shift 
paralleled the decline in significance of Communist ideology both in China and the world as a whole 
and the corresponding rise of Chinese nationalism officially designated as “patriotism” (ai guo zhu yi 
or ‘state nationalism’).
The decline of Marxist ideology has reduced the supranational nature of Chinese statehood with the 
result that the formal identity of Chinese state has become more nationalist. In this sense China has 
changed from being a supra-national empire to a nationalist state. These developments have shaped 
the re-emergence o f Mongolian nationalism in China, which in turn has challenged aspects of the 
basis of statehood as asserted by China’s Communist party rulers.
In the world as a whole, nationalism has played a more important role in state legitimacy in the post- 
Cold War era. Sub-state and inter-state nationalism have had a heavy impact upon state legitimacy 
and inter-state relations. I will examine the development of Mongolian nationalism to see the extent to 
which the development in post Mao China correspond to the above those trends.
In order to chart the complex inter-relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese state, it is 
necessary to adopt an historical perspective. The history of Mongolian self-rule, the struggle for 
autonomy, and the titular regional autonomy are reviewed to show that the resurgence of Mongolian 
nationalism may be said to have arisen in part from the deterioration of the political and economic 
situation of Mongols in China.
During the period o f reform, the political ideal of a socialist nation that had unified ethnic and non­
ethnic Chinese in the early years of the People’s Republic was weakened. In opposition to the ideal of 
socialist unity, the old traditional view has re-emerged. According to this, the identity o f the Chinese 
nation is defined principally by the cultural, ethnic, and historical ties that bind the Chinese people 
together in the state.
Since this view is dominated by perspectives and interests of the Han Chinese, the developments
since the beginning o f the reforms have combined to weaken the authority that the Chinese
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government has exercised over what the Chinese call “national minorities” (shao shu min zu). This 
weakening of authority has resulted in the more overt use of force and it may be seen as an example 
of the problem that arises when the power of coercion replaces political authority.
In terms of foreign relations, Mongolian nationalism has complicated important dimensions of 
China’s relations with other countries of Northeast Asia, especially in the post-Cold War era. 
Moreover, the increasing nationalistic basis on which the identity of the Chinese people is based, 
together with the problems this raises in regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan, have profound 
implications for the international identity of the Chinese state. Consequently, the way in which 
Chinese “national minorities” have emerged as a problem within China also has clear international 
implications.
/. Explanations of Nationality Issues in China
In the Chinese language, nationalism is referred to in many different ways: patriotism (ai guo zhu yi 
or statism) that is usually translated as nationalism, is in fact statism and carries a favorable 
connotation in Chinese, but nationalism (min zu zhu yi), the supposed neutral term, is regarded as 
bourgeois and narrow-minded in the Communist ideology, and ethnic splitism or secessionism(min zu 
fen lie zhu yi), has a straightforward pejorative connotation. Even though, these terms all refer to 
nationalism, they denote the official Chinese attitude toward minorities whose nationalism is at best 
particularist and at worst threatens the current Chinese state and the concept of the Chinese nation.
It can not be simply said that the concept “nation” is entirely a European invention, but at least we can 
say that it first appeared in European political and academic language and that European scholarship 
has produced the most literature on nationalism.
Nationalism as a political principle and belief is clear, but the specific definition of “nation” is more 
elusive. “The basic problem arises because the political utility o f the national idea is not matched by 
its analytical clarity. The difficulty lies in defining the nation itself.”4” According to Ernest Gellner, 
nationalism as a political principle holds that “the cultural and the political units should be 
congruent”.5
But most problems in understanding and in practice are created over the difficulties of defining a 
nation. In the real world, there have never been clearly defined cultural and ethnic maps as there have 
been political maps. In the various theories of nationalism, how to define a nation or how to conceive 
of a nation is where the differences emerge.
It would be inadequate to explain the Chinese case using only one approach and to regard the Chinese 
nation or the Mongolian nation as the product of a single intellectual model, say, as the result of
4 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.2.
5 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell, 1983) p.l.
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industrialization and modernization, or simply as a modem revival of historical roots. But the 
different approaches are useful in understanding the case of China since they all shed light on aspects 
of the Chinese nationalist phenomena although some theories are more applicable than others. The 
discussion on Chinese and Mongolian nation and nationalism reflects these different approaches.
Perennialists view the Chinese nation as having long existed since remote ancient times.6 The 
perennialist view makes no distinction between ancient ethnic centrism, racism and modem 
nationalism. Joseph Levenson referred to pre-modem Chinese centrism as culturalism to distinguish 
it from modem nationalism. The modem state system and the external differentiation it provides 
promotes the idea of nation and nationalism.
The Chinese nation is believed to have been bom two thousand years ago7. While the Chinese nation 
is believed to have begun at the time of Qin’s unification two thousand years ago or even earlier, 
Mongols as a nation can be traced to days of Genghis Khan’s unification in 1206.
The perennialist view plays quite an important part in Chinese historical education and propaganda, in 
which, the ancient Chinese state and modem Chinese state, ancient Chinese and modem Chinese 
people and non-Chinese peoples in China are fused together. Ancient Chinese heroes are treated in 
the way modem national heroes are treated.
Some English literature on Chinese nationalism can also be categorized as perenialist since it 
distinguishes a proto Chinese nationalism in pre-modem Chinese history, thus differ from the view 
that nationalism is a clear cut modem phenomenon.
James Townsend argues a type of ethnic proto nationalism existed along side the elite’s identification 
with Chinese culture8. He claims that the Chinese case is not that of clear-cut classic nationalism. 
Consequently he differs from Gellner who wrote that “It is nationalism which engenders nations and
6 The perennialist approach treats nationalism as a modem embodiment of perennial ethnicity. A.D. 
Smith argues that the nation even has pre-modem ethnic origins though its civic features are a modem 
product, A.D. Smith, Ethnic /?ev/va/(University of Cambridge Press, 1981). Miroslav Hroch says 
“intellectuals can ‘invent’ national communities only if certain objective preconditions for the 
formation of nation already exist”, Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed 
Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe”, Becoming National, ed. By Geoff Eley and Roanald 
Grigor Suny, (Oxford University Press, 1996)7
Chinese leaders claim that the emergence of Han Chinese nation began with the Qin dynasty, but 
that China as a civilisation started 5,000 years ago. The legendary "Three Kings and Five Emperors" 
are known to average Chinese people as the beginning of Chinese people. The first legendary king 
Fuxi is dated back to 2852 BC. Western scholars usually date a 4,000-year Chinese history, referring 
to the first powerful Chinese state Shang (1766-1122 BC) basing this on the oldest conclusive 
documentary evidence that survives from the time. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nation and State: An Inquiry 
into the Origins o f  Nations and the Politics o f  Nationalism, (London: Nethuen Co & Ltd., 1977) p.274.
8 James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism”, Jonethan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism, (M.E. Sharpe, 
Armonk, New York, London, England, 1996)
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not the other way around”9 and from Eric Hobsbawn who wrote “nationalism comes before 
nations”.10
The intellectualist view11 traces the origin of Chinese nationalism to racist thinking and anti-Mongol 
ideals in the Ming period and anti-Manchu ideals in the early Qing period, and even earlier to 
Confucius who after all made the distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese barbarians.
Dikotter, in his book The Discourse o f  Race in Modem China, gives; a historic description of Chinese 
view on race. He also shows the continuity of traditional Chinese racial views into modem time12.
European ideas are another important intellectual source for Chinese nationalism. Many early Chinese 
nationalists, Sun Yatsen and Zhang Taiyan for example, were exposed to modem European ideas. But 
more important is the force that brought foreign ideas, i.e. Western intrusion and its superior 
technology and social organisation had profound impact on the Chinese intellectual and political elite. 
Western intrusion as a major outside force gave Chinese a new perception o f the modem world.
The Chinese modem world outlook was not generated by a modernisation that happened internally, 
rather it was stimulated by a modem force from outside. In this sense, nationalism is viewed as a 
modem phenomenon13.
9 Enest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell, 1983), p.55.
10 E.J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990) p. 10.
11 Ernest Renan’s definition of the nation as a form of morality, its solidarity is sustained by a 
distinctive historical consciousness, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’ in John Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, 
Nationalism,{Oxford University Press, 1994)p.l7. Max Weber claims that nations are too various to 
be defined in terms of any one criterion, but he affiliates nations to ethnic communes as populations 
unified by a myth of common descent, Max Weber, ‘ The Nation ’, in A.D. Smith,(op. cit)p.21. Other 
early literature on nationalism, such as by Carlton Hayes and Hans Kohn, also regarded nationalism 
mainly as an intellectual product originating from the European tradition. Elie Kedourie’s analysis of 
nationalism’s ideological origins is based on the experiences of whole of Europe; he regarded 
nationalism as a product of a tradition of irrational thinking. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism(Oxford: 
Blackwell, Fourth, expanded edition, 1993)
12Frank Dikotter, The discourse o f Race in Modern China, (Hurst & Company, London 1992)
13 Modernization theorists regard nations as constructed and invented entities. Because a nation could 
be viewed as a construction arising out of modernization or the rise of bureaucratic state, nationalism 
is thus sociologically rooted in modernity. Gellner argues that the concept o f the nation is created by 
the need of modem societies for cultural homogeneity. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism(Basi\ 
Blackwell, 1983). Karl Deutsch regards nations as a functional entity in modernity in which 
communication is both the cause or the purpose of the nation, and the objective of nationalist 
organizations is to strengthen and extend the channels of communication which can ensure a popular 
compliance with national symbols and norms. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social 
Communication, 2nd edition, (the M.I.T. Press, 1966). Marxist theorists such as Eric Hobsbawm and 
Benedict Anderson base their theories on historical materialism and put nationalism in the context of 
historical development, such as Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s “invention of tradition”, and 
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities”. Hobsbawm and Ranger, ed. Invention o f  
7>ac//Y/o«(Cambridge University Press, 1983). Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:
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Chinese nationalism can be regarded as a phenomenon of the modem age, but many have found the 
link between pre-modem Chinese centrism and modem nationalism, and even Chinese communism.
The Chinese nationalist revolution drew on the pre-modem racial revolution and also influence of 
social Darwinism14. Early Chinese nationalist thinking was influenced by the ideas of racial salvation 
and racial war15, thus Sun Yatsen’s nationalist revolution started with racial slogans.
Levenson found that the centricity of culturalism surpassed the outlook of Chinese communism.16 
Wang Gungwu writes that the Communist revolution is an extension of the nationalist revolution led 
by Sun Yatsen.17 According to Wang Gungwu, the communist triumph of 1949 brought with it a 
narrow, increasingly exclusive view of nationalism even while party leaders believed themselves the 
purveyor of world revolution; in retrospect they were more Chinese than revolutionary, more inward- 
looking than outward-looking.18
Relating to the nationalist nature of Chinese revolution, Chalmer A. Johnson’s book on the nationalist 
nature of peasant revolution suggests the Chinese Communist revolution was more nationalist in 
character than just a Soviet style revolution.19
Li Weihan as an official authority on the CCP’s standing on the issue o f nationalism, made a political 
interpretation of how the Chinese nation came into being, but he did not make a good materialist 
narrative of modem Chinese nationalism, as may have been expected from an avowed Marxist. Li 
Weihan put more emphasis on political factors and issues of class struggles. This may reflect a more 
general problem of Chinese communism, i.e., China’s lack of the materialist conditions prescribed by 
Marx.20
In the Marxist tradition, nationalism is treated as an interim phenomenon and is not given the 
importance it deserves. The communist analysis, as outlined by Li Weihan, o f the international and
Reflections on Origins and Spread o f Nationalism^/erso Editions and NLB, 1983). Other related 
economic explanations on nationalism are the internal colonialism thesis by Tom Naim and the gap 
between peripheral and central development. Tom Nairn, The Break-up ofBritain{NLB and Verso 
Edition, 1977). Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development, 1536-1966, (Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1975).
14John Fitzgerald, chapter 3, Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism, (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New 
York, London, England, 1996)p.83.
15Frank Dikotter, The discourse o f Race in Modern China, (Hurst & Company, London 1992), p.69.
16 Joseph R. Levenson. Confucian China and its Modern Fate: the Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p.96.
17 Wang Gungwu, China and the World since 1949 (The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977) p.9.
18 Wang Gungwu, Chapter 5 in Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism, (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 
New York, London, England, 1996)
19 Chalmer A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power(Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1962)
20 .Li Weihan, Minzu Lilun he Minzu Zhengce De Jige Wenti (Several Issues on Nationality Theories 
and Policies) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1980)
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domestic situation which provided the Chinese nation with a particular sense of self-consciousness 
suggests the importance of external differentiation provided by the outside world in Chinese 
nationalism.
Fei Xiaotong’s theory that claims that the Chinese nation emerged from plural origins argues in the 
same way as Li Weihan’s official theory, except for his functionalist explanation o f the Chinese 
nation. His view of the Chinese nation as functioning as a system adds a more materialist explanation 
to the Chinese nation. But his view of the Chinese nation is also perennialist.21
As a matter of fact, Chinese official theorists such as Li Weihan and Fei Xiaotong have never drawn 
the distinction between the ancient Chinese and the modem Chinese nation in the same way as 
European theorists. As Fei put it, the Chinese existed as a nation for thousands of years, and the self- 
consciousness of the Chinese nation began several hundreds of years ago.
In many ways, the literature on Chinese nation in the post-Mao era is the same as Li Weihan’s 
Marxist theory. Thus the Chinese nation is presented as a timeless notion, which modem socio­
economic changes are credited for generating Chinese national self-consciousness. One major 
difference, however, is that the Marxist logic of social development has been replaced by Fei 
Xiaotong’s functional theory. Another difference is that the inevitability of a communist future is 
replaced by a nationalist vision, i.e., an economically prosperous and politically powerful China in the 
world.
A wider range of issues concerning Chinese national identities have been discussed in recent Western 
literature, e.g., traditional Chinese identity, the role of Chinese intellectuals in Chinese nationalism, 
regional sub-state identities and official national identity which is the self-perception of Chinese 
identity in international relations.22 More recent issues such as Chinese intellectuals in Chinese 
nationalism during the reform period is also discussed.23
The meaning o f the Chinese nation and the content of Chinese nationalism is also regarded as having 
been transformed and monopolized by the state24 But Lucian Pye has written on non-state driven 
national identity, arguing that the modernisation of Chinese culture has been driven by the coastal 
treaty ports.25 This is illustration of a literature which emphasises that Chinese nationalism is shaped
21 Fei Xiaotong, Zhonghua Mingzu Duoyuan Yitihua Geju (The Pattern of Chinese Nation: Unity 
With Plural Origins) (Beijing: The Central Institute of Nationalities' Press, 1989)
22 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, ed. China’s Quest fo r  National Identity, (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1993)
23 Merle Goldman, Perry Link, and Su Wei, “China’s Intellectuals in the Deng’s Era”, Lowell Dittmer 
and Samuel S. Kim, ed. China’s Quest fo r National Identity, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1993).
24 John Fitzgerald, chapter 3, Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism, (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New 
York, London, England, 1996)p.83.
25 Lucian Pye, chapter 4, Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism, (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New 
York, London, England, 1996)
by the impact o f modern age.
Peter Van Ness wrote on the relationship between proclaimed national identity and the success or 
failure of a particular foreign policy undertaken under its auspices”.26 Michael Ng-Quinn27, Michael
H.Hunt28, James L. Watson29 and Richard W. Wilson30 wrote on traditional Chinese identity and the 
intellectual and ethnic origin of Chinese national identity.
The regional identities in China is an issue particularly related to the Chinese reform period.31 
Usually economic explanations dominate the discussion of regional identities and the regionalisation 
of economic interests. Economic regionalism does not necessarily lead to disintegration because 
economic factors form only one of the many causes of nationalism. More emphasis should be put on 
the differences of varying sub-state identities such as regional identities and non-Chinese identities. 
Non-Chinese identities are another complicated issue, which is different from regional identity and 
yet has international implications. The role o f external differentiation functions differently with regard 
to regional and non-Chinese identities.
Christopher Rene Hughes’ writing on the controversial issue of Taiwanese nationalism shows how 
what Chinese and indeed the Chinese government regard as merely a regional identity has developed 
into a separate identity of international significance and how Taiwanese nationalism has acquired a 
new meaning that has gone beyond traditional ethnic and cultural nationalism.32 He analysed in 
particular one aspect of Chinese nationalism, namely, its transformation from an ethnicity with a 
cultural basis into one with a civic basis. Hence he associates the transformation of nationalism with 
the legitimacy issue. According to Hughes, the new legitimacy in Taiwan and the social solidarity 
were cultivated not in terms of ethnic identity but rather on the basis of civic criteria of shared 
interests amongst the population of Taiwan.33
2. Contribution
The national identities such as those of Chinese nationalism and non-Chinese nationalism are usually 
studied within the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and political sciences. In China, issues of
26 Peter Van Ness, “china as a third world state: foreign policy and official national identity”, 
relationship between a proclaimed national identity and the success or failure of a particular foreign 
policy is undertaken under its auspices”, Ibid. p. 195
27Michael Ng-Quinn, “National Identity in Pre-modem China”, Ibid.
28 Michael H. Hunt, “Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican 
Crisis”, Ibid.
29 James L. Watson, “Rites or Beliefs? The Construction o f a United Culture in Late Imperial China.” 
Ibid.
30 Richard W. Wilson, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Cultural Identity: The Filial Ideal and the 
Transformation o f an Ethic”, Ibid.
31 Lynn White and Li Cheng, “China Coast Identities: Regional, National, and Global”, Ibid.
32 Christopher Rene Hughes, National Identity and Status in International Society: Taiwan in Chinese
Nationalism, (London School of Economics and Political Sciences: Ph.D. Thesis, 1995).
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nationality and national identity fall into the sphere of anthropology and sociology. There is, therefore, 
a certain gap between the international and internal study of national identities.
International and area studies deal with the state as a whole and treat China both as a nation and a 
state as a whole without distinguishing some sub-state factors such as non-Chinese national identities 
and its interaction with the idea of the Chinese nation and Chinese self-identity, and its international 
implications. Sociological and anthropological studies o f non-Chinese nationalism within China do 
not deal with the international implications o f sub-state nationalism.
The nation state may be seen as constituting a barrier for the study of nationalism both in its 
international context and sub-state context. My approach by which nationalism is examined in 4 
different dimensions avoids the constraints put on the study of nationalism by statehood and state 
borders. I shall include in my thesis information and approaches derived from a wide variety of 
disciplines and sources encompassing Chinese studies and Mongolian studies, International Relations, 
domestic nationality policies, and theories of nationalism from various fields of the social sciences.
This multi-disciplinary approach requires that Nationalism in my thesis is examined in a multi­
dimensional way. The idea of a Chinese nation has been given various interpretations by Chinese 
leaders and writers throughout modem history. In order to summarize effectively the distinctive 
development of Chinese national ideas and different Mongolian national ideas, they will be reviewed 
on a comparative basis. These national ideas can be separated into the following four different 
categories, that is, justification of a common past, justification of a common future, some inner 
mechanism which makes a particular nation distinctive, and certain outside contrasts.
Historically, the formation of nations has not been necessarily dependent upon statehood or upon the 
roles that states may play. But where the state has been instrumental in the formation of the nation and 
in the spread of nationalist ideas to the intelligentsia the process can be better understood in the wider 
context of theory about the system of states.
James Mayall writes on the development and role of nationalism as influences upon the character of 
international relations. In my thesis, I try to look for the opposite causal relations, i.e. how the 
international world shapes nationalism.
The major theoretical models of nationalism mostly deal with the internal mechanism, the intellectual 
origin, and the revival of the pre-modem roots of the nationalist phenomenon, all o f which can be 
applied to the Chinese situation to some degree. But one additional important factor in the formation 
of group that is given considerable attention here is the external differentiation factor in nationalism.
I will deal with the role of external differentiation upon nationalism, particularly the Chinese and 
Mongolian nations. The perception that different national groups have of each other, and their
33 Christopher Rene Hughes, Ibid. p.2.
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perception of the international world is vital to the formation of national identity.
James Mayall defines nationalism in a wide international framework. According to him, the 
nationalist principle ’’also holds that the world is(or should be)divided into nations and that the nation 
is the only proper basis for a sovereign state and the ultimate source of government authority.”34 
Therefore nationalism has a two-fold meaning: the first is a view of nationalism that an ethnic group’s 
self-identity should be expressed in the form of a state, and the second is an international 
consciousness wherein each nation is aware that there are other nations of equal status.
Self-identity of a nation in most cases is impossible without a feasible outside contrast and an 
awareness of the international arena. Apart from internal conditions such as modernization, 
intellectual tradition or ethnic revival, national self-identity is dependent on external conditions. 
Nation and nationalism are inseparable from the states system; they come into being when the states 
system or international relations develop to a certain stage. A single nation is inconceivable without 
the contrast of other nations in an international system.
The ancient Chinese had a strong sense of self-identity; they had very clear ideas regarding their 
cultural uniqueness and superiority, but they did not have any concept of the international or interstate 
world. Chinese referred to their country as the “middle kingdom” not only in a geographical sense, 
but also in a cultural and moral sense. To the ancient Chinese, external to the middle kingdom, instead 
of other equal states or nations, were to be found all the different types o f barbarians. This centrist 
view does not provide the international view that has been so fundamental to the emergence of 
nationalism elsewhere. Therefore, outside contrast is an important element for understanding modem 
nationalism.
The idea of nation and the principle of nationalism originated in Europe of the late-18th century, and 
the national idea has spread from Europe to other places of the world. As Miroslav Hroch says, 
the ’’(national) idea could not flow through Europe by their own inspirational force”35, intellectuals 
cannot invent a national community out of nothing, there must be some objective preconditions for 
the invention. While the underlying ethnic and cultural communities before the age of nationalism 
may form the basis for such a national invention, the international world on the outside provides the 
inducement.
The concept of nationalism that originated in Europe comprises territorialization of state, legal 
equality, economic unification, mass education, scientific communication, and so forth. National 
ideas help to add governmental structures to nations which were pre-modem ethnicities originally.
34 Mayall, James, Nationalism and International Society, (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p. 2.
35 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building 
Process in Europe”, in Becoming National, ed. by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford 
University Press, 1996) p.60
16
Certain criteria or standards for a nation were set up during the modem history of nation building. The 
European nations such as Britain and France who became self-conscious and manifested themselves 
as nations set the criteria for other peoples. This was true even nations, such as the Chinese who 
adopted the same standards later, that may have had a much longer history than the nations who first 
set the standards. The outside pressure for these peoples to adopt the European model and to regard 
themselves as nations is the states system. Nationalism has had a great impact in shaping modem 
international society36; on the other hand, the international system or society has also influenced 
greatly the emergence of many nations. The states system provides an external differentiation for the 
re-invention and strengthening of the existing group identities and the expansion of the state system 
facilitates the emergence of new national identities.
The nature of the external differentiation influences the imagination o f a national community. This is 
especially so when the states system expands to cover the globe, leaving no political vacuum on earth.
The last 300 years have witnessed the emergence of a states system which covers the entire planet. 
This saturated states system forces people to choose either to accept the state they are in and its 
national identity or to oppose the imposed political identity for a new identity.
The view o f internal sovereignty and international anarchy reinforces the belief in the principles of 
nationalism. In the late Manchu Qing dynasty, Chinese nationalists began to comprehend the 
pluralistic nature o f the international world, and the universal values found in ancient Confucianist 
classics were overshadowed by redefined group identities or even racism. Under such circumstances 
Chinese nationalism was bom. The Chinese nationalist perception o f international anarchy was 
strengthened by European imperialist invasions and by the unequal treaties imposed on the Manchu 
empire. This perception of both international anarchy and geo-politics in international relations gave 
an urgency to the early Chinese nationalists’ understanding of the necessity o f national self- 
strengthening and national sovereignty.
To the early Chinese nationalists of the late Qing period, nationalist doctrine was there to be borrowed, 
there were already numerous states known as nation-states. To those states already exposed to a 
sovereign states system, socio-economic conditions were no longer the primary condition of 
nationalism, nor was its own tradition of thought. The concept of a territorially-based Chinese nation 
is not possible without the influence of the European nationalist ideas. The ready-made nationalist 
principles together with the reality of the states system are a much more powerful stimuli for the 
development o f nationalism which came after these two facts. Nation construction for these new 
nationalists was mainly a task of justifying the newly discovered nationhood. Nation building also 
involved recognition of the need to change the domestic system of the empire, hence even the 
Manchu Qing empire in its last 10 years sought to reform its constitutional and political systems.
Nation building is an on-going process, but it is always under the constraints of the states system. The
36 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge University Press, 1990)
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states system set up constraints and limitations for the fusion and fission o f nations. Economic 
integration and a world economy do not replace the external differentiation of the states system, nor 
guarantee political integration of nation states.
The European colonial empires did not become enlarged nation states, nor were those colonizing 
nations expanded to include the non-European peoples in the colonies. As for the non-European 
peoples in the colonies, it was true that their economies had been integrated with that of the 
colonizing power, and that some of them were able to read the same language as the colonizers and 
share the same information made possible by modem mass printing technology, nevertheless they 
were never regarded as part of the European nations. The boundary of the imagined community is 
limited by the already existing saturated states system which provides external differentiation for the 
later nations-to-be.
3. Chapters
Chapters are so arranged to illustrate four dimensions of nationalism in both Chinese and Mongolian 
cases, i.e., historical justification of nationhood and nationalism, ideological justification of a 
common future, internal mechanism and external differentiation provided by the international world.
3.1. History and Nationalism
Chapters two and three, respectively, are on the historical background of Chinese nationalism and 
Mongolian nationalism. Also, the historical relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese is 
examined to show that, as in other cases of nationalism, history is interpreted differently by the 
different parties to serve their modem nationalist agenda.
One major myth about the Chinese view of history is that Chinese history is regarded by the Chinese 
as an uninterrupted history with a series of consecutive Chinese states since Neolithic times. Yet, 
history before the onset of the modem Chinese state was not an uninterrupted line of consecutive 
Chinese states. From the official Chinese perspective, Chinese history is viewed as a scheme, the 
present state o f the PRC is viewed as the endpoint, the culmination o f all previous Chinese history. 
This ideological view of history is interpreted to justify today’s Chinese state by either Marxist 
historical materialism or nationalist logic.
In more or less the same way, Mongols have their own view of history. They trace the beginning of 
the Mongolian state to the Hun state two thousand years ago. The period when Chinese history and 
Mongolian history was most inter-woven was during the what Chinese call the Yuan Dynasty when 
China was ruled as part of the Mongolian empire. Whether Genghis Khan was a Chinese emperor and 
whether the Yuan dynasty was a Chinese dynasty are contested questions for Chinese nationalism and 
Mongolian nationalism.
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The state is regarded differently in the Marxist view and the nationalist view. The Marxist view places 
the Communist Chinese state into a worldwide scheme, at the end of which both states and nations 
will disappear in the envisioned utopian communist commonwealth. In this larger view, the Chinese 
nation and the Chinese state are only interim phenomena. Modem history is seen as an important part 
of the historical scheme for the Chinese nation to be awakened and to become conscious of its 
revolutionary mission.
In contrast, the nationalist view of the state is a view on a smaller scale in which the Chinese nation 
state is the ultimate end value in and of itself. The Chinese state is worshipped and fulfills the destiny 
of a powerful and prosperous China, regarded as the appropriate and successful culmination point of 
Chinese history. In contrast to the merging worldwide commonwealth o f the Marxist scheme, a social 
Darwinian view of the international world is part of this nationalist vision.
Although the Chinese Communist revolution maybe regarded as a component part of modem Chinese 
nationalism, the CPC’s attempts to copy the Soviet model of nationality theory and practice did 
provide some chance of finding a middle course between the claims of Chinese nationalism and non- 
Chinese nationalism, with the ideal of a Chinese nation based on a common ideology and class 
interests.
3.2. The Soviet Model of Nationality Policy
It is now clear that China’s Communist leaders never seriously thought through the significance of the 
Soviet model. The CCP has always been more chauvinistic than internationalist in its outlook.
The Soviet model of nationality policy provided a middle ground for a compromise between Han 
Chinese nationalism and that of other ethnic groups, including the Mongolians in China. Before the 
Inner Mongolian National Autonomous Region was established up in 1947, there were different 
Mongolian nationalist movements in Inner Mongolia demanding national independence or a merger 
with the Mongolian People’s Republic. There was also the CPC-controlled autonomous movement 
led by Ulanhu and this became decisive. Although the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement 
leading to the IMAR was controlled by CPC, most Mongolian cadres in the movement were trained in 
Soviet Russia or in the Soviet-influenced Mongolian People’s Republic.
Given that Ulanhu was a Chinese Communist party member, a member of the Inner Mongolian 
People’s Revolutionary Party, and someone who had experience in both Moscow and Ulaan Baatar, 
he proved to be the most eligible leader for the united autonomous movement. With the backing of 
the CPC, he successfully unified the different Mongolian nationalist forces. Apart from being backed 
by the CPC’s military strength, Ulanhu and the CPC also made a promise of autonomy for Inner 
Mongolia in order to win over those Mongolians who were in favor of national self-determination.
All previous oppressive policies toward the Mongols by the Manchu-Qing, and during the Republic
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and KMT periods were repudiated by the CPC in order to win the Mongols’ support.
The Soviet nationality policy model in China had been a formal part of the CPC programme from the 
early beginnings of the CPC when it copied the Soviet policy of allowing ethnic minorities national 
self-determination37. At the time that the Chinese Communist leaders began their campaign to control 
the whole country, they retreated from their original position which allowed national self- 
determination for non-Chinese peoples38. Instead, they instituted a plan to establish nationality 
regional autonomy in ethnic minority areas. This can be easily understood since that the Chinese 
communist revolution was based on a strong Chinese nationalist motivation.
In principle at least autonomy of a most limited kind was applied in the first twenty years. But in 1967 
in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and Ulanhu was removed from power in Inner Mongolia. 
All autonomous policies pursued by Ulanhu were reversed, and the Soviet model was replaced by a 
radical ostensibly class based policy that was highly assimilationist in practice and that lasted until 
1976, for the duration of the Cultural Revolution. In 1978 after the Cultural Revolution, radical 
ideological rhetoric began to be replaced by nationalist rhetoric. The period of the Cultural Revolution 
saw the negation of the Soviet model in practice; but since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Lenin 
and Stalin’s theory on nationality issues began to disappear from official ideology altogether.
The demise of the Soviet Union and the changes in Eastern Europe reinforced the Chinese leaders’ 
belief that the Soviet nationality practice was not suitable in China. From the perspective of the 
Chinese leaders, the Soviet model gave non-Russian minorities too much leeway in maintaining their 
separate identities and later this was seen to have played an important part in the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union.39 The CPC took a lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union: believing that the 
disintegration of USSR came from the Soviet leaders’ being too soft on ethnic nationalism. Chinese 
leaders applied the lesson by suppressing non-Chinese nationalism and by speeding up the 
mechanisms of assimilation.
3.3. The Reform Period and Rising Nationalism
During the period of economic reform that followed the Cultural Revolution, economic pragmatism
37 As early as 1922, in the second Congress of the CCP, the declaration of the CCP condemned 
“warlords and KMT’s oppression of Mongolian autonomy under the name of unification” and 
advocated that “Mongolia, Tibet and Moslem Frontier could establish Republics within a Chinese 
Confederation.”, see “Declaration Of 2nd National Congress Of CCP”, July, 1922, Collection O f 
CPC Historical Documents (the CPC Party School Press, 1992)
38 When exactly CCP shifted from the position of advocating nationality secession to that of 
autonomy is difficult to tell since in the late 1930s-40s the CCP mentioned both policies on different 
occasions. The time that the CCP still mentioned the right of self-determination and secession must be 
later than it is indicated in CCP history textbooks today. Mongolian communists in Inner Mongolia 
must have still used the slogan of national self-determination even later than the CCP. Mongolian 
nationalists, however, always regarded the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic as 
their models.
39 The internal publication by the IM Institute of East Asian Studies, Oct. 11,1993, on Pan- 
Mongolianism, by Zhao Chunguan, p.6.
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and politically moderate policies were adopted by Deng Xiaoping. As the radical ideology was 
abandoned, Chinese nationalism came to be utilized increasingly to justify state authority. Ethnic 
tolerance never resumed its pre-cultural revolution level. In this period, the Chinese nation has been 
increasingly regarded as both an historical and a modem entity rather than a multi-ethnic group based 
on the modem state and socialist ideology. The Chinese state began to be viewed as a nation-state 
rather than a socialist family of many nationalities.
On the Chinese side, the emphasis is on economic rationalism rather than socialist egalitarianism. 
Since the commencement of the reforms the market has begun to play an increasingly important role; 
emphasis has been put on the more prosperous coastal and southern Chinese areas, while the non- 
Chinese peripheral areas have been more and more marginalized in the national economy. And within 
the regional economy of non-Chinese areas, the freer market allows and justifies the capital-rich 
Chinese to have an even greater economic share.
All this adds up to a “perceived deprivation” in the non-Chinese frontier areas. The dissatisfied non- 
Chinese minorities have found encouragement in the new waves of nationalist secessions following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes in Eastern Europe are encouragement. But the 
Chinese authorities have viewed these waves are an alarm. The de-communisation o f the MPR and 
the concomitant liberalization in the MPR has been a great source of inspiration to Mongols in Inner 
Mongolia although the enthusiasm has been curbed by the present economic difficulties in the MPR.
These international changes reinforced the Chinese belief that the Soviet model of nationality policy 
is no longer suitable in China, and the ethnic problems in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
have strengthened the beliefs of Chinese leaders that the Soviet nationality policy partly contributed 
to non-Russian nationalism by creating/strengthening non-Russian identities.
3.4. Chinese Nationalism and Mongolian Nationalism in the International World
The international world is no longer viewed by China in terms o f class struggle, but in terms of harsh 
Realism. The international world is regarded as a jungle of nations, and the Chinese nationalist belief 
is that China is destined to survive and prosper in the arena of international competition. Yet, the 
impact of the conception of the Chinese nation and nationalist world outlook, has exceeded national 
limits. The Chinese reunification issue involves Hong Kong and Taiwan, which are of international 
concern. This creates tension with the economic policy of dependency and inter-dependency with the 
international economy and the Asia-Pacific in particular. Chinese nationalist ideas also have an 
impact on neighboring states, e.g., Mongolia. Additionally, how the international world regards the 
Chinese self-perception as a nation is an international issue.
Nationalism as a political principle is defined as the congruence of state and nation. Between state and 
nation, there are two different directions contained in the definition. The first is from state to nation:
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the nation is regarded as a result of the state. According to the socio-economic view of nationalism, 
the nation is largely defined by the state, i.e., territory and administration, the economy protected by 
the state, a national culture promoted by the state. The second is from nation to state: nation is 
regarded as the reason for the nation-state, and that nations by right should be expressed by a nation­
state.
Current Chinese nationalism shows both directions in the state-and-nation relationship. The PRC’s 
position on the reunification issue, as seen through its external policy regarding Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, indicates a nationalist view that the same nation should be expressed by a single state. The 
nationalist belief is embodied in the formula of “one country, two systems”. The PRC’s solution to 
the Hong Kong and Taiwan issues, “One country, two systems” is a straightforward nationalist 
principle. It shows that a perceived unitary Chinese nation is the ultimate value, that all Chinese 
should live within one state despite their political differences.
But the Chinese nationality policy towards non-Chinese minorities within the PRC reflects a different 
logic, which downplays ethnic, cultural and historical differences between Chinese and non-Chinese 
minorities, and emphasizes the state’s role in forging a new nation, i.e., the socio-economic structure 
of the state provides the primary standards for the great Chinese nation (“zhong hua min zu”)
If nationalism is viewed in two stages, that of defying old imperial rule and of nation-building, then 
Chinese nationalism has passed the stage o f defying the old political order by the anti-Manchu 
nationalist revolution and by the later class revolution led by the CPC. However, the previous two 
revolutions left two different legacies: a traditional and cultural concept of the Chinese nation, on the 
one hand, and an idealized Chinese nation based on socialist ideology, on the other. The task which is 
currently facing Chinese nationalism seems to encompass both legacies at the same time: 
reunification based on a traditional nationalist principle, and assimilation of non-Chinese minorities in 
the name of socio-economic progress.
While Chinese nationalism is in its assertive second stage, non-Chinese nationalism in its defying 
stage has more problems in the clarification of distinctive separate national identities. To non- 
Chinese minorities, e.g., Tibetans, Turkish Moslems and Mongols, oppressive Chinese nationalism 
provides them with some common but separate identity. Non-Chinese nationalism in China is more 
anti-colonialist in nature.
Non-Chinese national movements at present are largely a response to rising Chinese nationalism 
although they also have their own historical roots. Recent waves of secessionist nationalism following 
the demise of the Soviet Union and changes in East Europe are merely outside influences rather than 
direct causes for the resurgence of non-Chinese nationalism in China.
In the case of Inner Mongolia, although there is an independent Mongolian state across the border, the
Mongolian state has little irredentist intention toward the PRC. The independent Mongolian state
serves only to remind the Mongols in Inner Mongolia of their different identity from the Chinese. But
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an independent Inner Mongolian state is not the ultimate goal of Inner Mongolian nationalism as 
currently expressed. Secessionism and the demand of a merger between Inner Mongolia and the 
Mongolian state is not the content of current Mongolian nationalism. The impact of the independent 
Mongolian state on Inner Mongolian nationalism depends upon the desirability of its economic and 
political system. After the de-communization of the MPR in 1988, the Mongolian state began to 
evolve towards a westem-style parliamentary democracy. If  the merit o f the newly gained democracy 
is proved by a more prosperous economy and improvement in people’s living standards, the 
Mongolian state would increase in attraction to Inner Mongolians and have a bigger influence upon 
Inner Mongolian nationalist sentiments.
But Chinese nationalism faces challenges not only from non-Chinese nationalism, but also from those 
Chinese with a different national conception, i.e., those in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some may agree 
on the idea of one Chinese nation, but not necessarily the strict principle of nation state. Some will be 
satisfied with the “one country, two systems” formula, others will not. There is an increasingly 
stronger Taiwanese nationalism which refuses to identify with idea of one Chinese nation.
One aspect o f the impact of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is the lesson provided for the 
leaders of the CPC to strengthen their belief in its nationality policy. The differences between the 
Soviet theories and practices of nationality affairs and those of the Chinese, in China’s view, is the 
reason why the Chinese nationality issue has been more successfully managed. As a result, Chinese 
nationality policy continues to depart even further from the Soviet influence, and the assimilationist 
policy has been accelerated in non-Chinese regions.
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CHAPTER n. ANCIENT CHINA AND MODERN CHINESE NATIONALISM
To understand the character of Chinese nationalism, it is useful to make a distinction between the two 
dimensions of the Chinese nation: historical China and modem China. The former is defined more by 
ethnicity and culture; and the latter is more territorial and political in its focus. In many current 
theories on the Chinese nation, the difference between pre-modem Chinese people and the modem 
Chinese nation is not made clear. Neither the Marxist views in mainland China nor the non-Marxist 
views in Taiwan pay sufficient attention to the transformation from pre-modem ethnicity into a 
modem nation. For example, Li Weihan and Fei Xiaotong, the major Chinese nationality policy 
spokesmen and theorists on Chinese nationality affairs, do not question whether the existence of a 
Chinese nation throughout Chinese history should be treated as an objective fact; they do not regard 
the concept as an invention or construction, they simply accept it as a given. According to Chinese 
Marxist theorists on nationality, nationhood belongs to the sphere of objectivity instead of 
subjectivity.1 For them the existence of a Chinese nation several thousands years ago is an objective 
fact. An historical figure such as Su Wu in the Han dynasty two thousands years ago was appraised 
by Fan Wenlan as a character possessing national integrity, while Fan accuses another ancient figure 
from the same period o f being a national traitor.2
The idea of a modem Chinese nation-state involves a transformation of the idea of a traditional 
culture-based China to one that follows the modem territorial-based China.3 The transformation 
encompasses the following two aspects. The first is longitudinal or historical, which views the past in 
a way so as to serve the contemporary needs of justifying a coherent modem nation. In such 
revisionism, historical China is regarded as already a multi-national state, and the dynastic 
successions are considered to embody a certain historical logic in the unfolding scheme of the 
Chinese state and the development of the state political legitimacy. The second aspect of the 
transformation, is latitudinal or contemporary, such as how to deal with non-Chinese nationalities and 
include them into a unitary Chinese nation.
China, many would agree, is the only civilization that has existed almost uninterruptedly for 5,000 
years in the same land. A long history of a unitary culture, a unique written language, political ethics, 
and a centralized bureaucracy based on a common written language are the major features which 
some see as the proof for setting China aside from other civilizations in human society. Despite
1 Taiwan scholars such as Hu Qiu Yuan also support the view that the Chinese nation is a solid, fixed 
objective fact rather than an invented and imagined entity. The view is expressed in his “Origin of 
Oriental Society”, Zhongxi Lishi Zhi Lijie (Understanding o f Chinese and Western History) (China 
Magazine Press, 1967)
2 Su Wu was the diplomatic envoy sent by Emperor Wu Di of Han Dynasty, who was captured by the 
Xiongnu (Huns) and held as a prisoner for 19 years before he finally returned to Han dynasty. During 
his capture he remined loyal to Han dynasty. Li Lin was an Han general who surrendered to Xiongnu. 
See Fan Wenlan, Zhong Guo Tong Shi (General History o f  China), Vol. 2, (Beijing: People’s Press,
1956) p. 105
3 This was a major point made by Joseph Levenson in his Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The
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frequent invasions by non-Chinese; periods of partial or complete conquests of the country by Turk- 
related Tongus, Nuzhen, Mongols and finally Manchus; and periods of disunity and weakness, the 
Chinese structure o f government and society is seen as continuing to function and survive. But this 
4,000 or 5,000-year old China survives to modem times as a culture rather than as a state.4
According to Fan Wenlan’s Comprehensive History of China, China was formed as a nation-state as 
early as the Qin and Han dynasties from 221BC to AD 220. If judged by Stalin’s five criteria for 
nationality, the Chinese people already “qualified” as a nation having satisfied the four standards: 
common language, common territory, common economic life and common psychological character 
embodied in a common culture.5 Evidence for national unification by the Qin was cited from the 
Book of Rituals(Zhongyong Pian) which described the situation thus: “nowadays all under the heaven, 
carts use the same wheels, people use the same written characters and abide by the same ethics”. The 
Qin dynasty first set up a centralized bureaucracy with the emperor ascendant. Second, written 
Chinese characters were standardized. After the Qin unification, the Chief Minister Li Si standardized 
the various written Chinese characters by using seal characters. Later, Cheng Miao, a prison warden, 
invented Li Shu scripts with even simpler strokes which then became the official script in the Han 
dynasty. Third, the Qin was regarded as having established a more clearly defined territory which 
stretched from Lintao (today’s Gansu Province) in the northwest to Liaodong (today’s Liaoning 
Province) in the northeast and, in between, to the north with the Great Wall built by the previous 
kingdoms as the northern border. The Qin territory to the south reached Wu Ling (today’s 
Guangdong province). Fourth, a standard highway system for carts was built. The measurements of 
length, capacity, and weight were standardized. Massive migrations were implemented. All these 
strengthened economic links within the state and promoted a sense of unity. Fifth, Confucian ethics 
were emphasized by the first emperor as the norm of conduct for his subjects throughout the country. 
At first the Xunzi school o f Confucianism with its emphasis on legalism played an important role, 
later giving way to what became orthodox Confucianism, Mencius’ school.6
The Chinese nation, envisioned as existing throughout both the pre-modem and modem ages, was 
conceived both by current Chinese theorists such as Fei Xiaotong and by previous Chinese Marxist 
theorists such as Li Weihan. Fei Xiaotong, in his much publicized theory of the Chinese nation, 
argues that the Chinese nation (including Han Chinese and the other 50 or so officially recognized
Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.97.
4 China is referred by Chinese people as a civilized state with 5,000-year history. The legendary 
"Three Kings and Five Emperors" are known to average Chinese people as the beginning o f Chinese 
people. The first legendary king Fuxi is dated back to 2852 BC. Western scholars usually date a 
4,000-year Chinese history, referring to the first powerful Chinese state Shang (1766-1122 BC) 
basing this on the oldest conclusive documentary evidence that survives from the time. Hugh Seton- 
Watson, Nation and State: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, 
(London: Nethuen Co & Ltd., 1977) p.274.
5 “A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture”, Joseph Stalin, Marxism And The 
National And Colonial Question, (London, 1936) p.8.
6 Fan Wenlan, Zhong Guo Tong Shi Jian Bian (Comprehensive History of China) Vol. 2, 5th Edition 
(Beijing: People’s Press, 1978) pp.5-21
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non-Chinese nationalities) has existed throughout the thousands of years of Chinese history, with the 
Chinese nation gaining self-consciousness in modem times; according to him, it is improper to define 
the Chinese nation by the limits of the territorial state.7 Li Weihan, who was for a long period in 
charge of CPC’s United Front and Nationality Works, argued that the more than fifty peoples living in 
China have been so since the very early ages and they all created the ancient civilization together, and 
formed a Great Chinese nation together throughout history8
However the evidence of the Chinese nation as an objective fact is not so easily established when the 
multi-ethnic reality in China is considered, with each different ethnic group having widely varying 
understandings. Therefore, it is impossible to establish concrete criteria for the Chinese nationhood as 
incontrovertible fact; to start with, nationhood here is better regarded, as in many theories, as a matter 
of people’s inner identification. Why a people imagine and identify themselves as a national 
community when it is too large for them to know each other personally can be explained in many 
ways by various major theories of nationalism9. People’s inner identification with a particular nation 
can be explained by the various processes of modernization. Nationhood is generally regarded as a 
modem phenomenon. It can be viewed as a result of modernization, industrialization, or as an 
intellectual movement brought about by the modernization process.10 Thus, as a nation, the idea of 
the Chinese nation can be also said to be a modem creation, but one that has been based upon a 
considered reconstruction of the past. It is inadequate to regard the Chinese nation merely as a 
modem phenomenon as in many general theories that do not take into consideration its historic legacy. 
But attempts to depict the Chinese nation merely as a timeless entity throughout the thousands of 
years of history fails to make any distinctions between the ancient Chinese community, the Chinese 
civilization, and the modem state-based Chinese nation.
In order to understand whether the Chinese nation can be both an historical and a modem 
phenomenon, or a combination or a transformation of the two, it is useful to go back in time to find a 
historical basis for the Chinese sense of identity and, armed with this knowledge, then see what links 
may be established between the modem and ancient Chinese. The Chinese nation as outlined here, is 
a different phenomenon from the European style of nationhood, because modernization and 
industrialization have played different roles in China. Modem Chinese national consciousness or 
nationalism has not been generated by a process that transformed the Chinese from agricultural 
communities into a new socio-economic community. The major factors facilitating the imagining of a 
Chinese nation are first, historical; and second, the result o f modem influence. The latter was initially 
brought about by Western intrusion but subsequently served as no more than a catalyst or stimulus for
7 Fei Xiao-tong, Zhonghua Mingzu Duoyuan Yitihua Geju (The Pattern o f  Chinese Nation: Unity With 
Plural Origins) (Beijing: The Central Institute of Nationalities' Press, 1989) p .l.
8 Li Weihan, Minzu Lilun he Minzu Zhengce De Jige Wenti (Several Issues on Nationality Theories 
and Policies) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1980) p.l.
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on Origins and Spread o f  Nationalism 
^Verso Editions and NLB, 1983)
0 Ernest Gellner, Nation and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on Origins and Spread o f  Nationalism (Verso Editions and NLB, 1983); 
A.D. Smith, Ethnic Revival (University of Cambridge Press, 1981).
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transforming the ancient Chinese into modem Chinese.
The ancient Chinese community was based mainly on the belief in common blood, morals, and 
ethnicity, such as in culture and written language. In contrast, the modem Chinese nation has been 
based on the notion of the territorial bounds of the modem state encompassed by the administration as 
that claimed to have been the domain the previous ruling dynasty.
China is described by Lucian Pye as a civilization pretending to be a state.11 The comment shows 
Chinese obliterate rather than clarify the difference between the ancient Chinese and modem Chinese.
Despite many different official attempts to bridge the gap and minimize the differences, there have 
been always contradictions between the traditional sense of the Chinese community and the modem 
idea of the Chinese as a nation. The lack of clarity and the confusion has resulted in many 
misunderstandings and disagreements in contemporary domestic Chinese politics and indeed in 
international politics. For example, the issue of reunification with Taiwan, which turns on the 
perception of the nature of Chinese nationhood, continues to be the root cause for the many major 
quarrels between the different parties.
The need to envisage China as a nation did not come until the Chinese began to be exposed to the 
international world in the late Qing dynasty, the beginning of modem Chinese history. The process of 
transforming the concept o f a traditional Chinese community to that of a modem Chinese nation 
began in the late Qing dynasty and it is a process that still continues. Although revolutions have taken 
place and the western ideas have been imported, the perceived links between the ideas of the modem 
Chinese nation and the ancient Chinese civilization still remain very strong.
1. Historical Chinese Community
There are many reasons that could be adduced to explain why a pre-modem Chinese community 
managed to exist more or less intact through thousands of years of history. Under Communist Party 
rule, Stalin’s definition of nationality has been very frequently used by Chinese scholars as the 
standard12. The existence of an identifiable Chinese people throughout history is believed to be based 
upon geographical, economic, cultural and common psychological factors.13 Language can be 
included as part of the cultural dimension. A relatively stable Chinese community has been possible 
because of a shared sense o f togetherness and this sense of identity has been the result o f a 
geographical affinity, political forces, and a common culture. Moreover there has always been an 
external referent to highlight a shared sense of identity. From the perspective of the historical 
Chinese community, the outside referents were non-Chinese barbarians.
11 Lucian W. Pye, “How China’s Nationalism was Shanghaied”, Chinese Nationalism (M.E. Sharpe, 
1996) p. 109.
12 Joseph Stalin, (op. cit) p.8.
13 Liu Xianzhao, “Zhonghua Ge Minzu De Gexing Yu Gongxing De Tezheng Jiqi Yanbian (The 
Evolution of Chinese Nationalities’ Characters)”, Zhonghua Minzu YanjiuXin Tansuo (New 
Explorations On Chinese Nation), Ed. by Fei Xiao-tong (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences Press, 1991) pp.37-52.
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Both historical China and modem China may be analyzed in terms of their physical, spiritual and 
intellectual aspects. Physical aspects include geographical and economic factors. Spiritual and 
intellectual aspects include culture, ethics and ideas. The factors in both categories are interrelated in 
their causal relations. In the Materialist Marxist view, the common spiritual character may be 
regarded as the result of socio-economic environment and changes. The idealist view would regard 
the issue otherwise. In the modem age, the dynastic power of China has been replaced by the modem 
sovereign state, the traditional agricultural economy has given way to the nation-wide drive toward 
industrialization, and traditional culture and values have come into conflict and compromise with 
westernization. The Chinese understanding of nation and state has also changed. The physical 
transformation of the Chinese people and state from dynasty to modem nationhood has taken place on 
the same ground which has long been known as China, and on its peripheral frontiers; similarly, the 
idea of modem state and nation is also bom out of pre-modem conceptions of China as a state and an 
ethnicity.
Before the Han dynasty, Han Chinese were known as Hua or Xia people, and their activities took 
place within the Yellow River valley area. The legendary Xia dynasty is believed to have been 
founded forty-two centuries ago by King Yu in the Yellow River valley. Even today ethnic Chinese 
still regard themselves as the descendants of the Xia (“hua xia zi sun”). Having inherited a rich 
agrarian culture that extended from the Neolithic period, the ancient Chinese founded a unified 
political state, Shang(1700BC-l 100BC) in North China during the Bronze Age.
The Shang state was placed by the Zhou state(l 100BC-256BC). In the Spring and Autumn (Chun Qiu) 
period in the seventh century B.C., the Zhou dynasty was challenged repeatedly by vassal states. The 
era of military feudalism ended with the rise of King Cheng of the Qin kingdom, who unified China 
in 221 B.C., declared himself the First Emperor, and inaugurated a centralized bureaucratic system of 
government. When the big Kingdom Chu on Yangtze River valley was defeated by the powerful Qin 
Kingdom (221BC- 206BC), die Hua Xia people’s sphere of activity was expanded to include the 
Yellow River and Yangtze River valleys.
During the next two millennia, the Chinese governmental system gradually evolved (without the 
development of alternatives) from the foundation of the Qin political institutions, which rested mainly 
on the secular Confucian philosophy14 and other philosophies such as remnants of Taoist, 
cosmological, and Legalist ideologies, and with a complex but well-organized bureaucratic 
administration. Although China was divided for about half of this period the Chinese way of life 
continued and China’s various conquerors had no alternative but to rule in the Chinese bureaucratic 
style an essentially unchanged economy and society.
Since the Han dynasty (206BC -AD 220), the Hua Xia people have been know as the Han people.
And, since then, the Han/Chinese people have dwelt in basically the same areas for about two
14 It was in Han Dynasty when Confucian teachings were dogmatized and became the ideology that 
underpinned political and social relations. Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo Tongshi (Comprehensive History 
of China), Vol.2, 5th Edition (Beijing: People’s Press, 1978) p. 120.
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thousand years, until the Republican period. Traditional Chinese dwelling areas were confined to the 
basins o f Yellow River and Yangtze River. Prior to the Manchu Qing dynasty, Chinese people never 
lived beyond the so-called 18 provinces.15
The Han/Chinese economy was mainly agriculture. And the agricultural economy directly influenced 
and determined much o f the content of Chinese culture. The tribe of the Yellow Emperor, the 
legendary ancestor of Chinese people, were originally nomads in north-west area who had migrated 
into Yellow River valley and had gradually become agrarian. The legend of King Yu harnessing the 
river reflects this evolution from nomadic life to agricultural life.
In the time of Xia period (2200BC-1700BC), the Xia people knew how to dig irrigation canals and 
they invented a chronicle to guide their agricultural activities. In the Shang dynasty (1700BC - 
1100BC), the Shang people knew how to harness the ox to plough and cultivate the land.
Considerable progress then, had been made in ancient Chinese agricultural techniques up until the Qin 
and Han dynasty and since then, over the next two thousand years to the Republican period, there was 
no dramatic new development in Chinese agriculture.
The handcraft industry and animal husbandry existed as supplementary to agriculture and accounted 
for only a very small part of the agricultural economy. Division of labor did not go beyond family 
boundary with the men o f the family working the fields and the women sitting at the loom (nan geng 
nu zhi). And for two thousand years this “nan geng nu zh f  ’ has reflected the basic character of 
Chinese agricultural society.16
Chinese(Hua Xia) culture had many influences on its origins before Han dynasty. From Xia, Shang 
Chun Qiu and Warring states were the famous periods in which (bai jia zheng ming) a hundred 
schools of thought contended: Confucianism, Moism and Legalism were the most important schools. 
From the Han dynasty to the Republic, Confucianism dominates as the most important intellectual 
factor in the formation o f the pre-modem Chinese community.
The distinctiveness of the relative stability of the Chinese agricultural community and culture has 
been given several rationalist explanations. The socio-economic explanation is the need to harness the 
Yellow River for agricultural purposes.17 Wittfogel’s thesis of Oriental Despotism was echoed in Fan 
Wenlan’s narration of Chinese history according to the Marxist view. In the Comprehensive History 
of China (zhong guo tong shi) 18, Fan argued that harnessing the Yellow River demanded unitary
15 The 18 old Chinese provinces with their archaic names are Zhili/Hebei (Ji or You Yan), Shandong 
(Lu or Shan Zuo), Shanxi (Jin or Shan You), Henan (Yu or Zhong Zhou), Jiangsu (Wu), Anhui (Wan), 
Jiangxi (Gan or Yu Zhang), Zhejiang (Yue), Fujian (Min), Hubei (Er), Hunan (Xiang), Guangdong 
(Yue or Yue Dong), Guangxi (Gui or Yue Xi), Yunnan (Dian), Guizhou (Qian), Sichuan (Shu), 
Shaanxi (Qin or Guan hong) and Gansu (Long).
16 Sun Yatsen, Sun Zhongshan Xuanji (Selected Works of Sun Yatsen) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1956) 
p.637.
7 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparison Study o f  Total Power, (Yale University Press,
1957) see also Mark Elvin, The Pattern o f  the Chinese Past (Cambridge University Press 1973)
18Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo Tongshi (Comprehensive History o f China) 5th Edition (Beijing: People’s 
Press, 1978) p.50.
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management, and he cited a story by Mencius to emphasize the importance of harnessing water in 
ancient Chinese society. The moral of the story is “do not use your neighbor’s field as a drain”. 19 In 
the story, Mencius told Bao Gui that Yu, the legendary Chinese sage king, had used the surrounding 
sea as a drain. Yu’s wisdom and spirit in his water works were used to show the highest ideal for a 
unified Chinese community.
The other explanation is a political and military one, which argues that the organization arose from 
the need for defense against northern nomads. But today the sense o f uniqueness of Chinese 
community is usually referred to the spiritual and ethical heritage.
1.1. Zheng Tong, Ancient Chinese Political Legitimacy
“zheng tong”, in Chinese means “correct rulership” or “proper bloodline” in reference to legitimacy, 
“zheng tong” refers to the ruler’s mandate and to the recognition the genealogical transmission of the 
imperial family. It conveys the Chinese sense of a ruler’s legitimacy. The term originated in two 
separate words: “zheng” means “correct”, “proper”, ’’rectified”, ’’upright”, “legitimate”, “orthodox”; 
“Tong” means “system”, “square”, “filiation”, “tradition”, “succession” or “unification”.20
“zheng tong” has two-fold meanings in both blood and moral dimensions: succession along the right 
bloodline, and mandate from the heaven. The two aspects strengthen the sense of Chinese dynastic 
continuity. Si Maqian, the Han dynasty historian observed that the reason why the ”Han state is 
prosperous is because it carried out changes according to the law of change. That is the reason why 
people are happy, and thus it (Han state) has the mandate of heaven.21
“Zheng Tong”, as a compound, first appeared in early documents o f the Late Han Dynasty, it meant 
“correct filiation”, “proper bloodline”, in reference to genealogical transmission of the imperial 
family o f Liu Bang, the founder of the Han Dynasty. Later it was invoked to legitimize Liu Xiu 
(Guang Wu), who was inaugurated in the Han Dynasty in A.D.25, and to show that he inherited the 
bloodline o f the dynastic progenitor in the restoration after the demise of the usurper Wang Mang. 
Later “zheng tong” has been used as a reference to legitimate succession.22
Before the Shang dynasty and even in the early Xia state, “shan rang” was said to be the practice of 
political succession. “Shan Rang” means that a king abdicates in favor of a chosen able man23. But in 
the later Xia, the earliest Chinese state in which political power passed through succession from father 
to son, it became necessary to have various legitimation theories to justify political authority and 
succession. Some scholars hold that the hereditary system began from the time of the Shang, while
19 Mencius,“Mengzi, Gaozi”, Mengzi Yizhu (Collection o f  Mencius with Explanations), edited and 
explained by the Chinese Department of Lanzhou University, (Chinese Book Press, 1960) p. 250.
20Hok-lam Chan, Letitimation in Imperial China: Discussions Under the Junchen-Chin Dynasty 
(University of Washington Press, 1984) p.21.
21 Ibid. p.21
22 Ibid. p.22.
23 Zhang Su & Gu Chao, Zhongguo Minzheng Shihua (History o f  Chinese Civil Administration) 
(Heilongjiang Education Press, 1992)
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during the Xia, the Xia Chinese were still a community more based on blood link than territorial and 
political link.24
Shang Kings first practiced religious worship of the deities and their ancestors, since they regarded 
divination as the most sacred duty of the theocratic king. Then the basis of Shang political power was 
derived from Shang kings’ ancestors. In terms of political legitimation, the Shang’s ancestral worship 
was replaced by Zhou state’s mandate of heaven.
The Zhou state succeeding Shang was “the golden era of classical China, which was distinguished by 
its organization of feudal institutions and the cultivation of humanistic philosophies”25. The Zhou 
Dynasty was founded by a coalition of ethnic and cultural groups from the western frontier of the 
North China plain. The Zhou Dynasty developed a different theory of political legitimacy: the 
Mandate of Heaven. The theory was designed to maintain that the Zhou kings as Sons of Heaven 
owed their rise to power to its blessings, and that the Zhou kings, having deposed the Shang because 
of the latter’s moral unworthiness, thus were bestowed the Mandate of Heaven. Hence the change of 
bless of heaven(tian) and change of dynasties is justified.
Confucianist View of the Mandate of Heaven
Since the Qin and Han dynasties, the mandate of heaven has been an important part o f Confucianism 
as the apogee of moral justification of political authority.
The concept of the Mandate o f Heaven evolved and was strengthened by the Confucian idea that 
“Heaven embodied the people’s will” in the Zhou dynasty.
Confucius said: “The Mandate of Heaven is not permanent” (tian ming mi chang)26. He was further 
credited with saying, “Heaven will follow the people’s will”27, so a king can not rely solely on having 
been granted the Mandate o f Heaven, but he should cherish it, and always be “conscious of his 
surroundings,(and) know people’s suffering”.28
According to Confucius, Heaven is the Ultimate Truth or Reason and it holds command over human 
beings, over both morality and emotion. Confucius said: ”it is difficult to know Heaven”.29 He did 
not advocate the worship of Heaven from a religious point of view, but regarded it as the essence of
24 Chinese historians argue, according to Marxist theory on historical stages, that the earliest 
hereditary in Xia indicates the beginning of class society in Chinesehistory, slavery society. Accoding 
to Marxist theory on state origin, class society is the prerequisite of state. Therefore before Xia state, 
Chinese society was at the stage of a primitive commune. See, Zhang Su and Gu Chao, (op. cit). Guo 
Moruo, Nuli Zhi Shidai (The Time o f Slavery), (Beijing: People’s Press, 1954) p.3.
25Hok-lam Chan, (op. cit)
26Confucius, “Da Ya. Wen Wang”, Shi Jing (Book o f Poetry) (Jiangsu Ancient Book Press, 1984) 
p.614.
7 Zuo Qiuming, “Tso Chuan. Xiang Lord 31 year”, see Gao Shiqi (Qing dynasty), Zuozhuan Jishi 
Benmo, Vol.2 (China Book Press, 1979) p.541.
28 Confucius, “Da Ya. Huang Yi ”, Shi Jing (Book o f  Poetry). (Jiangsu Ancient Book Press (Jiangsu 
Guji Chubanshe), 1984)p.644.
29 Confucius, Lun Yu (Anelects), annotations provided by Tang Manxian (Jiangxi People’s Press, 1982)
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everything. Mencius linked human inner world to Heaven, saying that self-cultivation would lead to 
knowledge of the ultimate will of heaven.
Mencius’ political doctrine that “people are the most important, the state is less important and the 
monarch is the least important”30 is extremely significant in Chinese political thought. Throughout 
history, almost all politicians have used this notion for different purposes. Mencius summarized the 
experience of administrations in various states as: ’’there are three treasures for monarchs: territory, 
people, and policy. Jewelry is a harmful thing for a king”.31 He also said that “all under the heaven are 
for public, not for one person or one family. Heaven’s will is so”32.
What Mencius meant is that the Mandate of Heaven is the sole source of morality and authority, and 
that people are more important than the monarch because people can better reflect Heaven’s will. As 
I understand it, Mencius did not mean that that people are the source of the political power. Therefore, 
the political ideas of Mencius can not be equated with modem ideas of democracy and popular 
sovereignty.
Confucianism as a Way Of Life
Confucianism, the thoughts of Confucius, and their elaboration by his disciples during the fifth 
century B.C. during the Eastern Zhou period, had a very important influence on Chinese political 
thought. Vying with Taoism and Legalism, it was basically a humanistic philosophy that attempted to 
re-establish what were seen as the harmonious feudal society o f the early Zhou by inculcating in both 
rulers and people the cardinal virtues: righteousness, uprightness, loyalty, reciprocity, and, above all, 
humanness or benevolence.
The Han Dynasty (206BC - 220AD) was founded on the basis of the unification of the Qin dynasty. 
The 400 years o f the Han Dynasty is regarded as one of the most brilliant periods in Chinese history, 
and as one which left an imperishable mark upon Chinese political institutions. So many of the 
permanent elements in Chinese life were foreshadowed during the Han Dynasty that the Chinese have 
ever since referred to themselves as Han people. During the reign of Emperor Wu (Wu Di,146-86BC) 
of the Han Dynasty, Dong Zhong-shu, the state theorist, advised Emperor Wu to establish 
Confucianism as the political and educational orthodoxy.
In the two millennia since the Qin and Han dynasties, Confucianism, both as an attitude to life and as 
a concept of the ideal political order, has played a key role in sustaining the centralized Chinese state,
p.108.
0 Mencius, “Mengzi, Jingxin Xia”, Mengzi Yizhu (Collection o f  Mencius with Explanations), edited 
and explained by the Chinese Department of Lanzhou University, Chinese Book Press (China Book 
Press(Zhonghua Shuju), 1960) p. 22,
31 Mencius, “Mengzi, Gaozi”, Mengzi Yizhu (Collection o f Mencius with Explanations), edited and 
explained by the Chinese Department of Lanzhou University, Chinese Book Press (China Book 
Press(Zhonghua Shuju), 1960) p. 335.
32Ban Gu, “Geyong Zhuan (Biography of Geyong)”, Han Shu (Book o f  Han Dynasty) ,Wo\.Z5,, (China 
Book Press, 1962) p.3443. Zhongguo Tongshi (general history o f  China), Liu Yizheng, (China Book 
Press, 1948)
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providing the stable Chinese community with an ethical base. Because of the shared ethical base, 
together with the need for defense and a common economic mode, some contemporary Chinese 
historians argue in accordance with Stalin’s definition of nationality, that the Chinese community as 
early as in the Qin and Han times was not simply an unstable military-political alliance, nor anything 
like the separated feudal states in European history, but a stable nation-like community33.
As an attitude to life, Confucianism is mainly about “Ren” (benevolence), “Xiao” (filial piety) and 
“Dao” (ultimate truth or reason). “Ren” is the basis of all morality, an attitude of life and the highest 
principle which has its meaning within family, society, and state politics. “Xiao”, filial piety, is an 
ethical basis within the family unit, “dao” or “li” is the ultimate truth or reason, and is equivalent to 
“tian” (heaven) which is the philosophical basis for the individual and society.
According to Confucianism, a cultured Gentleman (jun zi) should possess these virtues. They could 
be attained through learning, conformity to established customs, and self-cultivation, and it was a 
Gentleman’s duty to educate the uninitiated34.
Confucianism about State Power
The Confiicianist idea o f the state may be described as the extension o f family ethics to the state. 
According to Confucianism, an ideal state should be ruled by a benevolent and morally upright sage- 
king assisted by the cultured elite, whose views and actions were based in Confucian principles. A 
Confiicianist governmental structure may be accurately looked upon as the consistent extrapolation of 
the idea of the ideal family. The people were the children, the emperor, the father; confidence and 
obedience were expected on one side; protection and benevolence on the other: such was the 
relationship between ruler and subject in familial China, just as the ancient classic says: ’’the son of 
Heaven is the parent of the people and rules over the empire...the whole universe is but a large 
family”.35 In the Book of the Late Han Dynasty (Hou Han Shu, Yi Ming Lie Zhuan, Jiang Yin Fulao), 
the monarch was depicted as “the son of heaven is set up to father the world” and “the world labor to 
serve the son of heaven”.36
The moralist view of state power is based on the Confiicianist view of human nature. Mencius had a 
gentler opinion in this as in other respects which eventually evolved into orthodox Confucian doctrine. 
He regarded man as instinctively social, requiring only the humane presence o f a virtuous ruler, a 
“true king” sympathetic to human moral needs, in order to live at peace with himself and with others.
33 Fan Wenlan, Zhong Guo Tong Shi Jian Bian (Comprehensive History o f  China), Vol. 2, 5th Edition 
(People’s Press, 1978) pp.5-21.
34 For a succinct discussion of Confucius's political philosophy, see Hsiao Kungchuan, A History o f  
Chinese Political Thought, Vol.l: From the Beginings to the 6th Century A.D. trans. F.W. Mote, 
(Princeton University Press, 1979) pp.79-124.
35Confucius, “Chapter Hongfan”, Shangshu Jiyi (Shu King), ed. by Qu Wanli (Lianjing Publishing 
Co(Lian Jing Shiye Chuban Gongsi), 1983) p. 120.
36Wang Zijin, Heian Quanli: Pipan Zhongguo Fengjian Zhengzhi Shenhua {Dark Power: Criticism o f 
Chinese Feudal Political Myths) (CCP Central Party School Press, 1995) p. 18.
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Government, in the Mencian view, is the spontaneous reward of such rulership, for “the people turn in 
allegiance to Humanity, as surely as water flows downward or as a wild animal takes cover in the 
wilderness.”37 Because man’s nature is originally good, people follow right by nature and it is human 
nature that they need a righteous monarch and harmonious order.
There was also a pessimistic view of human nature in the Confucian tradition that was presented by 
Xunzi. He thought that human beings were not motivated by benign instincts, but rather by selfish 
passions38, so it is necessary to have a coercive authority. He believed that social order is created by a 
righteous person and inherited by the people. Both Mencius and Xunzi thought that education was 
necessary.
Either way, social order is not the result of conflicts of will, nor some social contract, but a reflection 
of the ultimate order o f the universe. The ruler’s position, as Mencius envisioned it, was not one of 
prerogatives definable by law or reducible to the terms of a contract. The ascendancy o f the 
Confucian ruler was moral, not social: he was not elevated by the community to safeguard its 
common interests but was rather, by virtue of his own moral character, the natural focal point of 
loyalty and source o f authority.
The absolute monarch was restrained in his exercise of authority by Confucian benevolent political 
ideals and by the need to share power with his supporters and administrators. Civil authority 
dominated the military in a government staffed by bureaucrats recruited through competitive 
examinations in the classics and letters, and Confucian ethical precepts were cultivated. Confiicianist 
ideology, by emphasizing a hierarchical scale of authority and value for all members of society at the 
expense o f sectarian interests and individual aspirations, was the primary source of rule and order.
1.2. The Distinction Between Chinese and Non-Chinese (“B arbarian”)
The standards for maintaining the distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese, between the 
civilized and the barbarians, were almost as old as Chinese history. The distinction originally drew 
on many dimensions: geographical and biological, linguistic and cultural, ethnical and political. Yet, 
as the historical Chinese states were continually interrupted by non-Chinese intrusions, it became 
more and more difficult to justify a Chinese state based on a strict ethnic distinction between Chinese 
and non-Chinese.
Regarding non-Chinese rule over China, in the beginning, the indigenous Chinese, harking back to the 
doctrine of the Spring and Autumn Annals, kept up a strict distinction between Chinese and non- 
Chinese on ethnic and cultural grounds. Confucius’ comments on the barbarians, Yi, and the Chinese, 
Xia, were to abandon the racial standard and instead employ a cultural gauge as the basis for his
37 Mencius, “Mengzi, Gaozi”, Mengzi Yizhu (Collection o f  Mencius with Explanations), edited and 
explained by the Chinese Department of Lanzhou University (Chinese Book Press (Zhonghua Shuju), 
1960) p. 254.
38 Burton Watson (trans.J, Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings (Columbia University Press, 1963) p. 171.
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distinction.39 Since northern nomadic peoples often stayed as threats and even invaded China, the 
reference was usually to the “northern barbarians” (bei lu or bei hu). Since the standard for deciding 
who was a barbarian and who a Chinese fluctuated according to the rise and fall of the level of culture, 
the standard therefore, more often than not, lost its racial significance and became mostly a cultural 
measure.
The Confucian distinction between Chinese and barbarians primarily emphasized cultural standards, 
hence pre-modem Chinese “nationalism” is called culturalism by Joseph R. Levenson since the state 
authority was often justified by cultural rather than racial standards.40
The distinction shift to cultural criteria was complete when the Chinese became willing to consider 
the non-Chinese as one of their own as long as they adopted the Chinese culture and political tradition. 
In the course of social and political integration, the Chinese gradually assimilated these former 
outsiders and broadened their ethnic base.
The Chinese, interestingly, also accepted these non-Chinese peoples as bona fide rulers o f China and 
regarded their rule, especially of those who were sinicized, as part of the unbroken chain of Chinese 
history. This ethnocentric view can be found throughout Chinese history until modem Chinese 
nationalism. The anti-Mongolian sentiments in the Ming Dynasty and the early anti-Manchu 
nationalism were exceptions.
Maybe the cultural standard is also the reason that the Chinese like the Mongolian Yuan dynasty less 
than the Manchu Qing dynasty because it was the least “Chinese” dynasty out of all the dynastic 
“successions”. Compared with the eventually assimilated Manchu dynasty, the Mongol Yuan dynasty 
is more “international” and less a Chinese dynasty, thus it was not so helpful for strengthening the 
sense of being Chinese, although to consider the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty as a Chinese dynasty helps 
to emphasize the historical continuity of China.
Confucianism provided an early assimilationist view for the Chinese regarding state and nation.
Those who use the racial concept to distinguish the barbarians from the Chinese comprise a distinct 
minority, such as the example in Zuo Zhuan: “If he is not of our race, he is sure to have a different 
mind” and, in the “Zhou Yu”41: “(As for the Rong and Di barbarians...) they do not govern their 
passions; they are like the birds and beasts.”42
But since the Chinese were disturbed by the alien nomadic peoples from the north, they emphasized 
the distinction using racial rather than cultural terms such as the strong racial element in proto- 
Chinese nationalism after the Mongolian Yuan dynasty and during the late Manchu dynasty. Even the
39In Lun Yu (Analects), Confucius expressed Chinese superiority over Barbarians and also he thought 
Barbarians could be transformed by Chinese culture. See, Lun Yu Jin Yi (Jiangxi People’s Press, 1982)
40 Joseph R. Levenson.Co«/MC/a« China and its Modern Fate: the Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p.96.
41Ban Gu, "Harsh Official,"(Ku Li Zhuan), Han Shu (Book of Han Dynasty), Vol.90 (China Book 
Press, 1962)p.3645.
42Ban Gu, Under the Twenty-fourth year of King Xiang, ch.2 of the "Zhou Yu" section of the Guo Yu,
( Shanghai Ancient Book Press, 1978) p.62.
35
racial view allowed for the possibility of assimilation through acculturalisation -  just as both Mencius 
and Xun Zi agreed the need for education and self-cultivation. An example diametrically opposite is 
the Tang dynasty which was quite cosmopolitan with Persians, Arabs, Moslems, and Jews becoming 
officials.43
The distinction between the Chinese and the barbarians is a cultural and political idea with a legacy 
persistent throughout Chinese history. It is very important to the sense of historical Chinese identity 
and remains so even to the concept of the modem Chinese nation.
The sense of a nation is impossible without an effective contrast from outside, between a “we” and a 
“they”. Throughout history although the sense of the Chinese we-group was an evolving notion, the 
early Chinese sense of community with the belief in common ancestry developed into a sense of 
community based on common culture, and finally into a territorially based modem Chinese nation. 
Whether the standard for Chinese and non-Chinese distinction is racial, cultural or political, there is 
always a contrast between the idealized Chinese and the evil barbarians in history, even down to the 
Chinese people versus the hostile Western powers in modem times.
1.3. Sino-Centric View Of State
The traditional Chinese state is characterized by a sense of the ascendant centricity o f the Chinese in 
many aspects such as in territory and ethnicity, and above all, in the significance of superior culture 
and moral values. All these views generated a sense of confidence and destiny, which can still be 
discerned in the modem Chinese state and nation.
Territory
The term for “China” in ancient classical Chinese means “great or magnificent” (hua) and “glorious, 
beautiful” (xia) and the Chinese view of the world was Chinese-centered. China began to also refer to 
itself as the “Middle Kingdom”(zhong guo) as early as the Han dynasty. In territorial terms, the 
“middle kingdom”(zhong guo) “under heaven” (tian xia), and “surrounded by four seas” (si hai) or 
“four directions” (si fang) defined no limitation around the center that was China.
Of course China as the center was a changeable entity, as when the more powerful Chinese dynasties 
expanded their administrations beyond the Great Wall to the north, and at times also included the 
areas to the south of the Yangtze River. There were also those middle zones between the civilized 
center and the surrounding uncivilized land, those were the territories where the local political powers 
set up links with China in recognition of China’s centricity in different ways such as tributary 
relations.
43 Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History o f  China, Sui and T ’ang China 589- 
906. Vol.3, Part 1. (Cambridge University Press, 1993) p.21. And see, Wang Gungwu, “Openness and 
Nationalism”, Jonathan Unger, ed. Chinese Nationalism (M.E. Sharpe, 1996) p.l 14. Also see Si 
Maguang, Zhizhi Tongjian, Vol.4, (Gaige Press, 1993) p.4165, Tai Zong Emperor: “Chinese is 
valued, non-Chinese barbarians despised, only I treat Chinese and non-Chinese equally, therefore they 
treat me as their parents”, Vol 198, Zhenguan Year 21, 5th month.
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When modern Chinese sought to define the territorial extent of China, this traditional open-ended 
view on the extent o f territorial domain was difficult to reconcile with the modem state system which 
originated from European international experience.
People
Apart from the geographic sense, the centric self-perception of the Chinese people and state has ethnic 
and cultural significance as well. While Chinese ethnicity was demarcated by the distinction between 
the Chinese and the non-Chinese barbarians, more and more the measure of the distinction was 
Chinese culture rather than blood.
This has raised difficulties for those Chinese nationalists who have tended to distinguish Chinese 
people from others by real or imagined blood ties, except in emphasizing policies of assimilation.
The Confucian distinction o f Chinese (as civilized) and the rest as barbarians not only became a 
political slogan, but also remains an ethical principle. Political legitimacy therefore can be conferred 
only upon those people who occupied the center position in China in geographical, ethnic and culture 
terms. By the same reasoning, the authority of the Zhou Dynasty which succeeded the Shang, in spite 
of its different ethnic origin, was accepted. And many other later non-Chinese regimes which 
occupied the center position in China were accepted into the line of Chinese Confucian statehood.
But it is a modem nationalist view that the Chinese together with the different more or less 
assimilated non-Chinese peoples made up a continuous and uninterrupted Chinese dynastic 
succession.
Who were Chinese and what “China” encompassed in history were debated in 1950s when Chinese 
historians argued that all minorities in the PRC were equally part of the Chinese nation, all wars in the 
past between Han Chinese and any other groups, be they Turkic, Tibetan, Mongol or Jurchen-Manchu, 
were simply brotherly quarrels that happened within the family. That view has remained basically 
unchallenged throughout the Cultural Revolution until now.44
The slightly different arguments in the debate all try to bridge the two different notions o f modem and 
pre-modem China. However, the effort to bring two different notions together has brought more 
confusion than clarity on the question. There is a contradictory view that is currently advanced to 
justify the multi-ethnic reality of the modem state. The view argues that China has always been a 
multi-ethnic state in its history. The ambiguity of the present views draws on ancient inconsistencies 
as well as illustrating the problems of converting pre-modem ideas and realities to suit the modem 
international system.
State Nature
With regard to the nature of the state, Confiicianist intuitive thought would more likely lead to
44 Wang Gungwu, “Pre-Modem History: Some Trends in Writing the History of the Song”, Michael B. 
Yahuda, ed. New Directions in Social Sciences and Humanities in China (The MacMillan press,
1987), pp.7-10.
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metaphysical explanations, such as some unquestionable order quite beyond the average people’s 
capacity for reasoning rather than a physically and directly induced theory of popular sovereignty as 
suggested by contemporary nationalists. The idea of the state (guo jia, literally means state and 
family) is viewed as an extension of the ideal of the family, which is an embodiment of the higher 
order that is supreme over both the rulers and the ruled. It is a political virtue to follow and obey the 
order to achieve harmony.
It is a holist view of state authority that the order of the universe, state and family in essence reflect a 
single entity. A social hierarchical order, such as King and Subject mirrored by father and son is 
beyond an individual’s capacity for reason. Kantian individual self-determination has no proper place 
in this conception of man and state. Nor would the Kantian notion be believed a supreme virtue 
according to Confucian political philosophy. The individual is not believed as the sovereign of the 
universe but is regarded as defined by social relations and subordinated to the mandate of heaven.
The Chinese state is not viewed as a collective expression of individuals but as part of the ultimate 
natural order whose ruler is the Son of Heaven following the imperial way subject to the mandate of 
heaven. The metaphysical nature of state is so beyond an individual’s power of reason that the 
Chinese have to hearken back to the ancient classics to find out what the sages meant by legitimacy or 
“zheng tong”. In the same way, in modem communist China, people are not allowed to judge state 
authority by their individual beliefs rather by what authority and Marxist sages have said.
This viewpoint is deeply embedded in Chinese political thought and practice and it is diametrically 
opposed to western individualistic values. Therefore the idea of national (collective) self- 
determination as a consequence of the irreducible authenticity of the individual is simply outside the 
logic of modem Chinese nationalism, in contrast to European type nationalism45.
For the forerunners o f modem nationalism represented by Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yatsen, the idea of 
self-determination of the state and of the national revolution was regarded as no more than the means 
by which to restore the glory o f Chinese civilization and to return it to its original, and rightful, 
supremacy. For most Chinese, China as a state is still a subject of worship rather than a subject of 
rational probing. By contrast it was only after the transformation of its state legitimacy from ethnic 
and cultural connotation to civic rights that Taiwan Chinese began to think otherwise of statehood. 46 
But despite the general support for democracy as a principle among the different viewpoints current in 
China, a consensus can easily be formed with the position that the Chinese nation should remain 
intact as one unified nation-state in its current form.
The following is a typical official rhetoric on national integration: “China has always been one from 
the very beginning, which is a unitary nation; it include ideas and history in politics, geography, 
nation, history and traditions (combination, integration o f many notions). No matter how many times 
dynasties change, China remains a single organism which has never tolerated any of its part to be
45 Ellie Kedourie, Nationalism, Fourth, expanded edition, Blackwell, 1993
46 Christopher Rene Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in 
International Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) pp. 161-2.
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separated out. This is the cardinal principle of Chinese nationalism and the ideal of Chinese nation.”47
Although the above view is published as official propaganda in the Party’s newspaper, it shows at the 
very least that the Chinese leaders place much importance on utilizing nationalist emotions as a means 
of bolstering their claim to rule. Of course we should consider the fact that it is impossible to write 
about the state and its various connotations in mainland China. The legitimacy of the CPC and its 
ideas of state and nation are based on a particular reading of history and no other readings are 
tolerated. Nevertheless we should not underestimate, however, the extent to which some of the 
official propaganda ingrains popular sentiments especially in the matter of nationalism.
Sense o f Destiny
The Mandate o f Heaven can be understood as a universal view of political authority because it carries 
the intrinsic meaning that Heaven is the only authentic source of rulership. The political ideal under 
the rubric of the Mandate o f Heaven is a universal state ruled by the Son of Heaven.
The sense of China’s centricity or as the Middle Kingdom is not complete without the sense of the 
superiority of Chinese culture as well as the distinction between Chinese and barbarians. The belief in 
the Mandate o f Heaven and the sense of Chinese cultural supremacy are interdependent. The former is 
the general law and belief, the latter explains why the mandate is conferred upon the Chinese. Faith in 
the incontrovertible fact of Chinese cultural superiority over the rest of the world was reflected in the 
Chinese self-description of China’s policy toward the surrounding non-Chinese states as a 
conciliatory policy of winning over conquered tribes with restraint and kindness. The Chinese state, 
from its own point of view, was regarded as so superior that it would attract the non-Chinese 
voluntarily and they would want, of their own accord, to become Chinese. This concept of the state 
was expressed at an early stage by Confucius: ’’All under heaven is the realm of our King, and all 
inhabitants are his subjects.”48
The ideal of a single political authority presiding over a political unity has persisted throughout 
Chinese history even though Chinese history has also seen periods of division and the lack of unity49. 
When Mencius met King Liangxiang, the king asked Mencius how could stability in the world be 
maintained, his reply was that “the world should be ruled under one authority”.50
Xun Zi advocated that “the whole world is like a family”. He argued that “If the world had not been 
unified, the lords would have rebelled and the king would have been unqualified”, “the reason why
47 Liu Wenzong, “those die-hards will be historical culprits - on Lee Denghui’s UN bid”, (People’s 
Daily, 19 August 1995)
48Confucius, Shi Jing Quan Yi (Complete Shi Jing with Annotations) ed. by Jin Qihua, (Jiangsu 
Ancient Books Press, 1984) p.515
49 See Rossabi, China Among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbours, 10th-14th 
Centuries,(University of California Press, 1983) pp.6-11.
50 Mencius, “Mengzi, Lianghui Wang Shang”, Mengzi Yizhu (Collection o f  Mencius with 
Explanations), edited and explained by the Chinese Department of Lanzhou University (Chinese 
Book Press(Zhonghua Shuju), 1960) p. 12
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Yao and Shun were sage kings is that they had unified the world”.51 And according to Xun Zi, “a 
great scholar is the one who helps the king to unify the world”.52
This sense of superior political legitimacy coupled with destiny has survived into modem times in the 
guise of differing political ideologies, of both the nationalist and communist varieties. The ideal can 
be perpetuated in metaphysical forms other than the Mandate of Heaven including those based on the 
“logic of history” or the “will of the people”. Thus, in the late Zhou period (770BC-256BC), 
although there were many de facto independent kingdoms, there was still a nominal universal king. 
There was always the ideal of orthodox universal rule, which caused the periods of equal relations 
between separate kingdoms in Chinese history to be regarded as short, interim, and intolerable.
The modem version of the ancient ideal is still utilized by the CPC to stir up Chinese nationalism. 
Official propaganda often invokes rhetoric on the cardinal principle of the Chinese nation being that 
o f unification and of the one-China principle, so that the existence of separate political identities such 
as Taiwan and, before 1 July 1997, Hong Kong is presented as intolerable and therefore of limited 
duration.
The unique sense of Chinese continuity is yet another dynastic legacy: it is a continuity in terms of 
people, territory, and political authority. The sense o f political continuity is in part due to the idea of 
“zheng tong”, and therefore it is possible to regard dynastic changes, including those changes from 
Chinese to non-Chinese dynasties, as successions rather than as revolutions.
2. From Traditional China to Modern China
As the official ideology, Confucianism heavily influenced people’s viewpoints about the proper way 
of life and moral standards and provided a strong sense of community and society. This conformity 
of mindset together with the common pattern of the agrarian economy and the centralized state are 
regarded by Chinese historians as the necessary conditions for identifying the pre-modem Chinese 
nation.
Because Chinese society never experienced self-motivated modernization and enlightenment as that 
in Europe, it never experienced fundamental social deconstruction and reconstruction in the way that 
the process o f industrialization brought to the nations of Europe. In the case of Chinese nationalism, 
the role of modernization and industrialization should be viewed in a different fashion.
The modem Chinese nation has its origin in early Chinese history. Of course that is not to say 
modernization played only a minor role in the formation of Chinese nation. The Chinese nation was 
heavily influenced by its exposure to westernization and the modem international world at the turn of 
the 20th century. Maybe the most obvious impact is the notion o f a sovereign state based on a clearly 
defined territory.
51 Xun Zi, “Xunzi Wangzhi”, see Wang Zijin, Dark Power: Criticism o f  Chinese Feudal Political 
Myths, (CCP Central Party School Press, 1995) p. 122.
52 Ibid. p. 122.
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On the other hand, some fundamental ideas of the Chinese nation or Chinese perceptions of that 
nation have survived the impacts and shocks of modem times. As Asian countries, esp. those NICs 
(newly industrialized countries) and China gain more economic power, they tend to turn to their own 
tradition to justify their road to modernization separate from the western model. In the Chinese case, 
the first major intellectual response to western intrusion was “zhongxue weiti xixue weiyong” 
(Chinese study as the essence, western knowledge as the utility), and it is still not out of fashion now 
so that modernity issue facing the Chinese people remains unsolved just as it did one century ago.
The transformation from traditional China to modem China involves changing ideas regarding 
territory, people and ethnicity, and state legitimacy. The ideas may be seen as transforming from a 
moral emphasis to a legal emphasis; from a cultural sense to an administrative sense; from a dynastic 
to a nation-state, from agriculture to industry, from a sense of timelessness to a sense of change. The 
development of modem Chinese nationalism both encompasses and is encompassed by this 
transformation.
2.1. Modern Age and Modern Chinese State and Nation
One of the changes in the transformation from traditional China to modem China can be seen in Sun 
Yatsen’s changing position on the Chinese nation and Chinese nationalism. His initial attitude toward 
the Manchu Qing dynasty was no different from those of the racist revolutionaries in the Ming and 
Qing dynasties. Later his xenophobic attitude was replaced by an assimilationist stance toward the 
non-Chinese within the Manchu empire. By making this intellectual and emotional switch, he could 
envisage a new Chinese state whose territorial bounds encompassed the entire domain of the Manchu 
Qing empire which incorporated vast non-Chinese frontier regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang (Chinese 
Turkistan), Mongolia, and Manchuria. He was also ambitious enough to include Korea, Vietnam, 
Bhutan, and Nepal as the territories China should inherit from the Manchu empire as reclaimed 
territories since they had once numbered among the Manchu’s tributary states.53
As an alien dynasty, the Manchu dynasty could not possibly be utilized as the basis for a so-called 
official nationalism54 since that would have provided the dynasty with a new legitimacy in the era of 
rampant Chinese nationalism. However, the job was accomplished by the Chinese nationalists, in that 
they replaced the diminishing imperial authority with a secular ideology of the nation state. Sun 
Yatsen said that the loyalty that the Chinese had formerly reserved for the emperor should be 
transferred to the new nation state.55 In the new Chinese nation, the authority of the new nation state 
would take the place of the Manchu monarch, therefore rightly inheriting a similarly divinely 
sanctioned authority.
53 Sun Yatsen, “San Min Zhuyi Juti Banfa (the Practice of Doctrines of 3 Peoples)”, Sun Zhongshan 
Xuanji (Selected Works o f  Sun Yatsen) (People’s Press, 1956) p.633.
54 Hugh Seton-Watson, ‘Nationalism and Multi-national Empire’, Nationalism and Communism: 
Essays, 1946-1963 (Methuen and Co Ltd., 1964) p. 19.
55 Sun Yatsen, ‘The 6th Lecture on Nationalism’, San Min Zhu Yi (The Principles o f  Three Peoples) 
(no publisher, held in SOAS Library, c.206 s. 15) p. 122
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It is in the Chinese Communist state that the state is understood in a less divine sense, which can be 
understood as a vehicle for the CCP in its agency to advance historical and social progress. And in 
the Communist state, non-Chinese minorities began to be treated as equal to the Chinese in the sense 
that the non-Chinese are not to be absorbed by the Chinese Han nation, but one day they are to be all 
absorbed together with the Han into a Communist society.
2.2. Age of Chinese Nationalism
Under the influence of western historiography, the end of the feudal system and the beginning of the 
nation-state are regarded as important criteria for demarcating the beginnings of modem Chinese 
history. There are some Chinese scholars who think that modem Chinese history began much earlier56. 
Just as modem Western history is dated from the ending of the feudal period, these scholars argue that 
the earliest Chinese nation state emerged in the Qin dynasty when the feudal system ended and the 
bourgeoisie class began to emerge. Some Chinese and Western historians date the beginnings of 
modernity back to the Ming dynasty when they identify what Mao used to describe as the “budding 
sprouts of capitalism”. But this, too, reflects a nationalistic outlook as it suggests that China would 
have modernized by using on its own inner resources and that it did not need the West. Indeed Mao 
argued that the West suppressed China’s own “indigenous sprouts” of capitalism. In the end, the 
dominant view is that modem Chinese history started around 1840 when the western intrusion 
brought about deep changes in Chinese society.
The first Anglo-Chinese War (Opium War 1840-1842) rather than the mid-17th Century when the 
Manchu dynasty was first founded (and when European international relations first took its modem 
shape) is generally regarded as the beginning of modem Chinese history.57 It is the sense o f loss, 
rather than a parallel to European enlightenment, that is regarded generally as the starting point of 
modem Chinese history.
In addition, Chinese confidence in their traditional self-perception of being the center of the world in 
many ways began to be destroyed by the superiority of western material progress since mid-19CC. 
Formerly, the Chinese sense of being the center of world civilization remained intact during the 
recurring and period intrusions and conquests by northern nomadic peoples such as the Turkic 
peoples, Nuzhen, Mongols and finally Manchus. This is what Joseph Levenson distinguished as the 
modem character of Chinese history58: it is that the sense of being the center has been irreversibly 
damaged. When China was first subject to the intrustion of western powers and exposed to its modem 
technologies, the Chinese began to have a real sense of collective psychological loss and to question 
their alleged superiority.
56 Hu Qiuyuan, “On Origin of Oriental Society and Fairbank’s view on China”, Zhongxi Lishi Zhi 
Lijie (Understanding o f Chinese and Western History) (China Magazine Press, 1967) He thinks 
modem Chinese history starts from 13CC.
57H u Sheng, From Opium War to May Fourth Movement (Cong Yapian Zhanzheng Dao Wusi 
Yundong), p.6, Shanghai People’s Press, 1982.
58Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.99.
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It took several wars from the first Anglo-Chinese War to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to 
persuade the mandarins that the Manchu Empire was no longer an equal among the great empires59. 
According to Chinese analysis of history based on Marxist historical materialism, the modem age 
began when China was transformed from the feudal society of thousands years duration into a semi- 
feudal and semi-colonialist society. Modem imperialism and colonialism became the principal 
contradiction that that brought China into the modem age and that has colored the character of its 
history since then. The driving force for historical change was then embodied in the struggles between 
the Chinese people and Chinese feudalism on the one hand, and with western imperialism on the other. 
Mao Zedong saw Chinese peasant rebellions as representative of the progressive historical force in 
the several-thousand-year Chinese history, and in the modem age, he argued, the historical mission 
was conferred upon CCP which then developed the long line of peasants’ struggles to a much higher 
level and to its final conclusion.
All the new ideas springing up in China at that time, republicanism, anti-feudalism, anti-imperialism, 
democracy and the scientific spirit, communism etc., are related to the creation of a new Chinese 
nation. Modem history for the Chinese is about how to take China as a nation and a state and adapt it 
to the modem international world.
2.3. Modern Chinese
The word “China” appeared in the English language as early as in 16CC60 which referred to the China 
of the Ming Dynasty. China under the Chinese Ming dynasty, being a much smaller state than the 
Manchu Qing dynasty, did not include the frontiers such as Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. 
Chinese, meaning natives of China, did not include Manchus, Mongols, Central Asian Moslems, and 
Tibetans. “China” was mostly a geographic term and “Chinese” was a cultural and anthropological 
term. In this sense, the English-language “Chinese” is now usually a reference to a number of 
different Chinese terms each with their own connotation, i.e., “han ren”, “hua ren” and “tang ren” in 
Chinese. The meaning of “han ren” (Chinese) was originally limited to the historical and cultural 
sense, and this term denoted those people whose name derived from the unified Han dynasty and 
whose lives were mostly influenced by Confiicianist ethics.
As the modem idea of the Chinese nation developed, new meanings have been added to the sense of 
being “Chinese”. From the modem political and legal point of view, the term “Chinese” in English, 
which Chinese would equate with “zhong guo ren” in Chinese, is also used to refer to the citizenship 
of the Chinese state which includes non-Chinese people as well as Chinese. Both “zhong guo ren” in 
Chinese and “Chinese” in English have ethnic and political connotations. However, because of the 
multi-ethnic reality o f today’s China, the political and ethnic content of Chinese are not congruent. 
Within Chinese nationalism there has been always a tendency to commingle the ethnic meaning and 
legal meaning of being “Chinese” and to confuse “peoples of China” with the Han (ethnic) Chinese.
59 Wang Gungwu, China and the World since 1949 (The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977) p.9.
60 J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, prepared, The Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, Vol. 3, 
(Oxford: Claredon Press, 1989)pp.l24,128.
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This mixed use o f the term to the point of interchangeability of the two meanings often has 
assimilationist overtones. To avoid any assimilationist connotations, here I use “Chinese” only in the 
ethnic sense as it is traditionally and usually used. It is used to referred to Chinese people in the PRC 
(hua ren, han ren), Chinese in Taiwan, Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao (Taiwan tong bao, gang ao 
tong bao), and overseas Chinese (hai wai hua ren, tong bao, qiao bao, and hua qiao). In the Chinese 
language, all o f the above categories of Chinese are referred to as the descendents of King Yan and 
King Huang (“yan huang zi sun”) or as “long de chuan ren” (descendents of the dragon). Ethnic 
minorities (minorities as described by the Chinese state) are referred to as non-Chinese here.
In dynastic times, the identification of Chinese people was de-limited by the bounds of Chinese 
culture and Chinese ethnicity. The cultural distinction between Chinese and barbarians was 
convenient for the political and military purposes of the different dynasties. The word “Chinese” 
caused little confusion until ideas of nationalism were imported from the West and people began to 
express their senses o f their ethnic, cultural identities in political terms. In order to create a modem 
identity to cope with conditions created by China’s confrontation with the Western world, the Chinese 
were obliged to deal with foreign concepts, including that of nation-state, territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, citizenship, and race. More recently they have had to come to terms with their cultural 
and ethnic identities. When China entered its nationalist era, non-Chinese peoples were incorporated 
as members of the one Chinese state and this raised particular problems for justifying the territorial 
bounds of the modem state and the integrity of the Chinese nation. The Chinese nation is similar to 
those nations that were bom out of the self-reform of empire61, with a major difference in China being 
that the reform is not carried out by the empire itself, but by revolutionary nationalists and later 
nationalist revolutionaries.
The earliest expressions of Chinese nationalism in the late Manchu Qing period were anti-Manchu 
sentiments, by which the Manchu dynasty was regarded as an alien dynasty which should bear the 
blame for China’s backwardness and its defeats at the hands of the western powers. The initial anti- 
Manchu and non-assimilationist stand taken by Chinese nationalists reflected the Chinese sense of 
wounded superiority because the Manchu dynasty was blamed for selling out Chinese interests to 
western imperialists. The nationalists at first insisted that the Chinese nation should be based on 
ethnic ties, namely that the Han people and the Chinese state be congruent with Chinese nation. But 
quickly this radical ethnic standard upholding the old Chinese and barbarian distinction was replaced 
by a cultural standard, and the sinicized Manchu dynasty was no longer regarded as an alien dynasty.
As a matter of fact, the Chinese had flourished and reached new heights in the course of the Qing 
period in terms o f population, territory, cultural, and political influence while the dynasty itself 
experienced a decline62. After the first Anglo-Chinese war, the Manchu dynasty changed its long­
standing frontier policy. Formerly it had regarded Manchuria and Mongolia as ancestral lands (for
61 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nation And Nationalism: an Enquiry into the Origins o f  Nations and the 
Politics o f  Nationalism (London: Nethuen Co & Ltd., 1977)
62 Ping-ti Ho "The Significance of the Ching Period in Chinese History" The Journal o f Asian Studies, 
26, No.2.(Feb.l967) pp.189-145.
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Manchus and Mongols)and as the site for military reserves; but after the 1860s, a new policy was 
carried out according to which the northern territories like Manchuria and Mongolia were no longer 
regarded as a secure backyard but as a threatened frontier. The fact was that the Manchu dynasty no 
longer needed to keep up a Manchu and Mongol alliance, as it had come to be increasingly allied with 
the Chinese officials and the Chinese gentry class on whom it had gradually come to rely for the 
administration of empire. This made the Chinese people identify more closely than ever before with a 
non-Chinese dynasty.
The ascendant and finally dominant Chinese influence during the Manchu Qing Dynasty gave 
Chinese nationalists the confidence to change their formal anti-Manchu racist views and adopt an 
assimilationist attitude. They advocated that the Chinese state should be a commonwealth of five 
major peoples: Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Moslems. The nationalists’ deliberate 
identification with the Manchu empire was motivated mainly by geopolitical reasons, namely, the 
perceived territorial legacy of the empire.
Sun Yatsen believed the integration should be achieved by “assimilating all different peoples in China 
into one single nation”. He advocated “by copying the United States, Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, 
and Tibetans will be assimilated into one Chinese nation and form a nation-state.” 63 Although after 
the Sun-Joffe Manifesto of January 1923, Sun Yatsen granted in principle that those non-Chinese 
peoples could practice autonomy and exercise the right o f self-determination, but this principle was 
copied from that o f the Soviet Union and it is generally believed to have been adopted only in order to 
gain more help from the Soviet Union.64 Sun actually still continued in practice to insist that the 
Chinese state should be a single cultural and political whole. Chiang Kaishek, his successor, was less 
capable in terms o f theory, and simply did not recognize the difference of nationalities and said that 
all the different peoples within China were of the same racial stock65. The “Chinese Nation”, 
according to him, “was formed by the blending of numerous clans. This blending o f various clans 
continued, dynasty after dynasty, but the motive power was cultural rather than military, and it was 
accomplished by assimilation rather than by conquest”.66
63 Sun Yatsen, “San Min Zhuyi Juti Banfa (The Practice of Doctrines of 3 Peoples)”, Sun Zhongshan 
Xuanji (Selected Works o f  Sun Yatsen) (People’s Press, 1956) p.618.
^H s’ui Shu-ch’in,”The Background of the Alliance with the Soviet Uniion and Accomodating 
Communists”, Sun Yatsen and Communism, (Yazhou Chubanshe (Asian Press), 1954) p.9. Leonard 
Shihlein Hsu, Sun Yat-Sun: His Political Social Ideals (Los Angels: University of California, 1968)
65Ch’iang Kaishek wrote “Our nation is of one stock, and due to its fertility the population has greatly 
increased and the nation has become stronger and bigger.” ...“’’After the period of the ‘Five 
Emperors,’ written records were kept in greater detail so that the organization of different clans can be 
studied historically. Within the Four Seas, the clans of the various localities were either descendents 
of a common ancestor or were interrelated through marriage. The Book of Odes states: “The 
descendents of Wen Wang extend to hundreds of generations, but all came from the same family tree”, 
this means that the main and branch stocks all belong to the same blood stream. The Book also states: 
“He is not an outsider but a cousin or an uncle.” That is to say, among all the clans, there were either 
blood relationships or connection by marriage. This is how the Chinese nation was formed in ancient 
times.” See, Ch’iang kai-shek, China’s Destiny and China Economic Theory, with Notes and 
Comments by Philip Jaffe (New York: Roy Publisher, 1947) p.29, pp30-31.
66 Ibid. p.30.
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In 1928 when the KMT took over Peking, they changed their national flag of five colors which 
symbolized the commonwealth of the five nationalities.
In as similar fashion, as their power position changed, the Chinese communists also changed their 
position on the conception of the Chinese nation. In their early period they copied the Soviet Union’s 
admission of the right of self-determination for minority nationalities.67 But later they denied that 
right though they still recognized that different nationalities were entitled to separate legal status. 
Notwithstanding Lenin’s position on national self-determination question, the CPC gave much greater 
emphasis to the integration o f classes and expression of class interests than their agreement to 
recognize nationality differences and separate interests.
As for modem explanations o f the Chinese nation, it is widely agreed that the Chinese nation (zhong 
hua min zu) is a notion with both modem and historical dimensions. In a modem sense, it includes all 
56 peoples dwelling in today’s People’s Republic of China (Han Chinese account for 93.3% of the 
whole country’s populations);68 which historically includes all the peoples who had lived on what is 
today’s territory o f China.69
Marxist theory on social progress provided theoretical justification for such an entity. According to 
Marxist historical materialism, Communism is the ideology or the end of history. Chinese Marxist 
theorists identified each nationality with a certain social development stage by using Marxist ideas of 
the different stages in historical development. Therefore each of the nationalities within the PRC has 
been categorized as relatively advanced or backward along the line of social progress, following 
Marxist theory.
67 The first documented CCP's avocation for non-Chinese self-determination can be found in “the 
Declaration of 2nd National Congress of CCP”, July, 1922, Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji 
(The Selected Documents o f  CCP Central Committee), ed. By CCP CentralArchive Library, Vol. 1 
(1924-25) (CCP Central Party School Press, 1988) p.99. The same attitudes can be also found in 
193 l's "The Resolutions on Minority Peoples Within China" passed on the 1st Chinese Soviet 
National People's Congress o f Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, and it can also be found in “the 
Chinese Soviet Republic's Constitution”, Ibid. vol.7 (1931), p.490. The same promise appeared again 
in the famous 1935 Declaration made by Mao Zedong on 10 December, i.e. "Chinese Soviet Central 
Government's Declaration to the People of Inner Mongolia". Ibid. Vol.10 (1934-35), p.880.
68Nationality Theory and Policy Writing Group, Minzu Lilunyu Shijian (Nationality Theory and 
Practice) (People’s Press, 1988) p.9.
69Li Weihan, "Minority Nationalities and Nationality Relations in China", Minzu Lilunyu Shijian de 
Yixie Wenti (Some Issues on Nationality Theories and Policies), (People's Press, 1980) p.l.
Modem and contemporary Chinese historians view all these peoples (such as Toba-wei, Liao, Jin, 
Yuan and Qing) who intruded into China not as foreigners, but as minorities of the Greater Chinese 
race that includes the Han, Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and others. But Japanese and Western 
scholars, who regard the Han People as the indigenous rulers of China, have applied the notion of 
"foreign conquest dynasties" to the writing of Chinese history. They contend that China under the 
Toba-Wei, Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing was conquered by alien nomadic or tribal peoples. These 
notions o f course have been rejected by Chinese scholars and they hold that those non-Chinese 
dynasties in China were only temporarily ruled by national minorities who were subsequently 
assimilated, culturally if  not also ethnically, by the Han people.
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Since the (Han) Chinese people happened to have reached such an advanced position in historical 
progress according to the Marxists, while all the other non-Chinese nationalities were still located at 
relative backward stages o f social development, it followed that non-Chinese would then have to ally 
themselves with the Han Chinese in their struggle to defeat their common enemies such as their own 
oppressing class as well as outside imperialism in order to realize socialism. Thus, according to this 
theory, their incorporation into the Chinese nation has become their historical destiny. Thus, the 
Chinese sense of being at the center has carried over into the new political ideology although it no 
longer has a Confiicianist tint.
After the world-wide decline o f the appeal of Communist ideology and after the Chinese engendered 
reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, this Marxist historical logic that supposedly underlay 
modem Chinese history and the development of the modem Chinese nation increasingly came into 
question. In Mao Zedong’s time there was a variant of national communism but since Deng Xiaoping 
began the reforms the communist dimension has ended leaving nationalism with a shell of 
communism left as a means o f upholding the formal legitimacy of the PRC. But, in a repeat of history 
from the time of the Repubic, Han Chinese found that this was precisely the moment that Chinese 
nationalism began to replace of Communism as a buttress to state authority.
The Chinese nation needs to be envisaged in a different way and therefore the concept of the Chinese 
nation is being explained increasingly on historical, cultural grounds rather than in terms of the 
modem political theory previously advanced under the Communist ideology. Fei Xiaotong’s 
explanation of the character o f the Chinese nation is a major explication among the new adaptations 
of the old theory. His view of the Chinese nation is indicated by the title of his article, “Unitary 
Chinese Nation o f Pluralistic Origins”70. Basically there is nothing new in his theory, as he still views 
Chinese nation as a timeless entity (both modem and historical). The only difference seems to be that 
instead of a Marxian historicist logic underpinning the great Chinese nation, he provides a 
functionalist logic.
Chinese Nationalism
Modem Chinese nationalism was bom mainly as a reaction to outside stimulus in the post-dynastic 
transition. It first expressed itself as a reaction to western intrusion, a reaction to the cruel competition 
and struggle for survival imposed from outside. Most writers claim it was a response to the defeat by 
Japan in 1895 that aroused the initial spurt of nationalism.
Nationalism was first espoused as a means to save China and restore its previous central status. 
Accordingly it was different from the liberal nationalism emergent in Europe, because there was no 
concomitant Chinese parallel to the European intellectual enlightenment that exalted science, reason, 
and the autonomy of the individual.
70 Fei Xiaotong, " The Pattern of Chinese Nation: Unity With Plural Origins”, The Pattern o f  Chinese 
Nation: Unity With Plural Origins (Beijing: the Central Institute of Nationalities' Press, 1989)
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By the fall of Manchu Qing dynasty there was despair about “old backward China” that sparked off 
the May 4th movement with its embrace of the new(Communism as well as liberalism) and its 
rejection of the past. The rejection of the past was to prove a weakness of the kind of nationalism that 
May 4th engendered.
Although there was the May 4th Movement that called for the spirit of science and democracy, the 
theme of science and democracy (“Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy”) and the westernization, and 
there was also the strand of Chinese Communism which argued for a social revolution so as to make 
China strong and effective in the modem world, they were comparatively short-lived and limited in 
influence.
Other political agendas, such as national salvation and the Communist revolution, for the most of time, 
became the top priorities in political and social life. Therefore at the nascence o f modem Chinese 
nationalism, the traditional basis for political legitimacy was replaced more by the requirements of 
self-strengthening and the aim of restoring past greatness than by invoking popular sovereignty based 
on individualist values
Chinese-Centric Character o f Chinese Nationalism
With its intellectual inspiration drawn partly from ancient classics, Chinese modem nationalism 
evolved mainly as a result of disillusionment and the resolve to back the self-strengthening resolution. 
Chinese nationalist forerunners such as Kang Youwei and Zhang Taiyan all found their nationalist 
and even revolutionary inspirations in Chinese classics.
In the eyes of the nationalists, the victimization of the Manchu dynasty caused by the western 
imperialist intrusion was tantamount to the victimization of the entire Chinese people. Further, the 
dynastic decline was equivalent to the decline of the Chinese people. The survival crisis of the 
Manchu Dynasty was in fact a crisis of the Chinese nation and state. Among the concessions and 
rights surrendered to western powers and to Japan by the Manchu dynasty71, there were those 
concerning the non-Chinese territories such as Manchuria, Mongolia and Xinjiang as well as those 
concerning traditionally authentic Chinese areas, yet Chinese nationalists treated the non-Chinese 
areas in the same way as Chinese areas. They believed that the dynastic interests were Chinese 
interests as well, and could not be, should not be surrendered. Chinese nationalism was bom out of 
such a sense of crisis.
Sun Yatsen symbolize modem Chinese nationalism largely because of the success of the KMT and 
later CPC who both claimed Sun as their founding father that his ideas gained currency. Sun Yatsen
71 The major humiliations imposed upon the Manchu dynasty by western powers in modem history 
are the Opium War of 1840-42, the Anglo-French invasion of 1857-60, Russian's occupation of Ili in 
1871, Japan's take- over Liuqiu in 1874, the Sino-French war of 1883-5, smashing Japanese victory 
over China in 1894-95, the scramble for concessions in 1898 and the Boxer War of 1900. See Denis 
Twitchett and John K. Fairbank ed. The Cambridge History o f  China, Vol. 10 Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, 
Part I (Cambridge University Press, 1978) p.3.
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blended nationalism, the democratic idea and humanitarianism together and presented his amalgam as 
“the Three Doctrines of People”. Although his position on the Chinese nation evolved over time, it 
retained a basically Chinese-centric assimilationist view.
In the early stages Sun Yatsen’s nationalism was mainly an anti-Manchu nationalism. He blamed the 
Manchu for all of Chinese backwardness. The aim of his nationalism was to restore true Chinese 
culture and virtue, restore Chinese (Han) sovereignty and nation-state. In November 1894 in 
“Constitution o f Strengthening China Society”, he wrote “expel Manchu barbarians, and restore 
China and set up a republic”. Sun Yatsen, in the declaration of the tong meng hui, said that the goal 
was to continue the cause of the Ming and Taiping revolution, with the only difference being the goal 
of establishing freedom and democracy. He said, ’’..get rid of 260-years of rank smelling (metaphor 
for northern nomadic peoples), restore 4000-year mother country”, “drive northern barbarians and 
restore Chinese rule”.72
Later he removed the anti-Manchu element from his doctrines and adopted an assimilationist stance. 
In November 1922, he said that “what I mean is to integrate all the peoples of China into a single 
nation”. “Following America’s example, we should put Han Manchu, Mongols, Tibetans and 
Muslims into one Zhong Hua (Chinese) nation, and form one nation-state”73.
Before his death, he rejected his view of there being a commonwealth of five peoples. He regarded it 
as inappropriate, because he realized there were many more than five peoples in China and that the 
solution would seem to be based on national self-determination. But he still believed that the self- 
government or autonomy of other peoples would depend on Chinese support, and that after the defeat 
of imperialism and the warlords, they should all form together as part of a unitary Chinese republic.74
Sun’s ideal nation state is based on the (Han) Chinese nation. He distinguished state and nation as: 
the state is founded by force/violence; and nation by natural forces which are the moral and cultural 
bindings75. The so-called natural forces include bloodline, way o f life, language, religion and customs. 
According to him, the (Han) Chinese people are bound by the sense o f justice and morality, they are 
culturally integrated, they are the only people with the capacity to form a nation state, and they 
constitute the core of zhong hua min zu (Chinese nation). To accomplish this end, he invoked 
traditional teachings. He appealed to a modified Confucianism in the effort to restore China’s “old 
virtues,” without which the nation could not “recover its viability.”76
Traditional Character of State
Apart from his traditional Chinese-centric attitude, another character of his doctrine, as Anthony
72Sun Yatsen, The Selected Works o f  Sun Yatsen (People’s Press, 1956) p.618.
73 Ibid.
74 Zhu Yizhi, Sui Qiren,. “Chinese KMT 1st National Congress Declaration”, Sun Yatsen’s Thoughts 
and Path, 1866-1925 (Jiangsu People’s Press, 1987)
75 Sun Yatsen, The Selected Works o f Sun Yatsen (op. cit.) p.674.
76 Sun Yatsen, The Selected Works o f Sun Yatsen (op. cit.) p.689.
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Smith suggests, is Sun’s revolutionary nationalism with a family resemblance to fascism.77 Sun 
Yatsen was deeply convinced that the Chinese faced virtual extinction unless nationalism could be 
reinvoked among the passive, ignorant, individualistic, and selfish masses of China.78 China’s 
problem, in Sun’s judgment, was that the Chinese had, for too long, enjoyed too much individual 
freedom. He sought to create a new “nationalist man,” one who would dedicate himself to the 
survival of his people, who would sacrifice his personal interests and his individual freedoms in the 
service of his community.
“The grains of sand are individually very free. If  they were mixed with water and cement they 
would harden into stone. The concrete would be a solid body, but the freedom of the individual 
grains of sand would necessarily be sacrificed. Thus it is with our people. We enjoy too much 
individual freedom... The fact that we are as incohesive as sand establishes and we have too much 
freedom. Because of that excess of individual freedom we have no solidarity.”79
The above-mentioned view of the state has enabled Chinese nationalists to regard China as the 
legitimate successor to the Manchu empire. This is especially true in the context of the attitudes and 
policies developed towards the non-Chinese peoples. The success of the Manchu dynasty’s revised 
policy towards its non-Han Chinese peoples increased the empire’s size both geographically and 
ethnically, and this lay the territorial foundation for the modem Chinese state. Generally the area 
known as China throughout most of Chinese dynastic rule is the area covering the main 18 Chinese 
provinces which covers some 1,532,800 square miles, only 41% the size of today’s P.R.C. In the late 
Qing dynasty, even though the empire had shrunk considerably from its fullest extent, it still covered 
an area of 4,278,000 square miles in the 18th CC.80 Another reason why modem Chinese nationalists 
identified so easily with the Manchu dynasty is that during the decline of the Manchu dynasty, the 
Chinese experienced a steady growth of the population, an enlargement of the areas they could inhabit 
and an expansion of cultural and political influence.
Chinese nationalism is further different from European liberal nationalism in terms of the relationship 
between the individual and the nation or state. As Seton Watson argues, Chinese nationalism bears 
less resemblance to the Kant and Mill tradition, and more to that of Fichte and Mazzini, as well as to 
Fascism.81 The Nation is depicted as a natural creation based on Chinese culture, which is seen as 
natural as the family and the universe. The culturally based nation is a part of a natural order outside
77 Anthony Smith, Theories OfNationalism (op. cit.) p.260.
78 Sun Yatsen, The Selected Works o f  Sun Yatsen (op. cit.) p.674.
79 Translation of Sun’s The Three Principles Of The People, in Sun Yatsen: his principles and Social 
Ideals (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1933) pp.285-286, 293-294. see also, Sun 
Yatsen, The Selected Works o f  Sun Yatsen (op. cit.) p.674.
80Ping-ti Ho "The Significance of the Ching Period in Chinese History" The Journal o f  Asian Studies, 
26, No.2.(Feb.l967) pp.139-145.
81 Seton-Watson,‘Twenty-century Revolutions’, Nationalism and Communism: Essays, 1946-1963, 
(Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1964) pp.36-50.
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the realm of human debate. The order is maintained by obeying authority rather than as the result of 
agreement among equal individuals. This reasoning upon which the modem Chinese nation and state 
rests also has strong links to dynastic heritage. The metaphysical righteousness o f the individual’s 
integration with the whole is what justifies the demand that individuals must subordinate their 
interests to the whole.
Both Confucian righteousness and later the Communist cause demanded self-sacrifice and martyrdom 
from the people. It could be concluded that the shared nature of nationalism and communism is the 
absence of individualism, or that Chinese nationalism in some fashion inherited the traditional 
Chinese value that denies individualism. In the historical interpretations of the Chinese Communists, 
there is never a shortage of examples of the heroic sacrifice of individual interests for the sake of the 
whole. It is this aspect of Chinese nationalism that makes Chinese people ignore the lack of, and even 
tolerate the low level o f individual freedom in return for economic prosperity, stability and unity of 
the state. Of course, besides this intellectualist explanation, there is always a materialist explanation 
that, rather than decided by the legacy of the political culture, Chinese people enjoy choices as 
consumers that have been opened to them and therefore they are willing to ignore temporarily the low 
level of individual freedom.
The Sense o f Destiny
The faith in the prosperity o f China’s 5,000-year ancient state survives in different ways o f modem 
Chinese political thought, from the nationalism of the KMT to the CCP revolutionary nationalism.
The self-strengtheners and reformists from Zeng Guofan (1811-72) and Zuo Zongtang (1812-85) to 
Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao (1873-1929) sought to change China mainly in terms of 
gaining equality in wealth and military strength, and established only certain aspects of modernity 
such as more efficient political institutions and scientific education. Even when Sun Yatsen (1866- 
1925) and his followers first pronounced the need for “nationalism”, they still identified China with 
other empires in the world82.
This confidence in China is often supported by the Chinese vision of a glorious past based upon the 
enormous historical record. However, when looking back to the past, often a “Disneyfied history”83 
has been created. In the Chinese-centric view of history, the development of Chinese history is mainly 
about Chinese civilization, so that non-Chinese peoples are neglected or regarded as unimportant or 
secondary. This provides a historical basis for the assimilationist view. Another view has it that 
dynastic history provides an account of successive ruling houses in command of the Chinese people 
including as many different nationalities as at present with all the different nationalities living in 
harmony. The Chinese nation, according to this view, not only includes all the various present
82 Wang Gungwu, China and the World since 1949 (The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977) p.9.
83The term is used to describe a false sense of history held by many people which has little to do with 
historical fact, see David Lowenthal, The Past Is A Foreign Country (Cambridge University Press, 
1985) p.xv.
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nationalities in China horizontally in spatial terms, but also longitudinally in time, it includes all 
peoples that have ever lived on today’s China’s territory throughout history. This view of the Chinese 
nation has been constantly modified in modem Chinese history from Sun Yatsen to the Chinese 
communists without however challenging the centricity of the Han Chinese.
Behind this strong faith in Chinese historical destiny is an imagined and beautified Chinese history. 
The imagined past has never been experienced by devotees and the strong nostalgia it creates sustains 
the nationalistic belief in China’s glorious destiny. In contemporary Chinese nationalism, the 
evocation o f historical destiny has been best illustrated by the CPC within the China’s framework of 
historical materialism.
The sense of loss was expressed most deeply by the early Chinese nationalists in considering the 
modem age. But the Chinese revolutionary historical view added a sense of historical mission, which 
created a belief in an attitude of ultimate optimism regarding modem China’s fate. According to the 
CCP’s historic view, the main theme of modem Chinese history is to rebuild a powerful and 
prosperous new China. The CCP’s achievement is the final and summary stage along the line of this 
modem nationalism. The Chinese nationalist movements that developed following the collapse of 
Manchu Qing dynasty, including the CCP’s campaign of liberation, were depicted as laying the 
foundation o f the modem Chinese state. Quite successfully the modem Chinese state has been built 
so as to include nearly all the territories considered to have been incorporated within the Manchu 
empire. These included the vast areas of Manchuria, Mongolia84, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang in 
addition to the traditional 18 Chinese provinces85.
When Mao declared on October 1st, 1949 at Tiananmen “from now on Chinese people stand up” in 
the world, he meant a new Chinese nation was bom, which was different from those envisioned by 
Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek. The powerful combination of ideology and nationalist claims set up 
a new orthodoxy in place of the battered Confucianist culture86, therefore most Chinese did not doubt 
the congruence between the new Chinese state and the new Chinese nation. This strong ideological 
belief laid a solid foundation for the new state’s legitimacy. But neither of the two claims, socialism 
or nationalism, proved adequate to support the legitimacy of the state in subsequent developments. 
Severe problems arose in the period of reform after the Cultural Revolution.
MOuter Mongolia first declared its independence from the Manchu dynasty on December 11, 1911, 
but did not get the Manchu's Chinese successors' reluctant recognition until three decades later.
85The 18 old Chinese provinces together their archaic names are Zhili(Ji, Youyan), Shandong(Lu or 
Shan Zuo), Shanxi(Jin or Shan You), Henan(Yu or Zhong Zhou), Jiangsu(Wu), Anhui(Wan), 
Jiangxi(Gan or Yu Zhang), Zhejiang(Yue), Fujian(Min), Hubei(Er), Hunan(Xiang), Guangdong(Yue 
or Yue Dong), Guangxi(Gui or Yue Xi), Yunnan(Dian), Guizhou(Qian), Sichuan(Shu), Shaanxi(Qin 
or Guan hong) and Gansu(Long).
86Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity, 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.97. One of his argument is CPC set up a new orthodoxy, a sense 
of mission in the place of Confucianism
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3. National Ideas and Political Legitimacy of Modern Chinese State
Nationalism has been an important legitimation of modem Chinese state since the end of Manchu 
empire in spite o f the fact that different concepts of Chinese nation are contradictory.
Theories have explained nationalism in various ways, nationalism has been described by different 
theorists variously as a result of socio-economic development, of ideological inspiration or of the 
revival o f historical remains. But no single theory can cover convincingly all aspects of such a vastly 
diversified phenomena as nationalism.
Nationalism can be regarded as either a help to or a resistance against existing political authority by 
searching for new identities amid competing cultures, ideologies and different visions of modernity. 
The Chinese nation as envisaged by the communists, for example, is different from that conceived of 
by early nationalists after the weak Manchu empire.
In modem Chinese history, the state legitimacy of China as a nation state has been justified differently 
according to different interpretations of the Chinese nationhood. In the Chinese Communist 
revolution, the entity that the Communists idealized in order to mobilize the people involved shifting 
balances between the priorities given to the proletariat class, the peasants and all other working 
classes, and those non-working classes which could be included within the united front against the 
major enemy.87 Those included in the united front embody the new Chinese nation as envisioned by 
Chinese communists. Since a Chinese nation was first conceived, its precise identity has always 
changed and its connotation has been continuously modified to match the outside contrast or national 
enemy and to challenge or reinforce a particular political order.
When Chinese nationalism was called out to rally mass support for such differing nationalist goals as 
the toppling of the Manchu dynasty, the defeat of the warlords, the defense against imperialist 
invasions, and the strengthening o f the state power in both domestic and international sphere, the 
concept and content of the Chinese nation was emphasized differently. It is as if the Chinese nation 
were to be conceived as made up of an alliance of different constituent parts with the different parts 
being emphasized at different times, and some parts being excluded altogether at other times. In anti- 
Manchu nationalism, the Chinese nation may have an ethnic and cultural emphasis, in the CPC’s 
revolutionary nationalism, the Chinese nation had a class emphasis.
It was not until the Sino-Japanese war when the CPC gained considerable strength that large scale 
social mobilization took place and made rural as well as urban Chinese more used to the idea of 
belonging to a common Chinese nation. The Chinese nation that was then envisaged by the CPC in a
87 The People's Democratic United Front policy is summarized by the CCP as one of the secret 
formula for its revolution success. The United Front is a wide alliance under CCP's leadership, which 
includes other nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties, societies of the people, and 
patriots of various professions. The working class (led by Communist party) is the leader of the 
United Front and the alliance o f workers and peasants is its basis. There are two alliances within the 
United Front: the worker-peasants alliance and the alliance between the working class and non­
working classes (mainly national bourgeoisie). About the united front, see Li Weihan, Issues on the 
United Front and Nationalities (People's Press, 1980) p.3.
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politically unitary sense that corresponded more closely to the identity of most Chinese people as a 
whole. It was a nation based more or less on political class, and the nation’s enemies were the 
imperialist powers, big bourgeoisie represented by KMT and compradors, also feudalism as 
represented by landlords and traditional leaders of ethnic minority groups. The CPC’s united front 
policy was the way to unite all possible allies to fight against common enemies; at the same time the 
policy also expanded and reinforced the Chinese nation by adding other ethnic and cultural elements 
to the nation based mainly on class interests. The united front policy is referred to by the CCP as one 
of the three magic formulas (fa bao) to success.
Although nationalism has not been summarized as one of the formula for the CCP’s revolutionary 
success, Chinese nationalism has been always an important component of the United Front strategy. 
As early as 1922 when the CCP joined the Comintern it began to apply the United Front policy 
according to the Comintern’s instruction. In 1923 CCP members joined the KMT. The United Front 
policy was to “expand the national liberation front, accept all nationalist forces who are against 
Japanese and other imperialist invasions”.88 The Anti-Japanese National United Front in 1935 was 
aimed at uniting all nationalist forces in anti-Japanese warfare89. Because the ultimate purpose of the 
United Front policy is to strengthen the CCP itself and to weaken its enemy, so the UF is urgent 
especially when CCP is not very strong. As it grows stronger, the need for and the sincerity to 
practice the UF policy diminishes. After the Sino-Japanese war when the CCP’ military strength grew 
considerably, the UF policy became not so much a means of survival but a tactic to confuse and 
weaken its enemy, the KMT. The united front after 1945 was called the Peace Democratic United 
Front. After 1949 in a Socialist United Front, the need for domestic united front work decreased for 
the CCP as the country was under its tight control, and the emphasis of UF was shifted to the 
international sphere, the targets being the US and KMT in Taiwan. So through these few stages of the 
workings of the CCP’s united front, as the difference within the country, among Chinese and between 
Chinese and non-Chinese peoples decreased, the need for such a United Front also decreased.
At a policy and theoretical level, the nationalist attitude is made intrinsic in that Chinese practice and 
Chinese characteristics are most valued above any doctrine or theory. The point has been repeatedly 
emphasized by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping that the essence of Marxism is to adhere to practice, 
and at the same time, that Marxism or socialism can not be genuine unless they are applied to Chinese 
practice. The CCP likes to say that the spirit of Mao Zedong thought is to combine Marxism and 
Chinese practice together, in other words, a true follower of Maoism has to be a nationalist in the first 
place.
The CPC’s war mobilization during the Sino-Japanese war for the first time in Chinese history 
effectively politicized the masses of peasants, making them aware of the whole o f the nation to which 
they belonged by linking their economic interests. It was the CPC who for the first time successfully
88 “On the Strategy of Anti-Japanese Imperialism”, Selected Works o f  Mao Zedong, Vol.l, (Mao 
Zedong Selected Works Publishing Committee of CCP Central Committee, 1951) p. 146
89 Mao Zedong, “CCP’s Tasks in Anti-Japanese Period”, Selected Works o f  Mao Zedong (op. cit.) 
p.248.
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harnessed the nationalist forces nationwide by mobilizing the masses with both its nationalist appeal 
and the communist ideological appeal of social justice, and which finally toppled the KMT regime 
and founded a unitary modem Chinese state. This war-time mobilization functions in approximately 
the same way as Karl W. Deutsch’s theory of “social mobilization”90 even though the process was not 
directly driven by modernization as in the social mobilization theory. But the process involved 
substantial parts of the population which resulted in considerable changes to their traditional way of 
life. The propaganda by the Chinese Communist army was very powerful and in those remote areas 
controlled by the CPC, it was the only source for illiterate peasants to be presented with an 
understanding of what had happened in China as a whole and to some extent it also improved the 
peasants’ literacy. The commissar system actually worked to feed illiterate soldiers with the 
information in written Chinese. As early as in the Resolution of the Gutian Conference, Mao Zedong 
mentioned the army’s educational role as well as its combat duties: “ our army should be a combating 
team, but in the meantime it should also be a guiding team and production team.”91 The wartime 
mobilization increased assimilation, increased people’s participation in politics in the same manner as 
indicated in the theory of overall social mobilization in modernization process. These processes 
increased the commonality of people’s experiences and further increased the group’s identity as well 
as the coercive processes o f the group over the individual.
The common bases of the Chinese nation were strengthened even further after 1949. The idea of a 
new Chinese nation free o f feudal and imperialist oppression was first envisaged during the May 4 
movement, and since then the struggle for this new Chinese nation had become the main theme in the 
so-called new democratic revolution as interpreted by CCP. The new nation was finally pronounced 
by Mao Zedong in 1949.
It was not until the nationwide industrialization drive after the CPC came to power that modem 
Chinese nation began to gain a modem economic base. During this period, not only a social 
mobilization process could be seen in the solidarity of Chinese nation, but also the industrialization 
strengthened the new unified socialist culture.
According to Gellner, “The minimal requirement for full citizenship, for effective moral membership 
of a modem community, is literacy.”92 This was recognized in principle during the May 4th 
Movement(1915-25), but the most complete nationwide educational system within China was set up 
only after 1949. In order to facilitate the nationwide education needed for the new state required 
standardization of the linguistic media, and therefore the People’s Republic of China government 
began a serious effort to popularize the Chinese written language, and they standardized spoken
90Karl W.Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. 2nd edition, (the M.I.T. Press, 1966) 
p i 64.
91 Mao Zedong, “The 9th Congress of the CCP of the 4th Red Army Resolution”, December 28, 1929, 
Gutian, Shang Hang, Fujian, December 28, 1929. See Zhong Guo Gong Chan Dang Jian She Ci Dian 
(CCP Construction Reference Book) (Shangdong People’s Press, 1989) p.501.
92Emest Gellner, Thought and Change (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964) p. 159.
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Chinese and reduced illiteracy nationwide.
Socialist industrialization together with various political movements added so many new elements to 
Chinese culture that the culture of the socialist Chinese nation can be distinguished quite sharply from 
those of other Chinese peoples in Hong Kong, Taiwan and among the overseas Chinese. In both 
written and spoken Chinese, the difference between mainland China and Taiwan and HK have been 
now made obvious by the different educational system in place for more than four decades since 1949.
Another interesting sign is that since China put more emphasis on the notion of cultural China for the 
purpose of reunification, the increased exchanges between China and Hong Kong, and Taiwan have 
reduced the language gap between them to some degree. There is also a trend that mainland Chinese 
prefer to use formal Chinese character as used outside the PRC instead of the simplified character 
which is a result of Communist language reform.
During this period of creating a new sense of Chinese nationhood since 1949, cultural markers such as 
linguistic and cultural differences between Chinese people and non-Chinese people were erased 
considerably both through deliberate efforts and by indifference. But still some cultural and linguistic 
cultural marks survive and remain, such as the many non-Chinese languages, cultural customs and 
religions. Although many different cultural and linguistic aspects remain in non-Chinese minority 
regions, the territorial and economic autonomy and distinctiveness have not survived in these non- 
Chinese regions. And without developing their own particular modernization process, those cultural 
markers seem unlikely to be powerful enough to define their own national boundaries. Nevertheless, 
the cultural, linguistic and religious differences serve as a separating force.93
With the aim of encouraging non-Chinese peoples to feel a sense of “togetherness” with Chinese, the 
CCP drew new ideological distinctions to separate outsiders from the envisaged Chinese nation. It 
propagated an historical analysis that depicted the common enemies, the so-called “big three 
mountains” obstructing the advance of the Chinese peoples: imperialists, KMT and comprador 
bourgeois, and the feudalist class. This vision of the new Chinese nation is based more on the new 
socialist state than on traditional Chinese culture or an imagined ethnicity.
In contrast more than thirty years later in the era of Deng Xiaoping more and more emphasis has been 
put on the traditional cultural heritage of China as the common basis o f the identity for the Chinese 
nation. That is because the explanatory power of the official Communist ideology is helplessly 
diminishing. Today’s idea of a Chinese nation is the result of a long evolution of concepts in modem 
Chinese historiography. This is also true of evolution of the legitimacy on which the state is based. 
The legitimacy is now drawn from a view of the Chinese nation and state that owes more to the 
cultural roots o f China than to any newly invented concept. While the different emphasis satisfies 
some who see the Chinese nation in a more traditional sense, it will dissatisfy others.
93Emest Gellner, (op. cit) p i69.
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CHAPTER III. MONGOLIAN HISTORICAL IDENTITY AND MODERN NATIONALISM
Nationalism is not possible without a national history and conflicting nationalism have conflicting 
interpretations of history. The history of Sino-Mongolian relations is interpreted differently by 
Chinese and Mongols. Historical interpretation also plays an important role in generating Mongolian 
nationalism, but as to the question why Mongolian nationalism succeed in the north and fail in the 
south, the answer is mainly geopolitical.
The degree that national sentiments and nationalism depend upon national history can be best 
summarized by an old Chinese saying, “yu wang qi guo, xian wang qi shi”, which means that “to 
destroy a nation, its history has to be destroyed first”. A different interpretation of history may 
generate a different national consciousness. Therefore study of the history of relations between ethnic 
groups in China’s past is vital for understanding the contemporary justification by China’s leaders of 
the historical foundations for, and the continued existence of, a multi-ethnic Chinese nation.
One of the fundamental issues in the developmental and linear interpretations of Chinese history is to 
discern the main trends in historical ethnic relations. Since the present-day Chinese nation-state needs 
historical justification, it is necessary to show not only that a multi-ethnic state o f China existed in the 
past, but also that there is a historical trend showing that all the different non-Chinese peoples had 
long been attracted to Chinese culture before they finally became members of the big family of 56 
nationalities o f the great Chinese nation.
Thousands o f years of Chinese history have been depicted mainly as the uninterrupted development of 
a mostly unified Chinese state. Ethnic harmony and historical continuity are generally depicted to be 
the fundamental truth of Chinese history. The predominant Chinese view is that the multi-ethnic state 
of China was originally formed in the Qin and Han periods (BC221 - 220AD)1. From the Chinese 
perspective, as far as Mongolian-Chinese relations are concerned, all historical conflicts, wars, 
confrontations, and conquests have been put on a backstage, and a harmonious and mutually 
dependent line of existence has been sought to justify the above argument.
The history of ethnic relations is no longer simply that of “embracing an imagined past never 
experienced by their devotees or perhaps by anyone”.2 It is the sense of the past, rather than the truth 
of the past, that matters. It is not only that the present-day China must be a happy family of different 
nationalities, but also that the past must depict a happy family as well. Many different theories of the 
Chinese nation and state, on both the earlier and the recent periods, offer a rationale for the history
1 Wang Duo, “Preface”, in the Historical Ethnic Relations in North China Committee, ed., Beifang 
Minzu Guanxi Shi (the Historical Ethnic Relations in Nort-h China) (Chinese Academy of Social 
Science Press, 1987) p.2. Wang Duo wrote, “the majority of the scholars on history agree that our 
country since Qin and Han has developed into a multi-national state.” Also see, Fan Wenlan, Zhong 
Guo Tong Shi Jian Bian (Comprehensive History o f  China), Vol. 2, 5th Edition (People’s Press, 1978) 
pp.5-21.
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behind the perceived multi-ethnic harmony or unity. The justification is constructed either in terms of 
logic to seam political ideological needs or in terms of the unfolding of economic rationality.
In all the different theories, it is considered historically imperative to show that Inner Mongolia should 
stay within China and that the emergence of the state of independent Mongolia was a result of 
imperialist evil intentions and interventions.3 But it is obvious that the Mongolian view of history 
directly contends with the Chinese view. Just as the Chinese like to create a story of an uninterrupted 
history, so the Mongols like to supply their nationalist traditions with a long history independent of the 
Chinese. They base their claims on descent from the Huns empire in 209 BC and the Mongolian 
empire founded in 1206.4 In September 1991, the Mongolian College Student Union held the first 
World Conference of Mongolian Students to celebrate 2200 anniversary of the founding of Hun State, 
785 anniversary of Mongolian Empire and 80 anniversary of modem Mongolian state.5 The Huns who 
in earlier times had lived in today’s Inner Mongolia are treated in folk belief as ancestors of the 
Mongols. An example of the way in which different symbolic meaning is given to historical events 
may be seen from the significance attached to the dispatch of Wang Zhaojun by the Han emperor to be 
a consort to a Hun chief. Mongolian historians present this as a gesture of appeasement but the 
Chinese depict it as evidence of traditional friendship between the Chinese and the Mongolians.
In this chapter, Mongolian history is briefly reviewed in two periods, the pre-nationalist period and the 
modem nationalist period. The first period demonstrates that the wars and confrontations between the 
two peoples remain basic facts of history and that the Mongols had not been assimilated into China as 
had many other non-Chinese peoples. The latter period shows the process by which Mongols became 
increasingly associated with the Chinese. Examining the two periods shows that the claim that the 
Chinese state has a timeless and seamless notion is simply a historical myth created to support today’s 
Chinese nation-state. What comprised Mongolian-Chinese relations and the emergence of their 
respective national identities must be seen within the context of the historical events associated with 
the rise of modem nationalism and, in examining the historical record, a much more complicated 
picture emerges.
In the period that pre-dated modem nationalism, Mongolian independence was evident from the 
founding of the Mongolian empire by Chinggis Khan in the early 13 th century to the middle of the 18th 
century when the last defiant Mongol faction was defeated by the Manchu emperor. During this period 
of independence, the Mongols refused to be assimilated by the Chinese. In terms o f culture and 
religion, they established much closer and stronger ties with the Tibetans rather than with the
2 David Lowenthal, The Past Is A Foreign Country (Cambridge University Press, 1985) p.xix.
3 One recent book on the topic by the Chinese is Menggu Duli Neimu (The Inside Story O f Outer 
Mongolia Independence) by Shi Bo (Press of People's China, 1993)
4Bulag, Uradyn Erden, Nationalism and Identity in Mongolia Ph.D. thesis submitted in the 
Department of Social Anthropology, July 1993 (University of Cambridge) p.l 14.
5 Internal Publication by the IM Institute of East Asian Studies on Pan-Mongolianism, 11 Oct. 1993,
p.6.
58
Chinese.6
When Kublai Khan decided to make Peking the capital of the Mongolian empire, he met considerable 
resistance from the more conservative Mongols. In terms of political legitimacy and sense of 
succession, the Mongolian Yuan dynasty did not adopt the same assimilating stance as the previous 
non-Chinese dynasties such as Nuzhen Jin and Kitan Liao and, later, the Manchu Qing dynasty, which 
in the end were all assimilated by the Chinese. The Mongols did not derive their power from previous 
Chinese dynasties, not did they claim to be the legitimate successors of the previous Chinese dynasties 
in the zheng tong line.
Before the 1911 replacement of the Manchu dynasty by the Chinese republic, in theory the Mongols 
had never been ruled under Chinese political authority. Subordination to the Manchu court was based 
on “feudal” ties, wherein the Manchu emperors at least presented themselves as the legitimate 
successors to the Mongol’s great Khans. But it was difficult for the Mongols to accept immediately the 
new authority of the Chinese nationalists who followed the Manchu dynasty, because of their 
revolutionary nature and the depth of the cultural differences between the traditional Mongols and the 
relatively modem new Chinese leaders.
Confronted by the authority o f the Chinese republic and by Chinese nationalist forces, the Mongols 
tried to realize their own proto-nationalist goals by adapting to the situation. As a result, Northern 
Mongolia’s efforts were rewarded with its independence in 1911 and by the formation of the socialist 
Mongolian Republic in 1921. In Inner Mongolia, which was largely controlled at that time by Chinese 
in one form or another, Mongolian nationalism had to put on a disguise of various political ideologies 
and was closely interwoven with Chinese politics. Nationalist sentiments took different forms and 
could be found variously in the upper-class-inspired reform, the revolt by the lower class, 
collaboration with outside forces to counter Chinese nationalists, and finally, allying with the CCP and 
using the ideology that it represented to counter the most virulent forms of Chinese nationalism.
1. Mongolia In The Pre-Nationalist Era
1.1. Historical Ethnic Relations
To support today’s conception of China as a nation-state, historical China is viewed as a multi­
national state7 dating from the first unification of China by the Qin dynasty. This view is related to the 
following two observations. The first view is that the Chinese state has survived all the way through a 
several thousand year history without interruption. The second view is that of Chinese centrality, and a 
China-centric worldview that the ancient world of the Chinese and many non-Chinese peoples is a
6 Jagchid, Sechin, Mengzang Guanxi Lishi Yanjiu (Study o f  the Historical Mongolian-Tibetan 
Relationship) (Zhongzheng Press, 1978. p i0) “The Manchu-Ch’ing Policy Toward Mongolian 
Religion”, Essays in Mongolian Studies, Volume 3 in Monograph Series of the David M. Kennedy 
Center for International Studies (Brigham Young University, 1988) p. 142.
7 ‘Ethnie’ and ‘nation’ are used almost interchangeably in the Chinese language, “min zu” is the term 
for both. Race in Chinese is “zhong zu”. In the beginning, Chinese
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closed system. In the evolution of the system between Chinese and non-Chinese peoples, integration 
and assimilation is depicted as the main tendency, and confrontations and conflicts are viewed as only 
aberrations.
However, this multi-national view of historical China cannot explain the role of the distinction 
between the Chinese and non-Chinese which was actually essential to the Chinese identity in history. It 
is a modem historical myth that pre-modem China had an undisturbed sense of being in the middle of 
the world until suddenly the modem western imperialist powers posed an outside contrast convenient 
for the identity of the more modem Chinese nation. As a matter o f fact, the distinction between 
Chinese and non-Chinese had always been vital to distinguishing Chinese identity in both pre-modem 
and modem times. The distinction evolved from a formerly racially and culturally based distinction 
into a politically and territorially based distinction.
According to the Chinese view, Chinese culture has a 5000 year history, which implies that the 
Chinese state as well has lasted for 5000 years without interruption. The non-Chinese dynasties such 
as Mongolian Yuan dynasty are interpreted simply as short episodes in the overall uninterrupted 
Chinese history. But this view contradicts the historical fact that throughout its history, China was 
many times invaded and conquered by non-Chinese peoples.
These invasions and conquests by the northern non-Chinese peoples together with the periods of 
separate Chinese regimes lasted for around 2,000 years, almost half of the purported 5,000 years of 
“unbroken” history. There were 17 dynasties of infiltration, (wu hu luan hua) The most prominent are 
the Five dynasties that resulted from military conquest: Tabghach-Wei (386-557); Kitan-Liao (907- 
1125); Jurchen-Chin (1115-1234) Mongolian Yuan (1260-1368) Manchu-Qing (1644-1911).8 If 
today’s Chinese nation including 56 officially recognized nationalities and today’s PRC’s territory are 
used to judge the historical Chinese nation and state, China both as a people and as a state have never 
been unified even once in all the history preceding 1949.9
In the 2000-year period since the Qin’s unification, unification is emphasized by the Chinese as the 
main trend in their history10. To solve this contradiction, the Chinese are usually called upon ‘to 
identify the general trend in the history’. Therefore the study of historical facts becomes a matter of 
subjective interpretation for the sake of today’s needs.
China’s problem of ‘international relations’ from the Chinese Han dynasty to the Chinese Ming
8 Morris Rossabi, ed., China Among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th-14th 
Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983)
9 According to Morris Rossabi, “Even the most powerful dynasties in pre-modem times, the Han and 
Tang (AD618-907) could not permanently govern Mongolia, Manchuria, or Central Asia.” As to many 
alleged territories such as Ming dynasty’s ‘Wei’ (Guard) institution, he agrees with Henry Serruys, a 
distinguished scholar of China's relations with foreigners during the Ming period. They described 
‘Wei’ as ‘protectorate territories’, which ‘did not imply Ming’s political control.’ ‘Wei's function is to 
prevent other political power from controlling the region concerned. See Morris Rossabi, his China 
and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day^ London: Thames and Hudson Ltd., 1975) pp.9, 29.
10 The Historical Ethnic Relations in North China Committee, Beifang Minzu Guanxi Shi (The
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dynasty (1644) can be summarised as a tribute system. The Chinese assumption of the tribute system 
is that the “Chinese civilisation was superior to the cultures of its neighbours. They believed that their 
literature, their Confucian ethics, their technology and their magnificent cities and palaces, all of 
which the frontier peoples lacked, assured them a position of world leadership. They rejected 
international relations on the basis of sovereign equality”, instead, foreigners who came to China were 
treated as vassals o f the Chinese emperor.11
Yet, the Han dynasty pursued a policy of ‘heqin’ (Chinese dynasties’ attempt to cement relations with 
rulers of non-Chinese powers in the border areas by marrying daughters of Han imperial family to 
them) toward the Huns to the north under which the Han court presented gifts and offered Chinese 
princesses in marriage to the Hun rulers in return for a pledge of peace. Another Chinese policy is 
called ‘yi yi zhi yi’ which means to use barbarians to control barbarians. The policy is to use the 
means of gifts and diplomacy to generate or exploit hospitality among tribal peoples by favouring first 
one group, and then another. The purpose was to take advantage of their internal conflict to control 
them. The policy was deployed especially by the Ming emperor Yongle to fight against east Mongols 
and west Mongols (Oirad Mongols).
In the Chinese view, ethnic relationships are mostly described as those between Chinese and non- 
Chinese, and little importance has been placed on the relationships between different non-Chinese 
peoples. In the relationship between Chinese, Mongols and Tibetans, most of the official history 
related Chinese-Mongolian and Chinese-Tibetan relationship.
From the Mongols’ point of view, in terms of cultural influence, Tibetan culture was easier for 
Mongols to accept than Chinese. According to Jagchid Sechin12, the reason was that the Tibetan 
nomadic culture was closer to the Mongol way of life than the Chinese agricultural culture. In 1362, 
Prince (Ayorchiridara) said that “Li Haowen has taught me for so many years Confucian knowledge, 
but I still do not grasp its meaning. Now only one night’s listening to Buddhist doctrine has made me 
enlightened”.13 And this happened one hundred years after the founding of the Yuan dynasty.
Khublai Khan was condemned by the Mongke Khan’s court because he used Chinese scholars and 
Chinese laws to rule China. The problem was regarded so seriously by Khublai Khan’s more 
conservative brothers that it almost caused a war between them. Compared to Mongols as well as 
Tibetans and Uyghurs, the agricultural peoples at the periphery of China, such as the Japanese, 
Koreans and Vietnamese, all accepted Chinese cultural influence with more ease.
The Chinese hierarchical view of the ancient world was further strengthened by a perceived rationality
Historical Ethnic Relations in North China1 (Chinese Academy of Social Science Press, 1987) p.2.
11 Morris Rossabi, China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day  ^ London: Thames and 
Hudson Ltd., 1975) p.23.
12 Sechin Jagchid, Study o f  the Historical Mongolian-Tibetan Relationship (Zhongzheng Press, 1978) 
plO, “The Manchu-Qing Policy Toward Mongolian Religion”, Essays in Mongolian Studies (pp. cit.) 
p. 142.
13 Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.) p. 143.
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that was supposedly behind the historical progress which led to today’s final realization of ethnic unity. 
Although the ancestral origins between ethnic groups may be different, the Chinese see a logic behind 
an inevitable merging process which leads to a bigger Chinese nation. The Qin unification and the 
Hun unification took place at the same time, but the two confronting powers have been viewed 
differently by Chinese historians. The Chinese unification in the agricultural areas are viewed as 
progressive, while northern non-Chinese nomadic unification has been regarded as negative to 
historical progress.14 Although this biased view has been readjusted by more recent official Chinese 
historians, it is still the same standard used to judge the non-Chinese dynastic unification in their 
historical writings. The Hun unification is regarded now as positive because it was on step on the road 
of the integration of a larger Chinese nation which therefore represents the already perceived general 
historical trend .15
When history is studied to serve the needs of the present nation-state, historical China is envisioned on 
the basis of today’s P.R. China’s territory. Inevitably in the revisions of history, some “unneeded” 
parts have been cut out, and some parts have to be enlarged to fill the vacuum. If more of the 
relationships among non-Chinese peoples and if a wider scope were investigated and traced, the 
Chinese-centred sense of history would be greatly reduced.
Before the Mongols set up their power to the north of the Great Wall in 13CC, there were many other 
nomadic powers such as the Hun, Turk, Kitan, Nuzhen and Liao, etc. Many of them simply 
disappeared in the world as recorded by the Chinese. If the wider scope were studied, a much larger 
process of ethnic interactions can be found than merely the Chinese-centered one. In this wider 
scenario, it would be clear that some peoples recorded by ancient Chinese in fact migrated away and 
their modem descendants are not necessarily PRC citizens. There were also many latecomers to what 
is called the great Chinese nation. Therefore it is impossible to say that all the peoples who are living 
within the current PRC as well as all the peoples who had ever lived on this same land should be 
included in the Chinese nation, as in the official view of China.16 According to the official view of the 
Chinese nation and historical ethnic relationships, the origins of non-Chinese peoples in China can be 
traced within the same scope as today’s PRC territory.
When historical China is regarded as a multi-ethnic state since the unification of the Qin, then the 
argument that the Chinese peoples have always occupied this land mass actually becomes stronger, 
while at its periphery, various non-Chinese peoples continuously came from nowhere and disappeared 
into oblivion. In this model, a historical trend favouring Chinese people can be easily distinguished; 
therefore, all traditional heroes defending the Chinese against the non-Chinese are transformed into
14 Guo Moruo, Zhongguo Lishi (Chinese History? (Beijing: People’s Press, 1976) p .l
15 Gu Bao, ‘Hun Nomadic Society’s Status in Ancient History’, Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan Yitih.ua 
Geju (The Pattern o f  Chinese Nation: Unity With Plural Origins) (Beijing: The Central Institute of 
Nationalities Press, 1989)p.l78.
16Fei Xiaotong, “The Pattern of Chinese Nation: Unity With Plural Origins”, Zhonghua Minzu 
Duoyuan Yitihua Geju (The Pattern o f  Chinese Nation: Unity With Plural Origins* (Beijing: The 
Central Institute of Nationalities Press, 1989)
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national heroes for the modem Chinese nation which is supposed to consist of the Chinese and 55 non- 
Chinese peoples. The reason for continuing to elevate these heroes is obvious, given that their 
struggles are consistent with the perceived historical trend.
The ancient myth of being the middle and the self-belief in the Middle is somewhat preserved by 
contemporary the Chinese in the above view of historical China. If ethnic unity were truly the main 
trend of history as in the official Chinese view, then there would be no need for the important outside 
contrast as a defining notion for Chinese-ness, and therefore non-Chinese ‘barbarians’ would never 
have existed as in important for the sake of Chinese identity and superiority.
A group identity is unimaginable without a feasible outside contrast wherein there is a sense of “we” 
and “they.” It seems that when a Chinese state is under alien threat such as the late Ming dynasty, then 
the Chinese tend to pay more attention to their Chinese-ness and to the distinction between Chinese 
and non-Chinese barbarians. In times of the more powerful and confident dynasties, such as the Tang, 
the Chinese were more open and ‘international’.
To have the requisite sense of common ground to justify a multi-ethnic Chinese nation, there had to be 
a different outside contrast that would now serve to confront both the Chinese and the non-Chinese. In 
the thought of Sun Yatsen’s nationalism and in the Chinese communist view of modem history, this 
outside contrast to the modem West is crucial to the new common identity. This supposed common 
identity between the Manchu Qing’s territorial peoples and the Chinese is reinforced then by 
identifying, in common, an outside contrast in the West.
1.2. Independent Mongol Powers
Historical confrontations and conflicts between Mongols and Chinese make for outside contrast to 
each other which is today counteracted by a blurring of ethnic identity and the creation of a sense of 
unity that is reinforced with the help of an outside contrast. But today’s Chinese historians have 
covered the historical confrontations and conflicts under the rewritten mantle of a titular tribute and 
relations of bestowal to indicate historical Chinese centrality.
The history of north China was one of constant ethnic change and assimilation, the long-term result of 
which has been the enlargement o f Chinese ethnicity and territory. Even so, the Chinese-Mongol 
contrast and confrontations remained in place up to and includes modem times. The Mongols 
managed to keep their separate identity in the north Yuan dynasty after they were driven out of Beijing 
by the Chinese Ming troops in 1368. Even in the Manchu Qing dynasty, Mongols largely lived 
separately from the Chinese. It was the integration efforts made by the later sinicized Manchu 
government that gave an important motivation for the rise of modem Mongolian nationalism.
Within the short 30-year period after the death of Chinggis Khan in 1227, there were four great Khans 
consecutively, Toli Khan, Ogtai Khan, Kuyuk Khan and Mongke Khan, after which Kublai became 
the great Khan. After Khublai Khan moved the capital from the Mongolian ancestral land of Khara
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Khorum to the Chinese territory of da du (Beijing), the Mongolian empire became more and more 
loosely organized.
In Kublai Khan’s reign, the empire was reduced to an alliance of 5 Ulus, and the power of the Mongol 
Empire under the Great Khan became limited to the territory of Mongolia and what is today known as 
Xinjiang along with some traditionally Chinese areas. It was during this time that the Mongols became 
associated directly with China. In the beginning, there were very strong objections voiced against 
Kublai Khan’s decision to move the Mongol Empire capital to Beijing. Kubilai Khan adopted Chinese 
institutions to rule China, but, unlike the later Manchu dynasty, the Mongolian Yuan remained 
unsinicized throughout the Yuan dynasty.
In 1368, when the last Mongolian Khan, Toghon Temur, together with 6 tumen of Mongols17 were 
driven out of the capital by Chinese Ming forces, the Mongolian Yuan dynasty collapsed. But the 
Mongolian royal family set up a North Yuan dynasty and managed to maintain their rule outside of the 
Great Wall. While Chinese historical records show that 1368 was the time when the Mongolian Yuan 
dynasty ended, from the Mongol perspective, this was the time when the Mongolian Yuan dynasty 
retreated to the north.
After the Yuan dynasty was driven out of Beijing, other ulus (states) such as the Golden Horde and 
Chahtai Khanate persisted and are recorded in Mongol history. O f course, the end o f the Yuan dynasty 
in 1368 contributed significantly to the ultimate demise of the Mongolian empire. The Mongolian 
empire collapsed as its main branches broke away: “Persia in 1344, China in 1368, Borhara and 
Turkestan in 1370, and by 1380 the Golden Horde had been defeated and fragmented into a series of 
separate territories (finally ceasing to exist by about 1500).”18 Until the Manchu Qing dynasty was set 
up in 1644, Mongolian power in the north remained independent, although for most of the time in a 
disintegrated condition, with unification under the rule of Chinggis Khan’s lineage (Borjigid) being 
interrupted by other Mongolian chiefs.
Relations between the Chinese Ming dynasty and the Mongols to the north were characterized by 
periods o f temporary peace interspersed by various trade wars, and with restored Mongolian power at 
its peak even trying to regain its previous rule in China.
According to Sanang Sechen’s chronicle, the Mongolian Yuan dynasty fled to north with six tumen of 
Mongols and four tumen stayed behind in China. The six tumen of Mongols remained unified under 
the rule of the royal family of the northern Yuan dynasty for some time. However, in the 1400s two 
warring factions appeared: Oirad and Mongols.
17' Tumen is the military and administrative unite of the time that refer to 10 thousand households. 
According to Sanang Sechen’s chronicle, the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty fled to north with six tumen 
of Mongols and four tumen stayed behind China. Sanang Sechen, Daruntiv, translated, Menggu 
Yuanliu (Erideni Tivch) ,(Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1981) p.227
18 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its 
Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) p .l.
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Later, Esen Khan, a chief of the powerful Oirad Mongols in the west, usurped political power from the 
Borjigid royal clan and once again unified all the Mongols. The rule of Esen Khan became so 
powerful that they captured the Chinese Ming emperor in 1449 in a place called Tu Mu Bu19 (tu mu 
Fortress) and they even surrounded Beijing. The incident was called “The Insult at Tu Mu” (tu mu zhi 
ru) in the old Chinese history books. In more recent history books die incident is recorded in less 
emotional terms such as the “Tu Mu Incident” or “Coup in Tu Mu” (tu mu zhi bian).
Like many other analyses of such embarrassing cases in the Chinese history books, most of the blame 
for the Chinese defeat has been put upon Chinese traitors, whereas nothing is mentioned about the 
superiority of Mongolian cavalry.20
The second unification of Mongolia that restored Mongolian royal rule under Dayan Khan (Batu 
Mongke, 1464-1532) in 1570 was so powerful a unification that Dayan Khan even considered 
restoring Mongol rule in China21. In the later years prior to the Manchu annexation, the central 
authority of Mongolia for the most time remained weak especially when local chieftains became 
powerful. The most prominent among the local chieftains was Altan Khan (1507-83) who founded 
Huhhot in 1554. His unification became very powerful and several times he besieged Peking 
demanding that the Chinese lift a trade embargo.
It is typical of the economic relationship between nomadism and agriculture that the mutual 
dependence is not even. The Mongols relied more on agricultural goods from China than the Chinese 
relied on animal products from Mongolia. The Mongols pressed for open trade and Chinese dynasties 
often refused thus causing wars, or they reluctantly agreed. Jagchid Sechen argues that throughout 
history, northern nomads launched war mainly for economic gains, whereas the Chinese launched 
expeditions to the north mainly for to political and security reasons.22 This is also the reason that the 
Chinese interpretation of the Mongol-Ming relationship in terms of tribute relations never reflects the 
real power pattern.
The so-called “tributary” relationships between the Mongols and the Chinese Ming dynasty were 
usually initiated by the Mongols for economic reasons because their dependence on agricultural 
economy was greater than Chinese on nomadic economy. In 1551, Altan Khan concluded a treaty with 
China, and two horse-trading markets were opened in Da Tong and Xuan Fu (Xuan Hua). The high- 
ranking Chinese official in charge of market affairs at Da Tong reported to his superiors “The market 
was opened at Da Tong for four days, from 25th to 28th of the fourth lunar month (28 Feb-3 Mar). The
19 Tu Mu Bu is in today’s Huailai County, Hebei Province.
20 The Historical Ethnic Relations in North China Committee, Beifang Minzu Guanxi Shi (The 
Historical Ethnic Relations in North Chine? (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Science Press, 1987) 
p.322.
21 Roy A. Miller, ‘Biography of Butu Mongke’ in L.C. Goodrich, ed., Eminent Chinese o f the Ming 
Period, see Morris Rossabi' China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day (Thames and 
Hudson, 1975) p.45.
22 Jagchid Sechen, “Patterns of Trade and Conflict Between China and the Nomadic People of 
Mongolia, Essays In Mongolian Studies, Volume 3 in Monograph Series of the David M. Kennedy
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horses the Mongols brought to the market are far from being sold out! But the supplies of silk and 
clothing which we brought to pay for the Mongol horses are exhausted and so we closed the market.”23
To Mongols, what is recorded in the Chinese history books as “tribute” and “bestowal” were forms of 
trade rather than forms of political submission. The trade conducted was actually always favorable to 
the nomadic peoples, contrary to the tribute relationship between China and the petty agricultural 
states to the south. In the latter cases, it was often the case that China forced the relationship upon the 
smaller agricultural states and the trade was in favor o f China, with the tribute was a symbol of 
obedience.24
During the Chinese Ming dynasty, Mongolian leaders demanded to “pay tribute” to Chinese emperors. 
When their requests were refused by Chinese courts, Mongols usually launched wars against China.
In one of Esen Khan’s talks with a representative of the Chinese Ming dynasty, Yang Shang, Esen 
justified his attack on China by asking, “Why have you continually reduced the prices of Mongolian 
horses and given us bad quality silks?” The Chinese representative replied: “ We are not guilty of 
reducing the value and price of Mongolian horses - it is really your fault because the number of horses 
you send to China increases from year to year. Since we do not send back your horses, we have no 
alternative but to reduce the prices o f the horses.”25
In a memorial to the Ming Emperor (1571) expressing gratitude for the rank of “Shun-yi Wang” for 
himself and for other official titles granted his relatives, it is reported in the Chinese history books that 
Altan Khan referred to himself and his clan as vassals and said: ”... grown up among the Northern 
Barbarians.., Imperial Decree has shown mercy on us and has bestowed upon him the rank of Shun-yi 
Wang; as Chinese emperor’s vassals, I am very grateful for the heavenly mercy...pledged never rebel 
again”.26 This is quoted in the Chinese official history on northern ethnic relations. But the same story 
was recorded differently in Mongolian history. Sagang Sechen Taiji, in his notable work, Eridni-yin 
Tobchi, said: “Altan Khan dispatched troops into China, invading and plundering. The Ming were 
greatly threatened and sent envoys to Altan Khan, gave him the title of Sun Ong, and presented to him 
a gold seal to carry out a great rule together with Emperor Lung-ch’ing of the Great Ming.27”
Today in Chinese history studies, the Chinese perspective of the political implications of Mongolian-
Center for International Studies (Brigham Young University, 1988) p.8
23 M. Sanjdorj, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia (C. Hurst & Company, London, 
1980) p.9.
24 Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.) p9.
25 M. Sanjdorj, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia (C. Hurst & Company, London, 
1980) p.7.
26 Bei Di Shun Yi Wang Yianda Gong Biao Wen (The Tributary Report of Shun-yi Wang, Altan and 
Other Vassals o f the Northern Barbarians)” 'Xuan Lan Tang Ye Shu  vol. 1 ,Beifang Minzu Guanxi Shi 
(The History O f Northern Ethnic Relations) (op. cit.) p.373.
27 Sanang Sechen, Menggu Yuanliu (Erdeni Tivch) Vol. 6, translated by Daruntiv (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1981)p.354, Jagchid Sechen, “Patterns of Trade and Conflict Between China and the 
Normadic People of Mongolia”, Essays in Mongolian Studies (Brigham Young University, David M. 
Kennedy Center for International Studies, 1988) p. 10.
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Chinese tributary relationship are more important than historical truth itself. Chinese emperors granted 
noble ranks and official titles to nomadic leaders to show that their authority was accepted. That the 
nomadic leaders accepted the titles does not mean that they accepted Chinese authority, it was 
understood as a means o f diplomacy on both sides. The trade wars between the Mongols and the 
Chinese Ming show that economic exchanges do not necessarily lead to political unity as Chinese 
historians now argue in Marxist fashion, and the perceived economic rationality between the supposed 
historical ethnic unity is open to question.
1.3. History And Mongol Identity
The principle of nationalism is used when a nation generates the need for a national political authority, 
a national state. It is also true in reverse that political power and order can cultivate a national identity. 
Political power and authority is crucial to the Mongolian people’s belief in a common ethnicity. The 
sense o f an independent history and the ideals of political unification still play a part in Mongols 
nationalistic sentiments today and in Mongol-Chinese relations.
The 1206 Mongolian unification by the founder of the Mongol empire was the first and among the 
most powerful of political factors which contribute to a Mongolian ethnic sense. The belief in a 
common origin has been reinforced by the cult of Chinggis Khan. Mongolian nomadic society, unlike 
most pre-modem secluded communities, was rather a fluid community without a strictly defined 
territory. This very fluidity and the periodic military actions it facilitated are important sources of the 
sense of pan-Mongolian-ness. Different outside cultures and ethnicities also strengthened the sense of 
political cohesion among the Mongols.
The Mongolian Yuan Dynasty did not follow the examples of previous non-Chinese dynasties such as 
the Liao and Jin. The Mongols did not regard themselves as the rightful successors to the Chinese 
orthodoxy and as successors to the previous Chinese dynasties. The Mongols (particularly in pre-Yuan 
times) and the Manchus had a strong belief in an intelligent Heaven, who had destined their rulers to 
govern and to whom they were personally responsible.28 In the beginning of the Secret History of 
Mongols, Chinggis Khan’s birth into the world and the legitimacy of his rule was described as being 
derived from “Monggke Tenggrei.”
“Monggke Tenggeri”, the everlasting Heaven, was the highest deity of Mongolian Shamanism. 
Veneration of heaven, of course, was more than just the expression of a religious emotion since the 
Mongols regarded heaven as the source of all power. The very first sentence of the Secret History 
claims that the ancestors of Chinggis Khan were bom by mandate of heaven 29 And also, the record
28 Heaven is Mongolian tengri, Manchu abka. See for Mongolian examples the seventeenth-century 
anonymous Altan tobci (The golden summary), ed. and tr. C.R. Bawden, The Mongol Chronicle Altan 
Tobci(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1955) p. 121 and passim.
29Dorontiv, translated, Menggu Mishi (Secret History o f Mongol^' (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 
1979) p .l.
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continually emphasizes that the success of the Khan stemmed from the power of Heaven and Earth.30
Prior to modem Mongolian nationalism, the Mongols’ political loyalty was given to their own Khans. 
Even when they submitted to the Manchu emperor, the Mongols accepted Manchus authority in the 
belief that the Manchus were the successors to the Mongolian Khan’s supreme authority.
Historical ethnic relations still influence present-day relationships between Chinese and other minority 
nationalities. With peripheral non-Chinese peoples, China established a superior-inferior relationship 
on the assumption of her cultural ascendance. This enabled China to enforce a divide-and-mle policy, 
or at least a policy of trade control, so as to maintain peace on her borders. According to Chusei 
Suzuki, the validity of this assumption rests upon the extent to which the Chinese claim of cultural 
ascendancy was actually effective across her frontiers.
“We can readily agree that China’s claim of cultural superiority was more or less effective toward 
such countries as Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, agricultural societies resembling that of China which 
regarded Chinese culture as advanced and worthy of adoption. But the situation was quite different in 
the case of northern and western nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. Mongols under Chinggis Khan 
and his successors did not much respect Chinese culture”.31
Mongols, together many other north and west non-Chinese peoples, have a historical relationship with 
China distinct from the ethnic minorities of agricultural societies. This gives Mongols a sense of 
historical importance and a different collective consciousness which to this day has influence in the 
conduct of relations between nationalities. The extent of the sense of non-Chinese-ness among non- 
Han minorities is related to their historical power and status in relation to both China and the outside 
world, and to the time that they were finally incorporated into Chinese political system.
In Mongolia, from the time of the Mongolian empire, through many wars and conquests, there 
survived an ethnicity albeit not in form of a unified entity but as a political ideal. Other non-Chinese 
to the north and west such as the Tibetans and Xinjiang Muslims retain the same kind of political 
ideals related to their own political histories.
1.4. Mongols’ Annexation By Manchu Qing Dynasty
The Manchu Qing dynasty began the annexation of Mongolia into China because ,from 1644 to 1911, 
the Manchus had been sinicized and this paved the way for a successive Chinese republic. The process 
of the decline of the Manchu dynasty was at the same time also inadvertently the process of Chinese 
expansion: As the Manchu dynasty relied more and more on Chinese officials to maintain the empire, 
Chinese migration extended the Chinese population to areas more remote than ever before.
Ironically, it was the Manchu Qing Dynasty that began the process of the annexation of Mongolia into
30Dorontiv, translated, Menggu Mishi (Secret History o f Mongols), (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 
1979) p.2.
31 Chusei Suzuki, “China’s Relations with Inner Asia: The Hsiung-nu, Tibet”, The Chinese World 
Order ed. by John King Fairbank (Harvard University Press, 1968) p. 180.
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China and that authorized the first migration of Chinese settlers into Mongolian lands. In effects it 
paved the way for the absorption of Inner Mongolia by the successive Chinese republics. As the 
Manchu dynasty declined from about the 1750s onwards it inadvertently encouraged the process of 
Chinese expansion. As the dynasty came to rely more and more on Chinese officials to maintain the 
empire Chinese migrated to areas hitherto considered remote and on the periphery.
When the Manchus rose to power in the early 17CC in Manchuria, the first alliance they made with 
Mongols was with the Khorchin Mongols Aimag in eastern Mongolia. The alliance was formed in 
1624 against the Chinese Ming and the Mongol Ligden Khan of Chakhar.
Ligden Khan (1592-1634) was by genealogy the legitimate Great Khan of all Mongolia and he had led 
many other Mongols into the fight against the Manchu expansion. But his authority was not accepted 
by all Mongols. Oirad Mongols and most Khalkha Mongols (Tusheet Khan et al) refused to submit to 
his authority. During the wars between Ligden and the Manchus, some of the princes of minor tribes in 
Southern and Eastern Mongolia preferred to submit voluntarily to the Manchus rather than to be 
conquered by Ligden. These princes seem to have been mostly descended from Khasar, brother of 
Chinggis, while Ligden was descended from Chinggis Khan himself. There had been a traditional 
political hostility between the descendants of the Chinggis and o f Khasar,32 that was still being played 
out.
Ligden Khan, as the last great khan of Mongols, was defeated by the Manchu Emperor Tiancong 
(Hung Taiji, or Arvkhai in Mongolian) in 1634, and his son was captured by the Manchu in 1635.
From 1634 to 1636, South Mongolia was annexed to Manchu Qing dynasty. In 1635, 16 Mongolian 
tribes and 49 feudals/lords (excluding west Turned and Ordos) convened at Shengjing (Shen Yang, the 
capital of the Manchus before they captured Beijing) to recognise the Manchu’s authority in Southern 
Mongolia. In 1636, the Manchu emperor Tiancong (Arvkhai) was elevated by South Mongol princes 
as their khan and in the same year he changed the name of his state from Jin to Qing. The year 1636 
was also the year when the distinction of South Mongolia/Inner Mongolia was first mentioned by the 
Manchu dynasty.33
It was almost half a century after the Manchu captured Peking in 1644, that Northern Mongolia 
(Khalkha Mongolia) recognized the Manchu’s authority and protection in 1691. The Northern 
Mongols sought Manchu’s protection against the West Mongols’ conquest. Galdan Boshigt (1651-96), 
leading the Oirad Mongols, invaded Outer (Khalkha) Mongolia in 1688. Facing die invasion, in the 
ninth lunar month of that year, the Khalkha aristocracy held discussions on whether they should 
approach the Russian Tzar or the Manchu Emperor for military aid. In the end, the Manchu emperor 
was chosen because the Manchus were closer to die Mongols on cultural and religious grounds than 
the Tzarist Russians. Later the Tusheet Khan Chakhundorj and his brother, the 1st Javzundamba
32 ' Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 19 
(E.J. Brill, 1989) p.72.
33 Robert H.G. Lee, The Manchuria Frontier in Ch ’ing History (Harvard University Press, 1970) p.24.
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Khutagt (1635-1723)34, of Khalkha Mongolia fled to the Manchu’s territory to seek help. At the same 
time, Mongols near Siberia began to go over into what is now Buryat Mongolia to ask for Russian 
protection.35
To get the protection they needed, Khalkha nobles had to accept the authority o f the Manchu emperor. 
In 1691 Emperor Kangxi (Enkh Amaglan Kangxi) was elevated as the Great Khan of All Mongolia. In 
1696 Galdan Boshigt was finally defeated in the last decisive battle at the hands o f the Manchus.
However, West Mongolia (Jungharia) remained independent until the 1750s when an Oirad-Khalkha 
joint-rebellion effort was defeated by the Manchu emperor Enkh Amgalan Kang Xi.36
Two things should be noted about the Manchu-Mongol relationship that are pertinent to the 
incorporation of the Mongols into the Manchu Dynasty. First, it was a military alliance, though not 
equal alliance, it was not a domination of one over the other. Second is that in the beginning of the 
Manchu-Mongol alliance, the Manchu emperors justified their authority over Mongols by admitting 
that they simply had succeeded in the ruling line of previous Mongol Great Khans.
The Manchus legitimized their succession to the Mongolian Khan by inventing a legend that the Seal 
of the last emperor of the Mongolian Yuan dynasty was in the possessed of the Manchu emperor who 
received it from the son of the Ligden Khan of the Chakhar Mongols when the Manchus captured him 
in 1635. This seal supposedly gave the Manchu emperor the legal right to be the successor to the Yuan 
orthodox lineage at the capital at Beijing, which was the former Yuan capital.37 Great khan was the 
title for the Manchu emperor until later in Shunzhi and Kangxi times, when the Manchu texts began to 
use the word “Huangdi” (emperor) or “abkai jui” (Son of Heaven), a literal translation of the Chinese 
“Tianzi”, for the Manchu emperor of China.38
The early alliance between the Khorchin Mongols and the Manchu was a relationship between the 
Manchu emperor and Mongol chiefs. In the early Manchu-Mongol alliance, Mongols and Manchus 
referred to themselves as two separate nations. In the ceremony on which Manchu-Kharachin alliance 
was sworn, Manchu Abakhai Khan (Emperor Tian Zong) and Kharachin Mongols said: ”We two 
nations, the Manchu and Kharachin, in order to form an alliance, offer a sacrifice to heaven of white
34 In the Qing dynasty, North Mongolia (Khalkha) was ruled by four khans: Tusheet Khan, Tsetsen 
Khan, Zasagt Khan and Sain Noyon Khan. A Khalkha noble Avtai (1544-86) was first granted the 
title of Tusheet Khan by the Dalai Lama in 1578. Later his fellow nobles were given the titles of 
Tsetsen Khan and Zasagt Khan by the Dalai Lama. The title of the Sain Noyon Khan was granted by 
the Manchu emperor in 1725. See Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern 
Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) p.3.
35 Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (Oxford University Press, 1955) p.30.
36 Amarsanaa (1718-51) of the Oirad and Chingunjab of Khotgoid (in Zasagt Khan aimag) had fought 
against the Manchu invasion of that territory during the 1755-8 war. See Urgunge Onon and Derrick 
Pritchatt, A sia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 
1989) p.3.
37 Gerard M. Fritters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position (The John Hopkins Press, 1949) 
p.152.
38 David M. Farquhar, “Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy”, The Chinese World Order ed. by 
John King Fairbank (Harvard University Press, 1968) p.201.
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horses, and to earth black cows and a cup of liquor, and then we shall unite our nation.”39
Alexander Baranov, a Russian travellor in the beginning of the century, wrote in his travel, Khalkha, 
Aimag Tsetsen-Khana, that the union between Southern Mongolia and Manchuria in 1636 when they 
were personally united under the ruling dynasty has been proven by Mongolian sources. In his trips 
(1905 and 1917) through Mongolia, Baranov managed to obtain a transcript of the decree of the Bogd 
(Holy) Khan Degedu-Erdemtu (Manchu emperor Tiancong, Avkhai, Deed Erdemt in Mongolian) 
relating to the time o f his elevation as Khan of Southern Mongolia.
The essential part of the decree is the promise to follow the example of former Mongolian khans and 
give identical treatment to the Outer (i.e. Southern Mongol) and Inner (i.e. Manchu) princes without 
distinction between them. The decree suggested that Manchu emperor was elevated by Mongolian 
princes voluntarily to be their great khan in accordance with the custom of the time, at their own 
Congress (Khuraltai). The decree stipulated a mutual relationship between the Manchu emperor and 
the southern Mongolian princes, it recognized Manchu suzerainty and promised Mongolian princes 
full autonomy.40 It read at the end of the decree that should the Dynasty fall, all laws previously 
existing should come into force again.
The decree in 1636 seems to be the first document dealing with Manchu-Mongol relations. Regarding 
the assembly of Mongol princes at Doloon Nor in 1688 when they decided to submit to the Manchu 
emperor, the Chinese today maintain that it indicates the formal annexation of Mongolia, but for the
39Zhufeng, Menggu Huangjin Shi(Altan Tovch), (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1985) p.105.
40 Decree o f the all-merciful prosperity-spreading Bogd Khan, now acceding to the throne of the will 
of heaven.
Ever since the time when it was determined by heaven and earth that the Bogd Khan of each 
governing dynasty should unfailingly have the independent princes assisting him in government, their 
exploits and names were recorded from ancient times by the Bogd Khans. Thus it has been from the 
beginning until the present time.
Acceding now to the Great throne, and following the example of the former Bogd Khans, I will make 
no distinction between the Inner and Outer (Princes), I shall think of all uniformly and, distinguishing 
their exploits, I will honor all the independent princes with charters given with my own hand and 
establish the degrees of the honorary titles (Wang, Beil, Beis and gung). Persons receiving and 
accepting these charters given in my own hand should act sincerely, and justly in accordance with the 
law and faith, and help in the government of the country as their consciences dictate; from beginning 
to end do not forget your duty and loyalty.
Thus if you are in a position to fulfill this, the favor will extend to your fathers and grandfathers, and 
the happiness which has spread to them will remain with your children and grandchildren from 
generation to generation, honor and fame will eternally be with you; try not to be remiss. If you 
embark on mutually hostile acts, if you fall away or revolt, you will be deprived of the four honorary 
titles (as above). If your fault should be committed in time of war, then by established law you will be 
executed.
Apart from this, for faults of every other kind, you will not be deprived of these degrees and your 
children and grandchildren will inherit them successively and without interruption.
In the event that the Dai Ch’ing dynasty should fall, then you will exist in accordance with the former 
basic laws. With this in view, by permission of Heaven, I present this adorned charter on the 23rd of 
the First Summer Moon (27 May) of the First Year (1636) of the Reign of Ubedekshi-Erdemu of the 
Dai Ch’ing dynasty by order of the All-Highest favored with the affixing of the Great State Seal.”, See 
Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its 
Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) pp.72-73.
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Mongols at that time, it was just as a personal homage paid to the Manchu emperor. The homage was 
formally extended in 1691 in Doloon Nor where the Emperor Kangxi met 21 regional princes of 
Khalkha and received an oath of allegiance. The above promise for Mongols to return to the existing 
laws was repeated by the emperor41. Since the Manchu emperor took note that some Mongols had 
turned to Russia for protection, he made the policy in Outer Mongolia one of minimum interference, 
so that the princes themselves would prefer to adhere to the Manchu empire rather than to that of the 
Russians 42
2. Independence Of Mongolian State
The independence of Khalkha Mongolia at the end of Manchu Qing dynasty is regarded very 
differently by Mongols and Chinese. In the Mongolian perspective it was a manifestation of 
nationalism. But most Chinese have been taught through historical textbooks that the independence of 
Khalkah Mongolia was mainly the result of foreign imperialist intervention, one of the many 
humiliations forced upon China by foreign imperialist powers. Among the various causes for the 
independence o f Mongolia in 1911, were the changes of Manchu Qing dynasty which proved very 
important in drastically affecting and changing the Manchu-Mongol relationship.
Yet, this independence was not a sudden event. Long before 1911, many changes appeared in the 
Manchu-Mongolian relationship and created tensions between the Manchu and Chinese on one side, 
and the Mongols on the other, and in 1911 these tensions reached a breaking point.
According to Owen Lattimore43, Manchu society was already semi-agricultural before they ruled 
China and they admired Chinese culture. This attitude of the Manchus to Chinese culture was totally 
different from that of the Mongols. Even by the time of the conquest of China by the Manchus, in 
1644, the Manchus’ Chinese education was far advanced44. In addition to the cultural and economic 
moving proclivity to China, Manchu rulers also seemed to recognize Chinese centrality in a political 
sense. In a note thatNurhaci, the founder of Manchu dynasty, wrote to the king of Korea in 1619 as 
follows: ’’There are all sorts of countries under Heaven; but only the great country [China] will 
flourish, while all the small countries will be destroyed?”45 As a dynasty o f an ethnic minority, the 
Manchus’ policy since the early period had been increasingly blurring and de-emphasizing the racial 
distinctions in order to stabilize their dynastic rule. According to what Sun Yatsen said later, this
41 According to Urgunge Onon, Kangxi said in 1691 to the princes of southern and Northern 
Mongolia: ’’Should the Dai Ch’ing(Da Qing -  the name of the dynasty) fall, you lead your own way of 
life.” See, Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims 
its Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) pp.73.
42 Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (Oxford University Press, 1955) p.30.
43 Owen Lattimore, Mongols o f Manchuria (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935) p.69.
44 Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate: The Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958) p.96.
45 David M. Farquhar, “Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy”, The Chinese World Order ed. by 
John King Fairbank (Harvard University Press, 1968) p.200.
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policy had greatly weakened Chinese national consciousness.46
2.1. Changed Manchu-Mongol Relations and Manchus* New Policy
As mentioned earlier, the Manchu-Mongol relation in the beginning, was an alliance rather than a 
straightforward conquest, and Mongols used to think they were voluntary auxiliaries and allies rather 
than conquered subjects of Manchu dynasty47. The Manchu-Mongol forces entered the Great Wall 
together in military campaigns against the armies of the Chinese Ming Dynasty and o f the peasant 
rebels. Mongol aristocracy enjoyed a privileged status almost the same as the Manchus, since they 
“entered the Great Wall together with the dragon” (“sui long ru guan”). The rank of a ruling prince of 
Mongolia was the same as the rank of the Manchu princes. The highest rank a Chinese official could 
obtain was the red button, which was equal to the second or third rank of the princely banner in 
Mongolia.48
The Mongolian and Manchu ancestral lands were protected from Chinese influence to keep them as 
the dynasty’s military reserve and as a place of retreat in case of a Manchu failing in their rule of 
China. In Manchuria, Chinese immigrants were allowed to settle only in the Liaodong Plain. During 
the reign of the Emperor Shunzhi (1644-1661), the Willow Palisades were built specifically to 
separate Mongolian land and Manchus ancestral land from the Liaodong Plain and the influx of 
Chinse immigrants. During the reign of the Emperor Kangxi (1662-1722), new parts were added to the 
Willow Palisades and it was completed in 1681. The Willow Palisades ran from Shanghaiguan north­
eastward to Kaiyuan (near Jilin), and from Kaiyuan south-eastward to the Yalu River. Chinese 
immigrants were forbidden to go beyond the Willow Palisades into Mongolian land, to the west of the 
Liaodong Plain and to Manchu ancestral land to the north of the Liaodong Plain.49
Chinese colonization was first allowed in Qinghai and Jungharia in 1700s. There were Chinese 
settlements in Manchuria when the settlements were forbidden. In 1803 the rules forbidding Chinese 
settlement in Manchuria was relaxed, seasonal Chinese farm labors had been permitted to come in and 
were supposed at the end o f the season to go home. A century later in 1908 when the New Policy was 
started, the old administration of the Manchuria as a special domain of the Manchu imperial house was 
abandoned, and a provincial system was set up which followed the norms of provinces inside the 
Great W all.50 In Manchuria, Chinese settlements large enough to be organized as counties(xian) were 
allowed to be established as counties (Mongolian banners were only allow to accommodate several 
hundreds of Chinese peasants, one and two thousands at most). Chinese counties were set up at an 
accelerating speed. Nine counties were set up between 1729 and 1882, 25 between 1900 and 1911,
46 Sun Yatsen, “San Min Zhuyi Juti Banfa (the Practice of Doctrines of 3 Peoples)”, Sun Zhongshan
Xuanji (Selected Works o f  Sun Yatsen) (People’s Press, 1956) p.633.
47 ' Owen Lattimore, Mongol Journey, Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1936, p.l 12
48 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its 
Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) p. 198.
49 Robert H.G. Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in C h’ing History (Harvard University Press, 1994) p.6.
50 Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (New York: Oxford
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more than 20 between 1921 and 1931.51
In 1791, the ruling Mongolian prince, Duke of the Front Gorlos Banner near Jilin (Kirin) 
memorialized the throne for permission to open tribal land for colonisation in order to legalise the 
status of many Zhili (Hebei) and Shangdong peasants who had already settled there. In 1799, the 
Manchu government agreed to set up the Chang Chun Sub-Prefecture in the settled area in order to 
administer the settlers by putting them under die direct jurisdiction of Jilin (Kirin) authority.52
Many factors caused Manchu dynasty to change its Mongolian policy. Mainly as a result of the 
encroachment of Tzarist Russia and other imperialist powers, the former homeland of Manchuria and 
the military reservoir of Mongolia began to be viewed by the Manchu house as frontier areas.53 As 
both internal and external crises escalated during the Manchu’s decline, the dynasty had to rely more 
and more on the Chinese to maintain the empire. The military Manchu-Mongol alliance lost the 
importance that it had before the Manchu’s conquest of China. The Manchus were by this time 
sinicized not only in a cultural and political sense, but also in an ethnic and psychological sense, and it 
began to be regarded by Chinese officials as the successor to and protector of the orthodox 
Confucianist culture.
The Manchu dynastic decline actually witnessed the expansion of Han Chinese power as noted before 
above. The Manchu dynasty was forced to break down the Manchu bannermen’s monopoly of military 
might and put the command of armies into Han Chinese hands.54 More and more Chinese officials 
occupied important military posts. The Manchu dynasty is the fourth greatest peak in the history of 
Chinese population growth55. The pressure of the population increase highlighted the shortage of 
farmland and the need to open more in non-Chinese frontier areas.
As Russian and Japanese intrusions in Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia put pressure on Manchu 
rulers, especially after the Manchu Qing’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the sense of crisis 
felt by Manchu-Chinese officials and intellectuals deepened. Officials and statecraft scholars began to 
advocate for the reform of self-strengthening and to attack the segregation policy which forbade 
Chinese people to migrated to Manchuria and Mongolia. The New Policy is promulgated by Manchu
University Press, 1955), p. 19
51 Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1955), p.20
52 Robert H.G. Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in Ch ’ing History (Harvard University Press, 1970)
p.20.
53 In 1907 Russo-Japanese Treaty was signed after Russian-Japanese War(1904-5), which set a 
dividing line between Russians and Japanese spheres of influence, that the term “Eastern Inner 
Mongolia”(i.e. east of the line) derives. See Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese treaties o f  1907- 
1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia, (Baltimore, 1933) in, Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, 
(op. cit.) p.20.
54 Joseph Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet”, The 
Cambridge History o f  China, Vol. 10, Part 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1978) p.351.
55 Wang Long-di, "On the historical tendency of Mongolian population development and the 
prosperity o f nationality's population", Collection O f Papers: The 1st Annual Conference O f 
Nationality Society in IMAR, Edited by IMAR Nationality Society, 1982
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dynasty was one o f the modernizing and self-strengthening measures.
Seeking a solution to solve the dynastic and social crises, Chinese stagecraft scholars like Gong 
Zizhen and Wei Yuan advocated that the landless Chinese peasants should go to colonize Xinjiang 
and Mongolia to consolidate the frontiers, and also to relieve the pressure of lack of farmland in the 
traditional Chinese provinces. Wei Yuan, a forerunner of Chinese nationalist thinking, wrote in 1888, 
“The weakness of the Mongols is China’s strength. To tame the Mongols o f the Yellow Religion is 
China’s best policy; and, indeed, from the point of view of Mongol interests, it is much better for them 
to live quietly, and multiply, with no other cares than those of finding pastureland water, then to 
swoop down upon frontiers as the Huns and Turks used to do, keep China under perpetual arms, and 
drench the plains with human gore. The policy is in fact, what may be called dispelling ferocity 
through charity, and guiding untamable men with the doctrine of rewards and punishments...”56
There were some high-ranking officials in charge of the frontier regions who advocated setting up 
provincial administration in place of dependency administration, Fu and Xian (“Fu”, Chinese for 
prefecture, “Xian” for county) to replace the leagues and banners.57 In 1887, the Shanxi Governor Hu 
Pinzhi suggested opening Mongolian land for the military cultivation [tun ken, the soldiers stationed in 
the frontiers also cultivate land and farm. In 1901, Chinese officials Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi 
presented memorials to the Manchu emperor suggesting changes in the Manchus’ Mongolian policy.58
Before Jia Qing’s reign, the Manchu court had consistently issued decrees forbidding the cultivation 
of Mongolian lands by Chinese immigrants, but the combination of famine-driven peasants and profit- 
seeking Mongolian princes continued to frustrate the decrees. During the reign of Jia Qing emperor 
(1796-1821), Manchu Qing dynasty began to officially change its Mongolian policy. In 1803,
Manchu dynasty began to relax the rules forbidding Chinese settlement in Manchuria(including Jehol 
and eastern Mongolian areas). Emperor Jia Qing once said: ’’Mongolian’s prosperity is China’s 
misfortune; Mongol’s weakness is China’s fortune”.59
There were 3 large-scale cultivation openings (Fang Ken) during the 130 years from 1803 to 1930.60 
The second wave of cultivation openings began from 1876.61According to the Suiyuan Cultivation 
Plan, in a 30-year period, 73,710 hectares of grassland in Ulaanchab League were cultivated by 
Chinese. Large-scale cultivation also took place in the same way in other areas in Inner Mongolia.62
As Chinese immigrants flooded in, many Chinese administrations were set up in Inner Mongolia:
56 Journal o f  the China Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society, 1887, New Ser., Vol. XXII, Shanghai, 
1888, p. 101: “Wei Yuan on the Mongols”, See Fritters,(op. cit.) p. 154.
57 Yu Bam, (op. cit.) p. 138.
58 Ibid. p. 136.
59 Da Qing Ren Zong Shi Lu ( Records o f Ren Zong Emperor’s Reign) , Vol. 8, Da Qing Li Chao Shi 
Lu (Administrative Records o f Qing Dynasty), Pack No.65, see, Yu Bam, Nei Menggu Lishi (Inner 
Mongolian History, Shanghai People’s Press, 1958) p. 130.
60 Houhe, “Grassland Construction in the Development of Animal Husbandry”, Xu Mu Ye Lun Wen Ji 
(CollectedPapers on Animal Husbandry) (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.281.
61 Owen Lattimore, The Mongols o f  Manchuria (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935) p.97.
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Chaoyang, Jiangchang, Jiangping, Linyuan, Fuxin, Suidong, Chifeng, Kailu, Linxi, Changtu, Liaoyuan 
(Zhengjiatun), Huaide, Fenghua, Kangping, Zhaonan, Jingan, Anguang, Zhendong, Kaitong, Jiuquan, 
Zhangwu, Fadu (Fakumen), Changchun (Kuaichengzi), Nongan, Changling, Dehui, Dalai, Zaozhou, 
Changwu, Anda, Baotou, Salaqi, Tuoketuo, Helinger, Qingshuihe, Fengzhen, Ningyuan (Liangcheng), 
Xinghe, Wuchuan, Wuyuan, Taolin, Dongshen, Hailar (Hulun-buir Cheng), Lubin (Manzhouli 
Tiedaonan), Jilalin (Shiwei), and so forth.
In 1902, the Manchu dynasty decreed an order to cultivate Mongolian land and to allow Mongolian 
princes to open Mongolian land for bidding.63 Special commissioners were sent to take charge of the 
cultivation and in cultivated areas many related administrative organs were set up such as the 
Cultivation Bureaus, Animal Husbandry Companies, Agricultural Companies. In the Mongolian areas 
that were open to Chinese cultivation, Chinese administration areas were set up such as Fu, Ting,
Zhou and Xian (Ting was later called Xian in Republic period).
In 1906 the Chinese official Zuo Shaozuo suggested that the three provinces of Jehol, Chakhar and 
Suiyuan be created in Inner Mongolia.64 In 1908, the old administration of the Manchurian provinces 
as a special domain of the Manchuria imperial house was abandoned, and a provincial system was set 
up which followed the norms of provinces inside the Great Wall.65
In 1906, “the New Policy” was promulgated by the Manchu Dynasty to modernise and strenghen the 
declining empire, but to Mongols, the “New Policy” accelerated Chinese migration into Mongolian 
homeland. The “New Policy” contained 14 articles altogether, according to which following changes 
were made. The Council of Dependency (Li Fan Yuan) was renamed the Ministry of Dependency (Li 
Fan Bu), within which two bureaus of investigation(dian cha) and editing(bian zhuan) were created. 
The purpose of these organization changes were to investigate Mongolian land, make policies 
concerning the reform of Mongolian land in the aspects of animal farming, cultivation, administration, 
opening of mines, forestry, fishery, schools, training a modem army, and so forth. The Immigration 
Bureau (Yi Min Ju) was established in 1906-7 in Peking, to encourage Chinese farmers to settle in 
Northern Mongolia.
At the same time, the Qing government also declared the following points to the ambassadors of all 
countries: Firstly, Mongolians should not be in contact with other countries directly; Secondly, no 
countries should give loans to Mongolia. To carry out the policy, a foreign office was set up in each 
Mongolian banner to handle foreign affairs.
In 1909, the Manchu court demanded that local generals, ministers, governors and govemor-generals
62Houhe, Ibid. p.281.
63 Yu Bam, (op. cit.) p. 136.
64 Those three Mongolian regions mentioned weren’t set up as provinces immediately, they were set 
up first as special administrative regions in 1914 by Yuan Shikai’s government, then KMT 
government changed those special administrative regions into Chinese style provinces in 1928.
65 Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1955) p.19.
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of frontier provinces were to discuss how to open Mongolia. In 1910, all bans on cultivating 
Mongolian land were lifted, and landless Chinese peasants were encouraged to migrate to Mongolia 
together with their families. The decrees forbidding Mongol-Chinese marriages were annulled, 
Mongols began to be allowed to learn Chinese, adopt Chinese names, use Chinese clerks, and issue 
documents in Chinese.
In the same year, the Ministry of Dependency, following the Emperor’s decree, set up the Department 
of Constitutional State Preparation, merged the two bureaus of investigation and editing, set up the 
Research Institute of Dependency Politics, and appointed Consultative Officials do study the 
dependency politics with the officials in the Ministry of Dependency. In all Mongolian banners, 
Chinese and Mongol schools were established, and in Manchuria, a Mongolian language newspaper 
was founded.66
As Onon Urgunge concluded on the New Policy in the Outer Mongolia, “the Manchu dynasty’s New 
Policy in Outer Mongolia was adopted. This was firstly, to prevent Russian and Japanese influence 
from spreading in Mongolia and, secondly, to protect the Chinese money lending capital in 
Mongolia.”67
As a result of the New Policy, Chinese merchants flooded in Outer Mongolia and dominated trading 
and other industries. In 1909, the Manchu government surveyed 9.25 million acres of farmland in 
Tusheet Khan Aimag for Chinese settlers. In the same year, the Manchus started to take a census of 
both men and livestock in Outer Mongolia. More than 20 new governmental organizations were 
established in Khuree, in addition to the office of the Imperial Resident. The expense of the new office 
buildings and the military barracks and food and firewood were paid for by the Mongols. By 1911, 
the Mongolian economy was bankrupt and Mongols owed about 11 million tael (one tael -  one ounce) 
of silver to the Chinese shops in Mongolia. By 1924, the total debt reached 30 million taels of silver, 
equal to the worth of half of all the livestock of Mongolia.68 In addition to these debts, the Mongolian 
commoners had to pay official Chinese taxes and levies.
The political policy toward Mongolia was that of divide and rule to frozen and permanent the division, 
prevent the merger and emergence of inter-regional leaders. The Manchus set up the League and 
Banner system in Mongolia which reduced the possibility of Mongolian unification by 
institutionalizing the divisions further. Mongolia was divided into 213 banners. South Mongolia (Inner 
Mongolia) was divided into 6 leagues (aimag in Mongolian) according to the six autonomous khanates 
established after Dayan Khan’s unification. North Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) was divided into 4 
leagues.
Under the New Policy, the economic policy can be summarized in Chinese words as “borrow
66 Yu Bam, (op.cit) p. 138.
67Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Ibid. p.5. Also see M. Sanjdorj, Manchu Chinese Colonial 
Rule in Northern Mongolia (London: C. Hust & Company, 1980)
68 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its
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(Mongolian) land to nurture (Chinese) people” (jie di yang min). The Cultural policy of obscurantism 
to encourage the monastic establishments in Mongolia and encourage Mongol males to join the 
monastaries as a means to control Mongols was changed. An assimilationist policy was adopted. 
Before the new policy, Mongols were not allowed to learn Chinese and marry Chinese. Since the New 
Policy began, Mongols were encouraged to learn Chinese and marry Chinese.69 Because of the 
Manchus’ Mongolian policies, Mongolian nomadism began to decay in 18CC and the Mongols were 
no longer capable of launching wars to consolidate and defend the now dispersed and impoverished 
nomadic Mongols. The New Policy indicated that Mongols had lost their former importance to 
Manchu dynasty and the former Manchu dynastic rule based on Manchu-Mongol alliance had changed 
into one based on Manchu-Chinese alliance.
The Mongolian decline was also reflected by shrinking population. The Chinese population grew from 
100 million at Qian Long’s reign to more than 400 million at the end of Qing dynasty, increasing by 
three times70. In 1800, the Mongolian- speaking population was estimated at around 3.5 million, 
among which 700,000 were in Outer Mongolia, 2.6 million were in Inner Mongolia, and 200,000 were 
in Xinjiang and Qinghai71. At the end of the Qing dynasty, the Mongolian-speaking population was 
only 2.52 million, among which only 1.18 million were in Inner Mongolia.72 In contrast to a four-fold 
increase in the Chinese population, the Mongolian population in the 100 years from 1800 decreased 
by 70%, and further decreased by 30% from the end of the Qing dynasty to the beginning of 
Communist China.
2.2. The Independence O f Khalkha Mongolia
The causes for the independence of North Mongolia (Khalkha Mongolia) were more than a scramble 
between Tzarist Russia and Manchu China; and the independence as declared by the Khalkha 
Mongols was provoked by the Manchus New Policy in Mongolia. It also should be noted that the 
1911 Mongolian independence was also pan-Mongolian in nature.
Independence activities had begun as early as 1900 among Khalkha princes and high ranking lamas 
when Badamdorj, a high-ranking lama, and Tseren-odsor were sent as representatives of Bogd 
Javzundamba (1870-1924) to Russia for to ask for assistance for Mongolian independence73. Bogd 
Javzundamba Khutughatu (saint) was the head of the Yellow sect in Mongolia. In the Khalkha
Independence in 1911 (op. cit.) p.4.
69 Hao Weimin, ed. Nei Menggu Lishi (Inner Mongolian Recent History) (Inner Mongolian University 
Press, 1990) p. 28.
70 Wang Long-di, (op. cit.)
71 Joseph Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet”, The 
Cambridge History o f  China, Vol. 10, Part 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1978) p.351.
72 Quoted from Thorough Ching Documents Supplementary, issue 25, in Wang Long-di, "On the 
historical tendency of Mongolian population development and the prosperity of nationality's 
population", Collection O f Papers: The 1st Annual Conference O f Nationality Society in IMAR,
Edited by IMAR Nationality Society, 1982
73 ' Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asians' First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Claim its 
Independence in 1911, E.J. Brill, 1989. p. 15
78
Mongolian region, he ranked third after the Dalai Lama and the Banchan Erdeni (Panchen Lama) in 
the hierarchy of all o f the Yellow Sect. Although he was a religious leader, he also wielded great 
political influence and led the independence movement.
He sent Chin Van Khanddorj, Da Lama Tserenchimid and Khaisan, a high-ranking official from 
Southern Mongolia, on a secret mission to seek arms and capital from Russia in order to fight the 
Manchu army. It should be noted that Chin Van Khanddorj was representing the secular lords and Da 
Lama Tserenchimid the ecclesiastical lords of Northern Mongolia, while Khaisan’s representation 
signified the inclusion of Southern Mongolia in the movement, which therefore shows its pan- 
Mongolian character. The delegation left for St. Petersburg in July 1911 and returned in October soon 
after the Wu Chang Mutiny (Oct. 10, 1911) that signaled the end of the Qing and the birth of the 
Chinese Republic.
Russia’s reaction was not to offer straightforward support since they feared arousing the suspicions of 
the Japanese. Nevertheless, the Russian government decided to send 200 Cossack soldiers with 
machine-guns to Khuree. And the Russian Secretary of the War Ministry, Sukhomlinov, at this same 
time, gave 15,000 Vintov rifles and 75 million rounds of ammunition to the headquarters of the 
Irkutsk military region for transfer to the Mongols.
On 28 November 1911, Mongolian princes ordered the mobilization of 4,000 Mongols soldiers from 
the neighboring khushuus o f Khuree on the pretext of sending the Mongolian army to Peking to 
protect the Manchu emperor from the Chinese revolts. At the same time, about 800 well-equipped 
Russian soldiers arrived in Khuree to guard Russian consulate personnel. On 1 December 1911 the 
Mongols issued an ultimatum to Sandoo, the Manchu Imperial Resident, that he leave within a few 
days. Sandoo at the time could call upon only 130 poorly-equipped Chinese soldiers, and he and other 
Manchu and Chinese officials left Outer Mongolia on 4 December 1911 for China.74
On 29 December 1911 (the 9th day of the middle winter month (11th lunar month) o f the White Female 
Pig Year), Khalkha Mongolia declared its independence. In the proclamation of the elevation of the 
Bogd as Great Khan, it read “We have elevated the Bogd, radiant as the sun, myriad aged, as the Great 
Khan of Mongolia,...”. Khuree will be the capital, and the official name of the nation will be ‘Olnoo 
Orgogdson’ (elevated by all), We have established an independent nation...”75
Some Mongol historians later named their newly-established nation in the Great Chinggis Khan’s 
tradition, “Ikh Mongol Ulus” (great Mongolian nation) or “Ikh Mongol Tor” (great Mongol dynasty). 
The national flag with the emblem of “Soyombo”(a Buddhist design symbolizing the triple function of 
looking with eyes, hearing with ears, and meditating with mind, the symbol is still used as the emblem 
of the Mongolian state76) was housed in Khuree for the first time since Tsogt Taij (1581-1636) had
74 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, (op. cit.) p. 15.
75 Ibid.
76 Bulag, Uradyn Erden, Nationalism and Identity in Mongolia, Ph.D. thesis submitted in the 
Department o f Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge, July 1993. p. 115.
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used it against the Manchus.
With the Wu Chang Mutiny in 10 October 1911, Mongolian independence was also intended to 
prevent the new Chinese government from claiming sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. Bogd 
Javzundamba was elevated to the throne of the Great Khan as a successor of Chinggis Khan’s lineage 
even though he was a Tibetan bom in Tibet. It also meant that Mongols again got the title of “Great 
khan” back from the Manchu emperor who had ceased to function. The Great Khan was meant to 
cover all the Mongols of Southern and Northern Mongolia. The new state declared that all Mongolian- 
inhabited territory north of the Great Wall was the legitimate land of the Mongolian state.
Political changes in the independent Mongolian state between the initial declaration o f independence 
1911 with a theocratic rule and the establishment in 1921 of the People’s Republic of Mongolia show 
that the Mongols were less sure of the new political authority they were going to have than the 
traditional one they wanted to replace. In 1915 the Khiakhta Tripartite Treaty signed by Russia, China 
and Mongolia made Mongolia abandon independence but remain autonomous under Chinese 
suzerainty. In 1919, Xu Shuzheng, a pro-Japanese Chinese warlord invaded Mongolia and briefly 
cancelled Mongolian autonomy before he was driven out by “Mad Baron” Ungem-stemberg. The 
independence of Mongolia was possible because Mongols got necessary help from Tsarist Russians
I
and the Soviet Union to fend off Chinese intervention.
Mongols in Inner Mongolia faced a more difficult situation: they had to deal with the new Chinese 
authority, and with Chinese nationalists and their concept of a modem Chinese nation. It is relatively 
easy for a Mongolian lordship to be transferred to or succeeded by a Manchu lord as long as the latter 
functions in the same way. But in an age of nationalism, it is more difficult to convince Mongols to 
accept nationalist authority from another people. This is difficult because the justification of the 
authority is more individual and it has to convince each Mongol that they were not what they always 
thought they were, they were now part of new nation with a different way of life, with different 
cultural and political traditions.
The independence of Mongolia in 1911 and De Wang’s collaboration with the Japanese both indicate 
that Mongolian interests are interests separate from those of the Chinese, and that when faced with 
outside forces, they chose “the lesser among two evils”. Regarding the fact that some Mongolian 
nationalist forces came under Ulanhu’s leadership, their collaboration with the CPC can be explained 
by their goal against a common enemy for both the Mongolian nation and the CPC: Jiang Kaishek and 
local warlords like Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi.
3. Mongolian Nationalism in Inner Mongolia
3.1. Chinese Colonisation In The End O f M anchu Qing And Chinese Republic
Inner Mongolia had been divided into 49 banners when Mongols were organized in the same banner
system as Manchus in the Manchu-Mongol military alliance before 1644 when they entered the Great
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Wall. The head of an aimag (league) was only an honorary position without real power. Being more 
divided than Khalkha Mongol, there was no political and religious leader in Inner Mongolia as 
powerful as the 8th Jevzundamba was in Outer Mongolia. Because of the reality of a divided Inner 
Mongolia, the traditional Mongolian aristocracy was unable to provide a powerful leader for revolt 
and resistance against the Chinese assimilationist pressures. More unified and nationalistic movements 
did not emerge until various modem political ideologies were introduced to Mongols.
The first modem political party in Inner Mongolia was the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary 
Party (IMPRP) founded in 1 March, 1925. Because it was founded during the time of cooperation 
between the CCP and the KMT, it was under the sway of the competing influences of the Russians, 
Chinese Communists, Northern Mongolians, and Chinese Nationalists. After the IMPRP was founded, 
it was an autonomous movement led by the Prince Demuchigdungrub, and although he belonged to the 
traditional ruling class, he represented modem nationalism. After World War Two when Japan was 
defeated, a pro-Chinese communist autonomous movement led by Ulanhu began to gain power in 
Inner Mongolia. Although they was subject to substantive and diverse external influences, these 
political movements in Inner Mongolia all centered upon a nationalist theme.
On Jan 1, 1912, the Chinese republic was established in Nanjing (Nanking), Sun Yatsen was 
appointed provisional president while the north was controlled by Yuan Shikai in the name of the 
Manchu monarch. Sun Yatsen’s Provisional Constitution was promulgated in February 1912. Article 2 
of the constitution provided that the ’’territory of the Republic of China includes 22 provinces, Inner 
and Out Mongolia, Tibet and Kokonor (Qinghai)”. Under such provision, in theory, Chinese 
colonization was no longer needed to be carried out in accordance with the Manchu dynasty’s excuse 
of “borrowing land”. The initial reaction from Mongolian princes in Beijing towards the Chinese 
republic was negative.
In December 1911 negotiations started between Sun’s republic in the South and the representative of 
the Manchu dynasty in the north on the matters of unification, abdication, treatment of the imperial 
household and Mongolian princes, and so forth.77 Sun Yatsen demanded that Chinese provinces be 
set up in Mongolia, but the request was turned down by the north because of resistance from 
Mongolian princes. Mongolian lobbying took place in the forum of the Association of Mongolian 
Princes and Nobles. Prince Nayantu78 as spokesman for 24 banners (8 Manchu banners, 8 Mongolian 
banners and 8 Chinese banners), spoke in favor of Manchu monarchism and against the republic. A 
compromise was finally reached between the two sides, with the Mongols supporting the Chinese 
republic and in return, the Mongols were promised that the traditional Mongolian system(both Inner 
and Outer Mongolia) would remain intact. A final compromise reached by the two side was the 
conclusion that “all Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans are equal to Chinese so as to protect
77 ' Jagchid Sechen, "Inner Mongolian Response to the Chinese Republic, 1911-1917"(op. cit.)
78 He later became an enthusiast supporter of Yuan shi-kai’s restoration of the monarchy. See, Jagchid 
Sechen, (op. cit.)
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private property and preserve ranks among the nobility.
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In March of 1912 when Yuan Shikai became the president of the republic, he had a two-handed policy 
toward Mongols. On the one hand, he promised to protect the old system in Mongolia. On August 19, 
1912, Regulations on Treatment toward Mongols was published by the Chinese government which 
promised the Mongolian ruling class that all the privileges and rights they enjoyed under the Qing 
dynasty would remain unaltered. It was also a gesture to the Outer Mongolian ruling class to win them 
back. On the other hand, he accelerated the policy of “divide and rule” in Inner Mongolia. The 
purpose was to control Inner Mongolia more tightly to avoid further separation.
To strengthen its control of Mongolian banners and leagues in Inner Mongolia, the Yuan Shi-kai 
government carried out two important measures: one was to set up a Mongolian-Tibetan 
administrative organ under the Beijing government; the other was to set up the three special 
administrative regions of Jehol, Chakhar, and Suiyuan in Inner Mongolia.
In May 1912 the Beijing government set up the Department of Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs under its 
interior ministry. In May 1914, following the Manchu Qing example, the Department of Mongolian- 
Tibetan Affairs was elevated as Mongolian-Tibetan Yuan, directly responsible to the president.
The “divide and rule” policy carved up Inner Mongolia. The leagues of Hulun-buir and Jerim were 
separated out and put under the administrations of Heilongjiang Province and Jilin Province. In 
January 1914, the Suiyuan special administrative region was set up which included 12 counties, 
Guihua city (Huhhot), two special banners of Turned, two leagues of Ulaanchab and Ikh Zuu. In 
February, the Chakhar Special Region was set up which included the Jehol region, Josotu and Juu-uda 
two Leagues. In March, the Chakhar Special Administrative Region was set up to include the Xinggan 
Region and the Shilinggol League, the 8 banners of Chakhar tribe. Govemor-generals were the top 
officials in charge of the three regions.
Two years after Yuan Shikai came to power, he was in even more control in terms o f dealing with 
nationalist revolutionaries in the south and the Mongol ruling class in the north. In 1914 large-scale 
cultivation o f Mongolian lands began, which were much larger in scale than the cultivation that had 
been carried out at the end of Manchu Qing dynasty. In February 1914, the ministries of the Interior, 
Agriculture-Commerce, and Finance together with Mongolian-Tibetan Yuan made the Ban on 
Unauthorized Opening Mongolian Lands for Cultivation, Award Measures to Cultivating Mongolian
79 On 9 Feb. 1912, the Nanking Provisional Government passed three documents on the Republic
government’s attitude toward Mongolian princes. The main content of the documents was that the 
private property of Mongolian aristocracy and their hereditary titles were to remain as before, and 
their faith in the Tibetan religion was to remain the same. The documents are: Favorable Conditions in 
the Post-abdication of Qing Emperor, Favorable Treatment Conditions about Royal Family, 
Treatments toward Manchus, Chinese, Moslems and Tibetans. Tian Zhihe, Feng Xuezhong, Minguo
Chu Mengqi Duli Shijian Yanjiu (Study on “Independence ” Incidents in Mongolian Banners in the 
Early Years o f  Chinese Republic) (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1991) p.190.
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Lands. In 1915 the Regulations of Frontier Wild Land was published.
The new policy forbade Mongolian banners to open lands for Chinese cultivation without the central 
government’s authorization. Yet, the more land that Mongolian banners provided for cultivation, the 
more rewards the ruling princes could get from the central government, such as medals, official titles, 
etc.. Half of the profit involved in the land lease and sale was surrendered to the state, the remaining 
half was kept by the Mongolian banners. The best grazing were being taken away from Mongol 
herdsmen, and as a result their livelihood suffered.
The death of Yuan Shikai in 1915 was followed by the period of turmoil known as warlordism.
Chinese warlords in neighboring Chinese provinces separately controlled large part o f Inner Mongolia. 
Warlords’ control of of Inner Mongolia did not completely end until 1947. The cultivation of 
Mongolian lands became the major means for the Chinese warlords to make profits and retain and 
enlarge their power.
The Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria use his military power to force Mongolian princes in 
the area to open Mongolian grazing land for Chinese cultivation. In 1916, he forcibly opened 180,000 
hectares of rich river valley in the Darkhan Prince Banner. In 1922 Zhang Zuolin again forcibly seized 
126,000 hectares to the west of Tongliao.
Warlords Zhang Yuting, Wu Junsheng, both Zhang Zuolin’s henchmen, followed Zhang’s example in 
seizing Mongolian lands. In 1924 Wu Junsheng forced a 99-year “lease” o f2,000 hectares of land in 
the Rear Banner o f Khorchin Right Wing. At the same time Wu Junsheng together with Yang Tingyu 
seized 2,200 hectare of cultivated land in the same banner. Wu Junan, Wu Junsheng’s brother, 
occupied a large parcels of land in the Jelim League as both farmland and grazing land and made a 
profit over 70 million silver dollars (Yin Yuan).
In the same year, Zhang Zuolin drew up the Program of Opening and Cultivation of Mongolian Lands, 
the purpose of which was not only to tender offer of Mongolian lands to Chinese immigrants but also 
to send his troops out for military cultivation of the land. Zhang Zuolin was the first person to begin 
the large-scale planned cultivation of Mongolian lands in the east of Inner Mongolia and from among 
all the warlords in Manchuria, he obtained and consolidated more cultivated Mongolian land than all 
the others.
In the west of Inner Mongolia, warlords seized and cultivate Mongolian lands as the major means to 
pay their soldiers and make profit. In the 8-year period from October 1912 to December 1920, the 
four consecutive Suiyuan Govemor-generals seized 552,970 hectare of land, and 132,700 taels of 
silver and 14,560,000 silver dollars (Yin Yuan) by way of seizing land. In 1914 in Turned Banner a 
Six County Measuring Bureau was set up. The bureau demanded that Mongol farmers pay for the 
price of their land in land certificates; if they could not afford the price, the land ownership would be 
transferred to Chinese farmers who could afford the price.
In 1926 after the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan occupied Mongolia, he confiscated the land from the
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peasants who lagged behind their mortgages while at the same time he continued to open Mongolian 
grassland. When Li Zhongming, Fu Yuxiang’s henchman, was Suiyuan governor-general, he opened 
36,045 hectares of land and made a profit of 1.62 million silver dollars (Yin Yuan).80
From end of the Manchu Qing dynasty to 1928, 198,492 hectares of land were opened for cultivation 
in the Suiyuan region alone. The land opened at the end of Qing dynasty accounted for 40% of the 
total number of 198,492 hectares, the land opened from 1912 to 1913 accounted for 0.6%, from 1914 
to 1928 59.4%.
According to an investigation made in the republic period, since 1915 the price of the “wild” land in 
the Chakhar Special Region was so cheap that the rich Chinese merchants, landlords, officials and 
politicians from all over the country were enthusiastically bidding on the newly opened land. The new 
land made many of them extremely rich and many of them became landlords with thousands and ten 
thousands hectares of land. “Those who got several hectares are as many as the stars in the sky, those 
who got under one hundred and several hundred hectares are not extraordinary, and those who got 
several hundred to several thousand hectares are many.”81
In Linhe County, where there were 60,000 hectares of cultivated land, there were two big Chinese 
landlords who had farmlands with holdings of over 20,000 hectares, 4 landlords with land over 667 
hectares, 9 landlords with land over 67 hectares. And the Catholic church owned nearly 10,000 
hectares farm land. These big landowners now held nearly 90% of the farmland o f die whole county. 
As a result of warlord cultivation of Mongolian lands, in Inner Mongolia “farmland became 
increasingly larger, grazing land increasingly smaller and Mongolian herdsmen’s livelihood harder”.82
While the officially organized colonization represented the Chinese ruling class’ colonialist policy 
toward Mongols, the vigilante groups and secret societies organized by the Chinese settlers 
represented common popular antagonism toward Mongols. In eastern Inner Mongolia, the most 
famous of the gangs of Chinese settlers was the Jin Dan Dao Society (Golden Pill Society), in the west 
of Inner Mongolia, the most famous example was the rag-to-riches landlord Wang Tongchun.
By the latter part of the Manchu Qing dynasty, the southern region of both the Juu-uda League and 
Josotu League were heavily settled by the Chinese, many of whom were deeply influenced by the 
historically rebellious White Lotus Society (Bai Lian Jiao), a militant Buddhist Sect. In 1891, a group 
of Chinese in the Ch’anyang and Aukhan Banner areas organized die Jin Dan Dao society (the way of 
golden pills), to fight for the restoration of the Chinese, the extermination of the Manchus and 
Mongols, and to fight against the foreign Christians. They killed the prince of Aukhan, disrupted the 
three Kharachin banners of Josotu League, and killed [massacred?] men, women, and children in these 
areas. This Chinese peasant revolt was crushed by the Manchu-Chinese forces and by Mongolian
80 Hao Weimin, ed. (op. cit.) p.94.
81 Hao Weimin, Ibid.
82 Hao Weimin, Ibid.
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volunteers.83
Wang Tongchun came from neighboring Zhili province as a landless peasant, and he took tremendous 
amount of farmland from Mongols by violence and chicanery. Wang Tongchun in the Hetao area (the 
rich irrigation areas in the Ordos bend of the Yellow River) had superb farmland of over ten thousand 
hectares, with an annual grain harvest o f20,000 hectoliters. He built up his own fortresses and 
maintained a private bandit army of over 100 soldiers. After the harvests like many other big border 
landlords, he often sent out his retainers on freebooting forays that ranged for hundreds of miles in a 
great curve sweeping from the Hetao region up into northwestern Manchuria.84
3.2. Mongolian Anti-Colonial Uprisings And Responses To The 1911 Mongolian Independence
Ordinary Mongols were more concerned about Chinese colonization, they were not interested in
monarchist or republic politics of China. Whether republic or monarchist made little difference to 
them in terms o f Chinese colonization. In the republic period in the newly established Chinese 
administrative territories in Inner Mongolia such as Chakhar, Suiyuan, the military and civilian 
officials were hangovers from the Ching. But in Manchuria, the new governors of the three new 
provinces were formerly Chinese bandits who had a history of early confrontation between local 
Mongolian peoples and Chinese settlers. Among the warlords in Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin had the 
most aggressive policy in terms of occupying Mongolian lands as noted above. After Zhang Zuolin, 
his son Zhang Xuelang dominated eastern Inner Mongolia until the Manchurian Incident of 1931. In 
eastern Inner Mongolia, there were locally organized uprisings against the Chinese colonizers, many 
of which were branded as being formed of Mongolian bandits. In western Inner Mongolia, the most 
famous rebellion was Dughuilang, a form of a secret society in which participants signed their names 
in a circle so that no ringleader could be recognized.
The Mongolian uprisings in the latter part of the 19th century took place after a period of two centuries 
of peace which had begun after the the Chakhar uprisings in 1657 had been quelled by the Manchu 
dynasty. This indicates that Mongol-Chinese ethnic tensions reached a breaking point mainly due to 
the drastically increased Chinese colonization. Though some of the uprisings were directed at the 
unscrupulous Mongolian ruling class, the social tensions within Mongolian society were directly or 
indirectly related to Chinese colonization.
“Mongolian Bandits” in Eastern Inner Mongolia85
The Mongolian areas within the three Northeast provinces were under more severe cultivation 
pressure than other areas in Inner Mongolia. It was under such circumstances that out of all the
83 Jagchid Sechin, “An Interpretation of Mongolian Bandits (Mengfei)”, Essays In Mongolian Studies, 
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84 Owen Lattimore, Mongol Journey (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1936) p28.
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Mongolian anti-Chinese colonization uprisings, most took place in eastern Inner Mongolia. The most 
famous were Toghtogh Taiji’s anti-Chinese Revolt (1908-11) and Babujab’s revolt (1913-16). The 
Mongolians who participated in these uprisings were usually labeled by the Chinese as “Mongolian 
bandits”. The phenomenon drew the attention of Owen Lattimore in his book on the Mongols of 
Manchuria. According to Jagchid Sechen86, those so-called Mongolian bandits were mainly involved 
in uprisings against the Chinese colonization. These rebellions contained members from both the 
upper and lower classes. And many of them were sympathetic and supportive toward the 
Independence movement in Khalkha Mongolia.
In the Mongol-Chinese conflicts in the Chinese-settled areas, there were both Chinese and Mongol 
bandits and vigilantes. The Chinese groups were much more powerful and aggressive. The Liu-Lama 
Band of the Turned Right Flank Banner (Chaoyang District), and the Josotu League from 1851 to 
1852 were early examples. There were also so-called Ma Ze (Bandits on horseback”), of which the 
Manchurian Warlord Zhang Zuolin was a prominent example. Jilanggha Taiji of Keshigten Banner, 
Juu-uda League, 1890, was typical of many groups on horseback.
The Bilinggha-Milsengge Band of Josotu League from 1862 to 1868 was a large group which looted 
Chinese towns near Mukden, Chaoyang, Chienchang Chinghomen, and along the Great Wall. They 
were protected by Mongols in Mongol territory until their capture by Manchu forces.
Many Mongolian revolts were against the tyrannical Mongol overlords. A typical example was Prince 
Sewangnorbusangbu, Jasagh of Tushiyetu (Khorchin Right Middle) Banner and Chief of the Jerim 
league, who put a heavy tax upon the Mongols within his banner to fund his luxurious life-style. In 
1901, banner officials and the ordinary people rebelled spontaneously, forcing him to hang himself.
As a result the leaders of the banner, such as Khuwaliyasun, Toghtogh, Namkhainingbu, Khuwaliyan, 
and more than thirty others were executed by the Manchu Qing court. There were other cases wherein 
the ruling princes were assassinated by Mongol rebels.
One popular uprising of the common people was the Lao Tou Hui movement. It took place in the 
Tumet Left Banner, Josotu League from 1860 to 1867. The fertile grazing fields of this banner were 
increasingly being cultivated by the Chinese settlers, and the Mongols’ livelihood was steadily 
deteriorating. The elders (lao tou) of this banner organized an association and led the people in armed 
resistance against the exploitative and corrupt banner administration. After an investigation, many 
commoner leaders including Chojintai, Namsarai, Chaghanbator, and Enkebatur were executed.
The rebellion of the Eight Sumun, Tumend Right Banner, Josotu league from 1861 to 1870 was 
influenced by the Lao Tou Hui movement mentioned above. Popular leaders, i.e., Changming, Danjur, 
Derchinjab, and others, stirred up the people in eight sumun (local units) o f the banner to refuse 
military service and the payment of taxes. This was a mass movement against both Manchu and 
Mongolian authorities. The leaders of the rebellion were either killed or exiled.
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The Revolt at Tokum in Jasaghtu Banner, Jerim League from 1899 to 1901 was a larger popular 
movement. This armed revolt was a co-operative movement among the Mongols of Jasaghtu and its 
neighboring banners whose livelihood was depressed because of poor administration and high taxes. 
Leaders of the uprising, Ghombosangbu and Wang Lao Hu, were outsiders who came in to help 
foment the popular uprising. Russian forces were also involved in the incident.
More recent and more fresh in the Mongols’ memory are the anti-cultivation revolts. Ghadaa Meiren 
(Meiren: title of banner administrator), a leader in these revolts, has become the best-known national 
hero for Mongols today and a famous folk song about his heroic deeds is sung on almost every 
occasion when national sentiments are expressed.
In the Jerim League, the Choghdalai Rebellion in Jalaid Banner in 1907 was an early example of anti­
cultivation revolts. After the Boxer Rebellion (1900), the Manchu Qing government accelerated its 
policy of land development and Chinese settlement north of the Great Wall. Eastern Inner Mongolia 
was the focus of the policy, and Jalaid banner was one of the main areas. As a backlash, in 1907, 
Choghadalai, the meiren of the banner, led a group of Mongols and killed Khafenggha, a Mongol 
collaborating with the Chinese. Then the group rose in armed rebellion and destroyed the Chinese 
administrative offices and settlements. This movement continued for almost one year.
A decade later between 1929 and 1930 again in the Jerim League, the Ghadaa Meiren in Darkhan 
(Khorchin Left Middle) Banner led another revolt. It was then a few years before the Manchurian 
Incident (1931)87, and Chinese development of Mongolian lands in the Jerim League was being 
forcibly carried out by General Zhang Zuolin. The Manchu wife of Namjilsereng, the prince of the 
Darkhan Banner, collaborated with the Chinese for personal gain and was the main promoter of 
Chinese settlement and cultivation. Ghadaa, a meiren of the same banner, strongly opposed her policy. 
He struggled in vain to stop the Chinese colonization and finally gathered his followers in an armed 
rebellion against her, her husband, Prince Namjilsereng and the Chinese.
In Turned Left Banner o f Josotu League in 1908, an uprising led by Bayandalai arose purely from the 
common Mongols without any leadership from the upper class. The armed struggle destroyed Chinese 
settlements in the districts of Changwu, Taoan, Huaide, and Tuquan, all of which were Chinese 
districts (or counties) that had been established within the Jerim League. This revolt was finally 
crushed by Chinese forces.
In Jarud Left Banner, Juu-uda League in 1913, Ghombojab’ a rebellion led by Ghombojab was 
directed against the Prince Dobjai, Jasagh (banner administrative head) of the banner, because the he 
was a corrupt official who collaborated with Chinese officials to sell banner land to Chinese settlers. 
Ghombojab, Tusalghchi (vice-head) of the same banner opposed the prince’s policies. He gathered the 
people, killed the prince, raided the Chinese city of Kailu, and destroyed the Chinese settlements
86 Jagchid Sechen, (Ibid.)
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within the three banners of Left Jarud, Right Jarud, and Aru-Khorchin of the Juu-uda League. Finally, 
being outnumbered by Chinese forces, the rebels escaped to Outer Mongolia.
Mongolian Uprisings in Western Inner Mongolia88
In Western Inner Mongolia, it was the same as in the Eastern region, with Mongols’ uprisings against 
Chinese settling being as old as the Chinese colonization. One early uprising was led by Bayanoljei in 
Urad Front Banner, Ulanchab League in 1856. Bayanoljei was a high official o f the Urad Front 
Banner and he led a group in burning Chinese settlements and in killing the settlers.
Baghadorji and Shobghor led a rebellion group near Hohhot, Turned banner and Ulanchab League in 
1870. This group robbed the Chinese in the vicinity of Hohhot and the north of the Mongnai 
Mountains (Da Qing Shan). They had support from Mongol officials of the Muu-Mingghan banner, 
Ulanchab league.
In western Inner Mongolia, Mongols’ resistance to the Christian churches was also related to Chinese 
cultivation. By the time of the Boxer Rebellion in North China in 1900, western Inner Mongolia was 
offended by missionary activity, especially in the Dalad Banner, Ikh Zuu League, the Doren-keud 
Banner of Ulanchab league, and the Alashan Banner. However, Mongolian opposition to the Christian 
churches was quite different from the Chinese Boxers. The Mongols were against the churches not 
only because they propagated a faith contrary to Buddhism, but because the churches supported 
Chinese occupation o f Mongol lands. In the settlement of the Boxer Rebellion, the churches received 
even more land from the Mongolian banners, thus increasing the hatred. Therefore, until the end of the 
Qing Dynasty there were always problems between the pastoral Mongols and those Chinese settlers 
who were under church protection.
The Dughuilang89 movements first happened in Jeunghar (Ordos left Front) Banner, Ikhe Zuu League 
(Ordos) between 1906 and 1908. In 1902 Yigu, the Manchu Governor-General of Suiyuan, forced the 
banners of both Ikhe Zuu Leagues and Ulanchab Leagues to open their land to Chinese settlers for 
cultivation. In 1906, a Dughuilang-type, popular and secretly planned movement broke out in the 
Jeunghar Banner but its leaders were killed by Yigu. Later, Mongols under the leadership of Dampil 
Taiji organized another Dughuilang and situation became more serious. Finally, Dampil and six other 
persons were executed by Yigu in 1908 and the movement was crushed.90
In the republic period, Dughuilang movements revived in Ikhe Zuu League on a much larger scale in 
the republic period in the form of armed struggle. Dughuilang movements broke out in the banners of
88 The part is mainly drawn from Jagchid Sechen (op. cit.) and Hao Weimin, ed. Nei Menggu Lishi 
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Uushin, Hangjin, Dalad and Otog. The targets of these movements were Chinese warlords and 
Mongolian princes who sold Mongolian interests to Chinese. The most prominent Dughuilangs were 
the two in the Uushin Banner and Dalad Banner.
The Dughuilang of Uushin Banner was led by the famous Shine Lama. He organized 11 Dughuilang 
organizations in the banner. The Dughuilang movement controlled the whole banner and put forward 
the following demands: a ban on the sale of the banner’s land and punishment to those who did the 
selling; and the banner’s public land was forbidden to be used for the payment of debt. The movement 
lasted from 1912 to 1919 when the Shine Lama was arrested by the head of Ikhe Zuu league.
The Dughuilang movement in Dalad Banner broke out in 1914. The movement was against the banner 
Jasagh Sunbarbaatu who sold banner land and put heavy taxes on Mongols. There were five 
dughuilangs involving several thousand Mongols. The movement set up its own armed force and 
controlled the whole banner. Because of its persistent armed struggle, the Dughuilang forced the 
banner administration to give in. The banner authority had to stop selling the banner land, close the 
already cultivated farmland, reassert the banner’s public ownership of the land and land rent, and so 
forth.
Efforts Towards Independence in Inner Mongolia
Faced with the dying Manchu dynasty and the change from the Manchu imperial authority to the 
Chinese republican authority, the Mongols’ sense of crisis increased abruptly. Apart from sporadic 
uprisings, there were more conscious efforts of self-strengthening made by the Mongols, as well as the 
active response of the Mongolian ruling class in Inner Mongolia toward the 1911 declaration of 
independence in Khalkha(Outer) Mongolia. Nationalist sentiments and efforts made by the Mongols in 
Inner Mongolia were no less than those shown by those who established Mongolian Independence in 
1911 in the north. But the different fates of Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia were the consequence 
of mainly outside forces.
According to Joseph Fletcher91, the earliest recorded modernization reform took place in Khalkha 
Mongolia and was led by Toghtakhu Toro, the grandson of Sechen Khan Sangjayidorji. He was well- 
versed in many languages such as Manchurian, Tibetan and Chinese in addition to Mongolian. 
Beginning in 1821, he began to modernize the systems of administration and religion within his 
banner. In 1837, however, when he tried to unify all the dispersed monasteries, he came into direct 
confrontation with the monasteries. In the end, he lost the ensuing armed conflicts because he had 
failed to gamer enough sympathy and support from his more conservative contemporaries. From a 
larger perspective, his failure was also caused by the Manchu Mongolian policy which thwarted the 
development of a unified Mongolia.
At the turn o f the century when the Manchu Qing dynasty was deep in crisis, the Japanese Meiji
91' Joseph Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet”, The 
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Reform provided a measure of inspiration not only to the Manchu-Chinese officials, but also to Prince 
Gungsangnorbu (Prince Gung), the most prominent Mongolian leader in Beijing and also the leader of 
the three leagues in eastern Inner Mongolia. He knew that modernization was essential to national 
survival, so he carried out modernization reforms in education, in the local military force and for 
individual rights in Kharchin Mongolia, his homeland. His most important achievement was setting up 
the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beijing. The academy played an important role in modem 
Mongolian nationalism since the academy produced many figures who later emerged in the nationalist 
movements such as the Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Party, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Movement led by De Wang and the pro-Communist Inner Mongolian Allied Autonomous movement.
After the Wu Chang Mutiny, Prince Gung declared that if the Manchu dynasty gave in to the Chinese 
nationalist revolutionaries, he would declare the independence of Eastern Mongolia. After the 
abdication of the Manchu emperor in 1912, Prince Gung went to Kharachin Mongolia, his homeland, 
and convened all the leaders of East Mongolia at Ulan Khada. At the meeting, all the Mongolian 
leaders advocated independence from China and the establishment of a Great Mongolia. They 
intended Prince Gung to be the Mongolian Khan and hoped for assistance from Japan or Russia.
At the time, the Bogda Khan of independent Mongolia responded very quickly by appointing Prince 
Gung as the governor of south Mongolia, of all 6 leagues and 49 banners. But in the end, the Japanese 
failed to meet their promises to the Mongolians because their needs regarding the Mongolian areas 
were satisfied by the famous 21 Agreements made with Yuan Shikai on May 25, 1915. The treaty gave 
Japan prerogatives on the economy, transportation, land and mining developments in South Manchuria 
and East Mongolia, and in return Yuan received Japanese support in the restoration of the Chinese 
monarchy.
Yuan Shikai’s secured position and his now strengthened power made Prince Gung’s attempt difficult 
and Prince Gung was forced by the situation to compromise with Peking. That same year(1915), the 
Khiakhta Tripartite Treaty was signed by Russia, China and Mongolia, and under the terms of the 
agreement, [Outer] Mongolia was forced to abandon its independence but was to remain autonomous 
under Chinese suzerainty.
An additional heavy blow to Mongolian independence and unification efforts was General Xu 
Shuzheng’s expedition into Outer Mongolia. Under the pretext of defending China’s territorial 
integrity, General Xu Shuzheng, a pro-Japanese warlord whose courage and strategic shrewdness are 
still admired by the Chinese today92, occupied Mongolia in 1919. He canceled the Mongolian 
autonomy that had been worked out by the Treaty, and demanded all taxes due going back to 1911, 
which pauperized most of the Mongolian population. One year later he was driven out by the “Mad 
Baron” Ungem-Stemberg, and the republic was formed with the support from the new Soviet Union in
92 Shi Bo, The Inside Story O f Outer Mongolia Independence (Press of People's China, 1993) pl76. 
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1921.
However, in 1911, the new Mongolian independence was an inspiration for nationalist revolts in Inner 
Mongolia. The anti-Chinese Revolt led by Togtogh Taiji broke out in Eastern Inner Mongolia in 1908 
and lasted until 1911. Toghtogh was a taiji (noble) of the Ghorlos Front Banner, Jerim League. 
Toghtogh launched his armed attacks on the Chinese settlements and government offices in 1908.
Soon this revolt against the Manchus and Chinese was supported by the people of the four banners of 
Jailaid, and Suke-Gung (Khorchin Right Front) in the Jerim league. Toghtogh, a talented leader of 
guerrilla warfare, led his force to attack Chinese settlements in the districts of Changchun, Talai, and 
Taoan. He was able to dominate the northern half of the Jerim league for several years from a 
stronghold in the Great Xinggan Mountains. His men continued their heroic fight against the Qing 
regime and the Chinese settlers until 1911, when Toghtogh and his group went to Outer Mongolia to 
join the Mongolian Independence Movement. This was the greatest “meng fei” incident of the late 
Qing dynasty.93
In 1912, the independence efforts of Inner Mongolia were joined by the efforts of Prince Utai of 
Khorchin Right Banner, Jerim League. Utai allowed Mongolian farmers from the Josotu League to 
cultivate the banner lands instead of the Chinese, and he attempted to play the Russians against the 
Manchu-Chinese power. For so doing, he was attacked by the Manchu Qing court. In 1912, seeing the 
inevitable fall o f the Manchu Qing dynasty, Utai cooperated with Rashiminjur, Prince of the Suke 
Gung (Khorchin Right Rear) Banner, in a rebellion against Peking. At one point they even occupied 
Taonan and Kailu, the newly established Chinese prefectures, but they were eventually defeated by 
Chinese forces and fled to Outer Mongolia94.
In the Silinggol league, there were two Khauchid banners who responded to the 1911 Mongolian 
independence. Princes of East Khauchid Banner, successfully rallied more than half of their banner, 
and along with the livestock, they migrated to North Mongolia. Yangsanjab, Chief of Abagha Right 
Banner, also declared his loyalty to the newly-founded Mongolia State. Countless individual 
Mongolian lamas, princes and common people, also migrated to the Mongolian state to show their 
political loyalty.
In 1913, the year of the black cow in Mongolian calendar, the Mongolian state began its military 
expedition o f unification. Positive response in Inner Mongolia extended from the east to the west. The 
expedition army commanded by Damdinsuren enrolled most of his 1,000-strong army from the eager 
volunteers o f Inner Mongolia. The army won battles all the way to Doloon Nor, the base for Chinese 
traveling merchants. The unification campaign won favorable response from the four leagues in the 
West of Inner Mongolia, and was later joined by Babujab in Eastern Turned in the siege of Doloon 
Nor. Finally the military unification failed mainly due to the shortage of supplies in winter of that
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Babujab’s Revolt in Easter Inner Mongolia from 1913 to 1916 reflected the competing outside forces 
which tried to influence and dominate Mongols. Babujab was an ambitious man from Surug (or 
Turned Left Banner) with a deep hatred of the Chinese colonization. He had once been involved in the 
Japanese-supported Manchu restoration movement. After the failure of Prince Gungsangnorbu’s Inner 
Mongolian independence movement, Babujab obtained Japanese arms and supplies and rebelled 
against the Chinese Republic. He fought in the Jerim and Juu-uda leagues, and even attacked the 
Chinese centers of Mukden, Jilin (Kirin), and Heilongjiang Provinces, and to the south and west in the 
Jehol and Chakhar areas. All along, he had maintained contact with the Urga Government of Outer 
Mongolia. He was killed in 1916 while attacking the city of Linxi, northern Jehol, and his troops 
scattered. Some of them joined the Outer Mongolian forces and some returned to their homes96.
Among these Mongolian rebellions, most were fighting against Chinese colonization and against the 
Mongolian upper-classes who had collaborated with the Chinese. But Chinese Communist historians 
focus on the supposed revolutionary nature of the struggle and refer to these movements against 
Chinese Colonization as the “Inner Mongolian Peasant Revolution”.97 Yet, the real nature of these 
nationalistic movements reveals most prominently very strong anti-Chinese colonization and anti- 
Mongolian ruling class sentiments, which indicates the complexity and depth of Mongolian 
nationalism in China. Actually the later development of Mongolian nationalism in Inner Mongolia 
mainly wavered between two themes: revolutionary nationalism and ethnic-nationalism. .
Even after the Khiakhta Tripartite Treaty wherein Outer Mongolia’s independence was canceled, there 
were still independence activities going on [in Outer Mongolia or in Inner Mongolia?], though more 
as isolated incidents. In 1917, Mugdenbo, a young and learned official of Ukerchin (later Mingghan 
Banner) of Chakhar, gathered several thousand young Mongols and carried out a military rebellion 
against the Chinese Republic in a struggle for independence. Without support from any outside powers, 
his group was soon crushed by Chinese forces before the rebellion had gained sufficient momentum.
The reaction of the ruling Mongolian princes toward the new Chinese rule established after the Wu 
Chang Mutiny in 1912, was that they preferred the traditional monarchy to a Chinese republic or a 
nationalist government; they preferred a monarch, even a Chinese monarch, as a ruling authority rather 
than an authority based on the concept of a Chinese nation98. For Mongolian leaders to accept Chinese 
nationalist authority, they would have had to admit that they were part of the Chinese nation as 
conceived by early Chinese nationalists.
The Mongols’ negative response toward the Chinese republic showed that an all-including Chinese 
nation equal to the Manchu empire was too alien an idea for Mongolian princes and nobles to accept.
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It was relatively easier for a Mongolian lordship to be transferred to or succeeded by a Manchu lord as 
long as the latter functioned in the same way. But in an age of nationalism, it was more difficult to 
convince Mongols to accept a nationalist authority from another people; it was difficult because the 
Chinese nationalist authority, as opposed to the concept of feudal allegiances, is an individualist 
notion and individual Mongols had to be convinced that they were not what they always thought they 
were, that they were suddenly a part of a new nation after the Manchu empire.
In spite of the ferocity and widespread nature of the uprisings and resistance, these efforts did not form 
a general Inner Mongolian nationalist movement with a unified leadership. According to Owen 
Lattimore, the Mongols rose in rebellion against Chinese colonization in different places at different 
times because each Chinese warlord pressed his encroachment on the Mongols at his own pace." 
Upper class Mongolian society after the Chinese revolution in 1911 remained relatively unchanged. 
The hereditary princes and monastic power were the ruling class, there was no middle class, and trade 
was in the hands of Chinese. Therefore Owen Lattimore, correctly, observed that there was not even 
enough manpower to make possible the rise of Mongol warlords to compete with Chinese warlords.100
3.3. Mongolian Nationalism and KMT: Collaboration And Disillusion
The KMT was different from all previous Chinese political powers in the sense that it had a whole set 
of political ideology, the principles of three peoples. The nationalist principle of KMT regime was an 
assimilationist policy toward non-Chinese minorities. During the period of the KMT regime, 
Mongolian resistance against Chinese pressure evolved from sporadic and non-unified uprisings into a 
form of ideological politics. The Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party founded in 1925 was 
the Mongols’ first modem political party in Inner Mongolia. The motivation behind the party was 
nationalistic though it had different ideological colors under the influence of different outside forces: 
Russians, Independent Mongolia, Chinese communists and Chinese nationalists. Although De Wang’s 
autonomous movement was a coalition of the radical Mongols with both modem educated and 
conservative nobles, De Wang’s personal leadership represented a more independent and genuine 
nationalist effort with less influence from other ideologies. There was also the pro-Chinese 
autonomous movement led by Ulanhu. Though Ulanhu represented the Chinese communist party, in 
the early period the party’s Mongolian characteristics were emphasized to appeal to Mongolian 
nationalists.
Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
To envisage a modem Chinese state, Sun Yatsen had to deal with the problem of how to incorporate 
non-Chinese peoples, inherited as part of Manchu dynastic legacy, into the new Chinese state. That 
was one of the considerations of Sun Yatsen when he departed from his early view of “expelling 
northern barbarians” and progressed to the view of setting up a commonwealth o f five nations. In
99 Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, (Oxford University Press, 1955) p.23.
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contrast to local Chinese warlords who had huge interests at stake in colonizing Mongolian lands, Sun 
Yatsen’s nationalist party in the far south appeared to be a friend. The KMT’s slogan of “down with 
Warlords” in their unification campaign certainly made them appear a potential ally for the Mongols 
against local Chinese warlords and this appealed to many Mongolian nationalists.
As early as 1917 when Sun established the nationalist government in Guang Zhou, Bai Yu-ti 
(Serengdungrub), a Mongol teacher at the Mongolian Tibetan Academy, joined Sun’s nationalist party 
thus becoming Sun’s earliest Mongolian disciple. He was appointed by the KMT as the Special 
Commissioner of Party’s Affairs in Mongolia and three special districts of Johel, Chakhar and Suiyuan. 
Since he was a former teacher of the Mongolian and Tibetan Academy and had many contacts, the 
KMT exerted influence through his Mongolian followers.
From the very beginning, the Chinese Communists began to pay attention to its work among the 
Mongols. The CCP’s organization in the north began to exert its influence among Mongol students in 
the Mongolian and Tibetan Academy. Among the early CCP leaders, Li Dazhao in particular paid a 
lot of attention to Mongolian affairs. In his articles of Doctrine of the People and Mongolian National 
Liberation Struggle, he regarded the issue of Mongolian national liberation as part of the Chinese 
revolution. Ulanhu, leader of the later Inner Mongolian autonomous movement, was one o f the active 
students who had contact with Li Dazhao. The Mongolian Revolutionary Party sent Buyan Nemeku, a 
famous writer, to Beijing to influence Mongolian students.
Later when the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party (KMT) formed an anti-imperialist 
and revolutionary united front with support from the Third Communist International (Comintern), it 
was possible for a Mongolian political party associated with both the KMT and the CCP to be 
established. At the time of the KMT-CCP cooperation, there was a representative from the Mongolian 
Revolutionary Party, B. Dantzen, who was sent to Guang Zhou where he was warmly welcomed by 
Sun Yatsen. The Mongolian People’s Republic also sent party representatives to Peking to influence 
the students of the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy.101
On March 1,1925, in Kalgan the IMPRP was formally founded under the aegis of the Pro-Russian 
warlord Fe Yuxiang and the Comintern. Among those attending the meeting were Dambadoiji, the 
first secretary of the Mongolian Revolutionary Party in Mongolian People’s Republic; and Orchirov, a 
Buryat Mongol, as representative of the Comintern. Bai Yunti, who represented the forces believing 
that Mongolian national liberation was to be achieved with the help of the KMT, was elected as 
Chairman. Merse (Guo Dao-fu), elected general secretary of the party, spoke for an independent 
nationalist force. When Bai Yunti went to Guang Zhou to join the KMT, Merse went to the north to 
become a member of Mongolian Revolutionary Party. During 1923 to 1924, Merse, together with Fu 
Ming-tai, another nationalist, founded the Mongolian Youth Party in Hulun-buir area. Many Mongols 
with a CPC background were also elected to the central committee; among these were Jiyatai, Li Yu-
101, Jagchid Sechen, “The Inner Mongolian Kuomintang in 1920s”, (op.cit.) p264.
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zhi and Ulanhu. Soon after the IMPRP was founded, it began to set up its own cadre school, a military 
academy.
The background of the KMT-CCP co-operation was reflected in the IMPRP’s guidelines. In Chinese, 
the party was called “nei meng gu renmin geming dang” (Inner Mongolian Nationalist Party) which 
indicates it was like an extension of the KMT in Inner Mongolia. In Mongolian, the party was called 
“totughadu monghol un arad un khubisghaltu nam” (“nei meng gu renmin geming dang” in Chinese; 
Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party) which means it was a sister party of the Mongolian 
People’s Revolutionary Party in the Mongolian People’s Republic. Since the Chinese Communists 
were incorporated by the KMT at the time, the IMPRP was also heavily influenced by the CCP and 
the leftist wing of the KMT.
The primary goal of the party was to realize Mongolian national self-determination. The party asserted 
its goals of protecting Mongolian public land and forbidding dishonest trade. The revolutionary goals 
of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism were also prescribed in the party constitution. The Mongols’ 
goal of national liberation was opposed to Chinese patronage whether it emanated from the KMT or 
from the warlords. At the time, Chinese warlords were the major advocates and executors of Chinese 
cultivation on Mongolian lands. However, the KMT later proved to be no more willing to stop 
Chinese migration and cultivation than were the warlords. In 1928, a KMT force controlled Beijing 
and renamed it Beiping, a name meaning “pacifying the north”102 which had once been used in the 
Ming dynasty. Mongolian national liberation was also emphasized differently by radicals and 
conservatives. The left wing tended to emphasize liberating Mongols from the oppression of th6 
Mongolian feudal ruling class, but others emphasized national independence from outside forces, i.e. 
Chinese domination.
The mixed representation of the goals of the IMPRP reflected the disagreements and confusions in 
Mongolian nationalism in those years. The goal of national self-determination was diluted by various 
competing ideologies. In the Eastern areas, the newly founded army led by the IMPRP took some 
action against the Chinese colonization forces under the warlords such as executing Chinese officials 
who were in charge of cultivating Mongolian lands. But these actions were possible only because the 
Mongolian army joined warlord Feng Yuxiang’s campaign against the Manchurian warlord Zhang 
Zuolin.
Being closely associated with external political forces, inevitably the IMPRP experienced up and 
downs together with the general situation in China in 1920s. In the autumn of 1926, Feng Yuexiang 
was defeated at Nankou by Zhang Zuolin, and the IMPRP together with Feng Yuexiang retreated from 
Kalgan to Baotou, and then to Ningxia. At this time, the IMPRP began to exert more influence in 
western Inner Mongolia.
In the west o f Inner Mongolia, the IMPRP’s force, the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army,
102 Jagchi Sechen, (op. cit., 1988) p.274.
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was more influenced by traditional radical forces (Dughuilang) and by the Chinese Communists. The 
army based itself in the Uushin Banner and engaged in armed struggle against the Chinese warlord 
Jing Yuexiu for two years. In 1926 radical forces created the Ikhe Zuu League Incident103 and Alashan 
Incident104 which shocked the whole of Inner Mongolia.
In July 1928, the Mongolian nationalists, Merse and Fu Ming-tai, took the opportunity to declare 
independence in the Hulun-buir League, with the help from the Soviet Russian and Mongolian army. 
The independence was short-lived, Mongolian army was defeated by Zhang Xueliang, the chief 
commander of the three provinces of Manchuria. However, Merse made peace with Zhang in return 
for more autonomy in Hulun-buir region.105 but the retreat of the Soviet army put an end to the short­
lived independence. Ulanhu, Kuibi and other Mongols had originally been sent by the IMPRP to the 
Soviet Union to receive training. After the split between the KMT and the CPC, they were instructed 
by the Comintern to return to Inner Mongolia.
The military successes achieved by the IMPRP were short-lived because they had been decided by the 
general political situations in the time. The factional struggle within the party reached a breaking point 
as the KMT began its showdown with the CCP. In 1927, the IMPRP moved to Ulaan Baator following 
instructions from the Comintern. Under the direction of the Comintern, the pro-KMT elements in the 
party were purged. When Bai Yunti escaped from the Mongolian People’s Republic, he completely 
sided with KMT and changed his faction of the IMPRP to the KMT’s Inner Mongolian section. That 
was the effectively end of the Ulaan Baator pro-KMT IMPRP.
The faction of the IMPRP associated with the Comintern and Ulaan Baator continued to work among 
the radical groups such as the Dughuilangs. After the “September 18 Incident” in 1931 when the 
Japanese army completed its occupation of Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia within the short 
timeframe of 4 months and 18 days, the IMPRP’s activities went underground in Inner Mongolia. It 
has been said that the IMPRP ended in 1933 when the Mongolian People’s Republic put an end to the 
IMPRP’s Ulaan Baator Office. But the IMPRP’s links with the Comintern and with the Mongolian 
People’s Republic and its continuing underground activities after 1931 106 were later used by the 
Chinese as a pretext for the fabrication of charges and the subsequent purge of the so-called New
103 The IMRPR revolutionary army led by Wangdanima and Communist Li Yu-zhi once drove the 
Prince of Uushin Banner Tehusamughulang out to Yu Ling County in Shaan Xi. The radical action 
caused internal conflicts between Bai's pro-KMT force and the pro-CCP force. As a result, Li Yu-zhi 
was killed by the pro-KMT force. Ibid., p271.
104 In 1926, Merse and Orchirov went to the Alashan areas and engaged in activities which led to a 
small-scale revolution. In April 1927, Dechinyinshinorbu, a relative of the ruling prince of Alashan, 
got arms from Feng Yu-xiang, occupied the capital of Alashan, and killed officials and the jasagh.
The rebels set up a revolutionary political office in place of the former administration which was also 
the headquarters of the IMPRP second rout army. In just 12 days, the rebellion was suppressed and 
Dechinyinshinorbu was executed. Jagchid Sechen, (op.cit.) p. 270.
105 Guo Guanlian, Guo Daofu Zhuan Lue (Merse’s Autobiography) ( the Institute of the IMAR 
Mongolian Language and History, 1976) p. 101.
106 Tumen and Zhu Lidong, Kang Sheng Yu Nei Ren Dang Yuan An (Kang Sheng and N1MPRP Case) 
(the Central Party School Press, 1995) p.l 13.
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Inner Mongolian Revolutionary Party during the Cultural Revolution.
As the KMT came to power, Chiang Kaishek abandoned Sun Yatsen’s pretension that “all peoples in 
China are equal” and “all peoples in China have the right of national self-determination””. The KMT 
began a straightforward assimilationist policy toward non-Chinese minorities. By collaborating with 
the KMT and now compromising nationalist goals, the pro-KMT IMPRP members led by Bai Yunti 
were put in charge of the Ministry o f Mongolia and Tibet which was the successor to the Manchu’s 
Ministry o f Dependencies, which had also been known as the Mongolia and Tibet Yuan in Yuan 
Shikai’s reign. The legitimacy of the pro-KMT radical Mongols’ representatives were questioned by 
Mongols in the later wave of the nationalist movement led by De Wang107.
De Wang’s Mongolian Autonomous Movement
Prince Demchukdongrub (1902-1966) of West Sunid (De Wang) became a prominent Mongolian 
leader on the eve of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, when he succeeded for the first time 
in organizing a general movement o f the whole of Inner Mongolia, from Manchuria to the Ordos, and 
set up a regime with a state nature. The major point he made was that Inner Mongolia should no 
longer be divided into different parts and annexed into to various Chinese provinces, and this was also 
a major demand that he made to Chiang Kaishek. His goal was a unified Inner Mongolia and a unity of 
Mongol action. Faced with he Japanese invasion, he maintained that Inner Mongolia, not just as the 
Chinese frontier, had its own interests to defend, and that these were different from Chinese interests, 
and further, that Mongols could not expected to fight against the Japanese for China’s security. He 
therefore demanded autonomy for Inner Mongolia, under a government chosen by the Mongols, not 
appointed by the Chinese108.
As soon as the KMT unified the whole country and its power reached north China and into west Inner 
Mongolia region, the KMT government began to reform Mongolian traditional administrative system 
which had remained unchanged from the Manchu Qing dynasty to the warlord governments. The 
purpose of the reform was to further institutionalize the separation of Inner Mongolia into different 
territorial divisions and to speed up the assimilation process.
The first important measures undertaken by the KMT in Inner Mongolia were to establish Chinese 
provinces and their concomitant administrative structures in Inner Mongolia. In August 1928, the 
KMT central Political committee passed a resolution to set up Chinese provinces out of the six special 
districts: Jehol, Chakhar, Suiyuan, Ningxia, Chinghai (Kokonor), Xikang (Kham). In addition to Jehol, 
the banners o f  Chakhar and Suiyuan became Chinese provinces, and the two banners of Alashan and 
Ejina were also thrown in to the newly established Ningxia Province109.
107 Jagchid Sechen, (op.cit.) p.270.
108 Lin Xiuche, “Two Key Figures in Modem Mongolian History”, Collection o f  Papers on Important 
Figures in Modern Chinese History p.953 and Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub ’s Autobiography 
(Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political Consultancy Conference. 1984)
109 Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub’s Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political
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In September 1928 the order o f setting up new provinces was published. In the beginning of 1929 the 
three Chinese provinces were set up on Mongolian land. By then the 6 leagues, 24 tribes and 4 special 
banners had already been incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, 
and the newly established provinces of Jehol, Chakhar, Suiyuan and Ningxia. Provincialization, 
which had never been realized under Manchu and Chinese warlord administrations because of 
Mongolian opposition, was completed. Inner Mongolia was now under the control of the new KMT 
warlords (old warlords who had received appointments from the KMT government), and under 
Manchurian warlords in the east and Shanxi warlords in the west. The Chinese cultivation of 
Mongolian lands was accelerated by both these new warlords and by the new Chinese provincial 
administrations110.
Bai Yunti, as a member of the KMT central committee, in the eyes of many Mongols, did not make 
much of an effort to stop the resolution. Mongolian representation in the KMT as headed by Bai Yunti 
was discredited at this point and this situation was then exploited by the Chinese. As a result, Yan 
Xishan, a Shanxi warlord who had had a long history of maintaining his troops by colonizing 
Mongolian land, was appointed Chairman of the Mongolia and Tibet Ministry in 1928.
This shows that by then the pro-KMT IMPRP as led by Bai Yunti had become a convenient tool for 
the KMT’s Mongolian policy and no longer represented Mongol demands. Disillusioned with this 
policy, Mongols demanded autonomy from the KMT regime and started a new autonomous movement. 
The campaign against the establishment of Chinese provinces on Mongolian territories was the 
starting point for the new autonomous movement111.
The setting up of Chinese provinces in Inner Mongolia caused major opposition from all Inner 
Mongolian leagues and banners. When the Mongols realized that there was no way to gain ground on 
the issue of the newly established provinces, they turned their attention to the issue of how to define 
the system and status o f Inner Mongolian leagues and banners, and to the issue of their relations with 
the Chinese provinces and counties. Mongolian representatives made petitions to Chiang Kaishek 
asking him to honor Sun Yatsen’s promise of self-determination for non-Chinese minorities. In June 
1929, the KMT held a Meeting of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs bureau. In the meeting, the 
Mongolian representatives asked for the establishment of a unified Mongolian autonomous 
administration of all leagues and banners, but their wishes were ignored112.
In the end, the meeting passed “Organization Law of the Mongolian Leagues, Tribes and Banners”. 
Though the organization law indicated that the status of leagues and banners were the same as that of 
provinces and counties, it confirmed the separation policy that all leagues and banners of Inner
Consultancy Conference. 1984) p. 15.
110 Jagchid Sechen, “The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement of the 1930s”, Essays in 
Mongolian Studies, (op. cit.) p.282.
111 Ibid. p.282.
112 Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub’s Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political 
Consultancy Conference. 1984) p. 32.
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Mongolia now belonged to the different new provinces. According to the law, although the traditional 
units o f the league and banners remained, power was transferred from the ruling class to councils of 
elected people. Though this would appear on the surface to be more democratic, in actuality, it further 
divided and dispersed Mongolian political power. For the Mongolian ruling class, the law was 
obviously worse than the Beijing Government’s (1912-1919) “Regulations for the Treatment of 
Mongolia113”.
During Mongolian opposition against the organization law, Prince Demchugdungrub emerged as a 
nationalist leader. He had assumed the post of Jasagh at the age of 18. In his banner, he conducted 
modernization reforms such as the setting up of modern schools, hospitals and factories. He made 
lamas who could not read the sutras return to lay life. He also organized a Mongolian armed force. He 
maintained that national survival was the most urgent goal for Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and that 
internal reform or social revolution was the second task. He advocated working hard in the grasslands 
to build up Mongolian strength rather than going to Peking to ask for titles.
The autonomous movement was initiated by the Bat-Khaalagh Sume conference in the summer of 
1933. The movement demanded the formation of a pan-Mongolian autonomous area governed by an 
autonomous government; Mongols were to hold frill autonomy except for diplomacy and defense; and 
it argued for the cessation of Chinese cultivation of Mongolian lands at the very least, if not also the 
return of previously taken lands now cultivated by the Chinese. Chiang Kaishek regarded the 
Mongols’ demand for autonomy as a “conspiracy” and decided to deal with De Wang using a carrot 
and stick policy114. He would tolerate only the separate local autonomies excluding the vast areas 
inhabited by Mongolian herdsmen. According to his view, the Mongolian nomadic economy should be 
changed and incorporated into part of Chinese agriculture for security purposes.115
The KMT Party’s Central Political Committee that same year reluctantly passed “Principles for the 
Implementation of Mongolian Autonomy”. In 1934, the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political 
Council was set up in Bat-Khaalagh Sume under the sovereignty and supervision of the KMT central 
government. With an administrative fee from the KMT central government of only 20,000 yuan, the 
autonomous political council setup office in three Mongolian yurts at (Bat-Khaalagh Sume in 
Chinese)116 and recruited its own armed force. The motivation behind the KMT’s approval of this 
council was the fear that the Mongols as led by De Wang might be enticed into collaborating with the 
encroaching Japanese.
The autonomous council at Bat-Khaalagh Sume was actually in a very hostile situation: De Wang’s 
Bat-Khaalagh Sume Mongolian Political Council was surrounded by numerous antagonist Chinese
113 Jagchid Sechen, (op. cit.)
114 Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub’s Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political 
Consultancy Conference. 1984) p. 5.
115 Owen Lattimore, Mongols o f Manchuria (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935) p. 102.
116 Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub’s Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political 
Consultancy Conference. 1984) p. 8.
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forces: Fu Zuoyi at Guisui (present Huhhot), Wang Jingguo at Baotou, and Song Zheyuan at Kalgan. 
Further opposition against De Wang’s autonomous movement came from local warlords like Yan 
Xishan and Fu Zuoyi117 rather than from KMT central government. Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi had had 
to depend on ever increasing cultivation in Inner Mongolia to maintain the large numbers of their 
armies and to provide cultivated land for their retired peasant soldiers. Yan Xishan appointed a 
commander ( Wang Jing-guo) stationed at Baotou exclusively for military cultivation.
Apart from administrating Chinese migration into Inner Mongolia, the Chinese warlords also 
interfered with local Mongolian affairs at the league and banner level. Chinese counties and 
prefectures were set up to administer the influx of Chinese. According to the principle self-rule under 
the Manchu dynasty, Mongolian local authorities had power not only to administrate their internal 
affairs, but they also exercised judicial power over those Chinese who committed crimes against 
Mongols.
In order to sabotage De Wang’s autonomous movement, Fu Zuoyi suggested to the KMT central 
government that De Wang’s autonomous political council be divided into two, with one in the east 
(Chakhar), the other in the west (Suiyuan). The suggestion was accepted by the KMT in January 1936, 
and the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan was appointed as the head of the Mongolian Political Council in 
the west. During the time of Fu Zuoyi’s opposition regarding the autonomous council] even the rights 
prescribed in “Principles for Implementation of Mongolian Autonomy” that were passed by the KMT 
could not be carried out. An example of this is that the law provided for the Mongols to have a share 
of the tariff on Commodities transported through Mongolian land, yet all of the tariff revenue was 
monopolized by Fu Zuoyi. Armed conflict between De Wang’s autonomous government and Fu 
Zuoyi’s army broke out because o f disagreements on the opium tariff, which was then also known as 
“Opium War”. Fu Zuoyi’s economic restrictions and embargo made the situation extremely severe for 
De Wang’s government and for the Mongols particularly during the times of natural disasters on 
pastoral lands.
With concrete examples of the ill-intentions of Fu Zuoyi on one side and the friendly gestures of the 
Japanese on the other, De Wang decided to collaborate with the Japanese to realize his goal of 
Mongolian autonomy118. In contrast to the actions of the KMT and the local warlords, the Japanese 
made efforts to win over Mongols. In Japanese-sponsored Manchoukuo which was formed on 1 March 
1932, the Japanese allowed Mongols to establish the Mongolian Xinggan Special District and a 
Mongolian army119, and later, the Japanese canceled the Chinese Chakhar Province and restored
117 The Shanxi warlord who then had the control of Suiyuan and the surrounding areas. Most 
immigrant farmers in Inner Mongolia came from Shanxi. In 1949, Fu surrendered Beijing to Nie 
Rongzhen
118 On 1 March 1932, the Japanese-sponsored Manchoukuo was established, and in Manchoukuo the 
Mongolian Xinggan province and the Mongolian army were set up with the approval of the Japanese. 
Dr. Lin Xiuche,”Two Key Figures in Modem Mongolian History”, Collection o f Papers on Important 
Figures in Modern Chinese History p.953.
119Lattimore, Owen, Mongols o f  Manchuria (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935) p.37.
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Chakhar’s League status.120 In the 1935 “white disaster” in Shilinggol, Japanese provided timely food 
aid. In Manchuria, the Japanese actually stopped further Chinese colonization of Mongolian land, they 
set up 1000 primary schools, and many hospitals and experimental farms in East Mongolia.
In 1935 after the Ho-Ying-Chin-Umezu Agreement was signed by the KMT and Japan, the Japanese 
extended their influence in North China. Song Zheyuan, a local warlord, maintained neutral 
independence in the north China. The KMT government was thus blocked and its influence could not 
reach Inner Mongolia. So, it was under desperate circumstances that De Wang began to collaborate 
with the Japanese to counter the Chinese warlords.
De Wang viewed collaboration with the Japanese as a necessary means to achieve his nationalist goal: 
after a period of Mongolian autonomy, to set up an independent, constitutional monarchy for the 
Mongolian state. After July 7, 1937, when Japan took control of north China, De Wang, with Japanese 
support, set up a Mongolian autonomous government. But soon the collaboration proved 
inharmonious with Mongolian nationalist goals. The Japanese refused to let autonomous Mongolia 
incorporate the Xinggan Mongolian district from the puppet state of Manchouguo. To facilitate its 
control of north China, Japan forced Mongolian autonomous government to take in two Japanese- 
sponsored Chinese local regimes, South Chakhar and North Shanxi, and to form the Mengjiang 
government.
De Wang’s autonomous movement and the autonomous government in Inner Mongolia in the 1930- 
40s was a genuine nationalist attempt, and the balance of power between Chinese, Russians and 
Japanese made it possible for De Wang’s autonomy to exist as a kind of semi-state nature for nearly 
10 years. The autonomous movement was more genuine because it aimed to set up an independent and 
unified Mongolian state based on a strong sense of history. Secondly the movement was an alliance of 
both the traditional ruling class and liberal-minded young Mongols. Thirdly, in spite of his anti­
communist stance, De Wang enthusiastically encouraged the recognition of the Mongolian People’s 
Republic by the Chinese nationalist government in 1945; this showed his nationalist vision 
transcended the boundaries of both localism and political ideology.
Although Japanese support was the prerequisite of the autonomous Mongolia, it still enjoyed 
considerable features of an independent state: a political council (government), a Mongolian army, 
and a consultative council (legislature). De Wang also envisioned a unified Mongolian territory which 
included all Mongolian leagues and banners, and also an outlet to the sea (as provided for by 
international maritime law for landlocked states). The autonomous regime was also founded with a 
historical ambition: it regarded itself as the modem successor to the historical Mongolian empire. The 
regime adopted Chinggis Khan’s chronicle.121
120 Chakhar as a administrative unite and tribe was cancelled by the Manchu dynasty after it had 
defeated Chakhar's rebellion against the Manchu in 1675.
121 Tovshin, ed., Demchugdungrub’s Autobiography (Historical Archive Committee, IMAR Political 
Consultancy Conference. 1984)
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De Wang’s autonomous movement may be the first and also the last movement dedicated exclusively 
to.nationalism in the modem history of Inner Mongolia. Before pondering its uniqueness, let’s first 
look at some of the negative elements inherent to the movement from its very beginning.
According to Owen Lattimore,122 its failure can be attributed to three factors. First, Chiang Kaishek’s 
central government was not powerful enough to control the warlords of the border provinces, and the 
new warlords would not agree to any Mongolian autonomy at the expense of their interests. Second, 
De Wang’s movement was a coalition of young idealistic Mongols who were radical enough to speak 
against the hereditary nobles, princes and high lamas, and the traditional ruling classes some of whom 
collaborated with the most outrageous Chinese policies for immediate personal profit, so this coalition 
had its own internal contradictions. Third, Japanese aggression overwhelmed almost all of Inner 
Mongolia. Beginning in Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese moved into Jehol in 1934, and into western 
Inner Mongolia in 1936-37. They made enough moves favourable to the Mongols to prevent unity of 
action between anti-Japanese Mongols and Chinese, and at the same time they successfully prevented 
unity among the Mongols by subdividing Inner Mongolia.
China’s Mongolian Policy since the end of the Manchu Qing dynasty, maintained its old “divide and 
rule” strategy. This was also an important characteristic of both the warlord and the KMT periods. 
Even when China became a republic, it still dealt with the Mongols almost exclusively through the 
traditional ruling class, the princes, nobles and high lamas. The Chinese state never addressed 
demands made by the Mongols as a people. When China used intimidation and force to carry out its 
colonisation policy, it was usually the Mongol princes and nobles who were ordered to move common 
Mongols out of land wanted for colonisation. Their authority to do so was augmented by Chinese 
troops when necessary. When a deal was made, princes and important lamas were let in on the deal. In 
this way, the powers of princes and lamas were enhanced within the structure of the old society at the 
same time that the power of the Mongols as a people was being steadily and surely eroded.
As a result of this, social tensions within Mongolian society were so serious that Mongolian 
nationalism was easily influenced by radicalism and revolutionaries. The reason was that it had 
become quite clear to the commoners and intellectuals that Mongolian interests could not be defended 
as long as the old social order was both preserved and exploited by the Chinese, and secondly that the 
Mongols could not resist colonisation unless they resisted the orders transmitted to them through their 
own authorities. The social tensions worsened by the Chinese “divide and rule” policy presented a 
formidable dilemma for both the IMPRP’s nationalist efforts and De Wang’s autonomous movement. 
But De Wang’s radical-conservative coalition survived the dilemma since he adopted a reformist and 
modernist stance by trying to find common ground for both traditional political order and modem 
politics. His personal leadership and nationalist vision were an inspiration for the united front of 
nationalists.
122 Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1955) pp.28-29.
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Traditional Mongolian identity, the ideal of political unity, common nomadic culture and a common 
language was not automatically transformed into a modem national identity, which is mainly 
concerned with a common citizenship, a common territory, and a common national economy. The 
modem Mongolian national consciousness, like that of the Chinese, was bom out of a sense of a crisis 
of survival. For Mongols in both Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, the Chinese encroachment was 
the primary outside contrast to their modem identity. For Mongols in Inner Mongolia, the independent 
Mongolia in the north remained an reminder of their non-Chinese identity and a beacon for their 
political aspirations. Besides an outside contrast, modem Mongolian identity in Inner Mongolia was 
reinforced by the common experience of unified struggles. The traditional ideal of a unified Mongolia 
survived as a part of the Mongolian sense of identity. Modem unification efforts and a unified 
Mongolian authority would renew and strengthen the political ideal based on a strong historical and 
cultural heritage. That was another part of the modem Mongolian identity. It should be noted that 
although there were some modernisation efforts implemented by the Mongolian ruling class, the lack 
of a nation-scale modernisation rendered the Modem Mongolian nation as only a political ideal 
without the base of a nation-wide industrialisation and a national economy. In this sense, De Wang’s 
autonomous movement, albeit short-lived, was significant in the development o f a modem sense of 
identity by the Mongols in Inner Mongolia.
Due to its ill-fated association with the Japanese, De Wang’s autonomous movement failed soon after 
Japanese defeat in 1945. However, Mongolian nationalism adapted to post-war changes in China’s 
politics and survived in a different form by associating with the CC
4. Conclusion
Chinese view on historical ethnic relations often presents a sino-centric history, according to which 
Mongolian history is simply part of Chinese history. Mongolian nationalism, which developed in the 
same way as Chinese nationalism, was ideas and movement by Mongolian intellectuals and political 
elites at the end of dynastic era, facing the imports of Western national ideas and the external 
differentiation of modem international world. Chinese republic after Manchu dynasty is an important 
external differetiation for Mongolian nationalism, esp. in the case of Mongolian independence with 
backing from Russians and in De Wang’s autonomous movement associated with Japanese. Outside 
assistance and other geopolitical factors prove crucial in the different result of Mongolian nationalism 
in the case of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.
103
CHAPTER IV. THE CCP AND INNER MONGOLIAN NATIONALISM - THE SOVIET 
MODEL OF NATIONALITY ISSUES
1. The Soviet Model Adapted by CCP
The founding of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region can be seen as resulting from competition 
between pro-CCP Mongolian forces led by Ulanhu and other nationalist forces that pressed for 
independence, but it was also a result of large-scale power politics played out between the Soviet 
Russians, the Mongolian state, the KMT regime and the CCP. At the same time the Soviet model of 
nationality policy appealed to many facets of Mongolian society.
1.1. Mongolian Social Crisis
The society and economy of the Mongolian people in Inner Mongolia had experienced drastic changes 
by the 1920s as a result of the massive Chinese migrations of the previous decades both before and 
after the KMT had come to power. In southern and eastern Inner Mongolia the Chinese cultivation of 
agricultural areas continued to increase, and between the agricultural areas and the grassland, the 
semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral areas were also continuously transformed into Chinese land for 
agriculture. The results were disastrous for the majority of Mongols whose livelihood depended upon 
animal husbandry.
The dramatic expansion of the agricultural areas under Chinese cultivation was paralleled by the 
changes in the balance between the ethnic groups. On the one hand, the population of Chinese 
peasants increased dramatically. On the other hand, large numbers of pastoral Mongols were forced to 
leave their homeland which was now cultivated. Only a small number remained. Since the best o f the 
traditional grazing land had enjoyed abundant rainfall, the presence of underground water and the 
richness of the soil were ideal for farming, most of the best grassland in Inner Mongolia was taken 
over for Chinese cultivation, leaving most pastoral Mongols without their best grassland. For those 
who chose to remain in the agricultural areas, switching from nomadism to farming was extremely 
difficult as they usually lacked the necessary farming skills. Mongolian aristocrats who had made large 
profits and had become big landowners out of the sale or lease of land in the agricultural areas were a 
minority even among their class group. The majority of aristocrats of low rank without holding office 
were reduced to the status of peasants or tenants.
The increased social gap in Mongolian society and the concomitant social tensions were due to the 
traditional Chinese policy towards the Mongols. The traditional Mongolian ruling class - the princes, 
nobles and high lamas - collaborated with the Chinese in opening Mongolian lands because they were 
greedy for profit and also because they had no other choice when faced with the intimidation and 
superior power of the Chinese warlords and heads of local provinces. The power of the Mongolian 
ruling class was artificially enhanced so that they could legally sell the public land of the banner,
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which formerly could not have been sold. The result was that Mongolian public ownership of 
grassland (which included all natural resources such as underground aquifers, minerals, and the 
forestry, rivers, lakes) was completely sabotaged1. Much of the Mongolian hatred was directed to then- 
own ruling class. Two things had become quite clear to the commoners and intellectuals: First, that 
Mongol interests could not be defended as long as the old social order was both preserved and 
exploited by the Chinese; and second, that the Mongols could not resist colonization unless they 
resisted the orders transmitted to them through their own authorities.
These social tensions in Mongolian societies provided a fertile ground for the breeding of radical 
politics and the growth of influence of the CCP, Soviet Russia, and the socialist republic of Mongolia. 
As seen by Mongolian revolutionaries, communism would provide a short cut for Mongols from what 
they considered to be a slave society2 to a communist society on the same level as Soviet Russia, now 
seen as the most advanced society on earth. And the Mongolian People’s Republic remained visible 
on the psychological horizon as a vivid reminder to Mongols in Inner Mongolia of what they could 
achieve.
Since anti-Chinese colonization sentiments together with anti-traditional ruling-class sentiments were 
the most powerful themes for Mongolian nationalism, the CCP had to appear different from the 
previous oppressive Chinese powers in order to appeal to Mongolian nationalism. The CCP’s anti­
traditionalism and revolutionary stance from the 1920s through to the 1940sprovided a potent 
ideological basis for the new Mongol-Chinese co-operation.
1.2. CCP and its Nationalist Character
The ideological stance of the CCP has changed much since its early days of the 1920s. Then, 
nationalism and Communism or a combination of the two could all be found in the development of the 
CCP. Of course, Communism, as a universalistic ideology, was opposed in principle to nationalism 
except for temporary, tactical purposes. Since nationalism was a formula for denying that class 
struggle ever existed, the communists could always say that international class solidarity was more 
important than national identity and national interests. Yet, the Chinese nationalists then could say that 
the Chinese must all have solidarity as Chinese, and that the Chinese culture or Chinese nation should 
have a universal claim on Chinese loyalty.
It is an ideological paradox for the CCP that either nationalism can be viewed as means to achieve a
1 Liu Jingping, Zheng Guangzhi, ed. Inner Mongolian Economic Development (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1979) p.31.
2 The Program of the Works in Inner Mongolia issued by the CCP Central Committee on November 5, 
1930. One point in the program was to cancel the slavery system in Inner Mongolia. It should be noted 
according the program, Inner Mongolian society was more backward in social development stage than 
the Chinese semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. See Hao Weimin, ed., The Recent History o f Inner 
Mongolia (Inner Mongolian University, 1990) p. 150.
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communist goal or that communism is just an effective means to a nationalist goal, yet the CCP 
exploited this paradox to its advantage. The CCP under Mao’s influence tried to add the Chinese 
character to the universalistic ideology to make Communism more Chinese. But the issue went deeper. 
As Joseph Levenson argued, a complete disavowal of old China was psychologically impossible even 
for the Communists. Some Chinese communists said that the May Fourth movement went too far in 
destroying the images of the past and searched for evidence of dialectical materialism in traditional 
Chinese philosophy.3 Liu Shaoqi wrote that the thought of Mao Zedong was the best expression of 
Marxism applied to a given nation, and “It is as Chinese as it is thoroughly Marxist”.4 In terms of 
nationality policies, from the starting point of Lenin and Stalin’s rhetoric on nationality issues,
Chinese communists have added more and more ‘Chinese spirit’ into the matter.
A different ideological emphasis was adopted in the different periods of the development of the CCP 
which can be roughly approximated as the period of KMT-CCP co-operation; the period of armed 
CCP struggle against the KMT; the anti-Japanese war period; and the period after 1949 when the CCP 
took over state power. But in the early period it was the CCP’s anti-traditional stance that appealed to 
its Mongolian collaborators and followers. The CCP decided that its ideology advocated revolt, 
against not only foreign imperialists, but also against previous Chinese “reactionary” regimes.
The CCP’s legitimacy, apart from the ideological justifications, rested mainly upon the negation of the 
old political regime. Yet, anti-traditionalism was more complete in a political sense than in a cultural 
sense. Since history was able to be interpreted by the CCP in terms of class struggle, so were the 
historical Mongol-Chinese conflicts. The CCP held that the oppressive Manchu-Chinese policies, 
Chinese warlord’s actions, and the KMT’s oppressive policies toward the Mongols did not promote 
the interests of the Chinese as a whole, but the interests of the Chinese ruling-class. So, class-analysis 
as utilised by the CCP provided a new way of solidifying and justifying a common fate and a common 
identity between the Chinese and Mongols, as they were seen to be all of the proletariat, o f the 
oppressed class, or of the people.
In the beginning of this period from mid-1920s to 1949, it may be argued that the Communist ideas 
from the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic had an appeal at least as equal, if not 
greater, to young Mongolian radicals as those from the CCP. Most early Mongolian revolutionaries in 
Inner Mongolia such as Ulanhu, Kuibi and Jiyatai who had joined the CCP had first received their 
revolutionary training in Moscow and Ulaan Baator. The Soviet party and even the Mongolian party, 
had more authority and influence upon them than the CCP. To many of the Mongol revolutionaries, 
the three communist forces were not all that differentiated in their minds because of their
3 Schwartz, ‘Marx and Lenin in China’, Far Eastern Survey, XVIII, No. 15 (July 27, 1949), p. 178.
See Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate: The Problem o f  Intellectual 
Continuity (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958) p. 135.
4 Liu Shaoqi, On the Party (Peking, 1950), p.31. See Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its 
Modern Fate: The Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) 
p.135.
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internationalist beliefs and because actual leadership of the worldwide Communist movement was 
provided by the Soviet Russians at the time. But the Mongolian communists had to make a choice 
regarding which group they should side with sooner or later. The reason was that Chinese memories 
of the humiliations suffered at the hands of Tzarist Russia were still fresh and the suspicion of Russian 
imperialist intentions did not die even though Lenin and Stalin reiterated many times their negation of 
Tzar Russia’s imperialism. Moreover Chinese suspicions increased as the Soviets began to assrt a 
moreover more domineering approach in coordinating relations with their country. The suspicion, 
interestingly, was rested in Chinese nationalist sentiments, and as a result this affected communist 
Chinese attitudes towards Mongolian revolutionaries and it had a profound effect on the fate of 
Mongolia nationalism.
The nationalist side o f the CCP did not like to see Mongolian revolutionaries following the Russians 
too closely. Their position could be justified on ideological grounds that stemmed from the ‘Chinese 
spirit’ that informed their approach to communism. Precisely because China did not fit in neatly within 
the grand Marxist design of historical social development i.e., it had a long history of feudalism, 
without much capitalist preparation before the advent of communist revolution, etc.) it was carrying 
out a revolution with Chinese characterises. This differed from the Soviet Russian experience, and the 
CCP believed that its experience provided a model for other non-western peoples to follow in their 
self-emancipation. Accordingly, Chinese communists held that it would be better for the national 
liberation of Mongols in Inner Mongolia if they were to follow the Chinese example and accept the 
leadership of the CCP. This was clearly a Chinese Communist justification of a Chinese nationalist 
intention.
1.3. The Soviet Model
The Soviet promise of the right of secession and independence to non-Russian peoples within the 
Soviet Union has been called by Walker Connor as an official myth. 5 It was at a time when the 
Bolsheviks were weak and in opposition, they sought to exploit the divisions among their opponents 
as well as seeking to get the support of non-Russian nationalists by giving the promise of national 
self-determination to non-Russians. It can be regarded as an exercise of astute tactics, but it was also a 
display of confidence in the superiority of the Soviet system and the Union.
Before the Bolsheviks came to power, the demoralizing war, the end of Tzarism and the weak 
provisional government all made non-Russian peoples contemplate severing their ties with Russia.
The Bolsheviks condemned the imperialist policy of the Tzarist government and the semi-imperialist 
policy of the Mensheviks and of the Socialist-Revolutionaries toward non-Russians and promised
5 Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton 
University Press, 1984) p.60.
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them the right of secession. After November 7, the Bolshevik government reiterated its policy and the 
policy won vital support from non-Russians in the Bolsheviks’ campaigns against the Whites.6
By 1922 the Soviet government succeeded in establishing control over most of the non-Russian 
minority areas both because of the military successes of the Red Army and also due to the work by 
local Communist elements. By the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union regained control 
over all the remaining peoples o f the old Russian Empire, with the exception of the Finns.
By then it was asserted, however, that a nation’s right to self-determination should not be put ahead of 
Marxist and socialist principles. The national self-determination principle was diluted when Stalin 
specified that only the people, or the toiling class should decide the matter of secession or 
independence for the nation concerned. And Lenin’s statement made in March 1919 best illustrates the 
official party policy:
“The All-Russian Communist Party regards the question as to which class expresses the 
desire of a nation for separation from a historical point of view, taking into consideration the 
level of historical development of the nation, i.e., whether that nation is passing from 
medievalism toward bourgeois democracy or from bourgeois democracy toward Soviet or 
proletarian democracy, etc.”7
In taking this position, Lenin reserved for the party the power to decide who is entitled to speak for the 
nation and thus kept the policy, in practical terms, flexible.
However the right of secession was a written part of the constitution of the Soviet Union throughout 
its existence. It was written into each of the 1924, 1936 and 1977 Constitutions of the Soviet Union 
that all member peoples (the union republics) are sovereign and possessed of the right to secede at will 
from the Soviet Union.8 That the promise was kept in the constitution certainly had its propaganda 
value, which also gave the USSR of extra seats in the UN, i.e., the Ukraine and Bylorussia. It was also
6 Walker Connor, (op. cit.) p.46. “At its Twelfth Congress (April 1923), the party also went on record 
as recognizing the absolute essentiality o f the support provided by the non-Russian peoples during the 
Red-White struggle. Referring to “the confidence of its brothers of other nationalities,” the party 
resolution added that “it need hardly be shown that if it had not enjoyed this confidence the Russian 
proletariat could not have defeated Kolchak and Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel.”
7 “The Program of the All-Russian Communist Party” (March 1919), in Christman, Communism, 16- 
46. The cited section is on p.27, See Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist 
Theory and Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1984) p.49.
8 Thus Article 70 of the 1977 constitution proclaims: “The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an 
integral, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the 
free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics. 
See Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton 
University Press, 1984) p.51.
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meant to set the Soviets’ nationality policy up as a model to both the colonial areas and fellow 
communist countries. The Bolshevik revolution was seen by its leaders as an international revolution 
and the USSR saw itself as the leader of the international communist movement right to the end.
While Chinese revolution was at heart a national revolution and it always had difficulty in 
accommodating the national aspirations of others. Therefore the clearly written secession right for 
non-Russian peoples within the Union, especially when compared with the PRC, showed more 
confidence in the Union and the Communist ideology. One of the major assumptions behind the 
promise was that even were those non-Russians given the chance to secede from the Union, they 
would not take it because it was in the best interest of each nation to stay within the Union rather than 
to be outside o f the Union. The fact that after 70 years of the union some non-Russian peoples could 
finally break loose from the collapsed Soviet Union, in itself indicates that within the union many non- 
Russian peoples’ identity survived to such an extent that they could assert their separate identity after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ironically, some of non-Russians, especially those in central Asia, 
created a sense of national identity from above with the arbitrary borders they inherited.
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The right of secession was never agreed to by Chinese nationalist revolutionaries such as Sun Yatsen 
and his successor Chiang Kaishek. Although the KMT recognized that all racial-groups in China had 
the right to self-determination, to the KMT the right to self-determination was not equal to the right of 
secession. In the Joint Manifesto of Sun Yatsen and A. Joffe (January 26, 1923), Sun Yatsen even 
managed to get a guarantee from the Soviets that it was not “the intention or the objective of the 
present Russian government to work for Outer Mongolia’s independence from China” although Outer 
Mongolia had already gained its independence with the help of the Soviet Union in 1921. 9 The 
KMT’s position on the Mongol national self-determination issue was best summarized by the remarks 
of Mr. Dai Jitao, the head o f the Examination Yuan: “The power of any people is derived from their 
culture. Chinese culture is superior to that of the Mongols and is the foundation upon which the 
Chinese state had been erected. Hence, from now on, the Chinese should exert every effort to confer 
their culture on the Mongols, who should strive to receive it.”10
It was the Chinese Communist Party that first made a break with the KMT’s assimilationist policy 
towards non-Chinese minorities. The CCP during the 1930s promised the right of secession for ethnic 
non-Chinese minorities. In the 1940s, the CCP began to retreat from this position and put forward the 
idea of nationality autonomy. For a period of 40 years, roughly from the 1930s to the late 1960s, the 
CCP’s nationality policy was largely based on the Soviet model which openly advocated nationality 
equality and self-determination. Yet, as part the CCP’s official ideology, in its nationality policy of the 
period, the Soviet model and ‘Chinese spirit’ were two competing factors. As ‘Chinese spirit’ grew to 
influence nationality theory and policy, nationality self-determination was mentioned less and less.
The Soviet model of nationality theory and practice were put to an end by the Cultural Revolution in 
1966.
2. Allied Autonomous Movement and CCP
9 Brandt et al., Documentary History, p.70, See William Connor, The National Question in Marxist- 
Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1984) p.92.
10 Jasper Becker, The Lost Country: Mongolia Revealed (Hodder and Stoughton, 1992) p. 13.
De Wang’s autonomous government failed due to the change of international and domestic Chinese 
political situations. At the end of World War II, the issue of Mongolian unification was simply out of 
the question because it was not the part of the deals the three big powers made at Yalta. Instead, the 
Soviet Union signed a treaty with the Chinese to secure the status of Outer Mongolia. Trumen 
administration, before and after the defeat of Japan, increasingly regarded that FDR had given in too 
much to Stalin in East Asia at Yalta. Probably to Americans, the merger of the two Mongolia was a 
much bigger concession than the Soviet control of Dalian and Lusun. The United State did not accept 
the total control of the above two ports by the Soviet Union, they certainly would not accept the 
merger of the two Mongolias. Stalin was careful not to exceed the limit of Americans’ tolerance.11
After the end of the war, the CCP gained sufficient strength to change the military balance in the north. 
De Wang’s autonomous government which was associated first with the Japanese and then with the 
KMT government was now seen as the enemy of the revolution and was doomed. Mongolian 
nationalism could not possibly escape influence of the Soviet Union and China between whom 
Mongolia was trapped. In this sense, Ulanhu’s autonomous movement as patronized by the CCP 
seemed naturally the most feasible way for Mongolian nationalism to find an outlet in Inner Mongolia.
CCP’s Interpretations of National Self-Determination.
In Inner Mongolia, the CCP tried to win Mongols’ support by striking a balance between their 
ideological beliefs and Mongolian nationalism. During its long campaign to achieve state power, the 
CCP denounced the KMT and all the previous Chinese regimes’ oppressive policies toward Mongols 
specifically in order to win the support of the Mongolian people.
As early as 1922, in the second Congress of the CCP, the declaration of the CCP condemned 
“warlords and KMT’s oppression of Mongolian autonomy under the name of unification” and 
advocated that “Mongolia, Tibet and Moslem Frontier could establish Republics within a Chinese 
Confederation.”12 But the CCP did not mention the right of secession for non-Chinese until the 1930s. 
The delay could be explained by geographic factor that the early CCP were active mainly in south 
China and the CCP’s preoccupation with urban centers at the time. Besides these two possible factors, 
another reason stemmed from nature of the CCP’s relations with the CPSU through the Comintern in 
1922 and before 1924 when the united front was negotiated by Joffe. It was not until then KMT broke 
with the CCP in 1927 that the CCP had to formulate a different line. By this stage the Trosky-Stalin 
divide was in full swing. When the CCP finally established a new center in Ruijin in Jiangxi it was 
anxious to show its Comintern credentials. Hence the documents of the party named Soviet in 1931-33
11 Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution, Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origin o f  the 
Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946, (Columbia University Press, 1993) pp. 43, 54.
12 “Declaration Of 2nd National Congress Of CCP”, July, 1922, Collection O f CCP Historical 
Documents (the CCP Party School Press, 1992)
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copied Soviet type documents when possible. This changed again at the end of the Long March.
The official Soviet model was certainly a contributing factor in the evolution o f the CCP’s position 
from advocating self-determination (not equal to secession) to advocating secession for non-Chinese 
minorities. The leaders of the Soviet Union, through the agency of the Comintern, were pressuring all 
other Communist parties during the 1920s to endorse publicly the self-determination for their 
respective minorities.
In November 1931, “The resolutions on Minority peoples within China” were passed by the 1st 
Chinese Soviet National Congress of workers, peasants and soldiers. It admitted that the non-Chinese 
peoples’ right of self-determination as “in the Chinese soviet republic’s constitution, minority’s right 
of self-determination even that of independence from China should be made clear. The independence 
of Mongolian People’s Republic should be recognized unconditionally.”13 According to Dreyer, the 
Soviets supported or even designed these developments. In 1930 the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern passed a resolution calling for the creation of a central Soviet government with 
headquarters in the hinterlands, and with its own “real Red Army.” With regard to non-Chinese 
minorities, the resolution wrote that “the party should also reinforce its work among the national 
minorities. It should establish strong links with and take the lead in the Moslem movement in North 
China, in the national-revolutionary struggle in Inner Mongolia, in the struggle o f the Korean workers 
and the Manchurian peasants, and of the tribes in South China...Further more, given the immense 
importance of the growing revolutionary struggle in Indo-China, the party should extend its influence 
toward the Annamite masses particularly in Yunnan, Hong Kong, and Canton.” 14
By the end of 1935 when the CCP’s Red Army reached Yanan and set up its base, it became more and 
more important for the CCP to appeal to Mongols in Inner Mongolia, just to the north of the 
revolutionary base. To win the Mongolian peoples’ sympathy and loyalty became part of the Party’s 
political agenda. At the time, Mao Zedong considered Mongolia as a convenient route through which 
the CCP could establish supply links with the Soviet Union. From October 1936 to March 1937, the 
west expedition force of the Red Army tried to cross the Yellow River but was almost totally defeated 
by Muslim warlords in the northwest region of the Qi Lian Mountains. Blame for the spectacular 
defeat was placed on rightist opportunism by the CCP Central Committee. But according to recently 
available materials, it was the CCP’s Central Military Commission headed by Mao Zedong that 
decided on the west expedition. The intention was to enter Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia, in order to 
link up a supply line with the Soviet Union for necessary international aid.15 When Edgar Snow met
13 “Declaration Of 2nd National Congress Of CCP”, July, 1922, (op. cit.)
14 See the extracts from “the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the Chinese Question” (June 
1930), in Jane Degras, ed. The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents, Vol. 3 (Oxford 
University Press, 1976) pp. 114-120.
15 Chen Jing, Shi Yan Shi (History in Poems), See Zheng Yi, ‘Uncover the Truth of the Long March’
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Mr. Shao Lizi, the governor of Shaaxi province, he was told by Shao that there had been little fighting 
between the KMT army and the Red Army in north Shaanxi, because “the Reds are moving into 
Ningxia and Gansu. They seem to want to connect with Outer Mongolia.”16
Just as Stalin held that the right to national self-determination right was available only to the toiling 
class, the CCP could always explain the self-determination and secession in the same way: they could 
always nullify non-Chinese people’s nationalist demands by saying that it was not what the toiling 
people of the particular nationality really wanted. National self-determination was also emphasized 
differently on different occasions and different times. It should also be noted that the CCP’s and Mao 
Zedong’s public and official statements did not always reflect their real intentions. While sometimes 
they did go as far as to interpret self-determination as secession for the non-Chinese, more often they 
envisaged a federation of China including all non-Chinese peoples even including the already 
independent Outer Mongolia. On one occasion Mao Zedong made the following statement concerning 
Outer Mongolia: “The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, 
has always been based on the principle of completely equality. When the people’s revolution has been 
victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become part of the China 
Confederation, at their own will. The Mohammadian and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form 
autonomy republics attached to the China federation.” Mao even said that Burma, Indochina, Korea 
and Mongolia are illegally annexed parts of China which must be restored to it.17
Among the numerous statements made by the CCP on nationality issues, the one that was directly 
related to the Mongols and also the most famous was “The Chinese Soviet Central Government’s 
Declaration to The People of Inner Mongolia”18 made on 10 December, 1935, widely known as the 
‘1935 Declaration’. In this declaration Mao Zedong promised to help Mongols to “preserve the glory 
of the epoch of Genghis Khan, prevent the extermination of their nation and embark on the path of 
national revival and obtain their independence enjoyed by such people as those of Turkey, Poland, the 
Ukraine and the Caucasus.”
The declaration further stated that “all the original 6 leagues of 24 tribes and 49 banners, together with 
Chakhar, Turned and two banners in Ningxia, regardless of their present county status, are all 
Mongolian national territory; the provinces and administrations of Jehol, Chakhar and Suiyuan should
Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties), January 1997 (Going Fine Ltd) p.98.
16 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1937) p.28.
17 “It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our 
sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, 
include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have reestablished the independence of the 
lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese 
imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in the struggle for independence. The same 
things applies to Formosa. As for Inner Mongolia which is populated by both Chinese and Mongols, 
we will struggle to drive Japanese from there and help Inner Mongolians to establish an autonomous 
state.” , See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1937) p. 102.
18 Collection O f CCP Historical Documents. Selections O f CCP Central Committee's Documents,
Vol. 10 (1934-1935), (The Press Of The Central Party School of CCP, 1991)
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be cancelled. Inner Mongolian nation’s land should never be taken away by any nation under any 
name...Mongolian nation in Inner Mongolia can organize themselves at their own will. They have the 
right to organize their own life according to their own principle and establish their own government. 
They also have the right to form a federation with other nations or to be completely independent”.19
2.1. Ulanhu: CCP’s Proxy Among Mongols
It is difficult to tell when exactly the CCP shifted from the position of advocating nationality secession 
to that of autonomy since in the late 1930s-40s the CCP mentioned both policies on different 
occasions. The time that the CCP still mentioned the right of self-determination and secession must be 
later than it is indicated in CCP history textbooks today. Mongolian communists in Inner Mongolia 
must have still used the slogan of national self-determination even later than the CCP. Mongolian 
nationalists, however, always regarded the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic as their 
models. Because of their close ties with the Soviets and Outer Mongolia, the CCP’s Mongolian 
collaborators and followers were different from the CCP’s other local branches for the following two 
reasons:
At first, the CCP’s influence among the Mongols was relatively insignificant compared to its work in 
the Chinese-populated regions such as Jehol, Chakhar and Suiyuan.20 The CCP’s activities in those 
regions were directed by CCP branches operating out of the neighboring Chinese provinces such as 
Hebei. Most of the cadres were Chinese and most of the work was conducted among the Chinese 
population. It was later in CCP history that these activities began to be regarded as part of the CCP’s 
effort to help the Mongols’ cause of national liberation.
Secondly, Ulanhu and other Mongolian communists had closer links with the Soviet Union and the 
Mongolian People’s Republic than with the CCP in Yanan. In 1929 Ulanhu and other Soviet-trained 
Mongolian cadres were sent back to Inner Mongolia by the Comintern. Before he went to Yanan in 
1941, his work in Inner Mongolia had been directly instructed by the Comintern and all his Mongol 
fellow comrades were Russian-trained and IMPRP members. According to material made available 
by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution and the KMT in Taiwan, Ulanhu in his early
19 1935 Declaration made by Mao Zedong on 10 December ("The Chinese Soviet Central 
Government's Declaration to the People of Inner Mongolia"). Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenjian Xuanji 
(The Selected Documents o f  CCP Central Committee), Vol. 10 (1934-35), p.880., ed. By CCP 
Central Archive Library, Vol. 1 (1924-25), p.99 (CCP Central Party School Press, 1988)
20 The CCP’s earliest influence on the Mongols started in the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy in Beijing 
in 1920s, which, as a matter of fact, had more to do with the earliest CCP and the Comintern and 
relatively little to do with Mao Zedong’s group who later came to the leadership of the CCP. Ulanhu 
was among the Mongolian students at the academy, and later he was sent by the CCP to receive 
training in Moscow. As early as 1925, CCP began its underground activities in Inner Mongolia.
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activities in Inner Mongolia was not a staunch member of the Chinese communist party.21 The time 
that he decided to go to Yanan was rather late in the game.
Ulanhu’s name was made known in a national newspaper because of his role in the Bai Ling Miao 
Mutiny in 1936. His agitation was partly responsible for the mutiny by the Mongolian autonomous 
army at Bai Ling Miao. It was a heavy blow to De Wang’s autonomous movement since the army was 
the only armed force he had at the time. The mutiny was an important fillip for Fu Zuoyi, the Shanxi 
warlord who controlled western Inner Mongolia, who was then engaged in a confrontation with De 
Wang, the leader of Inner Mongolian autonomous movement
Later on, in part because of on his role in the rebellion force, Ulanhu became the political commissar 
of New 3rd Division, the designation of the New 3 th Division was permitted by the Generalissimo 
Chiang Kaishek as a Mongolian force within the KMT army.22 Ulanhu never managed to establish 
control over the New 3rd Division and he failed to convert it into a Communist armed force. It has 
been said Ulanhu made up his mind to go to Yanan to join up with the CCP because he had become 
disappointed after he saw his advancement had been blocked in the KMT’s army.23
In 1938 Mao Zedong instructed He Long’s 120th Division to expand its activities to the north and set 
up a guerrilla base in Inner Mongolia so as to enlarge the CCP’s base o f armed struggle at the time of 
the united front with the KMT against the Japanese. It was at this time that Inner Mongolia became 
more important for the CCP’s build-up of its military strength. This was when the CCP retreated from 
its former position on national self-determination for minorities and put forward the idea of nationality 
autonomy because then the CCP began to give more serious consideration to Inner Mongolia’s future 
as a part of a communist China rather than using the former appealing slogan.24 In 1940, an 
international transportation link (Yanan - Inner Mongolia - Ulaan Baator) was set up with the 
assistance of the guerrilla force.25
In 1941 Ulanhu went to Yanan. The same year, the CCP set up the Yanan Nationality Academy to 
train cadres for non-Chinese areas, and Ulanhu was appointed the deputy director of the academy. In 
1944 Ulanhu returned to Inner Mongolia and organized a resistance group against Japanese, and that
21 Cultural Revolution Materials, and Feiqing Yanjiu {Studies o f  Chinese Communism) (the Institute 
for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems) Vol. No.7 July 1967, p.67.
22Hao Yu-feng, Wulanfu Zhuan (Biography O f Ulanhu) (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p. 
286.
23 Feiqing Yanjiu (Studies o f  Chinese Communism) (op. cit.)
241938 was the year when the CCP in Yanan set up the Northwest Working Committee and began to 
systematically study nationality problem and made the policy of nationality autonomy instead of 
advocating national self-determination and secession for ethnic minorities. The CCP Northwest 
Working Committee in 1941 passed the Program of Mongolian Issues in the Anti-Japanese War which 
was another comprehensive policy document concerning Mongols after ‘the 1935 Declaration’. See 
Hao Weimin, ed., Concise History O f Inner Mongolia Modern History, (Inner Mongolian University 
Press, 1990) p. 192.
25 Hao Wei-min, ed, Concise History O f Inner Mongolia Modern History (Inner Mongolian 
University Press, 1990) p. 187.
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same year, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Committee was set up under Ulanhu’s leadership. In 
1945 after the Japanese surrendered, Ulanhu set up the Suiyuan Mongolian Government.
Ulanhu advanced rapidly within the party especially after 1945. There are three basic reasons for this. 
The first was that the work in Inner Mongolia and the work among Mongols had become one of the 
priorities for CCP. The second was Ulanhu’s personal quality in that he was able to side with the right 
faction at the right time.26 The third was that his links with the Soviet Union and the independent 
Mongolia might also be regarded as political assets since at this time, the CCP still sought suggestion 
from the Soviet Union. In 1945 he attended the CCP’s 7th National Congress27, and was elected as a 
alternate member of CCP’s central committee, deputy secretary of the committee in charge of 
nationality affairs.
2.2. Ulanhu’s Allied Autonomous Movement
The end of the war gave Mongols short-lived hopes of a possible independent and unified Mongolia. 
Ulanhu, as the CCP’s representative, using a soft approach incorporated and neutralised the various 
independence efforts mounted by pro-Soviet Mongols. Just as the CCP had done in China, Ulanhu 
linked the goals of Mongolian national liberation with class liberation. To unite Mongolians under his 
flag, he showed the Mongols that CCP, in contrast to KMT and Japanese, was a genuine friend of the 
Mongolian people; the CCP advocated Mongolian autonomy in a united Inner Mongolia and against 
setting up Chinese provinces on Mongolian land.
Ulanhu had shown that he was more a realist than an idealist in his political career so far. At the point 
when he tried to unite and suppress pro-independent Mongolian nationalists, he showed again his 
realistic side either in request of his own political advancement or out of his belief in what was 
possible to achieve for the Mongolian people. Maybe it can be said he was an realist in both senses.
In August 1945, the Soviet Red Army and Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army entered eastern 
and middle Inner Mongolia. According to the Soviet practice on nationality policy, the Soviet and 
Mongolian allied force were both supportive and sympathetic toward the local independence declared
26 Gao Gang was the head of Mongolian Work Committee of Shan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi-Gangsu- 
Ningxia) Border District. Gao Gang was in 1941 the director of Nationality Institute and Ulanhu was 
the deputy. In Yanan’s Rectification, he was saved by Gao Gang. In the later year when Ulanhu 
became the head of the IMAR, while Gao Gang was the head of Manchuria, he pursued the same pro- 
Soviet policy as Gao. He was then under the leadership of the CCP's Northwest Bureau, which also 
had close ties with Soviet trained leaders. From the period of difficulties (1959 to 1961) created by 
Mao's Great Leap Forward to Cultural Revolution, he was a devoted follower o f Liu Shaoqi. See Hao 
Yufeng, Biography o f Ulanhu (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.338, and the Cultural 
Revolution Materials.
27 Ulanhu attended the CCP’s 6th Party Congress in Moscow, June 1928. As a student in Moscow’s 
Zhong Shan (Sun Yatsen) University, he was entrusted by the Russian hosts with the highly 
confidential work in the secretariat of the meeting. See Hao Yufeng, Biography o f Ulanhu, (Inner 
Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.l 13.
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by the Mongols. Due to the fact that Inner Mongolia was controlled variously by large numbers of 
troops from the Soviet Union, the CCP and the KMT, the issue of national determination in Inner 
Mongolia was determined by geopolitics rather than by the Mongols’ national aspirations. Besides, 
the co-ordination between the Soviet Union and CCP left little choice for Mongols but to side with the 
CCP.
The Yalta secret agreement on February 11, 1945 guaranteed the independent status of Outer 
Mongolia. The KMT government reluctantly agreed with the Soviet Union on the status of 
independent Mongolia, hoping that in return the Soviet Union would not let the CCP control 
Manchuria and Xinjiang - the areas under the Soviet Union’s influence and control. What was more 
important for the KMT government was that by agreeing with Stalin on the issue, in return they, 
instead o f the CCP, would be recognized by the Soviet Union as the legitimate government of post­
war China. From the point of view of Russian’s western allies and the KMT government, it was hard 
to accept Inner Mongolia, a region now controlled by Chinese, to be merged with Outer Mongolia and 
put into the sphere of the Soviet Union.
The KMT government later recognized the independence of Mongolia after the referendum held in 
Mongolia between October 10-20,1945, in accordance with the Sino-Soviet Friendship Allied Treaty 
signed on August 14, 1945. The CCP had not expressed any grudge to the Soviet leader for his 
support o f the independence of Outer Mongolia, because apart from the party’s ideological affinity 
with the Soviet Union, it needed Soviet support much more than did the KMT if it were to win the 
civil war. In Inner Mongolia, the CCP promised the Mongols more autonomous rights than had the 
KMT so as to win Mongols over. During the negotiations on the Sino-Soviet treaty in July, 1945,
Jiang Jingguo said to Stalin: “The CCP’s army is fighting against the government army in Inner 
Mongolia. And CCP propagated that since Outer Mongolia has declared independence, they will help 
to make Inner Mongolia independent as well”.28 The remarks indicate that the CCP and Ulanhu’s 
Inner Mongolian forces at least for propaganda purposes had promoted the idea of an independent 
Mongolia. According to the CCP’s instruction on the Inner Mongolian issue, the CCP began to 
support the idea of a unified Inner Mongolian autonomous government because Mongolian delegates 
in KMT’s National Congress had made the demand to the KMT government that Inner Mongolian 
autonomy be solved.29
In the same year, Lin Biao’s 100,000-strong army with 20,000 CCP cadres entered Manchuria and 
East Mongolia.30 In Western Inner Mongolia there had been CCP guerrilla bases in Chinese cultivated
28 ‘Memorandum of the meeting between Stalin and Jiang Jingguo, Jiang Jieshi’s private 
representative’, recorded by Baprov, translated by Chen Chunhua, Ming Pao Monthly, Feb. 1997. 
p.47.
29 “CCP’s Telegram on the Issue of Inner Mongolian Autonomy”, Nei Menggu Lianhe Zizhi Yundong 
Dangan Xianbian (Archive Collection O f The Joint Committee O f Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Movement) (Archive Press, 1989) p. 144.
30 Hao Weimin, (op. cit.) p.217.
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agricultural areas as early as 1938. By 10 October o f 1945 when the KMT-CCP truce was signed in 
Chongqing, the CCP’s Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi, Chakhar and Hebei three provinces) Military Zone already 
occupied the southern part of southern Inner Mongolia.
In September, Boindalai, a former supreme Judge o f the Mengjiang government, declared 
independence at De Wang’s Sunit Banner (Bei Zi Miao) and set up the Provisional Government of 
Inner Mongolian People’s Republic. The chief commander of the Soviet Russian army in the area, out 
o f his belief in the Lenin-Stalin doctrine on the nationality issue, supported their independence, but 
their request to merge with the Mongolian People’s Republic was refused by the MPR because by then 
the Soviet Union and the MPR had clarified their Inner Mongolian policy as an issue that was China’s 
domestic problem and should be solved in association with CCP.31 The inconsistency between the 
field commander o f the Red Army and the Soviet leadership at top level is also noted by Westad. 
According to Westad, the Soviet occupation policy in Manchuria during the 1st few weeks seems 
contradictory and aimless, compared to the great efficiency with which the military offensive had been 
carried out. The Red Army in some places such as in Shanghaiguan co-operated with the CCP’s army, 
in some other place they even refused to see the CCP leaders.32
Ulanhu, with the backing of the CCP and the co-operation of the Soviet Russians and the MPR, single- 
handedly cancelled the independent government and incorporated many of its followers into his own 
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement.
On 25 November 1945, the Joint Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was 
founded in Kalgan. In order to reduce Mongolian suspicions, the joint committee pretended to be an 
organization o f the masses rather than an official organization of the CCP.33 In his speech at the 
founding ceremony, Ulanhu said that the joint autonomous movement was the latest effort in the long 
line o f attempts to realize Mongolian national unification, independence and liberation. They began 
with Genghis Khan’s unification of the clans and were continued by Chakhar Ligdan Khan’s and 
Junghar Gerdan Khan’s defiance against the Manchu conquest. In modem times, they were continued 
with the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party founded 20 years earlier by Sukhbaator, 
national hero for the independent Mongolian state.34 He also said clearly that the goal of the
31 In August, 1945 the Inner Mongolian People’s Committee, the independence organization in 
Shilinggol, sent a delegation to Ulaan Baator asking for the merger of the two Mongolias, but their 
request was refused. In September, the newly-setup provisional government sent a delegation to Ulaan 
Baator asking to use Ulaan Baator’s radio station to broadcast to the world their independence. They 
also asked for the recognition of their independence and for military and economic aid from the Soviet 
Union and the MPR. Again their requests were denied. See Hao Weimin, ed., Concise History O f 
Inner Mongolia Modern History (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1990) p.219.
32 Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution, Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origin o f the 
Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946, (Columbia University Press, 1993) pp. 83-87.
33 “CCP Jin-Cha-Ji Central Bureau’s Suggestions on Inner Mongolian Autonomy”, issued in April 
1946. Archive Collection O f The Joint Committee O f Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement, 
(Archive Press, 1989) p.59.
34 Ulanhu’s speech at the founding ceremony of the Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous
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movement was the complete liberation of the whole Mongolian nation, and that the CCP was a sincere 
help to the Mongolian cause.
If the CCP and Ulanhu could still justify their cancellation of the independence in Shinggol by 
denying that it represented the toiling masses and the proletarian class, it was difficult for them to 
justify their cancellation of the independence in eastern Inner Mongolia on the same pretext. It seemed 
that to Ulanhu, whether the demand for national self-determination came from toiling masses was not 
as important as to whether the movement was under his control.
After the Japanese surrendered and before the Soviet-Mongolian army entered eastern Inner Mongolia, 
some pro-Soviet Mongol communists and revolutionaries, young intellectuals and officials began 
another autonomous movement. On 18 August 1945 they issued the Inner Mongolian Emancipation 
Declaration advocating the merger of Inner Mongolia and the MPR. In March 1945, in eastern Inner 
Mongolia the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was revived as the New Inner Mongolian 
People’s Revolutionary Party (NIMPRP) with a revised party program and constitution. NIMPRP was 
an anti-feudalist revolutionary party. Hafenga, Penstag and Temurbaagen and other Mongolian 
nationalists were the founders of NIMPRP whose aim was Inner Mongolian national liberation and 
merger with independent Mongolian state. The party also set up a Mongolian youth organization 
called People’s Revolutionary Youth League and it also established its own army.
On January 16, 1946, the NIMPRP and other Mongolian nationalist groups gathered at Gegen 
Monastery in Xingan League for the Convention of Eastern Mongolian Delegates and set up the 
Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government, and passed The Administrative Programme of the 
Eastern Mongolian Government. The government was formally established at Wangyemiao (Ulaan 
Hot) and Boinmandu was elected as Chairman. Quickly the autonomous government acquired all 
necessary features of a sovereign state: a constitution, government, parliament and an army. Within a 
short time, the government carried out a series of progressive measures. The East Mongolian People’s 
Co-operative and the East Mongolian People’s Bank were established.
For its goals of first, merger, and later, independence, the autonomous government sought the support 
of the MPR and KMT government and was turned down by the both. The CCP Bureau and Military 
Zone of western Manchuria did a lot work to influence the autonomous government in Wangyemiao 
and to persuade the Mongols to abandon their independence demands, but no agreement was ever 
reached.35 Again Ulanhu played a key role in incorporating the independent entity into his united 
autonomous movement. After a series of long and hard negotiations between Ulanhu and the Eastern
Movement, Archive Collection O f The Joint Committee O f Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement 
(Archive Press, 1989) p. 19.
35Li Fuchun, the secretary of western Manchuria CCP Bureau, spent some time at Wang Yie Miao, but 
achieved nothing, which was in sharp contrast to the success of Ulanhu's appeal to those nationalists.
At that time Lin Biao, Huang Kecheng and Li Fuchun were the top CCP leaders in Manchuria. Xi 
Zhongxun, “Ulanhu Forever Live in the Hearts of the Peoples of All Nationalities”, “Preface”, Hao 
Yufeng, Biography o f  Ulanhu (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.3.
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Inner Mongolian Government, the NIMPRP and the Eastern Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Government were disbanded in January 1946. The Eastern Inner Mongolian independence movement 
was incorporated into Ulanhu’s Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement36.
On 3 April 1946, at the Chengde Conference (also known as the ‘April 3 Conference’), the Joint 
Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and Eastern Mongolian Government were 
merged into Ulanhu’s joint autonomous movement. On 1, May 1947, the Joint Government of the 
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was established. In June 1946, the CCP and KMT again 
engaged in civil war, and by July 1947 the CCP began its strategic offensive. In the period from 1945 
to 1947, Ulanhu, using a policy of carrot and stick, controlled and assimilated various Mongolian 
independence movements and efforts. Backed by the weight of the CCP’s military triumphs, Ulanhu 
executed those Mongol nationalists who refused to surrender and united with those who accepted his 
leadership.
3. The Compromise of Autonomy and Revolution
3.1. The Situations for the Compromise
The success of Ulanhu’s joint autonomous movement in becoming associated with the CCP and the 
establishment o f the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was the result of compromise between the 
Mongolian nationalist demands and the CCP’s hegemonic communist ideology. Those sections of the 
Mongolian nationalist movement that were associated with both the Japanese and die KMT were 
clearly doomed. The movements which advocated the merger of the two Mongolias were also 
discouraged by the Soviet Union and by the Mongolian People’s Republic because it seems at the time 
the Inner Mongolian issue was considered as a Chinese domestic issue by the Soviet Union, and the 
merger of Outer and Inner Mongolia was not envisaged and agreed to as part of the regional post-war 
order37.
Ulanhu tried to present Mongolian nationalists the view that to reach an understanding and 
compromise with CCP was the only way to secure any position in the new political regime being 
established in Inner Mongolia, the CCP could also be perceived in many positive ways by the 
Mongols to justify the compromise. By doing so, Ulanhu enhanced his role in Inner Mongolian 
politics while promoting the CCP interests.
36 Boyan Bend, “Speech on April 3rd Conference in 1946”, Archive Collection O f The Joint Committee 
O f Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement (Archive Press, 1989) pp. 50-51.
37 Because the commander of the Soviet-Mongolian Joint Army in Shilinggol supported pro­
independent Mongolian nationalists, he was replaced by Niclayev, the deputy Soviet advisor in the 
Mongolian people’s Republic. Nicklayev told Ulanhu that Chinese affairs should be handled by 
Chinese Communist Party. See, Hao Yufeng, Biography o f Ulanhu (Inner Mongolian People’s Press,
1989) pp. 366-8.
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The CCP then regarded Inner Mongolia as an inseparable part of the future communist China, but they 
still needed as much support as possible to win the civil war against the KMT regime, hence it was 
important for them to win Mongol support to consolidate their hinterland bases. Therefore there was 
more room for Ulanhu to take more control in Inner Mongolia by meeting some of the Mongolian 
nationalist demands such as recognition of Mongolian land rights. CCP’s tolerant gesture on autonomy 
in Inner Mongolia, China’s first nationality autonomous region, was also a gesture to the Soviets and 
the MPR to win their trust and support.
The CCP made a lot of gestures to Mongols in Inner Mongolia, therefore it was possible for Mongols 
to understand the China-Inner Mongolia relationship as similar to that between the Soviet Russians 
and the Mongolian State. Since 1921, the Soviet-styled social revolution and modernization program 
was regarded by pro-Soviet Mongols as having completely transformed the backward theocratic 
Mongolian society from extreme poverty into a socialist society with modem industries, education and 
health care.38 But the Soviet Russians, in contrast to the Chinese colonizers, did not have much stake 
in colonizing Mongolian lands. Obviously the Soviet Union was never short of farmland and never 
had the same population pressures as China.39
Among the Mongolian revolutionaries there were always pro-Chinese views. On the question of with 
whom the Mongolian nation should form an alliance, some believed it was safer to ally with those 
nations of relatively similar and less modernized culture like the Chinese people, since Mongolia 
would be more likely to be simply assimilated by a more modernized nation like Russia.” In that 
period a there was a tendency to view Chinese people as being dominated by western powers so that 
they were regarded by Mongols as fellow sufferers.40 This pro-Chinese view was later certainly 
augmented substantially by the CCP’s Mongolian followers. The pro-Chinese views from Merse and 
later from Ulanhu idealized the new Chinese regimes of either Sun Yatsen or the CCP, and put much 
emphasis on the threats from western imperialists.
The nature o f the future state as conceived by the CCP was different from the previous Chinese 
republic which pretended to be a Chinese nation-state. The new Chinese state was to be a multi­
national state o f nationality equality, that would enjoy common progress. In the future multi-national 
state, Mongols were to be recognized as an equal and separate nation by the CCP and they were 
promised the integrity of Mongolian territory and right of national self-determination. Of course the 
incorporation o f Inner Mongolia into the Chinese state was interpreted by the CCP as a product of a 
voluntary act by Mongols rather than the negation of their self-determination right. The CCP, by
38 Guo Dao-fu (Merse), The Speech on Mongolian Issues (1929) (Inner Mongolia Dauer History and 
Language and Literature Society, 1987) p.22.
39 In 1945 when the Sino-USSR treaty was signed at Moscow, Stalin told one of the KMT 
officials: ”To be honest with you, we want Outer Mongolia for no other reason than military strategic 
considerations”. Wang Qichong, "The Strategic Position o f Outer Mongolia in Sino-USSR 
Confrontation", Feiqing Yanjiu (Study o f Communist China) (op. cit.)5/72.
40 Guo Daofu (Merse), The Speech on Mongolian Issues (1929) (Inner Mongolia Dauer History and
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exploiting all its foreign and domestic enemies’ oppressive policies towards Mongolian people, 
presented itself as a genuine friend and ally of the Mongols. After the Mongolian nationalists had 
swallowed their bitter experiences with the KMT and the Japanese, the CCP appeared more attraction.
3.2. A Revolution with Inner Mongolian Characteristics
If Ulanhu’s autonomous movement was only understood as no more than the sum of CCP activities in 
Inner Mongolia, its nationalistic side would be neglected. Although it was under the leadership of the 
CCP and was regarded as a part of the Chinese revolution, the joint autonomous movement was in 
nature a united front movement. In terms of its goals, roots and the logic of its development, it had its 
own character. Although it was understood as a communist movement, it was a movement with 
distinct Inner Mongolian characteristics.
Within the movement it was always clear to Mongols that the cooperation with the CCP was basically 
a political alliance rather than one based on a sense of a common national identity. Accordingly the 
possibility of merging with the independent Mongolian state was not excluded, which, according to 
Stalin’s view on the international proletariat revolution, depended on the requirements of economic 
and political development. In the documents of the autonomous movement, Mongols and Chinese, 
descendants of Genghis Khan and descendants of the Emperors Yan, were always used as two separate 
notions respectively, as Inner Mongolians and Chinese people.41 Since the Joint Autonomous 
Movement in theory was a mass movement and an united front movement led by the Communist 
party,42 its ultimate goal was Mongolian national liberation. After the Japanese were defeated in 1945, 
Ulanhu envisaged three stages for the Inner Mongolian revolution: an autonomous movement prior to 
the establishment of an autonomous government; then an autonomous government; and finally a state 
in a free confederation.43 According to the 1947 Program of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Government, the goal of autonomy was “ to unite Mongolian people of all levels in Inner Mongolia, 
unite Chinese Communist party and Chinese democratic forces,... finally set up for the Inner 
Mongolian people a self-determined government”, ”to realize complete Mongolian national 
liberation”, and to ’’form a free confederation”.44
In the beginning of the IMAR, the CCP’s role and leadership was not emphasized as much as today.
Language and Literature Society, 1987) p.31.
41 Ulanhu said: “the heroes of the Inner Mongolian defense army fight abreast of the 8th route army 
against the common enemy. They are suffering and refuse to give up and the blood of descendants of 
Genghis Khan and descendants of Huang Emperor are shed together”, Ulanhu, “The First Year of 
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement”, (27 April, 1949), Archive Collection O f Inner Mongolian 
United And Autonomous Movement (Archive Press, 1989)p.230.
42 “Jin-Cha-Ji CCP Central Bureau’s Suggestions on Inner Mongolian Autonomy Issues” (April 1946), 
Archive Collection O f Inner Mongolian United And Autonomous Movement (Archive Press, 1989) 
p.59.
43 Ulanhu, “The Path to Inner Mongolian National Liberation”, 1947, Cultural Revolution Materials.
44 “Program of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government”, Ibid.
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Regarding Inner Mongolia’s autonomy and its relations with the CCP, Ulanhu sometimes spoke of the 
CCP as a genuine friend and ally and he tried to convince people that the paramount leader of the 
autonomous movement was the Inner Mongolian Communist Party rather than the Chinese Communist 
Party45. When outside help for the Inner Mongolian national liberation was mentioned, the Soviet 
Union as the powerful victor in the war and the independent MPR were usually listed before the CCP 
and other Chinese democratic forces 46
Ulanhu’s power in Inner Mongolia was built up less through military means than by co-opting various 
Mongolian nationalist groups and this was also one of the reasons that he was highly valued by CCP. 
Contrary to Mao’s view that “national struggle, in the final analysis, is a matter of class struggle”, 
Ulanhu believed “ die Nationality problem was an internal problem”.47 Rather than engendering a 
social revolution as the CCP did, Ulanhu used an approach softer than the social revolution carried out 
in Chinese areas; he did not group Mongolian people into antagonist classes. The autonomous 
movement was described later by Ulanhu as a “Successful chapter of unity and struggle”. Just as the 
CCP had put forward a three-part secret formula as the reason for the success o f its revolution, Ulanhu 
summarized his own three during this period: to win over Mongolian youth; to establish Mongolian 
national liberation and unity; to unite the Mongolian traditional classes. 48
The Inner Mongolian revolution was regarded as having its own developmental logic. Mao Zedong 
sometimes liked to see himself as a modem successor to the historical peasant revolutions, and in the 
same way, Ulanhu saw the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement under his leadership as developed 
in the line o f historical Mongolian heroism, starting from Genghis Khan, Ligden Khan (the last 
Mongolian great khan to fight against the Manchu conquest), Gerdan Boshigt (Junghar Mongolian 
Khan who tried to unify Mongolia but was defeated by the Manchu emperor Kang Xi), to Sukhe 
Baator and Chalpasang, the modem revolutionary Mongolian heroes.49 In the history of Mongolian 
communism, the Mongolia-Tibetan Academy in Beijing was seen as the cradle o f Inner Mongolian 
revolution just as the Jing Gang Mountains or Yanan are regarded as the cradles of the CCP’s 
revolution. And Ulanhu said that the Mongolian revolution developed independently of the CCP 
before the Sino-Japanese war and during civil war period50.
45 Ulanhu, “Commemoration of Hanomola”, speech on Commemoration meeting in Yanan on 16 
March, 1945, Hao Yufeng, Biography o f Ulanhu (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.355.
46 “The Instruction of the Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement on Eastern 
Mongolian Situations and Works (1946)”, Archive Collection O f Inner Mongolian United And  
Autonomous Movement (Archive Press, 1989) p. 145.
47 Cultural Revolution Materials
48 Ulanhu, “Triumphant Advance on the Path of Creating New History”, the foreword of Archive 
Collection O f Inner Mongolian United And Autonomous Movement (Archive Press, 1989)
49 Ulanhu, “Speech on the Founding Meeting of the Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Movement “(26 November, 1945), Archive Collection O f Inner Mongolian United And Autonomous 
Movement (Archive Press, 1989) p. 18.
50 In the 1930s Mongolian communist activities in Inner Mongolia were under the leadership o f the
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4. The Autonomy Effort and leftist policies from 1947 to the End of the Cultural Revolution
The CCP’s leadership of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement was established by compromise. 
One element was the CCP’s promise to keep the integrity of Mongolian land and the traditional rights 
of Mongols. The other was the promise to all the people in common that they would enjoy equal rights 
and prosperity. Ulanhu, through his leading role in the autonomous movement, made himself a 
champion of both the cause of Mongolian autonomy and of the socialist cause.
At the beginning of the IMAR, Ulanhu and his followers tried to set up a basis for a genuine 
nationality autonomy in Inner Mongolia. But during the entire process, the Mongols and Chinese were 
in constant conflict. In spite of the haggles and struggles, some achievements were made during this 
period. Yet, ironically, in the same period, the very reason for Mongolian autonomy -the right of 
Mongolian people to Mongolian land - was canceled by China’s socialist reform in the 1950s. Though 
it was only ten years since the IMAR was founded, it was clear that the CCP would not tolerate any 
real autonomy in Inner Mongolia, and Ulanhu’s downfall in 1966 in the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution indicated the final end to an era of compromise. The CCP in the end abandoned 
completely the Soviet model of nationality policy.
After the CCP defeat of the KMT, it proclaimed the founding of the new China, and the PRC became 
an internationally recognized sovereign state which included all non-Chinese frontiers, such as Inner 
Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, where the KMT regime had never exercised full control. [ Even the 
Manchus had exercised only various means of indirect administration and only rarely did they enjoy 
outright control]. It was then that the guarantee o f the CCP’s promises regarding Mongolian 
autonomy came to mean nothing more than an ideological slogan. Yet, this slogan could guarantee 
little since the character o f Chinese communism had always flickered between the two influences of 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrines and Chinese deep-seated characteristics. Mongols who argued in 
favor of genuine nationality autonomy, could only base their arguments against the CCP in the 1950s 
with quotes from Lenin and from Stalin’s remarks on nationality issues, or from what the CCP leaders 
had previously promised to Mongols.
Nationality assimilation was usually carried out under the name of nationality integration. Nationality 
integration or assimilation was justified by the Chinese arguments based on the logic of historical 
materialism. Since Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto that class, state, and nation 
would vanish in the end, and the Chinese usually argued that since China was a socialist state, 
different nationalities together with their cultural and language differences would gradually be 
integrated into one. And since the Chinese were the largest nationality and at a more advanced stage of 
development stage than other ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities should therefore be assimilated into 
the Chinese. But Mongols argued that since Marx and Engels said that nation would vanish instead of 
being assimilated by a dominant nationality, the Chinese nationality was as unimportant as the
Comintern. “Speech on Lindong Cadre’s Meeting” (February 1947) Cultural Revolution Materials
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Mongolian nationality in the future common communist identity. According to Lenin, after socialism 
succeeded in one state, those nations previously under oppression would experience an unprecedented 
stage o f developmental prosperity, as would their languages and intellectual development.51
In the Maoist era, the CCP’s official perception of nation or nationality did not venture beyond 
Stalin’s definition which provided a mixture of objective and subjective standards for a nation: 
common territory, common economic life, common language, common culture and common 
psychological make-up o f the common cultural community52. Stalin’s criteria o f nationality was often 
quoted in reverse by those who argued for Mongolian autonomy. The reverse logic was that a people 
being recognized as a nation or nationality are entitled to their own common territory, common 
economy, common language and culture. That was Ulanhu’s main theoretical basis for nationality 
autonomy. Ulanhu, in his own way, listed three foundations for nationality autonomy: political, 
economic and cultural foundations.
The extent to which Mongols could manage their own affairs in Inner Mongolia was related to two 
issues: the first was whether Mongols’ right to Inner Mongolia as a whole was recognized; the second 
was the extent to which political authority in the IMAR represented Mongolian nationality. The first 
issue o f Mongolian land rights was complicated by the changes in the IMAR administrative regions 
which involved changes of ethnic population. The change of Mongolian rights was indicated not only 
in legal categories, but it was also determined by ideologically-motivated social changes. The second 
issue o f representation was a matter of compromise between two different principles. On one hand the 
Chinese Communist party decided that it did not need to derive its mandate from the people’s votes, 
but from the vanguard party theory; on the other hand there was also the pretension of democratic 
formalities. The democratic formalities in IMAR were the ethnic content or proportion of the 
officialdom.
51 Shenamjil, “Nationality Language’s Prosperous Development is the Party’s Important Task in the 
Socialist Historical Period”, Language and Intellectual Development (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 
1990) p.23.
52 Stalin: “A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life 
and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture”, Joseph Stalin, Marxism And The 
National And Colonial Question (London, 1936) p8.
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4.1. Ethnic Cadres and Mongolian Language
In the first 10 years of the IMAR after 1947, Ulanhu’s political position was significantly elevated.
He was a member of Constitution Draft Committee (1953). He was the person who in both theory and 
practice contributed most to the 1954 constitution on nationality issues.53 In 1954 he was the deputy 
chief of the Korea War Visiting Group in his capacity as vice-premier of state council, director of the 
State Nationality Commission and vice-president of the Sino-USSR Friendship Association. Before 
1967, Ulanhu enjoyed as many as twelve titles: alternate member of the politburo of the CCP central 
committee, vice-premier, director of the State Nationality Commission, the Second Secretary of the 
CCP’s North China Bureau, the First Secretary of the CCP Inner Mongolia Committee, the Chairman 
of the Inner Mongolian Government, the Chief commander and commissar of the Inner Mongolian 
military zone and the President of the Inner Mongolian University. In the 20-year period just prior to 
the beginning o f the Cultural Revolution, the administrative status of the IMAR was higher than any of 
the other Chinese provinces. The Inner Mongolian Military zone then enjoyed an equal status with 
other large military zones directly under the command of the Chinese central military authority.
Ulanhu put a lot emphasis on the ethnicization of cadres in Inner Mongolia, which naturally met 
considerable resistance from the local Chinese cadres who were in a majority at all levels of the 
IMAR’s party and government organization. Therefore it was important for Ulanhu to put his 
Mongolian followers in significant positions of the IMAR government and party organs. Many of 
these Mongolian cadres had not been trained by the CCP, they had been formerly associated with the 
former IMPRP, the Comintern and even De Wang’s autonomous movement. The cadres most trusted 
by Ulanhu were the Turned Mongols that he had co-opted and who had been under his leadership 
before 1947. There were also Mongolian cadres from eastern Inner Mongolia who had accepted 
Ulanhu’s leadership when he incorporated the eastern autonomous movement. Most of those from the 
east were formerly associated either with the Comintern or the Japanese, and thus were less trusted by 
the CCP. It may be that those most trusted by CCP were the Mongols who had joined the Chinese 
revolution in a manner which had nothing to do with Inner Mongolian autonomous movement. For 
example, there were those Mongols who had joined the CCP and its army in Manchuria after 1945 and 
there were those who had joined the CCP in north China, and many of them were sent to Inner 
Mongolia.
53 The Government Program (Shi Zheng Gang Ling) of Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Council passed in September 1949 incorporated all the content on nationality works written by Ulanhu 
in Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government Program (1 May, 1947). In December, 1951 Ulanhu 
presented the Report on IMAR Work as part of preparation of the PRC Nationality Regional 
Autonomy Program. In August 1952 Ulanhu presented the Report on PRC Nationality Regional 
Autonomy Program in the Central Government Committee. Hao Yufeng, (op. cit.)
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Ulanhu considered it vital for the autonomy to train more Mongols and other non-Chinese cadres and 
bring them into the autonomous government and the party organizations. In 1956, the IMAR and other 
autonomous regions launched a drive to “ethnicize” the party and government organs. In a speech 
before the 3rd plenary of the National People’s Congress on June 20,1956, Ulanhu explained that in 
order to enable the national minorities to truly become “masters in their own house”, it was necessary 
to train a large number of national minority cadres to take over the primary roles of government 
administration and party affairs in their respective autonomous regions. The achievement was made a 
year later. According to Wang Duo, deputy party secretary of the IMAR at the time, one fifth of all 
cadres in Inner Mongolia were Mongols while Mongols by then accounted for only 1/8 of the whole 
population. But in the ensuing period from 1957 to 1962, cadre ethnicization was affected by Mao’s 
radicalism.54
Another issue related to the ethnicization of the government and the party organs was widening the use 
of Mongolian language. Before the Sino-Russian split when the Soviet model of socialist construction 
was still highly regarded and copied by China, the MPR, the second socialist state in the world, was 
regarded by some Mongols in the IMAR as a better example to follow than China. Mongolian culture 
and language were regarded by the IMAR as better and more direct means than Chinese culture and 
language to learn the more advanced socialism of the Soviet Union.55 The common Socialist culture 
between the Mongolian state and Inner Mongolia was emphasized. Efforts towards unifying 
Mongolian culture was even once emphasized by the IMAR government.
The pro-Mongolian cultural policy was possible because of the Sino-Russian alliance. Besides, it 
might also have had something to do with the long-standing Chinese reluctance to recognize the 
independent Mongolian state. Senior Chinese leaders repeatedly spoke of their hopes of bringing back 
into China the Mongolian state56. Perhaps Ulanhu also took advantage of these Chinese expectations 
to justify his pro-MPR policy. He once said that the standardization of the Mongolian language in the 
MPR and the IMAR could better promote Mao Zedong thoughts in the MPR.57
54 Wang Duo, My Fifty Years,
55 Ulanhu, “Speech on Mongolian Language Reform”, 1955, Cultural Revolution Materials.
56 In the summer of 1949, Mao said "why don't we let Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia unite 
under the name of autonomy and become a part of PRC" when he mentioned nationality problem to 
Russians. Actually Mao in many other.occasions in 1945,1954, 1956 and 1964 mentioned “losing 
Mongolia”. Ming Pao 2/93 p55.
57 The Cultural Revolution Materials.
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In 1953 at a special conference on Mongolian language, the IMAR government decided to popularize 
Mongolian. On July 10, 1955, the IMAR validated the use of the Cyrillic alphabet for writing and 
spelling Mongolian in the same way as operated in the Mongolian state. The goals set were to follow 
the Mongolian state’s use of Cyrillic as the standard written form; to standardize local dialects 
following the standard of the Khalkha dialect which was the official language in Mongolian state; to 
standardize vocabulary and technical terms with those of the Mongolian State; unite Mongolian 
textbooks under a single system with the Mongolian state. These were designed to bridge the 
traditional cultural cleavage and bias between east and west Inner Mongolia using the then-believed 
higher culture of the Mongolian state.
The decision was followed by a wide-scale speak-Mongolian drive. The ability to speak Mongolian 
became then an important component of the nationalization of autonomous organs and also as an 
important criterion in determining a cadre’s promotion in Inner Mongolia regardless of whether they 
were Mongols or Chinese. During this period, Inner Mongolia was categorized in four different areas, 
from advanced areas to backward areas according to their different level of popularizing the 
Mongolian language. The most advanced areas were those border areas along the Mongolian state, the 
worst areas were municipalities where the majority of the population was Chinese.
Due to pressure from Beijing, the effort to popularize Mongolian was held back in the leftist years 
from 1957 to 1962. During that time, Mongolian cadres were not allowed to speak Mongolian at 
work and conferences in spite of the official legal status of Mongolian. In April 1958, the IMAR was 
forced to declare that Cyrillic spelling was not suitable for Inner Mongolia. Yet, after the Great Leap 
Forward, the term for “people’s commune” borrowed from the Chinese in Mongolian vocabulary was 
replaced by “nigdel”, the same term that was used in Ulaan Baator.
The goal of Mongolian education was defined by the Inner Mongolia government as to serve national 
culture. The Chinese authorities were so worried by this trend that during 1957 to 1962, they punished 
several people in highly publicized anti-rightest cases to warn against Mongols’ fervor in learning 
from Ulaan Baator. In the IMAR primary school Mongolian textbooks of 1956, all mountains and 
rivers were listed as belonging to the Mongolian state in the textbook “Our Homeland”. In 1960, in the 
officially published Mongolian-Chinese dictionary, the item “Ulaan Baator” was explained in Chinese 
as the capital o f our Mongolian motherland; “Nanking” as China’s capital; “Beijing” as Beiping.58 
Whether or not they were mindless mistakes, the incident showed the depth of the cultural influence 
from Mongolian State. Later in Cultural Revolution, the IMAR Nationality press and the IMAR 
People’s Press were accused by Red Guards as being “the branch press of Ulaan Baator”.59
Nanking was KMT China’s capital before 1949, after 1949 Beijing has been Communist China’s 
capital. Beiping is the old name for Beijing used by KMT and Ming dynasty. Beiping in Chinese 
means “pacify the north”.
59 The Cultural Revolution Materials.
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During the first 10-year period after 1947, considerable progress was made in nationality education. 
According to official statistics, in 1947, there were only two middle schools and 100 primary schools 
in Inner Mongolia, 100 Mongolian teachers and 95% of all Mongols were illiterates. By 1957, there 
were 25 middle schools, there were 20 times more teachers of Mongolian, and 37% of Mongols could 
read.60 In the second ten years from 1957 to 1967, there was some progress and there were some 
setbacks.
Before 1958, a lot of work was carried out by Inner Mongolia to preserve the Mongolian folk art and 
cultural tradition. Some major Mongolian literary classics were put together and published. To 
celebrate the 10-year anniversary of the IMAR, The Historical Romance of the Yuan Dynasty, Gada 
Melin, Erdni Tovch, Danabal were published. An important monument to the period is Genghis 
Khan’s Mausoleum which was rebuilt in 1955. The huge mausoleum was built in Mongolian style on 
the Ordos plateau where originally there were three simple yurts for the keeping of some relics from 
Genghis Khan.61
4.2. Inner Mongolian Territory and Mongolian Land Right
From 1946 to 1956 it took ten years for the IMAR to reclaim those areas which had been either 
incorporated into bordering Chinese provinces or established as new Chinese provinces. According to 
IMAR propaganda, the Mongolian territory promised by the CCP in the 1935 Declaration was 
restored in the new China.
In 1947 when Ulanhu united and secured the support of the eastern Mongolian nationalists, the capital 
of the Joint Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was moved from Ulaan Hot in east Mongolia to 
Kalgan [“zhang jia kou” in Chinese]. In 1952 the capital was finally moved to Gui Sui [meaning return 
and pacified in Chinese, today’s Hohhot, the capital of IMAR] which was immediately restored to its 
original Mongolian name, Hohhot [ “Hoh hot” in Mongolia means blue city] beginning from the time 
of Altan Khan.
Suiyuan Province was abolished in June 1954; in July 1955 the six banners and counties of Jehol 
province such as Onut Banner and Chi Feng county were incorporated into Inner Mongolia. (The 
other part of Jehol were put into Hebei provinces). In April 1956, Bain Hot Mongolian prefecture and 
Egina Banner of Gansu Province were incorporated into Inner Mongolia and in the same year Bayan
60 Shenamjil, “Nationality Language’s Prosperous Development is the Party’s Important Task in the 
Socialist Historical Period”, Language and Intellectual Development (Inner Mongolian People’s Press,
1990) p.23.
61 Genghis Khan’s tomb has never been found. It is generally believed that the real burial site is within 
the MPR. The Ordos Plateau in Inner Mongolia where Genghis Khan’s relics were kept is only a 
shrine to him. “Cheng Lin” (Genghis Khan’s Mausoleum), the Chinese name for the Ordos site is 
misleading. But the misnomer does have the political implication which supports the Chinese claim 
that the Mongolian empire was ancient China and Genghis Khan was a Chinese emperor whose 
burying ground is still on the territory of P.R.C..
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Nor League was set up in Inner Mongolia.62 The unified IMAR was regarded by Mongols as the end 
of 300 years of separating Inner Mongolia.63 Five hundred thousand Mongols outside the IMAR(in 
Xinjiang region, Qinghai province and IMAR’s neighbouring provinces, Gansu, Ningxia, Hebei, 
Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang) were welcomed to return to Inner Mongolia. Ulanhu said that the 
unification would benefit the development of nationality culture64.
The enlargement o f IMAR no doubt increased the IMAR government and Ulanhu’s power. One 
principle used to restore the original size of Inner Mongolia was to include as little Chinese as 
possible to provide Mongolian autonomy with Mongolian population bases. But the IMAR 
enlargement also brought in more Chinese cadres into the IMAR government, and also added 
substantially to Chinese population in the IMAR which was then already in a majority, particularly in 
those incorporated parts which were mostly agricultural areas.
But the enlargement of the IMAR administrative areas was not the same as unifying the territory of 
Mongolia. Since the people in China were not allowed to change their permanent residence freely in 
the PRC’s household registration system, the provincial border was another barrier to the freedom of 
movement. Therefore in the longer term, the enlarging administrative scope o f the IMAR, thus 
incorporating more Chinese peasants than Mongolian herdsmen, undermined the population basis for 
Mongolian autonomy.
During the Cultural Revolution, in the ten-month period from January to October in 197065, the size of 
the IMAR was reduced by half with only with three of the original leagues left: Shilinggol, Ulaan 
Chab and Ikhe Zuu. The other three leagues were annexed by the neighboring provinces of 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia and Gansu.
Within the 10-year period from 1947 to 1958, the state had became the landowner of the grassland of 
Inner Mongolia and Mongols lost their land ownership step by step.
Land reform was conducted between 1947 and 1952 in Inner Mongolia. In the pastoral areas, the 
reform was called “democratic reform” since the ownership of grassland was not changed. Before 
1947, the grassland in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public and the aristocracy was not 
the landowner, they had only privileges in using grazing lands. During the democratic reform, it was
62 Liu Jingping and Zheng Guangzhi, ed. Inner Mongolian Economic Development (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1979)p.l69.
63 Although Ligden Khan only controlled Chakhar, he was by lineage the orthodox khan o f all 
Mongolia. He was defeated by the Manchu Emperor Tiancong (Hung Taiji, or Arvkhai 300 years ago 
(1634), and then South Mongolia was annexed to the Manchu Qing dynasty.
64 Ulanhu, “Speech on IMAR Party Propaganda Working Meeting”, 1957. The Cultural Revolution 
Materials
65 The CCP Central Committee on December 19, 1969 made the ’’Decision on the Partition and 
Martial Law of IMAR”, according to which the Beijing Military Zone exercised general martial law in 
Inner Mongolia after the partition. The Commander, together with his deputies and commissars of the 
BJ Military Zone formed the Inner Mongolian Front Line Command which controlled all the works in 
Inner Mongolia. Hao Weimin, (op. cit.) p.320.
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recognized by the IMAR CCP Committee that all the land in Inner Mongolia belonged to the 
Mongolian people66. In the pastoral areas, the Mongolian public ownership of grassland and the equal 
right of grazing were reiterated by the IMAR government, and the policy was called “free grazing” (zi 
you fang mu)67.
During the democratic reform period, Mongolian ownership of all the land in Inner Mongolia was 
redefined to mean that the land right extended only to the limited pastoral areas. A document issued by 
the Nationality Commission of the State Council in 1953 confirmed that the grasslands in Inner 
Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public in common. It pointed out: ”at present all grasslands and 
grazing lands in all pastoral areas, which might formerly have belonged to the whole nationality or a 
tribe, an individual or a monastery, or might have been leased land between the different nationalities 
or tribes, are now owned by the Mongolian public in common, in the whole IMAR, the policy is free 
grazing on grassland and readjustment of grassland.”68
In the Inner Mongolian agriculture areas, the Mongolian ownership of land was annulled by the land 
reform. The land which had formerly belonged to the Mongolian public in common was now allocated 
to individual peasants. For centuries before the land reform, Chinese peasants in Inner Mongolia had 
no land ownership rights and the land belonged to the Mongolian banners. When Mongolian nobles 
illegally let or sold public land to Chinese landlords, some other land was then also allocated to the 
Mongolian commoners. Chinese tenant farmers paid rent to Mongolian landlords: either Mongolian 
nobles or commoners. The rent was called Mongolian Rent (meng zu) by the Chinese which clearly 
indicates Mongolian land ownership. One important measure of the land reform was to invalidate the 
Mongolian Rent69. And when those Mongols who owned more land were categorized as landlords, 
their land was allocated to the landless tenants, most of whom were Chinese.
From 1947 to 1957, a “no class-struggle” policy was pursued in the democratic reform in the pastoral 
areas in Inner Mongolia.70 Since there was no private ownership of grassland, therefore there was no 
exploiting class which could be said to control the means of production in the pastoral areas. The 
democratic reform on the pastoral land was not to change the land ownership, but only to abolish the 
Mongolian nobles’ privileges in the use of public grazing land. The guideline of the IMAR
66 Liu Jingping, The Economic Development o f Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1979) p.106.
67 Liu Jingping, The Economic Development o f Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1979) p. 111
68 The Basic Summary of the Animal Husbandry Production in IMAR and Suiyuan, Qinghai, Xinjiang 
promulgated by the Nationality Commission of State Council, see Ni Dongfa, “Two Kinds of 
Ownership of the Grassland in IMAR”, Gefu, ed. Collection o f  Papers on Animal Husbandry (Inner 
Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.335.
69 Liu Jingping, The Economic Development o f Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1979) p. 106.
70 The policy was called “3 no's, 2 beneficials”: no class struggle, no confiscation, no class 
classification/categorization; to be beneficial to both livestock owner and herders. See Hao Weimin, 
IMAR History, (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1991) p.38.
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government was that there should be “ public ownership of pastures, freedom of grazing, without class 
categorization and class struggle, and with mutual benefit for both herd owners and herdsmen.”71 The 
land reform in the cultivated parts, of the lands taken over from Mongolian landlords, 80% was given 
to Mongols and 20% to Chinese peasants. After the land reform, Mongolian peasants usually had 
more land than Chinese, therefore they were allowed to employ Chinese peasants or let farmland to 
Chinese peasants for rent.
The different policies of the democratic reform in the agricultural areas and the pastoral areas, and the 
different treatment toward Mongolian peasants and Chinese peasants in the agricultural areas reflected 
the compromise o f two principles: both recognition of Mongolian rights and the more radical policies 
based on class differentiation. The split in policy differences often showed up between the Chinese 
central government guidelines and those of the IMAR government, and between the Mongolian cadres 
and Chinese cadres of the IMAR government. In spite of the policy of no class differentiation and 
struggle, in practice, class distinction was still adopted as an internal guideline by some cadres, and in 
some pastoral areas the policy of class distinction was copied from the agricultural areas.
Cooperatives (he zuo she) were set up in the agricultural areas in Inner Mongolia from 1953 to 1956 
and in the pastoral areas from 1953 to 1958. By January of 1956, the first stage cooperatives had been 
established in the agricultural areas. The farm land and other basic production materials were 
collectivized into the cooperatives as shares of the means of production previously owned by 
households, and the peasants became the shareholder. Since the distribution was conducted according 
to the share, the first stage cooperatives were regarded as semi-socialist in nature. By the end of 1956, 
the first stage cooperatives were upgraded into advanced collectives in which the distribution was no 
longer conducted as a dividend, but according to work. And, the individual peasant’s land rights were 
totally abolished.
During the cooperative movement, the so-called “combined cooperatives” (“lian he she”: cooperatives 
consisted of many nationalities, most combined cooperatives were Chinese-Mongol cooperatives) 
were encouraged by Chinese cadres and welcomed by Chinese peasants. Since Mongolian peasants 
normally owned more land than Chinese peasants before the collectivization, Mongolian peasants lost 
more than Chinese peasants. During the collectivization in the pastoral areas, herdsmen’s livestock 
were taken by the preliminary cooperatives as shares first and later became the collective property of 
the advanced cooperatives. Many monasteries - large livestock owners in the pastoral areas - were 
forced to join the state farms together with their livestock and grazing land, while others were 
collectivized into cooperatives. In the cases of those “combined cooperatives”, more land which had 
formerly been owned by Mongols was transferred to the cooperatives and was shared by Chinese 
peasants. In the collectivization of monastery properties, the livestock formerly belonging to the 
monasteries and the Mongolian public grazing land both became state property.
71 Ulanhu, “Speech on Sub-branch of North China Bureau Meeting on 11 May”, 1952. The Cultural
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The communization of agricultural cooperatives in Inner Mongolia was completed in October 1958. 
By July of 1958 cooperatives had been set up in all the pastoral areas. Although the IMAR CCP 
Committee suggested postponing communization in the pastoral areas, in practice more radical 
policies were pursued and communization started after September and October of 1958. The 
guidelines of the CCP on the people’s communes emphasized that there was to be a transitional period 
from the socialist collective ownership to the socialist people’s ownership (quan min suo you zhi), and 
from socialism to communism. The guidelines also emphasized that the people’s commune was a 
three-level collective ownership, the ownership of the production team was the base.72 But in practice, 
the collective ownership was replaced by the state ownership (quan min suo you).
The period after the “Great Leap Forward” and before the Cultural Revolution was the period when 
land ownership experienced a transition from the collective ownership to the state ownership (it was 
known in Chinese as “public” or “the people’s ownership” (quan min suo you zhi). The so-called 
“Combined Communes” (lian he she: communes with many nationalities) were encouraged in Inner 
Mongolia. During the communization Mongolian land rights were finally abolished and the Chinese 
state became the owner of Inner Mongolian grassland.
Though Mongols may argue that the transition of the grassland ownership was contradictory to the 
Chinese policies on people’s commune73 and the 1954 Chinese constitution, Chinese can always argue 
the opposite. Since the 1954 Constitution stipulated that “wild land” belonged to the state74, the 
different interpretations of the definition of wild land became crucial to the issue o f grassland 
ownership. The Chinese tend to regard all the land which is not cultivated for farming as wild land. 
The cultivation of grassland has always been called by Chinese as “opening wildness/wild land” (kai 
huang). Mongols argue that no law was ever written that says that the grasslands in the IMAR, except 
those occupied by the state and PLA, are owned by the state.
The ownership of the grassland in Inner Mongolia was clarified later. In 1963 the Nationality 
Commission and the Agricultural Ministry of the State Council issued a 40-article regulation on the 
works in pastoral areas. It wrote: “the production teams have fixed rights to use the grassland within 
their sphere according to the particular conditions and historical customs.” Grassland ownership was
Revolution Materials, also See Hao Weimin (op. cit.) p.92.
72 “The Resolutions On The Several Issues Of The People’s Commune”, passed by the 6th Meeting of 
the 8th CCP Central Committee. “The Regulations Of The Work Concerning The People’s 
Communes In The Countryside (draft)” (commonly known as the “60 Articles”), Liu Jingping, The 
Economic Development o f  the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 
1979) pp.227,446.
73 “The Regulations of the Works on Countryside People’s Commune” (usually known as “liu shi 
diao” (60 articles)) see Liu Jingping ed ., The Economic Development o f  the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1979) p.227.
74 In the constitution of 1954, it was made clear that “each nationality autonomous region is an 
inseparable part of the PRC.” It also stipulates: “mines, rivers, the forest, wild land and other 
resources which, according to particular laws, belong to the state, belong to the whole people 
(quanmin suoyou)”. Sun Xianfang, The Laws o f Nationality Regional Autonomy (Inner Mongolian
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not mentioned. Yet, in 1965, ownership was mentioned in the IMAR Grassland Management 
Provisional Regulations. It wrote that “the grassland of IMAR is owned by the state (quan min suo 
you)”. State ownership of the IMAR grassland was reiterated in the Grassland Management 
Regulations stipulated in 1973.75 The two regulations were opposed by Mongols because they were 
not made through the particular legal procedures required by the state constitution. According to the 
constitution at the time, the two regulations could only have become law after they were approved by 
the standing committee of the people’s congress. As a matter of fact, the two regulations never went 
through the standing committee. The legal argument is not really to the point because it was never a 
problem for the regulations to be approved by the people’s congress which was simply a rubber-stamp 
anyway.
With regard to the communization, Ulanhu again displayed certain policy differences with the radical 
policies emanating from Beijing and the Chinese cadres. He advocated that the cooperatives on the 
grassland should remain the same except for putting up the sign of people’s commune. In spite of his 
moderate position, in the later period of the socialist reform after the collectivization of the Mongolian 
herdsmen economy in 1958, many newly-established cooperatives began to be upgraded to people’s 
communes by copying the communisation in the agricultural areas. The radical guideline was to ’’rely 
on the poor and lower-middle herdsmen, unite all eligible forces, resolutely strive for socialist 
transformation in the pastoral area”.76 When communization was carried out in Inner Mongolia in 
1958, “Gong She”, Chinese term for “Agricultural Commune”, was introduced into the Mongolian 
language. In the spring of 1959 when the central government readjusted the radical policy on people’s 
communes, Ulanhu quickly reversed many radical policies on the communisation o f the grassland.77
Land ownership went through three changes from the land reform to socialist reform. With regard to 
Chinese peasants, the new Communist state deprived landlords of their land and gave it to the landless 
peasants; the state first changed individual ownership of land into the collective ownership by 
collectivization, and then the collective land ownership was changed into the state ownership. Chinese 
landless peasants first became individual farmers with land, and then became landless again. As far as 
Mongolian herdsmen were concerned, the Chinese state was less justified in doing the same. In the 
process of collectivization the Mongolian public ownership of grassland was separated into many 
smaller collective ownerships, and then the collective ownership was transferred to the state. As a 
result of communization, Mongolian herdsmen for the first time in their long and ancient history 
became landless.
University Press, 1990) p.53.
75 Ni Dongfa, “Two Kinds of Ownership of the Grassland in IMAR”, Gefu, ed. Collection o f Papers 
on Animal Husbandry (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.339.
76 Liu Jingping, The Economic Development o f  Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1979) p. 198.
77 Gao Zengpei, “The Review and Reflections on Historical Experience”, Gefu, ed. Collection o f  
Papers on Animal Husbandry (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) pp. 17, 18.
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4.3. Chinese Migration, Cultivation and Environment Deterioration
Once the Mongolian grassland was no longer owned by Mongols either as individuals or collectively, 
it lost any remaining legal protection against Chinese cultivation and migration. After 1958 when the 
“agriculture first” policy replaced the former policy of “animal husbandry first” the new policy 
speeded up Chinese migration into the IMAR. Moreover, it also eroded Mongolian’s political identity 
still further. By 1960 66% of nomads had permanently settled for a sedentary life and during the 
period of the Great Leap Forward( 195 8-61) many Mongolian cadres were arrested and purged 
because they did not agree with the “putting grain first” policy.
In 1955 Mao said “in the third 5-year plan, 400 to 500 million mu (Chinese acre) wild land should be 
opened up”. According to this spirit, the CCP North China bureau, with the support of the Agriculture 
Cultivation Ministry, launched the opening-up campaign during the Great Leap Forward. From 1958 
to 1976, 31 million acres of grassland were turned over to cultivation as farmland. In Ulaanchab 
League, 8 million acres grassland have been opened since 1949. In Hulun Buir League alone, from 
1960 to 1961, 4 million acres of pastoral land were cultivated and 24 State farms were set up. In 
Hulun Buir League in the year of 1960 2.97 million acres of grassland were opened. By 1972 in Ikhe 
Zuu League there had been four large-scale cultivations, wherein 10 million acres of grassland had 
been changed into farmland, 6 million of which ended up as desert.78
After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP government readjusted its national economic 
policy. The adjustment enabled Ulanhu to reverse many radical policies carried out during the Great 
Leap Forward. He even restored some of the cultivated land back to grazing land. In 1962 he went to 
Hulun Buir and canceled all the newly set up state farms and sent back all the soldier farmers to where 
they had come from. At a 1963 meeting on nationality work, Ulanhu reasserted the “livestock first” 
development strategy in place of “agriculture first” strategy.
Yet within 20 years after 1958, there were 3 large-scale movements to expand cultivations in the 
IMAR, wherein 31 million acres of grassland were cultivated.79 During the period o f the Cultural 
Revolution, 14 million acres of grassland were opened up. All of them brought serious environmental 
problems to grasslands, and caused animal husbandry to stagnate. The total number of the livestock in 
pastoral areas in 1976 had fallen by 7.4% as compared with 1966.80
Mongols, already a minority in IMAR, were further dwarfed as large numbers of Chinese migrated 
into Inner Mongolia as both industrial and agricultural labors. Fully one-third of the IMAR population 
migrated there during the period between 1947 and 1976. The proportion of the Mongolian population
78 Hohe, “Grassland Construction in the Animal Husbandry”, Gefu, ed. Collection o f  Papers on 
Animal Husbandry (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.282.
79 Ni Dongfa, “Two Kinds of Ownership of Grassland in IMAR”, Gefu, ed., The Collection o f Papers 
on Animal Husbandry (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.336.
80 Gao Zengpei, “The Review and Reflections on Historical Experience”, Gefu, ed., Collection o f  
Papers on Animal Husbandry (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p. 19.
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(including Daur and other related indigenous nationalities) decreased from 25% to 4.7%. In 1947 the 
number o f Chinese was four times that of Mongols, by 1960, the Chinese population had increased to 
9 times that of the Mongols, and 8 years later, the Chinese outnumbered the Mongols by a factor of 12. 
In 1962 Mongols were majority in 22 banners, but by 1982, in only one banner were Mongols a 
majority. From 1952 to 1982, a total of 25 to 30 million Chinese migrated to frontier non-Chinese 
areas, 30% of which migrated into the IMAR. During the period from 1952 to 1982, China’s overall 
population increase rate was 50%, but in frontier areas the rate was 200%.81
During the process of socialist industrialization, Mongols in Inner Mongolia were exposed to even 
more Chinese pressure to assimilate. The slogan of social progress and socialism was a powerful 
ideological weapon against Mongols’ resistance to the assimilation and to their demands for autonomy. 
Since the 1st 5-year plan began in 1953, the IMAR has been more and more incorporated into the 
whole country’s economy and in the process forcibly changed into just another Chinese province. In 
the period of the 1st 5-year plan, Baotou Steel Base and other major industries such as forestry, wool, 
textile were set up as a priority in state development schemes to support China’s industrialization. As a 
result, large numbers of Chinese workers flooded in from outside. Together with the implanted heavy 
industries in Inner Mongolia, Baotou, Hohhot and other small townships began to emerge as big 
Chinese metropolises.
In 1969-70, the May 7 Cadre School system was set up according to Mao’s 5.7 Instruction (May 7 
1966) that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should be a big school. At the same time the PLA 
more and more interfered with administration. In 1969, the IMAR military district became a 
subordinate of Beijing Military District after the border conflict with Soviet Union at Zhen Bao Dao 
Islands. On May 7, 1969, the third anniversary of Mao’s 5.7 Instruction, the Production and 
Construction Corps of the Beijing Military Zone, which had been planned as early as 1966, was finally 
founded in Inner Mongolia. It started large-scale military farming in Inner Mongolia. According to the 
official view of its significance, first, the corps was an effective way to facilitate the migration of 
Chinese and utilize the land and resources in Inner Mongolia, and to crackdown on the Mongolian 
nationalist conspiracy of stopping the opening up frontier areas. Second there were security reasons, 
as had applied to military colonization in the historical past. The defense against the Soviet Union in 
accordance with Mao’s decision of people’s war could be better carried out by peasant soldiers or 
soldier peasants. There was also the issue of internal security: to suppress local nationalism, the PLA 
was regarded as the best propaganda team to educate and mobilize the local masses.
n 1989 in Inner Mongolia there were still 229 PLA landowners which belong to the 3 big military 
zones (Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou), 6 provincial military zones, the PLA’s infantry, air force, navy 
and the strategic armed force. These PLA organizations occupy 446 sites across 63 banners and
81 Wang Longdi, “Development of Mongolian Population in China’s History and the Prosperity of 
Ethnic Minority Population”, IMAR Nationality Study Society First Annual Conference Paper 
Collection (1981)
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counties of 11 Leagues and cities of IMAR and they occupy 8.9 million acres grassland in Inner 
Mongolia, 1.35 million acres of which have been cultivated for farming.82
82 Ni Dongfa, (op. cit.) p.336.
4.4. The Anti-Rightist Campaign
Ulanhu argued in 1951 that the scope of the United Front policy in minority areas should be wider 
than in Chinese area83. Accordingly each of the major political movements were carried out in a more 
moderate way in Inner Mongolia -  that is until the Cultural Revolution. This was true of the major 
campaign carried out in China during the 1950s and early 1960s including land reform, the 
suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the three anti-movement, the anti-rightist movement and the 
movement for socialist education. During the purge of counterrevolutionaries in 1955, the IMAR 
issued document “Materials on Inner Mongolia Parties, Political Organizations, and Japanese, illegal 
organizations and KMT Secret Agents”. The IMPRP, together with other nationalist organizations 
were recognized as progressive or revolutionary.84
In the Socialist Education movement initiated by Mao Zedong in 1965 that was intended to purge 
“alien elements”(“yi ji fen zi, in Chinese means those who are not one of us) within the proletariat 
class, Ulanhu emphasized that the class struggle issue in Inner Mongolia was mainly an issue of anti- 
Han Chauvinism. In 1966 Ulanhu ordered the 1935 Declaration to be reprinted and issued to all 
cadres as their study material in socialist education. The 1935 Declaration, with its promise of national 
self-determination and secession right for Mongols, reminded Mongols how much the CCP had 
retreated from its former position.
From the point o f view of Beijing, for the first ten years of the IMAR, Ulanhu had paid much more 
attention to the IMAR and much less attention to the CCP central authorities.85 That did not in itself 
cause Ulanhu to be categorized as a Mongolian nationalist, but to the CCP leaders in Beijing,
Ulanhu’s policies were sufficient to show that he had been more interested in promoting regional 
autonomy and consolidating his own personal power than in promoting common class interests. The 
perceived nationalist tendency in the IMAR, together with changes in the Mongolian socialist camp, 
were regarded by Mao as major threats to China’s domestic socialist construction and international 
communism. After Khrushchev made his severe criticism of Stalin in his secret report in 1956, and 
after the Polish and Hungarian Incidents later that year (political liberalization movements took place 
in Poland and Hungary the wake of Stalin’s death and were suppressed down by hardliners in each 
country and Russians from the outside), Mao Zedong became suspicious of Khrushchev, Stalin’s 
successor, and he also began to worry about possible antagonistic forces within the CCP.
83 Ulanhu, “Summery Report on Sub-Bureau of CCP North Bureau Meeting”, 24 January, 1951. The 
Cultural Revolution Materials. Here wider United Front policy means many people who were 
otherwise regarded as class enemy were treated as friends or potential friends worth being won over or 
united. In the early period of IMAR, the policy of no class distinction, no class struggle is an example 
of the wider united front policy.
84 Hao Weimin, ed, Concise History O f Inner Mongolia Modern History (Inner Mongolian University 
Press, 1990) p.310.
85 In the Qing Dao Conference when the local nationalism was criticized and national unity was 
emphasized as the precondition of the nationality autonomy, Ulanhu was recorded as having said that 
“Some Mongols wondered why I can keep good terms with Chinese, I say this is the natural
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In 1957 just before anti-rightist campaign began, the ‘Qingdao Nationality Conference’ was 
convened86. At the meeting, Zhou Enlai said that both Chinese Chauvinism and local (minority) 
nationalism should be opposed. He warned that a nationality autonomous state was not suitable in 
China. He made the comment that “the nationalities in China should not be separated but integrated”87 
On 15 October, the CCP Central Committee issued the Instructions on the Rectification and Socialist 
Education Among Minority Nationalities, which began to direct attacks against so-called “local 
nationalism”.88 The document was designed to target mainly the IMAR since all the criteria of local 
nationalism were listed in a tailored manner and suited the situation in the IMAR perfectly. At the 
Chengdu Conference in 1958, Ulanhu’s enthusiasm about Inner Mongolian autonomy was criticized 
by Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong emphasized that communism - instead of nationalism - should be the 
article of faith for nationality cadres.89 The IMAR was later mentioned by Mao as “waterproof 
independent kingdom”.90
development and historical inheritance from Genghis Khan. If he (Genghis Khan) had not maintained 
a good relationship with Chinese, how could the Yuan Dynasty have lasted for nearly 90 years? 
Without good nationality relationship, how could the Manchu dynasty have last for almost 300 years?” 
“On discussion session at Qingdao Conference”, The Cultural Revolution Materials.
86 From 20 July to 6 August 1957, the Nationality Work Committee of the People’s Congress 
convened a meeting on nationality works in Qing Dao, which came to be known as the “Qing Dao 
Conference”. Hao Weimin, IMAR History (Inner Mongolian University Press, 1990) p. 161.
87 Zhou Enlai’s speech was made on 4 August, 1957, the title was “Several Issues on Our Country’s 
Nationality Policy”. Hao Weiming, (op. cit.) p. 161.
88 The Instructions on the Rectification and Socialist Education Among Minority Nationalities 
analyzed the nationality issues in China, especially the increasing tendency of local nationalism among 
many minority nationalities. It listed the manifestations of local nationalism: “conservatism and 
exclusionism in terms of nationality relations, being passive and negative to nationality unity and co­
operation; with no regard to the conditions of historical development and reality, enlarging nationality 
autonomous region and improving the administrative status of the autonomous region in the aspect of 
nationality regional autonomy, in some regions the integral leadership of the state is not respected and 
there is even a serious separatist tendency with the purpose of disintegrating the family of the 
motherland; there are serious tendencies opposing the integrity and unity principle o f communism in 
terms of the party construction”. The document instructed that the rectification should be carried out 
within the party in minority areas, and local nationalism should be the main target. See Hao Weimin, 
(op. cit.) p. 163.
89 Mao Zedong: “Mongols and Chinese should co-operate closely, should believe in Marxism. All 
nationality should trust each other. It does not matter which nationality it is but whether you side with 
truth or not. Marx was a Jew, Stalin was also an ethnic minority. Ch’iang Kai-shek is a Chinese, but is 
a very bad man whom we should oppose. A provincial official is not necessarily a person from the 
same province. No matter where the person is from, South or North, this nationality or that, the first 
thing to ask is whether he is a communist or not, how much communism he believes. The point should 
be made clear to minority nationalities.
Chinese in the beginning were not a big nationality, but they were formed by many different peoples. 
In history Chinese conquered minority peoples, drove them in mountains. The nationality issue should 
not judged by history. Which should be our profession, nationalism or communism? Our profession at 
first should be communism. Locality is important but not localism.” Mao Zedong, “Instruction on 
Nationality Issue”, made in March, 1958. Ding Wang, Mao Zedong Anthology Addendum, Vol. 3 
(1949-1959) (Mingpao Monthly Press, 1971)
90 The Cultural Revolution materials.
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Ulanhu somehow survived the anti-rightist movement intact, but most of his Mongolian colleagues 
and followers were replaced by Chinese cadres. In the movement, a huge number of Mongolian and 
other ethnic minority cadres, intellectuals and party members were labeled as bourgeoisie local 
nationalists and treated as the enemies of the people. Normal discussions on nationality theories and 
policies were suppressed.
By the end of 1950s it had already become clear that there was no room for true IMAR autonomy. It is 
possible that Ulanhu remained unwavering in his belief in the prospect for IMAR autonomy all the 
way to the end91, but Chinese encroachment in Inner Mongolia under the name of social justice and 
progress was achieved to such an unprecedented degree that Inner Mongolia became a place where 
Mongols were marginalized in terms of population, economy, culture and political power. The name 
of Ulanhu, no matter how genuine his insistence on Mongolian rights, will forever be linked to the 
period when Inner Mongolia experienced fundamental changes and irreversibly became another 
Chinese province.
4.5. U lanhu’s Downfall: the Beginning of the Cultural Revolution
The Cultural Revolution in the IMAR not only purged all those who were regarded as capitalist 
roaders within the party and the government as had happened throughout all of China, but it also 
purged almost all the Mongolian cadres. More than half of the IMAR was incorporated into 
neighboring Chinese provinces. And Chinese assimilation was stepped up even further, reaching 
unprecedented proportions.
As early as in 1957, it was already obvious that genuine attempts of autonomy in the IMAR would not 
be tolerated by the CCP. The fervor of class struggle in the Cultural Revolution finally made it no 
longer possible for Mongols to argue for autonomy by quoting Lenin and Stalin on nationality issues. 
Any reference to the Soviet Model of nationality policy after the Sino-Russian split in I96092 was 
regarded by the CCP either as rightism or revisionism, and therefore was punished harshly. After 10 
years of the existence of the IMAR, the delicate but seemingly workable compromise between 
Mongolian nationalism and CCP socialist unity had collapsed, and by the beginning of the Cultural
91 In 1966 before his downfall, Ulanhu summarized his past experiences: “I struggled against Chinese 
Chauvinism for several decades. I am now in my 60s, I will struggle for another two decades until 
Chinese Chauvinism ends.” Ulanhu at the Hohhot Meeting in January 1966 expressing his defiance in 
the face of the on-coming Cultural Revolution, the Cultural Revolution Materials.
92 According to Yahuda, the breakdown of Sino-Russia alliance was a protracted affair lasting about 
10 years from 1956. Among many disagreement and quarrels, a major turning point in the two 
countries relationship was in 1959 when the Soviet Union refused to supply China with a sample 
atomic bomb as requested. In 1959 Sino-Indian border conflict, the Soviet Union adopted an neutral 
position, which showed publicly the division between the two socialist countries. In 1960, the Soviet 
Union withdrew all its several thousands experts who took with them all the blueprints away, it was a 
heavy blow to China’s economy. The withdrawal of Russian experts in 1960 are remembered by 
Chinese as the most important example of Russian’s Betrayal. Michael Yahuda, The International 
Politics o f  the Asian-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996)p.58
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Revolution, any traces of the compromise and the Soviet model of nationality solution were simply 
wiped out.
Ulanhu’s autonomous policy had been regarded as rightist since Mao Zedong started his anti-rightist 
campaign. In the course of China’s durable political struggles up until the Cultural Revolution, Ulanhu 
had clearly sided with die moderates who turned out later to be on the losing side, particular those 
factions in charge of north China before 1949, e.g. Gao Gang, Xi Zhongxun, and so forth. And also 
Ulanhu’s policy in the IMAR after 1947 was more in line with Liu Shaoqi’s moderate policy. While 
Liu was accused of being the Chinese Khrushchev, Ulanhu was accused of being Liu’s prot£g£ and the 
No. 1 revisionist in Inner Mongolia.
From 4 to 26 of May, 1966, the CCP Political Bureau convened an expanded meeting in accordance 
with Mao Zedong’s instructions. The meeting voted to pass the Notice of the CCP Central Committee, 
drafted by Kang Sheng and Chen Boda and revised several times by Mao Zedong himself (i.e., “May 
16 Notice”,), which set out the theoretical basis and program for the Cultural Revolution. At the end 
of the meeting of the politburo, the CCP North China Bureau also held a working meeting at 
Qiangmen Hotel from 21 May to 25 July. It was at this meeting, that the attack on Ulanhu was 
finalized and, after a 65-day struggle session, he was purged as an enemy. According to the CCP 
Central Committee’s North China Bureau’s Report on Ulanhu’s Problems that was passed on 27 July, 
1966, Ulanhu had committed five major crimes, “Ulanhu’s mistake in nature is anti-CCP, anti­
socialism and anti-Mao Zedong thoughts; he sabotaged the unity of the motherland, carried out 
nationalist separatism aiming at an independent kingdom, and revisionism, Ulanhu is the No. 1 
capitalist roader in the IMAR CCP. To uncover Ulanhu’s mistakes and to repudiate him is to unearth a 
time bomb within the party.”93 Among all the first secretaries at the provincial level, Ulanhu was the 
first to fall victim to the Cultural Revolution.
In September 1966 Ulanhu and his followers, mainly Turned Mongols and Chinese cadres who had 
worked in Inner Mongolia for many years, were repudiated by the big character posters put up by the 
rebels (Zao Fan Pai) in both Beijing and Hohhot. The rebels met a counter-attack from those in power 
in Inner Mongolia. In the Inner Mongolian People’s Daily on 24 September 1966, the IMAR authority 
urged the Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution to be suspended and people to concentrate on Autumn 
Harvest. The Red Guards were ordered to go to countryside to help with the harvest. In the meantime, 
with the support of those in power (“dang quan pai”), anti-Red Guard mass organizations were 
organized to defend Inner Mongolian leaders against pro-Mao Red Guards.
Encouraged by Red Guards’ exploits in Beijing and Shanghai, local anti-Ulanhu rebels took action to 
seize power from Ulanhu and the Chinese cadres. In January 1967, they occupied the buildings of the 
Hohhot municipal government, Post and telegram station, broadcasting station and railway station. 
When the PLA cracked down on the rebellion in Inner Mongolia, the anti-Red Guard mass
93 Hao Weimin, ed.(op. cit.) p.297.
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organizations took the buildings back from the Red Guards. Reflecting divisions in Beijing, the most 
powerful resistance to the rebels were mainly from the Chinese cadres rather than from Ulanhu’s 
Mongolian followers. The senior PLA men in the IMAR Military Zone were mainly from the former 
North China Field Army (Huabei Yezhanjun), some of which had participated in the Long March.
Zhou Enlai, together with other key members of the Cultural Revolution Group of the CCP Central 
Committee, lent their support to the rebels and replaced the cadres in control of the Inner Mongolian 
party, the government and the military zone. In April 1967, General Teng Haiqing, the deputy 
commander of the Beijing Military Zone, was assigned by Zhou Enlai as the head of the new authority 
of the IMAR, the IMAR Revolutionary Committee. At the same time, the CCP Central Military 
Commission issued an order that the IMAR Military Zone was demoted to a provincial military zone 
and was subordinated to the Beijing Military Zone. On April 7th, Teng Haiqing commanded a division 
of the 21s* Field Army, stationed in the neighboring Shanxi province, to go to Hohhot to suppress the 
antagonistic mass organizations.
On April 17, the CCP central committee declared that it was stripping Ulanhu of all the offices and 
that it had set up a Revolutionary Committee in place of the Inner Mongolian autonomous government. 
A month later, as a coincidence or a reaction to the change, Ulaan Baator expelled the CCP’s 
diplomats and teachers from Mongolia.94
94 Tumen and Zhu Dongli, Kangsheng and the New IMPRP Case (Beijing: CPC Central Party School 
Press, 1995) p.23.
4.6. The Miseries of Common Mongols: the Purge of NIMPRP
The need to use the army to handle the IMAR situation had little to do with Mongolian ethnic 
resistance but with the powerful local Chinese cadres. It was ironic that in the 20-year history of the 
IMAR nothing had been done to improve the Mongols’ collective power and the Mongols as a whole 
were even more vulnerable and powerless than before. What made the Cultural Revolution in the 
IMAR a peculiar case was that, apart from being both an ideological and power struggle, it also 
brought a large-scale purge based on ethnic boundaries - the purge of the so-called New Inner 
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, (xin nei ren dang). Ulanhu together with his followers and 
other Chinese cadres in charge in Inner Mongolia had already been purged at the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution, but the large-scale purge of the NIMPRP lasted one year from April 1968 and 
affected almost all the Mongolian families in Inner Mongolia. The most prominent case of injustice 
concerning an individual during the Cultural Revolution was related to Liu Shoal, the most prominent 
collective case o f injustice during the period was that of the NIMPRP.95
After the Soviet Red Army and the Mongolian army entered Inner Mongolia in 1945, some Mongols 
in Eastern Mongolia founded the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party in September. This 
party is also known as the New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (NIMPRP) to 
distinguish it from the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party that operated between 1925 and 
1927 (this party was also known as the Inner Mongolian KMT). The new party’s objective was Inner 
Mongolian independence and a merger with the Mongolian state. The main founders and leaders of 
the party were Hafenga, Pentsag and Temurbaagan. In January 1946 under the influence of Ulanhu, 
NIMPRP was disbanded and absorbed into Ulanhu’s Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian 
Autonomous Movement. The leaders of the NIMPRP such as Hafenga and Temurbaagan joined the 
CCP and worked for the party for many years. In 1967, a conspiracy theory was invented by Chinese 
that held that the NIMPRP was still active within the Inner Mongolian party and government as the 
Soviet Union revisionist arm and as a Mongolian nationalist force96.
95 Tumen and Zhu Dongli, Kangsheng and the New IMPRP Case (Beijing: CPC Central Party School 
Press, 1995) p.4.
96 Tumen, (op. cit.) pp.53-57.
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According to the People’s Daily (Nov. 21, 1980), 346,000 people were arrested in Inner Mongolia 
during the Cultural Revolution and 16,222 were tortured to death. But Mongols in the IMAR have 
privately estimated that as many as 800,000 Mongols were arrested, and that 23,000 - 50,000 were 
killed, while some 120,000 were permanently maimed during the NIMPRP purge. Mongolian 
intellectuals believe that the total number of Mongolian dead numbers 100,000, although this may 
include all those died during the entire Cultural Revolution97. According to a survey conducted by a 
Western anthropologist98, in Inner Mongolia among 186 pastoral and urban Mongolian households, 56 
households (30%) had at least one person arrested; 11 households (17%) lost at least one immediate 
relative. The survey indicated that one quarter of all Mongols were arrested during the purge of the 
IMPRP, which suggests the death of 100,000 Mongols’ death, slightly less than 1/10 of the then total 
Mongolian population. The anthropologist concluded that “there was not a single Mongol who did not 
lose a close relative or friend during the Cultural Revolution.”
The case has never been properly redressed, and few people have been found responsible for the 
wrongdoing. According to the later Chinese official view, Kang Sheng was the major person 
responsible for inventing the conspiracy theory regarding the NIMPRP. And Kang Sheng along with 
the Gang of Four, particularly Jiang Qing, were blamed for the deaths in the purge99. Clarifying the 
real causes of the purge still remains a taboo subject. It was alleged by Chinese authority that the top 
CCP leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had no knowledge of the purge o f NIMPRP100. But 
the CCP Central Committee never lost control of the IMAR situations during the Cultural Revolution, 
and Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng could have decided which mass organization in the conflicts should 
win over others. All the friction and struggles (e.g., friction and conflicts between eastern Mongols 
and western Mongols, between Inner Mongolian cadres and outside cadres, between PLA and 
civilians, between Mongols and Chinese) seemed to be planned and controlled101 by a higher authority.
Those Chinese who inflicted torture, causing maiming and deaths, were never allowed to be brought to 
court. According to the official position towards the Cultural Revolution, almost everybody was a 
victim, and all the blame was put upon a handful of individuals such as Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, and the 
Gang of Four.
97 Interview in 1993 in Hohhot.
98 Jankowiak, “An Anthropological Study of a Chinese City”, Occasional Papers, (Mongolian and 
Inner Asia Studies Unit, University of Cambridge, 1992)
"H ao  Weimin, (op.cit.) p.317.
100 Ibid.
101 According to Tumen, 1995, Zhou Enlai paid detailed attention to the Inner Mongolian situation 
during the Cultural Revolution, such as to the death of a particular student rebel caused by the PLA, 
and to the protection of the confessions and evidence collected during the purge of the NIMPRP from 
the angered victims. See, Tumen and Zhu Dongli (op. cit.) pp. 23-35.
144
This is the characteristic of the mass struggle, also the difference between the purge in Stalinist Soviet 
Russia in the 1930s. The perpetrators of the purge were mainly mobilized masses rather than state 
organs. This put the party state in a position above the conflicting mass groups and thus it evaded 
blame when the struggle bought expected damage.
The purge of the NIMPRP was carried out by PLA cadres and soldiers, local cadres and organized 
masses. During the Cultural Revolution in 1967, PLA sent numerous cadres and soldiers to the IMAR 
- as it had in the rest of the country - to support leftists, workers and peasants, and to exercise military 
control and military training. It was known as “Three Supports and Two Militaries” (san zhi liang jun). 
All the revolutionary committees and power organs in the IMAR during the period, consisted of 
mainly military cadres, then the rest were local leftist cadres and the representatives of mass 
organizations.102
During the CCP 9th Party Congress (April, 1969), Mao Zedong said “the scope of the purge of class 
team in Inner Mongolia has been broadened”. On 22 May Mao Zedong approved suggestions from the 
IMAR leadership to correct the leftist errors in the purge of the NIMPRP. Mao’s approval, known as 
the “May 22 Instructions”, put a brake on the further purge of the NIMPRP. Most of the victims in the 
purge were rehabilitated. After most of the victims had been rehabilitated, the PLA in Inner Mongolia 
were reassigned, many mass organizations retreated to their original working units or simply 
disbanded, therefore most of the perpetrators quickly disappeared back into normal life thus evading 
all charges. On 19 December 1969 the CCP Central Committee decided to establish direct rule of 
Inner Mongolia and exercise martial law. The IMAR was taken over by the Beijing Military 
Command in the name of preparing for possible attack from the Soviet Union. Teng Haiqing and the 
whole IMAR leadership were disbanded and sent to training schools (May 7 Cadre Training Schools) 
outside the IMAR. Martial law was implemented out of the consideration for both external defense 
and internal stability.
Because those directly responsible for the persecution did not need to face the aftermath of the purge 
and there was nobody there to bear the blame, and also under the martial law, any demand for 
rehabilitation was easily overruled by the excuse of national security, during the Cultural Revolution, 
the Mongols never had the chance to express their anger about their sufferings. The purge of the 
NIMPRP, with the tremendous sufferings it brought to the Mongols and the many unanswered 
questions remain alive in the memories o f the Mongols. The purge of the NIMPRP, as the most recent 
physical and inner emotional experience commonly shared by Mongols, has become an element 
content of modem Mongolian identity.
102 Tumen, (op. cit.) p.5.
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4.7. Decline of Mongolian Identity
The Mongolian collective status experienced a decline during the period from 1947 to 1976, and the 
decline was manifested in many ways. From the political aspect, the Mongolian ruling class was 
replaced by the Chinese state. The new Mongolian political elite was less powerful than the traditional 
ruling class had been before 1947. The Mongolian political elite a generation after Ulanhu are even 
weaker than Ulanhu. Ulanhu got certain respect from the CCP because he represented some aspects of 
Mongolian nationalism and he articulated the Mongols’ demands for social reform or revolution. But 
the present generation of political elite, without any resources to bargain with the central authority, 
have to totally rely on the Chinese state to keep their privileged position.
In a socio-economic sense, the modernization process did not break down the internal borders between 
traditional Mongolian communities, and it did not demand a free-flowing population within 
Mongolian territories. Therefore Mongolian ethnicity was not strengthened by any industrialization 
process that occurred during the period, and no new Mongolian culture was formed based on 
modernization. What did occur was the massive and irreversible migration of landless Chinese 
peasants from the poverty-stricken and overpopulated bordering provinces of Hebei, Shanxi and 
Shaanxi. After 1947 many parts of the IMAR experienced industrialization and large scale 
urbanization, but these did not build upon existing Mongolian cultural boundaries, but were implanted 
by the Chinese along with massive Chinese migration into Inner Mongolia. Mongolian people by and 
large were either confined to their pastoral land outside of the industrialization process, or they were 
assimilated into the Chinese to be included in the modernization process. The new contrast of 
industrialization versus the herdsmen economy; municipalities versus the pastoral lands created a 
division of labor along purely ethnic lines.
Despite the continuing increase of Chinese pressures to assimilate, the Mongols’ sense of a common 
identity has not diminished. The experiences of the 30-year IMAR, especially the drastic purge of the 
NIMPRP, have added new content to the Inner Mongolians’ sense of identity. The sufferings have 
added a deeper psychological dimension to their sense of self-identity and to their differentiation from 
the Chinese. It is this sense of victimization and humiliation in common which began to reemerge and 
intensified in the new situation during the period of reform.
146
CHAPTER V. REFORM PERIOD: RE-EMERGENCE OF MONGOLIAN NATIONALISM 
AND THE PROBLEMS OF SURVIVAL
The Mongolian nationalism that emerged during the reform period is consistent with that which 
developed in earlier periods in terms of the goals to which it aspired and in its senses of external 
differentiation. The external differentiation is both the very real pressure by the Chinese to assimilate 
and the new conceptual way in which the Chinese nation is defined. External differentiation referring 
to the Chinese has been reinforced by historical experiences throughout different periods. These 
include: openly seizing Mongolian land and imposing political oppression in the KMT period before 
1949; leftist policies and the large scale purges of Mongols after 1949, especially in the anti-rightist 
movement in 1957 and the Cultural Revolution(1966-76). In the reform period, the external 
differentiation was generated by socio-economic and ideological changes^ All these changes have 
deepened the sense of external differentiation between Mongolians and Chinese corresponding to the 
way in which China’s newly acquired sense of external differentiation has been accentuated between 
Chinese and outsiders, especially the West. In this chapter the intellectual dimension of Mongolian 
nationalism will be the main focus: i.e. Mongols’ interpretation of historical and current situations and 
the nationalist conclusions that have been drawn from the interpretations.
Mongolian nationalism should be understood as being more a revival o f a remote ethnicity in modem 
conditions rather than having been derived from economic development per se. Hence intellectuals 
have played an important role. It is the Mongolian intellectuals and academics who reflect and place 
the changes Mongols experienced in a historical perspective. It is they who also provide meaning to 
the changes brought by the reform to Mongolian people. Intellectual and historical analysis play an 
important role in current Mongolian nationalism.
The political, ideological and socio-economic changes during this period have intensified the sense of 
crisis among Mongols. It has become more obvious than before that the development of political, 
economic and cultural autonomy for Mongols is impossible without first establishing territorial 
autonomy. It has become a fully fledged nationalism in principle because the goal of territorial 
autonomy has been combined with the claim to cultural and ethnic distinctiveness. This nationalism is 
articulated in the process of discussing history, economics, political and cultural affairs. In nature it 
partly accords with classic descriptions of nationalism; e.g. nationalism as an ethnic revival in a time 
of change, nationalism generated by modem economic development, and also nationalist ideas bom 
out of intellectual discussions. But most of all, all the discussions provide a new sense of external 
differentiation, in this case it is the Chinese nation and state which is the important cause of 
Mongolian nationalism.
As Dr. Jirimutu suggested in his demography of Mongolian population, Mongols have become largely
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an urban people now and it is mainly those urban Mongols who face the pressure of assimilation1. 
During the reform period, Mongols experienced proportionately a greater degree o f urbanization than 
other ethnic minorities or even Chinese. From 1982 to 1990, as the table shows, Mongols witnessed 
substantial changes in many urban occupations, an increase of about 30% in the categories of 
state/party officials, administrative staff and service related occupations, an increase of 50% in the 
category o f production/transportation, and an increase of 122% in the category of commerce and sales. 
As expected, the percent of Mongols in the category of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry 
decreased by 16% from 1982 to 1990.2 Although Mongols were traditionally known in the outside 
world as a nomadic people and a significant proportion of them still live on the grassland and are 
engaged in animal husbandry, they, as a group, are more urban than most ethnic groups in China, 
including the Han Chinese majority. According to the 1990 census, nearly 36% of Mongols resided in 
urban areas while the remaining 66% of them were in rural areas. In contrast, only 25% for the Han 
and 24% for the ethnic minorities as a whole were urban residents.3 The following account of the 
IMAR industry and economy focuses mainly on the frustrations felt by urban Mongols.
The IMAR pastureland almost equates to the core of Mongolian-ness because it has always been 
regarded as the source of Mongolian traditions and ethnicity. Although the percentage of Mongols in 
agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry and fishery was lower than that of other minorities and Han 
Chinese(for instance, 59.5% of Mongols were in this category, as opposed to 82.4% of all minorities 
and 62.8% of the Han Chinese.4), the discussion of pastureland economy is also an important part of 
the chapter.
1. Two Contradictory Principles in the Nationality Autonomy and the Four Dimensions of 
Nationalism Perception
The practice of national autonomy in China can be regarded as a compromise between two 
contradictory principles, communism and nationalism. The former is used to justify integration and the 
latter to justify the separate interests of the different nationalities. The reform period after 1978 
created a situation in which more attention has been drawn to the nationalist principle. Chinese 
nationalism and non-Chinese nationalism are all on the rise. National autonomy both in theory and 
practice has become less and less adequate to contain the contradictory principles and the different 
nationalisms.
Supposedly, the Communist goal based on the common proletarian interests of integrating all 
nationalities can nullify the need of national self-determination(though in the socialist period, different
1 Jirimutu, A Sociodemographic Profile o f  Mongolia in China, 1990, Paper presented at the 1996 
Annual Meeting of Association for Asian Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, April 11-14, 1996.
2 Jirimutu, (op. cit.) p. 15.
3 Jirimutu, (op. cit.) p. 16.
4 Jirimutu, (op. cit.) p. 15.
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interests and identities of different nationalities were permitted and protected at least in rhetoric5). 
While according to the nationalist principle, national interests and identity are regarded as being of the 
utmost importance, the institution of nationality regional autonomy set up in the P.R.C. is based on the 
recognition of different nationalities within the unified socialist state.
In the reform period economic pragmatism and national interests have come to prevail over the former 
political ideology, Chinese nationalism prevails over the former socialist beliefs. Non-Chinese 
nationalism has also risen as a response, to challenge the rising Chinese nationalism and the ideas of 
China as a nation state. The ideological changes of the reform period indicate the end of the 
compromise between the socialist principle and the nationalism principle, and hence the end of the 
national autonomy system.
In practice the CPC shifted its position on nationality affairs from a position similar to that of the 
Soviet model(the self-determination of each nationality(including independence or secession which is 
allowed at least in rhetoric) to a less tolerant position. The CPC’s deviation from Soviet Marx-Leninist 
orthodoxy has been justified by reference to the claimed different circumstances of China and its 
revolution. To the CPC, Marx-Leninism can not be genuine without being modified by Chinese 
practice. Chinese practice and characteristics always came before abstract theories and doctrines. The 
CPC official view on regional autonomy is that the Chinese Socialist system brought an end to 
imperialist oppression of Chinese peoples and the KMT reactionaries’ oppression o f minority peoples. 
It also ended all the social causes for national oppression. National regional autonomy has been 
enforced within the integral territory of the country, under the leadership of the highest state authority. 
Democratic centralism is the administrative principle.6 This emphasis on Chinese characteristics only 
explains one aspect of the application of national autonomy, namely, why the principle of national 
self-determination is not applicable in China. But it neglects the other side of the question of national 
autonomy, namely, why is it needed at all.
Chinese nationalist views of the identity of the Chinese nation prior to the articulation of the views of 
the CPC were inconsistent and ambiguous on whether the Chinese nation included non-Chinese 
minorities. However, despite its claims, so is the CPC’s standing on the matter.
The CPC, for the purpose of political struggle, regards all peoples within China as a unity, but on the 
other hand, during a certain period in the 1930s it also advocated the right of national self­
5 According to Lenin, "by transforming capitalism into Socialism, the proletariat creates the possibility 
of abolishing national oppression; the possibility became a reality only - only- with the establishment 
of the full democracy in all spheres, including the definition of state frontiers in accordance with the 
"sympathies" of population, including complete freedom of secede(Lenin "Socialism and the Self- 
Determination of Nationality", in Walker F. Conner, Minorities In Marxist Theories And Practices 
(Princeton University Press, 1984) p.49.
6Ulanhu,"Minzu Zizhi De Guanghui Licheng (The Glorious History of Nationality Autonomy)",
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determination for non-Chinese minorities. But, strangely, Mao has said that all nationalities formed a 
big family. It is difficult to pinpoint the time when the CPC began to envisage a family of many 
nationalities7. Mao also said that “ethnic minorities gave Han Chinese great political help, their joining 
the big family o f the Chinese nation(zhong hua min zu) is a political help to Han Chinese”.8 The 
integrity of the Chinese nation or the family of many nationalities, according to the official 
interpretations, were justified by the following reasons.
Firstly, autonomy with Chinese characteristics is provided with a historical basis. According to the 
Chinese-centric view of Chinese history, the continuous history of centralist Chinese states has been 
the main trend in Chinese history. And those Chinese centralist states in history were multi-ethnic and 
unitary. In modem times, the international environment and the nature of society since the Opium 
War have again provided all the reasons for all nationalities to unite to realize their national liberation.
Secondly, the Chinese claim that a common socio-economic basis has existed for the family of the 
different nationalities or the Chinese nation(zhong hua min zu). Gradually over a long period of 
history and in wide areas, various nationalities have mixed with each other and only on a smaller 
localized scale have they lived separately. The co-existence of different nationalities is the social 
basis which makes non-Chinese self-determination unfeasible. Uneven economic development and 
unevenly distributed natural resources provide the economic rationality for staying together. The 55 
non-Chinese peoples account for 6% of the whole country’s population and occupy 50-60% of the 
whole country’s territory where there are rich grasslands, forestry and underground resources. 9
The third is the political and ideological basis. The changed nature of Chinese modem history and the 
modem international environment demanded a joint revolutionary struggle by the different 
nationalities so that the CPC’s long-time revolutionary struggle has set the framework for the practice 
of national autonomy within a unitary state. The doctrines favoring big states organized along the 
democratic centralist line are selectively picked out from works by Marx, Engels and Lenin to justify 
the following points: 1) Nationality integration is die general trend in human historical development; 2) 
the unitary state is beneficial to socio-economic development; 3) the unitary state is helpful to the 
revolutionary struggle of the proletarians.10 Of course there is much truth in the proposition that large,
People's Daily, July 14, 1981
7 Mao Zedong, “ One of the reasons why imperialists dared bully China in the past is because the lack 
of unity among each nationalities in China, but the era(of disunity) has gone forever, since the day 
when the People’s Republic of China was set up, each nationalities in China has begun to form a big 
family of friendship and cooperation which enable (us) to succeed over any imperialist invasion and 
build our mother country into a prosperous and strong country”, “Telegram Reply to the North-West 
Nationality Meeting of Anti-American Imperialism and Aid Korea”, Dec. 12, 1951, People’s Daily, 
Dec. 14, 1951. Also see, Liu Jingping, ed. The IMAR Economic Development (IM People’s Press, 
1979) p.543.
8 Mao Zedong, “The Speech on the CPC National Congress”, The Selected Works o f  Mao Zedong, 
Vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1977) p. 154.
\Jlanhu, "Progress On The Path Of A New History”, People’s Daily, 16 July 1987.
10 The often cited quotations are, Marx and Engels in Central Committee's letter to Confederation of
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industrialized and unitary states tend to incorporate smaller rural communities, but it is only so in 
terms of a rational observation, not as a normative standard.
Apart from the above, the first of the two principles in the compromise which justifies the unity of the 
socialist nation state, there is the other principle of national self-determination which the Chinese 
authorities try to avoid and ignore, but which had been emphasized by the CPC’s Mongolian 
collaborators in different periods. The CPC argues that the autonomy system is the best embodiment 
of political will and socio-economic interests of the non-Chinese minorities. According to the CPC, 
the nationalist principle itself is not an ultimate value, it will be phased out, and class liberation and 
communism will be the endpoint. Meanwhile during the socialist stage, there will still continue to exist 
the separate ethnic identity and particular interests of the Mongol people, for instance which provide 
the reasons for national autonomy. But the separate national identity, interests and national tradition 
were emphasized more by the CPC’s Mongolian collaborators. Ulanhu’s autonomous movement 
under the leadership of CPC even used nationalist slogans to attract Mongols.
The compromise of the two principles embodied in national regional autonomy has changed over time. 
The revolutionary Mongolians of the first generation like Ulanhu, often emphasised the nationalist 
principle, separate ethnic identity and interests as the basis of autonomy and national equality. But 
since the beginning of the reforms, the balance between the two principles began to be further changed 
especially after the communist ideology diminished as the legitimating ideology and Chinese 
nationalism was more emphasized than before. Chinese political authority began to be justified more 
and more by a state-defined Chinese nation rather than by an overriding universalistic Socialist 
ideology.
1978 is a turning point in the sense that the reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping has had a decisive and 
comprehensive impact on Chinese society. There have been fundamental changes in the CPC’s 
economic policies in its views of the international environment and in its self-perception o f the 
Chinese nation. All these changes, indicate, in terms of state legitimacy, the absolute decline of 
Communist ideology and the rise of Chinese nationalism -  a nationalism that has put the emphasis 
more on the historic traditional Chinese nation rather than on a community based upon political 
ideology and modem citizenship.
Communists: "in a state like Germany, so many feudal remains from middle ages need to get rid of, 
many narrow localities and provincialities need to be destroyed", "not only it is needed to set up a 
unitary, inseparable German republic, but also insist on all power be monopolized under the state." In 
1891 Engels in the Criticism of the Constitution of Social Democratic Party commented on German 
state system:" What should be used to replace current German state system? In my opinion, 
proletarians can only use the single inseparable form of republic." Like Marx and Engels, Lenin also 
mentioned the principle of big state of democratic centralism, "Proletariat party should build as big 
state as possible." "Our social democrats are the enemy of all kinds of nationalism and supporters of 
democratic centralism." see Buhe, On Nationality Works (People’s Press, 1992) pp. 152-3.
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Nationalism as a sentiment and a political principle expressed by the people involved can be explained 
by how and why people’s views were affected by their particular historical situations. Mongolian 
nationalism during the reform period can be explained by reference to how Mongols perceived the 
changing situation during the period and developed a heightened sense of national crisis. The 
intellectual explanations of the national idea can be examined in the following four dimensions upon 
which national identity or nationalist ideas are usually expressed. The first is how to perceive a 
common past, the second is how to conceive a common future, the third is to justify the national 
identity on the basis of a distinctive socio-economic development and finally to construct an external 
differentiation to reinforce the national identity.
During the reform period, ideological changes brought changes in the way history was discussed. The 
crisis of the Communist faith may have brought more uncertainty in people’s view of future, but it also 
allowed more room for historical discussion. The revival of historical memory at the time of change 
and uncertainty is important both for Chinese and Mongolian nationalism. The loss of credibility of 
the Communist ideology reduced the validity of the logic of the development of modem Chinese 
history according to which socialism and communism was portrayed as the inevitable result of the 
unfolding of modem Chinese history.
As the justification of the new socialist state and nation weakened, the Chinese tried to replace the 
Marxist interpretation of historical inevitability with new explanations, either culturalist or 
functionalist. At the same time it also made it possible for Mongols to look back in history with a more 
nationalistic perspective of their own.
Mongolian and Chinese nationalists, depend heavily upon their different interpretations of history, but 
neither provide the same forward-looking vision as the former Communist ideology. Many Chinese 
share the view that China in the coming century will become a prosperous and dominant power in the 
world, and Chinese nationalism may be said to be forward-looking in that respect. But Mongolian 
nationalism, partly as a reaction to Chinese nationalism, does not share the same faith in a common 
future.
During this period, the Chinese have used socio-economic arguments as a justification for
emphasizing unity. The socio-economic reasons can also give Mongols a sense of national decline and
they can be used by Mongols in support of their claim for economic autonomy. Economic pressure
and the growth of the market system do not always act as an integrating force in developing a national
consciousness. On the one hand, economic pressure could be an integrating force in nation building as
in Gellner’s model of nationalism, on the other hand, it can also be regarded as a fragmenting force as
well. The Marginalization of IMAR economy and the vulnerable herdsmen economy in the new
*
market system could be regarded by Mongols as examples of internal colonialism. In this way, 
because of the perceived disparity and injustice of economic development, nationalists realize that
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some political guarantee of a real autonomy or an independent state is necessary if Mongols are to 
enjoy equal economic opportunities.
Regarding external differentiation, during this period, the mutual perception between Mongols and 
Chinese is changing, their perception of the international world is also changing. The changing 
external differentiation has an important impact upon both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism.
2. Ideological and Historical Issues
The articulation of a national history is an essential component of nationalism, and it has become vital 
for the emergent nationalism of the Chinese and the Mongolians during the current period of reform. 
Since there is more freedom for academic discussions during this period, we can follow the 
contending interpretations of national history between Chinese and Mongols. The significance of these 
historical discussions are rich in nationalist implications because they present different views on the 
Manchu dynasty, the last imperial precedent of the PRC and the MPR. They also offer different 
interpretations of the roles played by foreign countries in their own national histories, and they provide 
divergent views on the national heroes of the Mongols and Chinese.
2.1. From a Political Nation to a Cultural Nation
When the Chinese nation is emphasized more in a traditional sense, i.e., in terms of Chinese culture 
and history, rather than as a socialist commonwealth of many peoples, Chinese writers tend to invent a 
common history for the different peoples in China. The new approach negates the previous 
presentation of China as a multi-national state. And the single history is largely identified with that of 
ethnic Chinese people. In support of the new idea of the Chinese nation, Chinese history has been 
reviewed and a new version of history has be created. The concept of a cultural Chinese nation brings 
more contention in historical discussions between Mongols and Chinese than the concept of a political 
Chinese nation.
Inevitably different views have appeared on how to view the history of the relationship between 
Chinese and other non-Chinese peoples. In the former version of China as a political nation, the 
modem Chinese nation was based more on the assumption of a common political fate and a shared 
communist faith rather than on the vision of a common cultural and ethnic past. It is only in modem 
Chinese history beginning with the Opium War that the common political tasks o f anti-imperialism 
and survival forged a political bond between the Chinese and the non-Chinese peoples within the 
Manchu empire. Modem history is vital to the conception of the political Chinese nation(zhong hua 
min zu).
For the same reason, the interpretation of modem history of Inner Mongolia is crucial for the Chinese
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communists’ claim that Mongols form a part of the larger Chinese nation.
The new political Chinese nation as envisaged by Chinese communists was mainly politically-based 
and contradicted the idea of a Chinese nation in the traditional sense with its emphasis on culture and 
ethnicity. The political nation is revolutionary because of its negation of the old and traditional 
Chinese nation. To envisage the political nation is also an attempt to apply modem concepts to define 
and explain pre-modem associations often in an anachronistic way
During the reform period, the Chinese government has put more emphasis on the networking of 
Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan and the overseas Chinese for the sake of economic development. 
The development of economic cooperation on the basis of a claimed common Chinese culture that 
spans across state borders has generated the idea of a so-called “greater China”. This shows that the 
view of the Chinese nation as based on culture has gained in importance while the concept of the 
political nation is in decline. The political Chinese nation which is associated with the declining 
Communist ideology has lost its former importance.
The historical view of the cultural nation places more emphasis on the pre-modem past in cultural and 
ethnic meanings rather than on modem history in political meanings. Therefore pre-modem China has 
been deliberately depicted as a multi-ethnic state, and pre-modem ethnic relations depicted as almost 
as harmonious as those in the idealized socialist family of many nationalities. The conceptual shift 
from a political nation to a cultural nation, in historical discussions, means that there has been less 
freedom for Mongols in historical discussions than before, since the idea of a cultural nation which 
includes Chinese and non-Chinese needs more than a modem political bond between Chinese and non- 
Chinese, it also needs to demonstrate that some ethnic and cultural similarities linked them in pre­
modem history. Apart from the modem Chinese history, the pre-modem history has not become 
increasingly important and relevant to the present interpretation of the Chinese nation.
The following discussions of history mainly cover three aspects: the nature o f the historical 
relationship between agricultural Chinese and non-Chinese nomadic peoples; the Manchu dynasty 
before the modem Chinese state and the relationship between the two; and the nature of modem 
history related to the CPC’s role in Inner Mongolia.
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2.2. Historical Inevitability and Direction
The conflicts and confrontations between Chinese and non-Chinese peoples in history, especially 
between the agricultural Chinese and the northern nomadic peoples, have been deliberately ignored as 
a more harmonious and idealized history has been invented to meet present needs. Both unification 
and confrontation are all regarded as part of the historical scheme by which Han Chinese nation was 
founded and developed. In this view of Chinese history, history has a course and a main trend. It is the 
task for Chinese historians to distinguish the main trend of history.
The emergence of the ancient Hua and Xia groups 4000 years ago was the beginning of the scheme, 
the second stage was the expansion o f the Hua and Xia into Han people 2000 years ago. Unification in 
the Qin and the Han dynasties, usually depicted as the foundation of historical Chinese people, is now 
regarded as only one of the many stages in the whole process of the formation of the Chinese nation. 
The unification of nomadic peoples to the north of the Great Wall, according to the new theory11, is 
considered as the next important stage of the Chinese nation’s historical formation. In the logic of the 
development of the Chinese nation, the unification of the northern non-Chinese peoples was the 
necessary preparation for the next unification between Chinese people and non-Chinese peoples.
The assertion that ethnic harmony was the main historical trend is based more on belief and 
imagination rather than on historical evidence. This attitude toward historical study is indicated by the 
following sentence: the co-existence o f “the two big regions’, Central China and the North, was not 
really one of confrontation, even though there were no shortage of recorded so-called wars, invasions 
or looting. These are historical facts, but what is more important are the interactions which have not 
been recorded: more frequent communications and trade.”12
2.3. Historical Figures and the Manchu Dynasty
When history is regarded as a grand scheme culminating in the development of a great Chinese nation, 
all actors in history are judged by the roles they played in relation to the realization of the scheme, and 
therefore all historical figures can be categorized as positive and negative. In this frame of mind, 
Chinese historians have set up some stereotypical standards for the assessment of historical figures.
The first standard is whether they are positive to the “defense of the integrity of territory and 
sovereignty”13. Given the complexity of the relationships between Chinese, Manchu and Mongols, 
consensus is a long way from being agreed on this. According to Mongolian scholars, before the 
establishment of the Mongolian Empire in 13th century, Tibetan and Dali kingdoms were fully
11 Fei Xiaotong, Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan Yitihua Geju (The Pattern o f  Chinese Nation: Unity With 
Plural Origins), (Beijing: The Central Institute of Nationalities Press, 1989) p .l 1.
12 Ibid. p .l l .
13Interview in Inner Mongolian University, July 26, 1993.
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independent with complete sovereignty and territorial integrity.14 Only after the establishment of the 
Mongolian empire, they were integrated as part of the territory of the empire that included China. 
During the Ming dynasty, the Mongolian people always enjoyed territorial and sovereign integrity and 
they continuously confronted the Chinese Ming Dynasty. In the course of the wars between Mongols 
and the Manchu Dynasty, both Mongols and Manchus could claim political legitimacy and territory 
and regard themselves as the defenders of their territory and sovereign integrity.
Gerdan Boshigt, the head of once powerful Zungharia Mongols, challenged and posed a serious threat 
to Manchu rule in China. His military campaigns against the Manchu dynasty could be regarded as 
splitism since he was trying to separate China. But by the same standard, he could be regarded as a 
hero whose unification effort just unfortunately failed. When Chinese say, that the Kangxi emperor 
conquered and oppressed rebels of the Zungharia Mongols led by Gerdan Boshigt in order to defend 
motherland’s territorial and sovereign integrity, Mongols also can say that Gerdan’s war against the 
Manchu was for the restoration and defense of Mongolian territorial and sovereign integrity.
It is interesting to note with regard to claims made by Chinese historians that in terms of their relation 
and contribution to maintaining the integrity of Chinese territory or sovereignty, Gerdan never ceded 
any land to the Russian Tzar except for some unrealized promises. On the other hand, in asking for the 
Tzar’ help to destroy Gerdan, the Kangxi emperor signed with the Tzar the Treaty o f Nerchinsk, 
ceding vast territory west of River Orguna to the Tzar15.
Gerdan Khan was once extolled as national hero in the Yanan National Institute as early as in 1930- 
40s, in the Yanan period, before the end of Sino-Japanese war. Gerdan Khan was then recognized as 
a Mongolian national hero and Genghis Khan’s status was also confirmed before the Cultural 
Revolution16. At the time there were no objections from Chinese scholars. But in the late 1970s and 
whole 1980s, articles appeared continuously to negate Gerdan Khan. Although at Chinese national 
conferences on Mongolian studies in recent years, after many discussions and debates, Gerdan Khan 
was once again recognized as a national hero for Mongols, the problem has never been settled. The 
politically utilitarianist standard is still very popular among Chinese scholars. They use the same 
standard to judge a Mongolian historical figure such as Togtkhu, who took part in Mongolian 
nationalist movements at the end of the Manchu Qing period and the beginning of the republic period.
The second criterion is whether the role of historical figures is seen as positive with regard to the unity 
of the state and nation. This actually has been the Chinese Communist party’s principal guideline on 
handling national relations after 1949. But many Mongolian scholars said openly and privately that it
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
16Manaohai, "Mongolian People Are Striding Forward", People's Daily, 1953; also Xinhua Digest of 
the same year.
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is obviously absurd to apply the criterion in historical study. There was no such thing as national 
equality in most parts of Chinese history, therefore there is no sense in talking about state unity 
through national unity. Both Gerdan Khan and the Kangxi emperor believed “the victors assume the 
titles of kings and dukes, the defeated are bandits”(the legitimacy is only conferred upon victors).
They both regarded China as a trophy to be conquered rather than a motherland to defend. For them 
wars were launched for the expansion of territory and dynastic interests other than for national 
interests.
While the same standard is normally used to negate the historical figures who are regarded as national 
heroes by many non-Chinese peoples, the standard is seldom applied by Chinese scholars to judge 
Chinese historical figures. Quyuan, an ancient poet during the period of warring states, some 2,000 
years ago, defended his native Chu state against the Qinshihuang Emperor’s unification, but he is 
commonly recognized by the Chinese as a patriotic hero. If judged by the above standard in the same 
way as any other non-Chinese fugures, Quyuan was a negative and reactionary figure because he 
resisted the main trend of the development of Chinese history, the Qin Unification, and his resistance 
was futile.
Yuefei, a Chinese general in the Song Dynasty(l 127-1279), defended against the Jin State(l 115-1234) 
in the north when Nuzhen Jin State was in the process o f conquering southern China. The Nuzhen Jin 
State was a stronger power in offensive than the Chinese Song Dynasty in defensive, therefore Yuefei, 
again, stood out against the general historical trend of unification, however he is still considered as a 
national hero throughout history by the Chinese. Another example is Wen Tianxiang, a Chinese 
civilian official and a poet in the Song dynasty, who chose to die rather than to surrender to the 
Mongolian conqueror. He is also regarded as an example of a great national heroe.
Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, a Chinese general of the Ming Dynasty(l 368-1644), fled 
to Taiwan and refused to surrender to the victorious Manchu Dynasty after the Chinese Ming Dynasty 
was completely wiped out by Manchus. Zheng drove out the Portuguese colonizers from the island of 
Taiwan when he got there. Still he is regarded as a national hero because he was Chinese although he 
fought for a lost cause. Another reason why he is highly regarded today is the fact that he drove away 
the Portuguese from Taiwan. The Portuguese colonizers and the Manchu invaders to Zheng at the time 
were both foreign invaders, but by today’s standard, the Portuguese in Chinese eyes, of course, are 
much more foreign than the Manchus. Therefore Zheng is today extolled more as a national hero 
against the Portuguese than a national hero resisting the Manchus.
The third standard is “whether the person has contributed positively to the socio-economic 
development of the nationality concerned”. If it is understood that for a smaller nationality to be 
absorbed by a bigger and more developed nation is equal to socio-economic progress, it is a standard 
very close to colonialist logic. It can be used to justify the earlier western imperialist’s expansion in 
China and Japanese occupation in China during the second world war. Of course Chinese historians
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are partial as they only use this standard with regard to non-Chinese peoples, when they are regarded 
as being in lower socio-economic grade than the Chinese.
By this criterion, Chinese historians regard Gerdan Khan as a reactionary figure because he resisted 
the socio-economic development of Mongolian nationality by resisting the Manchu’s conquest. But it 
can be always argued in the opposite way. By the same standard, Gerdan had more than enough 
reason to launch war against the Manchus considering the Manchus’ oppression and obscurantist 
policy toward Mongols(even Mao Zedong mentioned Manchu’s reactionary policy toward Mongols in 
his 1935 Declaration). Some Mongols argued that by the same standard, the rapid economic 
development under British rule would justify the British colonial rule in Hong Kong.
The fourth is “whether the person played a positive role in the struggles and rebellions against 
invading foreign forces”. “Foreign” is a relative term as it varies over time, yet the standard actually 
applied by Chinese writers uses today’s notion of “foreign” to judge the past when “foreign” had a 
totally different connotation. Even in using the same standard, Mongolian historians can also make a 
different argument from their Chinese counterparts. Monohai, a well-known Mongolian historian in 
Inner Mongolia, argues along the lines of the Chinese nationalists’ anti-Manchu argument. Since 
Chinese nationalists agreed that the Manchu dynasty was the worst and weakest dynasty in defending 
China’s interests, he suggests that if Gerdan Khan had not been defeated by the Manchu dynasty, if he 
had conquered the Manchu dynasty and ruled China, judged by Mongolian people’s inherent bravery, 
it is for sure Gerdan Khan and his successors would not have sold sovereign rights and territories like 
the Manchus did to foreign powers.17
In the discussions of modem history, foreign links have become a much more sensitive issue since the 
idea of which nationalities were foreign and which were within China is closely related to the idea of 
modem China either as a multi-national state or a nation state.
In discussions about Mongolian leaders in modem history, Mongol and Chinese scholars differ in their 
assessments o f those historical figures who had foreign support. Chinese scholars usually use a 
political utilitarianist standard whether or not the issue concerned is beneficial to the present Chinese 
state. The Chinese view is that Mongolian princes and dukes in leadership should be divided into two 
groups: those with foreign connections and those without foreign connections; the former are 
reactionaries and traitors, and the latter are progressive. In the same way, the average Mongols’ 
rebellions are also put into two categories: those who rose themselves and those who were led by 
feudal princes. That is the line to be drawn.18 Generally Chinese scholars assessed negatively all 
those Mongolian nationalist leaders or movements who had any foreign connections and who wanted
17Conference discussion, Inner Mongolian University, 28 July 1993.
18Aug., 1993, interview with Mr. Cai Zhichun, deputy secretary general, Chinese Association for 
Mongolian History Studies, Associate Research fellow, Institute of Nationality Studies.
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to merge with the Mongolian State or who sought independence.
Because of the political utilitarianism in the discussions of history, Chinese historical figures and 
Mongolian historical figures are not usually judged by the same standards. If the standard of foreign 
links were equally applied to Chinese historical figures, Sun Yatsen, who had been backed by 
imperialist forces like Japan, must have been a traitor to the Chinese nation, since he promised to cede 
to imperialist powers all sorts of concessions and rights in return for their support. And actually a 
Taiwanese writer suggests Sun was more or less a national traitor instead of the father of the modem 
Chinese nation as he has been always regarded by the KMT government19.
When a nation is in a weaker position, it is natural for it to seek for an external ally. It is not unusual 
that both Chinese nationalists and non-Chinese nationalists in modem history maintained certain 
foreign links.
Zevtsundanba, who founded the independent Mongolian state in 1911, is generally depicted today in 
Chinese literature as a traitor, conspirator and the puppet of Russia20. He is despised mainly because 
he was a non-Chinese. If judged without a Sino-centric bias, the Mongolian independence in 1911 
was no different from the independence declared by Chinese nationalists in various Chinese provinces 
following the collapse of Manchu Qing dynasty.
Togtkhu was a Mongolian nationalist who rebelled against the Manchu dynasty and local warlords. 
What he did was not different from Sun Yatsen except that he did it for the Mongols and Sun did it for 
the Chinese. They both had foreign connections, but according to the Chinese view, Togtkhu is a 
villain and Sun Yatsen was a hero. One Mongolian historian writes that the only fault of Toktohu is 
that he did not set up a Xing Zong Hui(Strengthening Chinese Society) and KMT party as Sun Yat-san 
did21. The irony is obvious, Chinese historians apply today’s national ideas and standards to the past 
when Mongols were still regarded by most Chinese as an alien people.
De Wang(Prince Demchigdungrub), the Mongolian leader of the Inner Mongolian autonomous 
movement 1930-40, is regarded by both KMT and CPC as a Japanese collaborator and a traitor to the 
Chinese nation. It is a verdict on which Inner Mongolian scholars cannot openly disagree. But some 
Mongolian historians openly argued that De Wang’s autonomous movement, especially De Wang & 
Wu he-ling’s anti-provincialization and autonomous movement in the 1930s, represented the popular 
sentiments o f Mongols at the time22. They argue that in spite o f De Wang’s personal motive, the
19Li Ao, ed. Zai Lun Jiangjia Fuzi (Comment on Chiang Kaishek and Chiang Chingguo} (Taipei: 
Quanneng Press, 1987).p.l8.
20Shi Bo, Wai Menggu Duli Neimu (Secret History o f Outer Mongolia's Independence) (Huaxia Press, 
1993)
21Zhu Feng, former director of Institute of Historical Studies, Inner Mongolia 
Academy, July 28,1993 on the conference.
“ interview with Prof. Bala, director of the Institute of Inner Mongolian Contemporary History, June
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movement itself was domestic in nature as it focused on conflict with the KMT government rather than 
seeking separation.
By today’s standards, the independent Mongolian state is a foreign country for Mongols in Inner 
Mongolia. Therefore sometimes the Mongolian nationalists in the past who advocated merging with 
the Mongolian State are now regarded as negative figures because of the so-called foreign links. Most 
of them as the IMPRP members, in the same way as the CPC in 1930s, just followed the instructions 
from Comintern. For them to demand the merger with the MPR or to side with the CPC was only a 
matter of different prioritization: national liberation first or class liberation first. Many Mongolian 
nationalists later accepted the CPC’s leadership with the understanding that Mongols need not only 
national liberation, but also class liberation. Foreign links or separatism is such that once it was 
touched, it became a permanent mark for the Mongolian historical figures concerned. But Chinese 
historical figure are treated differently. Sun Yatsen’s view of the Chinese nation was subject to change. 
He started with an Anti-Manchu racist stance and then moved on to a republican one. Nevertheless it 
was his latter view that is taken into account.
To Mongolian scholars it is obvious that the Chinese tend to overemphasize the Mongolian leaders’ 
foreign connections and their demands to merge with the MPR. The Chinese view is not only biased, 
but it is also harmful to the present situation in IMAR. Even the demand of merging with Mongolia by 
the Mongolian nationalists in the beginning of the century should be understood according to the 
situation at the time: that involved Chinese merciless colonization, Yuan Shikai’s chauvinist anti- 
Mongolian policies and maneuvers, and also Sun Yatsen’s racist doctrines. Therefore those demands 
for a merger by the Mongols expressed their anti-colonial and anti-oppression sentiments.
No standard, whether Marxist or not, cant satisfy the political utilitarianism with regard to the Chinese 
treatment of history. The lack of standards can often put the Chinese in a disadvantageous position in 
the discussion of history related to ethnic relations. As a Chinese historian argued, the discussion of 
the issue of national liberation need not only be guided by Marxism and Leninism, but it also requires 
the guidance of the Party’s nationality policy23. The Party’s nationality policy is of course based on 
political utilitarian considerations instead of academic analysis or pure ideological justifications.
History is given different meanings by the CPC to meet the different political needs of different times. 
This was true before 1978, and it has become especially so after 1978 when Chinese nationalism is on 
the rise and Marxist ideology in a decline. Gerdan Khan is denigrated by Chinese historians not only 
because he challenged the political authority of the Manchu empire over Mongols, but also because he
1993, July 26, 1993, and his presentation on the conference.
23 Mr. Zhang Zhi-hua, professor at the Institute of Mongolian Studies, Inner Mongolian University, at
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received assistance from the Russian Tzar. Because of this, he was criticized especially during the 
Sino-Soviet disputes in the 1960s. During the Cultural Revolution, Qinshihuang Emperor and the 
Kangxi emperor were greatly extolled because the Qinshihuang Emperor was the first unifying 
emperor in Chinese history and the Manchu emperor Kangxi fought against Russian encroachment.
The changes in the Chinese attitude toward the Manchu dynasty reflect their present views on Chinese 
nation. The Manchu dynasty laid the foundation in many ways for the modem Chinese state. 
Mongolian education in The Qing dynasty is described by contemporary Chinese historians 
as:”...(Manchu dynasty) paid great attention to Mongolian education, positively advocated the study 
and use of Mongolian language, and further promoted the development of Mongolian education.”24 
This is a totally different view from the CPC’s earlier position on the Manchu dynasty. Mao Zedong 
himself criticized the Manchu dynasty for its oppression of the Mongols, ”KMT reactionary group 
negated the existence of many nations in China, called those non-Chinese people as “clans”. Their 
nationality policy, inherited from the Manchu Qing dynasty and warlord government, exploited and 
oppressed non-Chinese peoples to an extreme degree. The massacre of Mongolian peoples of the Ikhe 
Zuu League 1943, armed crackdowns of non-Chinese peoples in Xinjiang since 1944 and massacre of 
Moslems o f Gansu during recent years all prove this. These are the results of wrong Chinese 
Chauvinist mentality and policy.”25 However during the reform period when there is more and more 
freedom for academic discussions to be conducted in a non-Marxist fashion, the Manchu’s ethnic 
policy has been evaluated more in a nationalist view rather than from the former class line26.
Popular interests in the Manchu dynasty were led to a new height partly by the Hollywood movie on 
Puyi, the last emperor of the Manchu dynasty. The Chinese seem to accept Puyi as the last Chinese 
emperor, but strictly speaking, the last Chinese emperor should be Chongzhen, the last Ming emperor 
who hanged himself when the peasant army led by Li Zicheng sieged Beijing in 1644. Or it could be 
Yuan Shikai who tried to restore the Chinese monarchy in 1915). The remaining members of the 
Manchu royal family suddenly became social celebrities. The scholars and writers of Manchu origin 
also used the chance to extol the glories of the Qing dynasty by producing a large array of literature on 
a few of the earlier Manchu emperors of the dynasty27. Popular literature added much to the imaginary 
history of the Chinese nation and the Manchu dynasty has come to be treated with nearly the same 
respect as the golden Chinese dynasties of Han and Tang28.
Mongolian scholars do not share the same enthusiasm about the new evaluation of the Manchu
the Conference, July 1993..
24A presentation In a national conference on Mongolian History, cited as an example by an 
Interviewee, 27-28 July 1993, Huhhot
25Mao Zedong, "On Allied Government", political speech on CPC 7th Congress 1945, Selected Works 
O f Mao Zedong (People’s Press, 1964) pp. 1029-1100.
26 Zhang Ertian, Mongolian Political And Religious System In Ching Dynasty (Chinese Academy of 
Social Science Press, 1989)
27Jin Qizhong, Manchu scholar, related to Manchu royal family
28The examples are the bestseller, Kangxi The Great and other popular publications on the subjects. 
There are also TV series on powerful Manchu emperors.
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dynasty, they still argue from the point of view of the Mongols that the Manchu dynasty’s Mongolian 
policy was reactionary and oppressive. The Manchu Qing dynasty’s Mongolian policies are 
summarized by Mongolian historians as follows: l)Obscurantist in approach to both to the Chinese 
people and especially to the Mongols. 2) massacre policy. 3) genocide policy: Qing’s restriction on 
Mongolian culture’s development and national consciousness; segregation of Mongols and Hans 
before the 17th century29. In the 20th year of Jiaqing’s reign(1816), the Qing dynasty forbade Mongols 
from constructing Han style houses, using the Chinese language, Chinese names and marrying Han 
Chinese. The ban lasted until as late as Xuantong’s reign(1909-l 1). In the 7th year of Qianlong’s 
reign[1743], all Mongolian books and archives were moved to Beijing from Mongolian areas, which 
is no different from the Qinshihuan emperor’s barbarian practice of “burning books and burying 
scholars”. The Qing’s Mongolian school in Beijng was restricted only to preparing translators.
Manchu’s segregation policy here is one reason used by Mongolian writers to disagree with Chinese 
writers in criticizing the Manchu Qing dynasty. On some other occasions, they also argue that the 
ending of the segregation policy was also harmful because it was replaced by a deliberate policy of 
assimilation. The truth is not so important as the way history is used as a justification for national 
heroes. It is possible to counter the Chinese argument by demonizing rather than extolling the 
Manchu Dynasty. Thus Mongolian scholars could argue that according to Lenin’s advocacy of the 
right for minorities to self-determination, it is justifiable to resist the ruler in Beijing as long as the 
struggle is directed against the Manchu Qing30.
If the Chinese were real Marxist materialists as they claim, they would follow the Marxist logic of 
historical development and their treatment of history would be supra-national. They should advocate 
or extol not only one nation’s interests, but also those of others and even the unification of all nations, 
whether by force or by peaceful means, as long as the result can be justified as historical and socio­
economic in progress. As far as Mongols are concerned, the Chinese political utilitarianism in 
historical study is worse than the Marxist view, because national questions are simply out of focus in 
the Marxist tradition while Chinese political utilitarianism is a Chinese-centric bias. Political 
ideologies involved in historical discussions between Mongols and Chinese are not so much about 
faith as theoretical weapons in the battleground of nationalist arguments.
29 See “Changed Manchu-Mongol Relations and Manchus ’ New Policy ” in Chapter Three.
30 National Conference on Mongolian History, Inner Mongolian University, July 1993.
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3. Economic Situations of the Urban and Rural Mongols
Market principles negate the principle of socialist egalitarianism formerly carried out by central 
planning. The differences between the national autonomous regions and Chinese provinces which 
were formerly preserved on the grounds of nationality equality will be erased by market forces.
Putting minorities in the market of China as a whole and immerging them into the overwhelming 
majority of the Chinese market, is a further denial of minority rights to their lands and resources, and 
thus constitutes a denial of the reasons for the nationality autonomy. Reform to the Chinese means 
opening to the outside world, and to Mongols it means more opening to the Chinese.
3.1. Peripheralization O f Regional Economy
The IMAR has been treated more and more like any other Chinese province by the state with less and 
less characteristics to distinguish it as a nationality autonomous region.
The Increased Regional Development Gap
National autonomous regions, especially those in the north-west, contain most o f the country’s natural 
resources. In the 1980s when Chinese economic reform gained momentum, these regions have become 
increasingly important for China’s economic growth. But the economic gap between the eastern 
coastal China and China’s interior region and north-western region(nationality autonomous regions) 
has become wider. The autonomous region is becoming rapidly peripheralized in China’s economy.
It should be pointed out that in recent years, the industrial growth rate of national autonomous regions 
is not only lower than the country’s average, but also lower than their pre-1978 speed. From 1978 to 
1987, the total national industrial output increased by 226%, but the output of national autonomous 
regions only increased by 146.3%.31 In Inner Mongolia, during the eight years since the reform 
began(1979-1986), GDP, the production of the industry and agriculture and GNP increased annually 
at 6.6%, 5.8% and 5.7%, the growth is faster than that during the 26 years from 1953 to 1978 which 
were 6.6%, 5.8% and 5.7%. But the IMAR growth is lower than the country’s’ average, the GDP and 
the production of the industry and agriculture of the whole country during the 8 year period are 10.3% 
and 10.1%, and even lower than Xinjiang. The growth of GDP and of industry and agriculture 
production in Xinjiang during the period are 11% and 10.9%.32 The production efficiency of the 
IMAR calculated by the national income created by each employee in the IMAR was 1230 yuan in 
1986, lower than the whole country’s average by 20.1%, lower than Xinjiang by 30.7%. The 
production efficiency of the state owned enterprises in the IMAR was only 57.3% of the whole 
country’s average, slightly higher than Tibet. Agricultural production per agricultural population was
31 Buhe, "Work Hard To Develop The Economy In Minority Regions", Buhe's Speeches On 
Nationality Works (Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1993) pp. 272-85.
32 Lin Weiran, Lin Weiran Lun Shaoshu Minzu Diqu jingji Wenji (The Collected Papers on the 
Economy o f  the Minority Nationality Regions) (Inner Mongolian people’s Press, 1992) p.97.
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only 79% of the country’s average, lower than Xinjiang by 31%.
The average income of the state enterprise employees in the IMAR, 116.3% of the country’s average 
in 1979, decreased to 97.8% of the country’s average, the lowest among all five nationality 
autonomous regions. Average income per agricultural population decreased from 97.3% to 80.1% of 
the country’s average. In 1981 and 1982 the income of the agricultural population was twice that of 
the country’s average, since 1983, it has been on a decline and the distance that it has been lagging 
behind the country’s average has been growing ever since.33
The table 1 shows the advantages of Inner Mongolia in terms o f natural resources per head. Table 2 
shows the decrease of the nationality region’s share in the country’s economy through some major 
economic indicators. Table 3 shows the case of Inner Mongolia.34
Table 1
Indicators Unit 1990 Percentage in the whole 
country
Population 19,274,279’ 12.3%
arable land 10,000 mu" 7449 x unit 5.19%
Forest 100 million mu 2.50 x unit 13.38%
forest covering ratio % 14.1% -
timber reserve 100 million cubic 
metres
9.7 x unit 10.61%
Grassland 100 million mu 13 x unit 21.67%
fresh water surface 10,000 mu 1286 x unit 5.14%
coal reserve 100 million tons 2009 x unit 22.29%
iron ore 100 million tons 15.6 x unit 3.13%
33 Lin Weiran, (op. cit.) p.99.
34Most of statistics data in the following tables are taken from Buhe’s "Work Hard To Develop The 
Economy In Minority Regions", Buhe's Speeches On Nationality Works (Inner Mongolia People's 
Press, 1993, Huhhot) pp. 272-85.
* The population figure taken from The 3rd Nation-Wide Census (State Council Census Office and 
State Statistic Bureau, 1982) The population of Inner Mongolia to that of the whole country is 
19,274,279/1031,000,000.
Chinese measure of area, 1 mu = 1/15 hectare.
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Table 2. Nationality Autonomous Regional Economy’s Proportion in the Country’s Economy as a 
Whole
Industrial
output
Agricultura 
1 output
Industry &
Agricultural
output
Total output of 
all industries
Total
retailing sales 
volume
1978 5.00% 11.14% 6.53% 9.68% 9.68%
1987 4.24% 8.22% 5.25% 9.15% 9.15%
Table 3: Inner Mongolia Economy’s Proportion in the Country’s Economy as a Whole
Industrial
output
Agricultural
output
Industry and 
Agricultural 
output
Total output 
of all 
industries
Total retailing 
sales volume
1978 1.2% 2.0% 1.4% 1.6% 2.4%
1987 1.1% 1.9% 1.3% 1.1% 1.8%
There are both subjective and objective explanations for the increased regional development gap. The 
subjective reason is the so-called frontier psychology. Economic determinism does not function as 
much in Inner Mongolia as in the Chinese provinces where the localization o f economic interests has 
usually led to political regionalism. In Inner Mongolia, and other non-Chinese regions such as Tibet 
and Xinjiang as well, there is more resistance among the locals to the regionalization of economic 
interests and political power. The resistance is related to the refusal by local Chinese to identify with 
the regions that they regard as foreign. Chinese in Inner Mongolia tend to consider the adjacent 
Chinese provinces, where most of them are from, such as Shanxi and Hebei as their homeland. It can 
be described as the frontier psychology observed by Owen Lattimore more than half a century ago.35
The difficulty in Inner Mongolia’s regionalization of economic interests can be illustrated by the 
frontier psychology. In 1993, some big power plants were under construction in Inner Mongolia for 
the purpose of supplying power exclusively to the Beijing and Tianjin areas while the electricity 
supply in Inner Mongolia was still rationed.36 When asked about this, the number of ethnic Chinese 
who felt angry about this was amazingly smaller than that of Mongols even though their daily lives 
were both equally affected by the power shortage. Mongols tend to say that the shortage of power 
supply in Inner Mongolia is due to the free power export to Beijing. But ethnic Chinese as well as
35Lattimore, Owen, Mongols o f  Manchuria (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935)
36According to the Power Supply Agreement between Inner Mongolia, Beijing Municipal and State 
Energy Ministry, starting from 1990, Inner Mongolia region supply power to Beijing. In 1993 the 
supply will be increased to 450 MW, 1/6 of Beijing's electricity consumption. In 1995 the power 
supplied will further increase to 1000 MW, 1/4 of the total power consumption in Beijing. Liaowang 
(Outlook) magazine, October 31, 1994.
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IMAR leaders would, through TV media, persuade people that IMAR’s shortage of power has nothing 
to do with power export.37
Ethnic Chinese officials in IMAR party and government organs are more eager than their provincial 
counterparts to show they support the center at the expense of regional interests. The following 
example maybe shows both the official corruption and the so-called frontier psychology. Perhaps the 
frontier psychology may relieve the guilt of those corrupted Chinese officials to some extent.
The Fengzhen power plant in Inner Mongolia, with a designed capacity of 800 MW(mega-watt), 
bought the 1st generator unit of the 4 from Wuhan. The generator has been proved in testing to be 
lower in quality than the approved Inner Mongolian standards. But because of the pressure from No 1 
official, the party secretary of IMAR38, the power plant was not only forced to purchase the generator, 
but it also had to buy the 2nd, 3rd, and the 4th from Wuhan. According to an engineer in the Inner 
Mongolian Energy Design Institute, Wuhan is not amongst the country’s five leading energy designing 
forces; even Inner Mongolia’s own power design institute can do better than Wuhan’s in terms of 
designing and manufacturing capacities. Wuhan’s generator units should not have been purchased at 
all. But favoritism and official corruption in Inner Mongolia made all the difference because the 
region’s Chinese party boss’ former power base was Wuhan before he was assigned to Inner Mongolia 
as the party chief39. Officials of the Inner Mongolian power sector dared not do anything against their 
party boss (the head of the power sector is an ethnic Mongol). The purchase was finally concluded, 
and those officials involved secured their officialdom and lined their purses as well.
There are other objective reasons for the increased gap of regional development: the IMAR’s 
relatively isolated geo-political locations for economic involvement, trade, technology transfer and 
investment from prosperous outside economies; the structure of industries left over from the pre­
reform period; unfavorable state current policies during the reform period.
37 In several formal interviews in Hohhot, Aug. 1993, about 10 people were asked of their opinion on 
the issue. They included several students and one faculty member at Inner Mongolian Teacher’s 
University and 1 couple operating a bookstore near the university,
38 Wang Qun was formerly the party secretary of Wuhan municipal, the big city with heavy industries 
in central China. He was one of ethnic Chinese bosses of the IMAR since Ulanhu's downfall in 1967. 
Ethnic Chinese officials have taken charge of Inner Mongolia after Ulanhu are Teng Hai-qing, You 
Taizhong, Zhou Hui, Zhang Shuguang and Wang Qun. The first two were PLA generals with 
meritorious military service to CPC, they are all assigned from outside.
39Interview with an engineer involved in Fengzhen project in Huhhot in August 1993.
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The Problem of the IMAR Industrial Structure
The industrial structural problem of the IMAR is that large basic industry and heavy industry(raw 
material and mining, metallurgy) is much more extensive than light and processing industry. Heavy 
industries, the largest part of the (Inner Mongolian) regional economy, accounted for 55% (light 
industry is 45%) in 1988. Industries of mining and raw materials constituted 64.45% of heavy 
industries. In 1988, the annual growth rate of heavy industry production is 11.20%, mining by 6.15%, 
raw material industry by 11.02, but processing by 17.65%.40
Guangxi autonomous region is the only one among the five national autonomous regions in which the 
ratio of light industry is above the country’s average by 5.8%, and the production of its light industry 
is higher than that of its heavy industry by 4%, therefore the economic performance of the province is 
higher than the country’s average.41
Many enterprises in heavy industries are directly controlled by the state which are exempted of local 
taxation and do not submit any of their revenue to the local government. The heaviest of the heavy 
industries are mostly those directly under the control of various Central ministries. They do not 
contribute profit and tax revenues to Inner Mongolia. Many of them are nuclear and military 
industries of heavy weaponry which cause environmental damage. One example is the Hexi Company 
near Hohhot, a large rocket-fuel manufacturer directly controlled by the Chinese military.
Take the coal industry for example, the coal mines in the IMAR, Xinjiang and Ningxia are famous for 
their huge reserves, deep/thick stratification, rich varieties, good quality and easy accessibility. There 
are also rich oil reserves in the IMAR and Ningxia. When the state decided to open those natural 
resources and to use coal for power generation, the enterprises tended to be monopolized by the state, 
so that the autonomous region normally had no share in the revenue and taxation generated by the 
enterprise.
The industrial structure problem in Inner Mongolia is severe because of the long-standing state policy 
whereby the prices of primary industrial products have been kept artificially low. The state generates 
huge profit and tax income by transporting coal and supplying locally generated power to other 
provinces. But Inner Mongolia gets no share from these transactions.
40 Lin Weiran, “Discussion on How to Reduce the Development Gap of the Nationality Autonomous 
Regions”, Lin Weiran Lun Shaoshu Minzu Diqu jingji Wenji (The Collected Papers on the Economy 
o f the Minority Nationality Regions) (Inner Mongolian people’s Press, 1992) p. 13.
41 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p. 13.
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The following table shows the low economic efficiency of the five nationality autonomous regions in 
relation to the country’s average. Guangxi is the only autonomous region with an above-average 
economic efficiency because light industry in Guangxi accounts for 54.0% of its total industrial 
production value realized.42 Other autonomous regions have much larger proportion of heavy 
industries than the country’s average. But heavy industries are usually a headache for Chinese 
economic reforms in terms of technical and structural changes, market competitiveness and ownership 
reform. Compared with other provinces and autonomous regions, the problem of Inner Mongolia is 
that “heavy industries are too heavy, light industries are too light”.43
Table 4. Main Indicators of Economic Efficiency: National Autonomous Regions and the Country’s 
Average in 198744
Product
value
realized per 
RM B100 
fixed capital
Profit & tax 
realized RMB 
per 100 fixed 
capital
Profit & tax 
realized per 
RMB 100 
capital
Profit & tax 
realized per 
RMB 100 
industrial 
output
Production 
per capita 
of state- 
owned 
enterprises
Xingjiang 64.78 9.36 11.15 14.45 13165
Inner Mongolia 61.82 9.21 9.69 14.90 9941
Ningxia 54.82 8.19 8.83 14.94.11391
Tibet 34.06 3.32 3.81 10.35 6184
Guangxi 11.34 24.14 23.32 21.12 14934
C ountry’s
Average
1.4.15 19.72 20.03 18.93 16671
42 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p. 14.
43A common observation in Inner Mongolia, interview in Huhhot, August, 1993.
44 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p. 14.
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Unbalanced Industry Policy in 1980s
For many years it was because of neglect by the central state authorities that the natural resources were 
not opened and utilized in a planned and efficient manner, with the result that the base industries lag 
behind and the processing industries are over developed. That is part of the reason for the 
development gap between national autonomous regions and the rest of the country. It was especially 
so during the early 1980s (the sixth five-year plan period) when a policy that “light industries are 
given 6 priorities” was pursued.45 The situation was made worse by other factors such as 
unreasonable/unfair price systems, low prices and low profit for raw materials, higher prices and 
profits of processing products, and the processing industries kept a high growth rate. Coal, crude oil, 
power generation, steel industries, road and railways stagnated and lagged behind.
In March of 1989 the state council issued “The Decision on the Present Industry Policy”, pointing out 
the problems existing in the industrial structure. It was an effort to try to readdress the problems.
The state’s long-term industrial policy made the IMAR region have much more o f a share of base and 
heavy industries(raw materials, mining and metallurgical industries). The situation of the IMAR has 
been made worse by a price system which does not reflect market changes. In the price system, the 
planned prices of those base products are kept artificially low, 80% of which are allocated to the more 
developed areas. This inevitably brings huge profit together with the base products to those developed 
areas since those more developed areas can make profit from buying cheaply and selling dearly. The 
state, while keeping the prices of base products low, fixed the consumer goods’ price at an artificially 
high level. Even in the later double-pricing system, Inner Mongolia did not benefit from the 
adjustment o f base products prices. In 1987, at planned prices, the state commissioned from Inner 
Mongolia 950,000 tons of steel, 3300,000 cubic metres of timbers, 24,000 tons o f aluminium,
9,100,000 tons of coal and 1.4 billion kwh of electric power, the total volume of which was 2.6 billion 
yuan at planned/fixed prices. But the market price then was almost the twice of the planned price. 
Therefore with these few items alone Inner Mongolia suffered the loss o f 2.5 billion yuan, which far 
exceeded the financial subsidies Inner Mongolia received from the central government.46
45 Lin Weiran, “Discussion on How to Reduce the Development Gap of the Nationality Autonomous 
Regions”, Lin Weiran Lun Shaoshu Minzu Diqu jingji Wenji (The Collected Papers on the Economy 
o f the Minority Nationality Regions) (Inner Mongolian people’s Press, 1992) p.29.
46 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p. 12.
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IIn the 1980s the changed fiscal policy had virtually ended the previous favorable treatment of the 
IMAR. In 1980, in determining the base of the budgets for provincial governments as they began to be 
responsible for their own finance, the Ministry of Finance cut the budget base o f all provinces, 
municipals and autonomous regions by 10%. 148.89 million yuan, 10% of the IMAR annual budget, 
was cut. Since 1981 the central government began to borrow from provincial governments, in 1981-82, 
the total borrowing from Inner Mongolia was 330 million yuan. In 1983, 99 million of the loan was 
offset against the reduction of the base of IMAR budget. In 1987 the Ministry of Finance, in a nation­
wide borrowing from the local government, borrowed from IMAR 345 million yuan. In the same year 
the Ministry of Finance also cut the increased rate of financial assistance to national autonomous 
regions by half. Formerly there was a policy regarding the autonomous region’s budget that made 
allowances for the economic development and cultural and educational needs in the national 
autonomous regions, the central government increased its allowance to the autonomous regions by an 
annual rate o f 10% of the normal budget of the previous year(excluding the allocated fund to 
infrastructure construction and the fund added to circulating capital). Therefore in the same year, the 
borrowing and the cut of allowance reduced the IMAR budget by 444.08 million yuan. Starting from 
1988, 316 million yuans worth of borrowing was again offset as the reduced amount of the budget 
base. In the same time, the 10% annual increase in the allowance to the national autonomous areas was 
cancelled. The two cuts in 1988 alone reduced IMAR financial capability by 500.19 million yuan. 
47Then the favorable treatment of the nationality regions in state fiscal policy, which has best 
embodied the state nationality policy since 1963 according to some people, was brought to an end.48 
The result was that the financial capability of the nationality regions has been weakened, leading to a 
slowdown of the normal development of the economy, culture and education in the regions.
The state also has different economic policies toward different regions. Development priority has been 
given to the coastal and the more economically developed Chinese provinces, while inland areas were 
encouraged to concentrate on energy and raw materials processing industries to serve the rapid growth 
in the favorable areas.
47 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p. 18.
48The state made some specific fiscal arrangements for the nationality autonomy regions as early as 
1954. In 1958, the state council issued “The Temporary Fiscal Measures of the Nationality Autonomy 
Regions(Draft)”, the policy was described as “revenue and spending to be calculated in total; the 
surplus to be submitted and the shortfall to be compensated by the central government; the policy to 
be renewed annually.” There were also four special arrangements: 1. The preparatory fund of the 
nationality autonomy regions is higher than other provinces; 2. The normal annual budget(excluding 
the fund allocated to infrastructure and those as flowing capital) is added by 5% emergency fund; 3. 
The compensation fund to the nationality autonomy regions is increased to meet some special needs of 
the regions; 4. The surplus budget revenue is totally controlled by the nationality autonomy regions.
All the above measures increased the financial ablility and fiscal power of the local governments in the 
regions. See Lin Weiran, (op. cit.) p.26.
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I From 1979 to 1988, a number of so-called special economic zones were set up in the coastal Chinese 
provinces and cities.49 The favorable policies granted to the special economic zones were numerous: 
local right to approve joint ventures; import and export right for raw materials and products for 
processing; exemptions from tariff; VAT and export tax; rights to authorize a presence abroad and 
quota o f foreign currency, etc..
All these solid economic rights were in sharp contrast to the rights on paper for national autonomous 
regions. While the rich coastal areas were given favorable policies by the state, the former policies 
made by the state toward minority areas to help the economic development of the minority areas have 
been tightened, and even cancelled.50
Some argued in the IMAR that the IMAR also should be given the same favorable policy. They listed 
the advantages o f the IMAR in support of the argument for granting it SEZ status: rich natural 
resources, it has become a sizable economic and technological base after its 40-year development; a 
special economic pattern of agriculture; animal farming; forestry combined together with good 
transportation links to eight neighboring provinces and national autonomous regions; and railway links 
with Mongolia and Russia.51
3.2. Pastureland Economy and the Traditional Way of Life
49As early as 1979, Guangdong and Fujian provinces were given favorable policies and were allowed 
to open to Hong Kong and Taiwan. In 1980 four SEZ(special economic zone) were set up there. In 
1984 further 14 port cities were granted favorable policy and the status as opening city for attracting 
foreign investment to the economic development zones of each city. From 1986 to 1988, other larger 
areas were treated as specialized areas for economic development: delta areas of Zhujiang and 
Yangtze river, a large triangle in Fujian province, East-Liaoning peninsula, Shandong peninsula, and 
cities like Qinghuangdao, Tang Shan and Chang Chou, etc. In 1988 Hainan Island was again 
designated as SEZ.
50 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p. 15.
51 Interviews in Hohhot in 1993.
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As a socio-demographic research shows, from 1982 to 1990, the Mongols in Inner Mongolia 
experienced a decrease in its population involved with agriculture and an increase in its urban 
population52. The scale of decrease and increase are both more drastic than the average of other 
ethnic minorities and Han Chinese during the same time. The Mongolian population in the agricultural 
sector decreased from 1982 to 1990 by 16%, while the average decrease rate during the same time for 
the other non-Chinese minorities was only 2% and for the Chinese only 12%. More Mongols left their 
traditional way of life and entered into an urban Chinese environment. In terms o f changing the 
balance between the rural and urban population of Mongols in Inner Mongolia, it can be said that the 
source for the traditional Mongolian life and artistic inspiration of Mongolian ethnicity and culture.
The IMAR pastureland economy has a bleak future for two reasons: First some negative signs 
concerning the pastureland economy appeared during the reform period; and second is the expansion 
of arable farming that competes more than before with the pastureland economy for land for further 
cultivation, for increased migration and for state funds.
Since the IMAR pastureland economy is still largely within the Mongolian ethnic and cultural 
boundary, the pastureland economy continues to represent the traditional Mongolian way of life. Both 
the pastureland economy and the traditional Mongolian way of life face the dilemma of either being 
absorbed into a vast Chinese-ness or of being isolated and lagging behind. Moreover, as to the 
Mongolian identity in Inner Mongolia, to be modem and to be Mongols are a pair of contradictions 
and mutually exclusive choices for Mongols.
State policies in the pastureland, copy rural reform
Under the influence of leftist policies during the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the Cultural 
Revolution period o f 1966-76, a pro-agricultural policy which gave priority to grain production over 
animal farming was pursued in Inner Mongolia, and vast areas of pastureland were cultivated for 
growing grains. The policy had a negative effect on the pastureland, turning vast swathes of 
pastureland into cultivated farming land. The newly cultivated land on grassland facilitated Chinese 
immigration and brought environmental problems. The pastureland economy stagnated during 1960 
and 1962. But after a 3 year restoration period, the total livestock number on the IMAR pastureland 
reached an unprecedented 41.76 million in 1965.53 The past fifty years have shown that the agriculture 
of grain first policy has been associated with leftism and it is related to a Chinese style-cultivation and 
a pro-immigration policy; while the animal husbandry first policy has been associated with a moderate 
policy which is more amenable to Mongolian herdsmen and the Mongol way of life.
52 Jirimutu, A Sociodemographic Profile o f  Mongolia in China, 1990, Paper presented at the 1996 
Annual Meeting of Association for Asian Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, April 11-14, 1996.
53 Lin Weiran (op. cit.) p. 101.
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Although the IMAR government reiterated that in the course the reform period since 1978 the policy 
forestry and animal husbandry should be the priority, in practice in the IMAR, the importance of grain 
agriculture has been increasing in the IMAR, especially since the later period of the 7th five-year plan 
from 1985 to 1990.
The reforms carried out on the IMAR pastureland were just duplicates of the experience that had been 
gained from the Chinese agricultural reform. The former commune system has been replaced by a dual 
contract (responsibility) system. The pastureland is still state-owned but it is managed by individual 
herdsman through contract; livestock is bought by herdsmen from the collective ownership and raised 
by individuals. The ownership of the IMAR pastureland has not returned to the collective ownership 
in the pre-commune period. The ownership of the pastureland is discussed later.
The system of family responsibility has been applied to grazing land and livestock and it has brought 
incentives into pastureland production resulting in a huge increase in production corresponding to the 
results of the rural reform in the cultivated agricultural areas. Since 1978, and especially during the 7th 
5-year plan from 1985-90, the total number of livestock on pastureland increased substantially. By 
June, 1990, the livestock of fine/improved breed reached 21.948 million, 14.018 million more than the 
number in 1985.54 In 1990, the year of the unprecedented agricultural harvest in the IMAR history, 
the livestock number in the IMAR also increased. The total meat production of the IMAR increased to 
53610 tons in 1990 an increase of 49.3% compared to meat production in 1985. Wool and cashmere 
reached 64400 tons in 1990, an increase rate since 1985 of 53%. The pastureland production value 
increased by 31.4% to 1.948 billion yuan from 1985 to 1990. The average income of herdsmen 
increased to 905 yuan in 1990, increase since 1985 of 39.2%.55
The Inner Mongolian pastureland economy, like China’s general economic situation, has been 
idealized with official statistics in such a way to show that the Deng Xiaoping period since 1978 has 
been the best ever in the history of the People’s Republic of China. The way this is usually done is to 
compare the period after 1978 with the whole period from 1949 to 1978 without distinguishing the 
disastrous periods such as Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution and the more 
economically sound periods such as the first-five year plan period (1953 - 1958) and the three-year 
economic convalescent period (1963 - 1965).
54 Zhang Dinghua, “Improvement of Livestock Breed is the Effective Way to Develop Pastureland 
Economy”, The Collected Papers on the IMAR Agriculture and Pastureland Economy (Inner 
Mongolian People’s Press, 1991) p.65.
55 Zhang Dinghua, (op. cit.) p.62.
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As to the achievements of the pastoral economy in the past, the IMAR government does not separate 
the pre-Cultural Revolution period, especially the first 10 years of IMAR, from the Cultural 
Revolution period. In many reports from the IMAR government to the central government in 1985, it 
was stated that during the 26-year period from 1953 to 1972, the total livestock number of the IMAR 
had been fluctuating the whole time around 30 million heads. This is not a scientific summary because 
in 1965, a year before the Cultural Revolution (CR), the number of the livestock already surpassed 40 
million56. But during the Cultural Revolution, in addition to political suppression, Mongols also 
suffered economic miseries, and the number of their livestock declined drastically. In 1978, the total 
livestock in Inner Mongolia was 36 million. The pastureland production in 1988 was mentioned as the 
highest since 1978 which was around 40 million57, the same as that in 1965. After the Cultural 
Revolution, although many reform policies and measures have been carried out, the pastureland 
production in IMAR has recovered to a certain degree, but it has not reached the unprecedented levels 
suggested by government propaganda. The livestock number in 1990 (the year o f unprecedented 
agricultural harvest in IMAR history) reached 55 millions, but that number included pigs and other 
agricultural animals, so it is hard to tell whether the number of the livestock on the pastureland 
surpasses the number in 1965.58
Less specialization in production
Some new problems appeared in the pastureland economy as a result o f the introduction of the family 
responsibility model. The soundness of this imitative policy is also questioned by Mongolian 
intellectuals. Some even argued that according to Marxist theory, whether or not a productive 
relationship is advanced depends on whether it is good for production59. Private ownership and 
family-based management have greatly reduced the producer’s ability to absorb large equipment and 
new technology. While the family responsibility reform may have increased the economic incentives 
for herdsmen, the family-based production has reduced the level of the internal labor division and 
production specialization in the pastureland economy. The structure of pastoral labors has changed as 
a result. In Inner Mongolia in 1979, the number of labors directly related to animal herding were
398,000 units, other auxiliary labors of various kinds were 17,000 units. In 1984 the former was 
increased to 548,000, meanwhile the auxiliary labors decreased to only 6,11360. The statistics indicate 
a tendency that more and more labors have concentrated on single trade of herding animals, labors on 
other lines are decreasing.
56 Orchelan, Research On Inner Mongolian Nationality Issues (Inner Mongolian Education Press, 
1993) p.45.
57 Buhe Choluu, “The Stable Development Of Inner Mongolian Pastoral Economy”, Collection O f The 
Papers On_Pastoral Economy, Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989.
58 Altan Ochir, “The Direction and Task for the IMAR Animal Husbandry in the Future”, The 
Collected Papers on the IMAR Agriculture and Pastureland Economy (Inner Mongolian People’s 
Press, 1991) p.113.
59 Orchelan, (op. cit.) p. 76
60 Ibid.
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Formerly there were the so-called four stations on the IMAR pastureland: the grassland stations; the 
breed improvement stations; the vet stations; and the management stations. In the reform period this 
specialization was reduced and the four stations were merged into one. The current number of these 
technical stations operating in the pastureland is only 118 in the whole IMAR employing 3500 people, 
amongst whom 64% are technical personnel.61
Lack of specialization of production also leads to degradation of livestock breeding. A common scene 
on pastoral land since the reform is that almost all households have five kinds o f animals (camel, cattle, 
horse, sheep and goats), none of which are large enough to form a herd of it’s own. It is common 
knowledge that various herds should be strictly separated, but the labor needed to do it is just too 
much for a family. Inevitably the mixed herding on a small household farm would lead to a 
degradation o f livestock.
Low level labor division and specialization also leads to a massive waste of labor. The labor 
production rate on pastoral land is in decline. From 1979 to 1984, the number o f laborers on the 
pastoral land of the IMAR increased by 37.8%, in the meantime the value of production increased by 
only 18.6%. Comparing 1984 with 1979, production efficiency decreased by 16%.62 In contrast, in 
agricultural areas production value increased at a much higher speed than the increase of labor.
In theory, the lack o f specialization in production could be solved by forming cooperatives amongst 
several families. The production experience in the past proved that co-operatives of 5 to 10 
households are more productive and efficient than family-based production, but so far this more 
suitable way of organizing production seems not to be favored by the government since the authority 
is now committing itself to the new economic thinking of family-based production. The real problem 
which makes cooperatives unfeasible is the problem of pastureland ownership. Under the current 
system, each of the families on the pastureland are tenants to the state, the sole land owner. Collective 
ownership of the grassland, or the old public ownership of the grassland in the pre-Communist period 
would certainly have been better.
Many other statistics given by Mongolian researchers show that there have been some signs of 
absolute decline in the pastoral production of each League (prefecture). The lack of the division of 
labour and production specialization is becoming an unprecedented barrier in the commercialization 
of the pastoral economy. Mongols are becoming a people who are bounded more and more closely to 
a single means of production, and are thus placed in a vulnerable position in the increasingly more 
market-oriented Chinese economy.
Price policy
61 Zhang Dinghua, “Improvement of Livestock Breed is the Effective Way to Develop Pastureland 
Economy”, The Collected Papers on the IMAR Agriculture and Pastureland Economy (Inner 
Mongolian People’s Press, 1991) p.63.
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The pastoral economy is also affected by an unstable state pricing system. Frequent fluctuation of state 
prices brings a lot of damage to Mongolian animal husbandry and it does not give herdsmen the 
stability necessary for their production and sense of security. Take Shilinggol League as an example, 
from 1979 to 1986, the state cattle purchasing price kept changing every year which made cattle 
raising herdsmen frustrated in their production decision-making. In 1979, the state price was 1.77 
yuan per kg. In 1983 the price was raised by 19.7% and reached 2.12 yuan per kg. In 1985 the price 
was further raised by 32% and reached 2.80 yuan per kg. But in 1986 the price declined by 17.1% to 
2.60 yuan per k g .63 Usually it needs 4 years to raise cattle before they are ready for sale, but state 
price policy changes almost every year. The price fluctuation is certainly not determined by day-to- 
day market conditions, but it is determined by the central government. The purchase prices were not 
governed by the markets but more controlled by fiscal policy and the availability of funds for the 
particular purchases.
In the first three price rises, the Mongols in Shilinggol League gave priority to raising cattle and also 
made extra efforts and incurred additional expenditure to ensure the cattle’s survival through the 
terrible winter. When the price was lowered, the herdsmen’s income was affected. The productivity 
of the pastoral economy in IMAR is largely influenced by natural conditions, so it is extremely 
vulnerable to the present unstable purchasing policy. The current practice on pricing by the 
government is certainly not designed to benefit the animal husbandry in the longer term and it also had 
an adverse impact upon Mongolian herdsmen’s normal life.
Another example is the government’s poor record as the regulator of the cashmere market which had 
adverse effects on the cashmere industry on the pastureland. In 1981 the price o f 1 kg white cashmere 
was 15.12 yuan and the price in the following years was raised by 20-30% annually. By 1986 the 
price had reached as high as 48 yuan per kg, and by 1988 it even reached 100-140 yuan per kg. The 
then market price was even higher than 200 yuan per kg.64 Raising white goats became such a 
profitable business that not only most Mongolian herders but also a lot Chinese peasants rushed to 
raise goats. But in the following years as the market crashed and the price dropped drastically and the 
“cashmere rush” started by speculators was over, long-term damage was done to the cashmere 
production industry on the pastureland and to the Mongolian herdsmen rather than the speculators and 
peasants.
Different funding policy
62Orchelan,"On IMAR Pastoral Economy Pattern", Nei Meng Gu She Lian, 5th issue of 1987
63Ibid.
^Interview in Ikhe Zuu League, 1993
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Another aspect o f the price system is related to the state funding policy, i.e. the state purchasing price 
is fixed far below the market value. Several decades of such practice in the pastureland means that 
state investment on the pastureland infrastructure is offset by the huge amount of invisible wealth 
taken away by the state. In 1986, the state purchasing price on cashmere was 40 yuan per kg, but the 
local market price was 70 yuan per kg. In the same year, the state purchasing price on improved wool 
was 3.48 yuan per kg, but local market price was 9 yuan per kg. The West Ujimqin Banner of 
Shilinggol League annually sells at the state price more than 1 million kg of wool and fur, and 600 
thousands pieces o f hides. The quantity of the sale to the state means that the banner loses more than 
7 million yuan annually to its state purchasing quota. But the state fiscal allocation plus investment to 
the banner is far less than 7 million yuan per annum. Of course the 7 million yuan annual loss is 
burdened by Mongolian herdsmen in the banner.
The state funding situation in the reform period was even worse than in previous periods. After 1947 
and even during the Cultural Revolution, although the state exercised planned control of pastoral 
production including management, production planning and purchasing, yet the state was nevertheless 
responsible for adding the necessary funding for production in pastoral areas and also for supplying 
consumer goods and production materials such as animal fodder, medicines, building materials, 
farming mechanics, etc. at a low fixed price. In the reform period, the state abolished the subsidies for 
goods supplied to pastoral areas. The price became subject to bargaining (a compromise between the 
state planned price and the market price). Chinese peasants are ensured to be able to sell their 
agriculture products because the state provides loans especially for purchase o f agricultural products, 
but since 1993 the state has stopped providing loans for purchase of animal products in Inner 
Mongolia. As a result Mongolian herdsmen have no guarantee either for selling their products at a 
reasonable price or for selling them at all.65 Animal fodder is another example. In 1985 the price of 
com was 0.252 yuan per kg which was 0.1 yuan more than the previous year’s planned price. During 
1985 West Ujimqin Banner’s anti-disaster efforts, a total of 3.25 million kg of com was consumed. 
Because o f the changing prices, herdsmen in the banner had to pay an extra 1850,000 yuan on the 
bargaining price.
Generally speaking, the pastoral economy in Inner Mongolia provides the state with products ten times 
more valuable than the funding received from state. During the last forty years since the founding of 
IMAR, the state has been provided with animal products valued at 13.8 billion yuan by Inner 
Mongolia, but the budget for both infrastructure and administration allocated to the pastoral areas is 
only 117 million yuan. State investment in the pastureland infrastructure in 1986 decreased by more 
than half that of 1980. Livestock pedigree improvement, animal epidemic prevention and research
65 After 1984, the State Agricultural Bank put limits on its low-interests loans, category I and II 
agricultural products are still entitled for low-interests loan, but not the category III products which 
include mainly animal products. Lin Weiran, Economic Study O f Minority Areas, 1990, Inner 
Mongolian People's Press.
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were also adversely affected by the reduction of funds.66
After 1979, Chinese peasants were allowed to take a considerable part of their agricultural produce to 
the free market, but Mongolian herdsmen were not granted the same freedom to sell their animal 
products. Furthermore, Mongolian herdsmen have not been able to enjoy the same favorable state 
subsidies that Chinese peasants do for their products. The situation has been made worse for 
Mongolian herdsmen by poorer transportation and by less developed commercial channels. As 
Chinese agriculture and its commercial animal husbandry sector have developed, the increasing supply 
of animal products has led to a price decline in recent years, and that has weakened the situation for 
the Mongolian pastureland economy.
66Boin, "On Inner Mongolian Animal Husbandry", Collection O f Works On Pastoral Economy (Inner 
Mongolian People's Press, 1989)
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Conclusion: Bleak Future for the Pastureland Economy
In 1990 the IMAR agriculture had an unprecedented bumper harvest as grain production reached 9.73 
billion kg. Comparative figures for previous years include: 4.5 billion kg. in 1959, near 5 billion kg. 
in 1974, around 5-6 billion kg. from 1985 to 1987, 7.35 billion kg in 1988 and 6.8 billion kg in 
1989.67 The harvest can be mainly explained by increased enthusiasm and by good weather.
According to official statistics, there are 80 million acres of cultivated land in the IMAR, but 
according to a satellite survey, there are 100 million acres, 20 million extra acres of cultivated land are 
not on the books.68 Although the IMAR authority attributed the bumper harvest to an increase in the 
yield per acre, increased cultivation also contributed to the harvest. If  general agricultural growth may 
be said to be mainly the result of increased production efficiency, the growth of the pastureland 
economy, however, is caused by overgrazing of the grassland and that cannot be sustained because it 
leads to environmental degradation.
The grain harvest, however was also gained at a huge cost. The expansion of cultivated farmland 
resulted in deforestation. Now only 13.6% of the whole IMAR area is covered by forest and the 
locations o f the forests are not necessarily best placed. More than 50 million acres land were already 
degraded into desert and huge areas of additional grassland continue to become desert. Land affected 
by soil erosion by water and wind now accounts for 1/3 of all the cultivated farmland in the IMAR. 
About 45 million acres of the farmland have become affected by salinization to various degrees. 10% 
of all cultivated land has already been too salinized for any production value.69
Formerly the IMAR had to rely on the rest of the country for food. Every year 1 billion kg grains were 
allocated to the IMAR by the state.70 After the 1990 harvest, the IMAR for the first time in history 
achieved food self-sufficiency. Because of the requirements from the state, and pressures from the 
growing Chinese population, the IMAR leader aimed to achieve the goal of 15 billion kg in grain 
production to relieve the whole country’s pressure by the year 2000, the end of the 9th 5-year plan71. 
The way to realize the goal, apart from further increasing the production per acre, is to increase the 
farmland.
67 Zhang Dan, “Reflection 1 on the Big Harvest in 1990”, The Collected Papers on the IMAR 
Agriculture and Pastureland Economy (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1991) p. 183.
68 Bointu, “Aim at the New Height in the Agricultural Production”, The Collected Papers on the 
IMAR Agriculture and Pastureland Economy (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1991) p. 178.
69 Zhang Tingwu, “Some Suggestions on the Strategy of the Agricultural Development in the IMAR”, 
The Collected Papers on the IMAR Agriculture and Pastureland Economy (Inner Mongolian People’s 
Press, 1991) p.224.
70Oton, “Reflection 2 on the Big Harvest in 1990”, The Collected Papers on the IMAR Agriculture 
and Pastureland Economy (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1991) p.202.
71Zhang Dan, “Reflection 1 on the Big Harvest in 1990”, The Collected Papers on the IMAR 
Agriculture and Pastureland Economy (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1991) p.189.
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The emphasis on the importance of cultivation will put additional pressure on the pastureland to 
provide new farmland. Considering that overgrazing animal husbandry on the grassland has already 
caused a deterioration and a desertification of the grassland, the pastureland available for animal 
husbandry will shrink still further. The pastureland economy now faces a bleak future.
3.3. Inner Mongolian Territory and Mongolian Land Rights
From 1946 to 1956 it took ten years for the IMAR to reclaim those areas which had either been 
incorporated into bordering Chinese provinces or had been set up as new Chinese provinces. 
According to the IMAR’s propaganda, the Mongolian territory promised by CPC in its 1935 
Declaration was restored by the New China. However the territorial restoration was only an 
enlargement of the IMAR administrative size, and it had nothing to do with the Mongolian rights to 
the land.
In 1947 when Ulanhu united and secured the support of the eastern Mongolian nationalists, the capital 
of the Joint Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement was moved from Ulaan Hot in east Mongolia to 
Kalgan. In 1952 the capital was finally moved to Gui Sui(“retum and pacify” in Chinese) and the city 
was renamed as Hohhot, the original Mongolian name for the city when it was first founded in 1554 
by AltanKhan(l 507-83).
Suiyuan Province was abolished in June 1954, In July 1955 the six banners and counties of Jehol 
province such as Onut Banner and Chi Feng county were incorporated into Inner Mongolia.(the other 
parts of Jehol were assigned to He Bei province). In April 1956, Bainhot Mongolian prefecture and 
Ejina Banner of Gansu Province were incorporated into Inner Mongolia and in the same year Bayan 
Nor League was set up in Inner Mongolia.72 The unified IMAR was appraised by Ulanhu as the end 
of 300-year separation of Inner Mongolia.73 500,000 Mongols outside the IMAR were welcomed to 
return to Inner Mongolia. Ulanhu said that the unification would benefit the development of its 
national culture74.
The enlargement of IMAR increased the geographical scope and power of the IMAR government and 
more particularly of Ulanhu himself. One principle used to restore the original size of Inner Mongolia 
was to include as few Chinese as possible so as to provide Mongolian autonomy with a stronger 
indigenous population base. But nevertheless, the IMAR enlargement also brought in more Chinese
72 Liu Jingping and Zheng Guangzhi, ed. Inner Mongolian Economic Development (Inner Mongolian 
People’s Press, 1979) p.169.
73 Although Ligden Khan only controlled Chakhar, he was by lineage the orthodox khan of all 
Mongolia. He it was defeated by Manchu Emperor Tiancong(Hung Taiji, or Arvkhai 300 years 
ago(1634), and then South Mongolia was annexed to Manchu Qing dynasty.
74 Ulanhu, “Speech on IMAR Party Propaganda Working Meeting”, 1957, Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) 
p.169.
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cadres into the IMAR government, and it also added substantially to the Chinese population in the 
IMAR which was by then already the majority. The incorporated areas were mostly agricultural areas 
where Chinese peasants usually outnumbered Mongolian peasants.
But the expansion of the IMAR administrative border was irrelevant to the unification of Mongolian 
territory. The people in China were not allowed to change their permanent residence freely because of 
the PRC’s household registration system, and the provincial border was another barrier for free 
movement. That had given a degree of protection against the migration by Han Chinese. But after the 
more populated agricultural areas were incorporated into Inner Mongolia, the door was opened for 
population in the agriculture areas to move to the more sparsely populated areas within Inner 
Mongolia. Accordingly the enlargement of the IMAR administrative area further changed reducing the 
Mongol-Chinese population ratio and reducing the population basis for the development of any 
meaningful national autonomy.
During the Cultural Revolution as Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated, the Soviet Union signed 
in 1966 a security treaty with the Mongolian People’s Republic and stationed armed forces in 
Mongolia along the Mongolia-China border. In 1967 China began to counter deploy force along the 
border75. In April 1967, General Teng Haiqing, the deputy commander of the Beijing Military Zone, 
was assigned by Zhou Enlai to be the head of the IMAR Revolutionary Committee, the new authority 
of the IMAR. At the same time, the CPC Central Military Commission issued an order that the IMAR 
Military Zone was to be demoted to a provincial military zone and was subordinate to the Beijing 
Military Zone. Between January and October in 197076, the size of IMAR was reduced to Vi of its 
original size mainly for strategic considerations. Only three leagues were left: Shilinggol, Ulaan Chab 
and Ikhe Zuu. The other three leagues were incorporated by neighboring provinces. The early period 
of the Cultural Revolution was the time of the massive purge of Ulanhu and Mongols in general. The 
partition o f the IMAR obviously enabled Beijing to control the situation in Inner Mongolia more 
easily.
On May 30, 1979 after the Cultural Revolution ended, the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council decided to restore the original IMAR administrative areas to the pre the Cultural Revolution 
dimensions. The IMAR took back the three leagues of Hulun Beir, Jerim, Jo-oda which were formerly 
lost to Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces, and the three banners of Alashan Left, Alashan 
Right and Ejina from Gansu and Ningxia provinces respectively.77 But the fact that IMAR was so
75 Michael B. Yahuda, The International Politics o f  the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London and New 
York: Ruotledge) p.62.
76 The CPC Central Committee on December 19, 1969 made the ’’Decision on the Partition and 
Martial Law of IMAR”, according to which the Beijing Military Zone exercised general martial law in 
Inner Mongolia after the partition. The Commander, together with his deputies and commissars of the 
Beijing Military Zone formed the Inner Mongolian Front Line Command which controlled all the 
works in Inner Mongolia. Hao Weimin, ed. (op. cit.) p.320.
77 The IMAR Survey and Mapping Bureau, Nei Menggu Dituji (The Collection o f  IMAR Maps) (Inner 
Mongolia News Publish House, 1989) p.3.
181
easily partitioned shows that the so-called national autonomy was just something at the central 
government’s disposal.
The Administrative territorial scope of the IMAR has very little bearing on the extent of the 
Mongolians’ right to land. The process in which Mongols lost their land rights happened much earlier 
and had little to do with the changes o f the IMAR administrative area. Within the 10-year period from 
1947 to 1958, the state became the land owner of the grassland of Inner Mongolia and Mongols 
gradually lost their land ownership.
Land reform was conducted between 1947 and 1952 in Inner Mongolia. In pastoral areas, the reform 
was called democratic reform since the ownership of grassland was not changed. Before 1947, the 
grassland in Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian public in common and the aristocracy was not 
the landowner, its privileges were confined to the use of grazing lands. During the democratic reform, 
it was recognized by the IMAR CPC Committee that all the land in Inner Mongolia belonged to the 
Mongolian people in common78. In pastoral areas, Mongolian public ownership o f grassland and equal 
rights of grazing were reiterated by the IMAR government, and the policy was called “free grazing”(zi 
you fang mu)79.
During the democratic reform period, Mongolian ownership of all the land in Inner Mongolia was 
redefined as the land rights were limited to only pastoral areas. A document made by the National 
Commission o f the State Council in 1953 confirmed that the grasslands in Inner Mongolia belonged to 
the Mongolian public. It pointed out:” at present all grasslands and grazing lands in all pastoral areas, 
which might have formerly belonged to a whole nationality or tribe, an individual or a monastery, or 
might have been leased land between different nationalities or tribes, are now owned by the 
Mongolian public, in the whole IMAR, the policy is free grazing on grassland and readjustment of 
grassland.”80
In the Inner Mongolian agricultural areas, the Mongolian ownership of land was annulled by the land 
reform. The lands which formerly belonged to the Mongolian public in common were allocated to 
individual peasants. For centuries before the land reform, Chinese peasants in Inner Mongolia had no 
right to land ownership and the land belonged to Mongolian banners(public land for all Mongols 
within the banners). When Mongolian nobles illegally let or sold public land to Chinese landlords, 
some land was also allocated to the Mongolian commoners. Chinese tenant farmers paid rent to 
Mongolian landlords: either Mongolian nobles or commoners. The rent was called Mongolian Rent 
(meng zu) by the Chinese, which indicated Mongolian land ownership. One important measure of the
78 Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) p. 106.
79 Liu Jingping, (op. cit.) p. 111.
80 ‘The Basic Summary of the Animal Husbandry Production in IMAR and Suiyuan, Qinghai, 
Xinjiang’, Ni Dongfa, ‘Two Kinds of Ownership of the Grassland in IMAR’, Gefu, ed. Collection o f  
Papers on Animal Husbandry (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.335.
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land reform was to invalidate the Mongolian Rent81. When those Mongols who owned more land were 
categorized as landlords, their land was allocated to the landless tenants, most of whom were Chinese.
From 1947 to 1957, a “no class struggle” policy was pursued as part of the democratic reform in the 
pastoral areas in Inner Mongolia.82 Since there was no private ownership of grassland, therefore there 
was no exploiting class which controlled the means of production in the pastoral areas. The policy 
during the period of democratic reform regarding the pastoral land was not to change land ownership, 
but only to abolish the Mongolian nobles’ privileges in the use of public grazing land. The guideline 
of the IMAR government was: “ public ownership of pastures, freedom of grazing, no class 
categorization and no class struggle, mutual benefit for both herd owners and herdsmen.”83 The land 
reform that was applied in agricultural areas ensured that regarding the lands taken over from 
Mongolian landlords, 80% was given to Mongols and 20% to Chinese peasants. After the land reform, 
Mongolian peasants usually had more land than Chinese, therefore they were allowed to employ 
Chinese peasants or to let farmland to Chinese peasants for rent.
The different policies of democratic reform that were applied to the agricultural and pastoral areas, 
that accorded different treatment toward Mongolian and Chinese peasants in the agricultural areas 
reflected a compromise of the two principles: recognition of Mongolian rights and more radical 
policies based on class distinction. Often the difference of the Chinese central government guidelines 
and the IMAR government policies was reflected in the different opinions of the ethnic Chinese cadres 
and Mongolian cadres and in the IMAR government. In spite of the declared policy of forswearing 
class differentiation and class struggle, in practice, class distinction was still adopted as an internal 
guideline by some cadres, and in some pastoral areas the policy of class distinction was copied from 
the agricultural areas.
The cooperatives were set up in the agricultural areas in Inner Mongolia from 1953 to 1956 and in the 
pastoral areas from 1953 to 1958. By the and of January 1956, preliminary cooperatives had been set 
up in the agricultural areas. The farm land and other basic production materials were collectivized into 
the cooperatives as shares and the peasants became the shareholders. Since the distribution was 
conducted according to shares, the preliminary co-ops were regarded as semi-socialist in nature. By 
the end of 1956, the preliminary cooperatives were upgraded into the advanced cooperatives in which 
the distribution was no longer conducted as a dividend, but according to work. Individual peasant’s 
land rights were totally abolished.
During the cooperative movement, the so-called “combined”(lian he she: cooperatives consisted of 
many nationalities, most combined cooperatives were Chinese-Mongol cooperatives) cooperatives 
were encouraged by Chinese cadres and welcomed by Chinese peasants. Since Mongolian peasants
81 Liu Jingping (op. cit.) p. 106.
82 The policy was called “3 nos, 2 beneficials”: no class struggle, no confiscation, no class 
classification/categorization; to be beneficial to both livestock owner and herders. See Hao Weimin 
(op. cit.) p.38.
83Ulanhu, “Speech on Sub-branch of North China Bureau Meeting on 11 May, 1952”. The Cultural
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normally owned more land than Chinese peasants before the collectivization, Mongolian peasants lost 
more than Chinese peasants. During the collectivization in the pastoral areas, herdsmen’s livestock 
were taken by the preliminary cooperatives as shares first and later became the collective property of 
the advanced cooperatives. Many monasteries and large livestock owners in the pastoral areas, were 
made to join state farms together with their livestock and grazing land, the others were collectivized 
into cooperatives. Because Mongols contributed more livestock and land than the Chinese to those 
“combined cooperatives”, and Mongols and Chinese equally shared the coops, Mongols actually lost 
and the Chinese gained land and livestock in the collectivization process. In the collectivization of 
monastery properties, the livestock that formerly belonged to the monasteries and Mongolian public 
grazing land became state property.
The leftist Great Leap Forward policies no longer accepted the principle of distinguishing between 
minority and Han Chinese as had been applied previously. The communization o f agricultural 
cooperatives in Inner Mongolia was completed in October 1958. By July 1958 cooperatives were set 
up in pastoral areas. Although the IMAR CPC Committee suggested that the communization in the 
pastoral areas be postponed, in practice more radical policies were pursued and communization started 
after September and October of 1958. The guidelines of the CPC on the people’s communes 
emphasized that there was a transitional period from the socialist collective ownership to the socialist 
people’s ownership(quan min suo you zhi), and from socialism to communism. The guidelines also 
emphasized the people’s commune was a 3-level collective ownership, the ownership of the 
production team was the base.84 But in practice, the distinction between the collective ownership was 
replaced by the state ownership(quan min suo you).
In the period after the “Great Leap Forward” and before the Cultural Revolution was the period when 
land ownership experienced a transition from collective ownership to state ownership( it was known in 
Chinese as “public” or “the people’s ownership” (quan min suo you zhi). The so-called “Combined 
Communes” ( lian he she: communes with many nationalities) were encouraged in Inner Mongolia. 
During the communization Mongolian land rights were finally abolished and the Chinese state became 
the owner of Inner Mongolian grassland.
Though Mongols may argue that the transition of the grassland ownership was contradictory to the 
Chinese policies on the people’s commune85 and the 1954 Chinese constitution, the Chinese can 
always argue the opposite. Since the 1954 Constitution stipulated that the wild land belonged to the 
state86, the question of how to interpret what was wild land become crucial to the issue of grassland
Revolution materials. Also See Hao Weimin (op. cit.) p.92.
84 “The Resolutions On The Several Issues Of The People’s Commune”, passed by the 6th Meeting of 
the 8th CPC Central Committee. “The Regulations Of The Work Concerning The People’s 
Communes In The Countryside(draft)”(commonly known as the “60 Articles”), Liu Jingping (op. cit.) 
pp.227, 446.
85 ‘The Regulations of the Works on Countryside People’s Commune’(so-called “60 articles” (liu shi 
tiao). See Liu Jingping (op. cit.) p.227.
86 In the constitution of 1954, it was made clear that “each nationality autonomous region is an 
inseparable part of the PRC.” It’ also stipulates: “mines, rivers, the forest, wild land and other
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ownership. The Chinese tend to regard all land which is not cultivated for farming as wild land. The 
cultivation of grassland has always been called by the Chinese as “cultivating unused or useless land” 
(kai huang). Mongols argue that no such law was ever written stipulating that the grassland in the 
IMAR, except those occupied by the state and PLA, is owned by the state.
Ownership of the grassland in Inner Mongolia was clarified later. In 1963 the National Commission 
and the Agricultural Ministry of the State Council issued a 40-article regulation on work in pastoral 
areas. It wrote: “ the production teams have fixed rights to use the grassland within its sphere 
according to the particular conditions and historical customs.” It did not mentioned grassland 
ownership. The ownership was mentioned in the IMAR Grassland Management Provisional 
Regulations made in 1965. It wrote that “the grassland of the IMAR is owned by the state(quanmin 
suoyou)”. The state ownership of the IMAR grassland was reiterated in the Grassland Management 
Regulations stipulated in 1973.87 Mongols objected to the two regulations on the grounds they were 
not made in accordance with the legal procedures stipulated by the state constitution. According to the 
constitution at the time, the two regulations could only become law after they were approved by the 
standing committee of the people’s congress. As a matter of fact, the two regulations never went 
through the standing committee. However, the legal argument is not really the key issue because there 
never was a problem in having the regulations approved by the people’s congress.
Land ownership underwent three changes from the beginnings o f land reform to the completion of 
socialist reform. From the perspective of the Chinese peasantry, the new Communist state deprived 
landlords of their land and gave them to the landless peasants(predominantly Chinese); the state first 
changed individual ownership of land into collective ownership during the collectivization process, 
and then the collective land ownership was changed into state ownership. During the rural reform 
period, the collective ownership of farmland was re-emphasized. Chinese landless peasants first 
became individual landowners after the liberation, and then became landless peasants in the 
agricultural communes. In the reform period, Chinese peasants came collectively to own their farm 
land. But as seen by Mongolian herdsmen, the treatment by the state was less just. During 
collectivization the Mongolian public ownership of grassland was separated into many smaller 
collective ownerships, and then the collective ownerships were transferred to the state. Since the 
communization, Mongolian herdsmen for the first time in history have become landless. Since the 
reform began in 1978, Chinese peasants have come to enjoy collective ownership and management of 
their farmland, where Mongolian herdsmen have still remained tenants the state.
resources which, according to particular laws, belong to the state, belong to the whole people 
(quanmin suoyou)”. Sun Xianfang, The Laws o f Nationality Regional Autonomy (Inner Mongolian 
University Press, 1990) p.53.
87 Ni Dongfa, ‘Two Kinds of Ownership of the Grassland in IMAR’, Gefu, ed. Collection o f  Papers 
on Animal Husbandry (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1989) p.339.
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4. National Language, Education and Culture: view and discussions
Among both cultural and economic changes, there are both positive and negative changes, it is hard to 
qualify or quantify that the negative side is more than positive side or the otherwise. Therefore a 
reductionist/materialist method is not feasible. A simple causal relation between the cultural changes 
and economic changes could not be set up, nor has there been found a causal relationship between 
cultural change and rise of ethnic nationalism. If we consider the issue within the broader context of 
the overall ideological, policy and socio-economic changes that took place in the course of the 
Chinese reform, one point that could be discerned is that changes in the issues of national language 
and culture that have worsened from the perspective of Mongolian nationalism are due more to the 
economic and socio-cultural environment than to an assimilationist orientation of the state. In other 
words, the deepening predicament of Mongolians was the result of practice more than from deliberate 
policy.
4.1. Mongols More Assimilated into Chinese society
China’s reform since 1978 brought changes and improvements in education and cultural development. 
In Inner Mongolia, from the Mongols’ perspective, those improvements are mainly restoring 
Mongolian Language departments in colleges, setting up college-preparing classes for ethnic 
minorities in colleges and universities, and ensuring a target number(or certain proportion) of 
Mongolian students graduating from secondary schools; increasing Mongolian teaching staff and ‘ 
improving teaching materials.
During this period, some professional research institutions and societies for Mongolian literature and 
study were set up. The China Society of Mongolian Literature was created in November 1989. In the 
same year, the Inner Mongolian Literature Society was also set up. There have been other non­
governmental societies established in recent years. These include the Research Institute of Mongolian 
Literature, the Society o f Injanash88, Societies of Janger, the Society of Gesar and the Society of 
Secret History. There were also some international academic activities about Mongolian literature and 
studies. From 1987 to 1988 the Inner Mongolian University sponsored the 1st International 
Conference on Mongolian Studies; Inner Mongolian Normal University hosted the International 
Conference on the Secret History of Mongolia. From 1985 to 1989 in Huhhot the 1st National 
Academic Conference on Janger and the 1st International Conference on Gesar took place. According 
to Mongolian scholars, one motivation behind the Chinese government’s permission and even 
sponsorship of those Mongolian cultural activities is partly politically-motivated, or at least the 
motivation was not purely academic. The Chinese authorities have tried to prove that the centre for
88A Mongolian literary figure in Manchu Qing period.
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Mongolian studies is not in Ulaan Baator but in China89.
Colleges and schools with Mongolian Language Departments have been increased from 5 in 1978 to 
10 1988. Teaching institutions using Mongolian as a teaching language increased from 21 in 1978 to 
30 in 1988. College Students learning in the Mongolian language have increased from 1698 in 1978 
to 3489 in 1988. Since 1947,17,000 graduates from higher education have been taught in Mongolian. 
By 1985, there were 9 national colleges and schools in higher education with 7831 students; there 
were 27 national middle schools and specialized schools with 8270 non-Chinese students; the number 
of national middle schools was 378 with 204,100 non-Chinese students; their number had increased by 
188. and 389 respectively. There were 3207 national primary schools with 426,100 non-Chinese 
students, and their respective increases were 8 and 18.90
Actually during the reform period the statistics show that the overall educational levels of all ethnic 
groups increased. According to Dr. Jirimutu, the rate of increase in the educational levels of Mongols 
was much higher than it was for the ethnic minorities as a whole and even for the Han Chinese. For 
example, the percent of Mongols who were illiterate/semi-illiterate dropped by 44% to 15.9 in 1990 
from 28.5 in 1982 and the percent of Mongols with elementary school education decreased by 24% to 
31.6 in 1990 from 41.5 in 1982. Nevertheless, the increase in the percent of Mongols with above high 
school education was the most dramatic, an increase of 577% from 0.96 in 1982 to 6.5 in 1990.
During the same period, the illiteracy rate of all ethnic minorities decreased by 30% and the 
percentage of minorities with elementary school education increased by merely 4%. Meanwhile, the 
percent of minorities with junior high school education and above high school education jumped by 
56% and 350%, respectively, and the percent minorities with senior high school education increased 
moderately by 11%. Surprisingly, the illiteracy rate of the Han jumped by 26% and the percentage of 
Han with elementary school education and senior high school education dropped by 27% and 6%, 
respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of Han with junior high school education and above 
high school education increased by 32% and 260% respectively.
The Higher proportion of urban population of the ethnic minorities including Mongols as opposed to 
the Han Chinese partly explains their higher educational level of attainment. This is because there is a 
huge gap in terms of income and education between the rural and urban population in China. In 
higher education there is a guaranteed quota allocated to ethnic minorities, which may partly explain 
the larger proportion of the Mongolian population in receipt of higher education as compared to the 
Chinese. From the chart, we can see Mongols, proportionately speaking, are a better-educated people 
than Chinese. The higher education in the Mongolian language was more developed than in many 
other ethnic minority regions, maybe with the exception of Xinjiang, even before the reform period.91
89Interview with Mr. Saihan, research fellow in the Research Institute of Mongolian history, Inner 
Mongolian University.
90 Buhe, "Development of Nationality Education and Prosperity of National Culture", On Nationality 
Works (Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1992) pp.331-6.
91 Jirimutu, A Sociodemographic Profile o f  Mongols in China 1990. Paper presented at the 1996 
Annual Meeting of Association for Asian Studies, Honolulul, Hawaii, April 11-14, 1996.
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The Educational Level of Mongols, Ethnic Minorities as a Whole and Han Aged 12 and above in 
China, 1982 and 1990
Educational ________Mongols_____________ All Minorities_______________ Han
Level 1982 1990 % 1982 1990 % 1982 1990 %
% % Change % % Change % % Change
Illiterate 28.5 15.9 -44 42.5 29.9 -30 16.4 20.6 +26
Semi-
Illiterate
Elementary 41.5 31.6 -24 37.2 38.8 +4 50.0 36.6 -27
School
Junior High 19.8 32.8 +66 14.5 22.6 +56 23.9 31.6 +32
Senior High 9.3 13.1 +41 5.3 5.9 +11 8.9 8.4 -6
Above Senior 1.0 6.5 +577 0.4 2.8 +350 0.8 2.9 +260
High
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Educational Levels above High School:
1982 Census
Attending
College 0.31 - 0.12 - 0.22 -
Graduation
from
College 0.65 - 0.32 — 0.59 —
1990 Census
Technical — 3.4 — 1.6 — 1.6
School
Junior — 2.2 — 0.7 — 0.9
College
University -- 0.9 - 0.5 - 0.4
Source: The 1982 Chinese Census and the one percent sample of the 1990 Chinese Census92
Although the statistics show that the ratio of illiterate/semi-illiterate Mongols has decreased since 
1978, the statistics do not distinguish the language to which the literacy refers. Sinicization of 
Mongols is not reflected by the above statistics. Looking at the Illiteracy level with reference to the 
Mongolian language alone, the illiteracy rate among the youth of Mongolian peasants and herdsmen 
has increased drastically, several times more than that before 194793.
92Jirimutu, Ibid.
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Not all the changes in IMAR national education and culture during the reform period may be said to 
be good and some have caused worries among Mongols. While statistics show a general improvement 
in education among Mongols during the reform period, distinctions should be drawn between the 
urban and rural areas, between higher education and primary education, and between education in 
Chinese and education in the Mongolian language.
In the pasturelands, where the Mongolian population is more concentrated, the basis of primary 
education is weaker and the conditions poorer. Even according to official figures, in pastoral areas, 
the admission of children in primary school only accounts for 87% of those eligible, lower by 7% than 
the IMAR’s average level. The annual drop out rate is 9%, higher by 5% than the IMAR average level. 
In some remote areas, the admission rate is lower than 50% of all school-age children. IMAR 
national primary schools have 300,000 students, but the number of boarding students is less than
50.000 because of the shortage of student accommodation.94
Special professional and technical education serving the pastureland has also weakened. There are 
only 6,000 non-Chinese students studying in agriculture and animal farming specialized schools, the 
number is far from enough to meet the needs in the pastoral areas. There is only 1 vet for every
11.000 livestock; only 1 technical administrator for 20,000 livestock, and even fewer administrators 
for livestock production and management. According to some experts, the educational level of 
teaching staff is lower and the school management is poorer in those national schools than it was in the 
period before 1957. 95
There is a severe shortage of technical personnel even at elementary level on pastureland, for example, 
nobody can repair the more technical items such as wind-powered generators, recorders, tractors and 
vans. The 500,000 Mongols in the pastureland with primary level schooling in the Mongolian 
language have no chance to receive technical training in Mongolian. But there are much more training 
facilities in Chinese for Chinese speaking peasants96 in cities and agricultural areas.
From a Mongolian point of view, the improvements in education explain how Mongols being 
increasingly assimilated into Chinese society.
4.2. Negligence of Government Policy
During this period there have been many instances of neglect and many setbacks in government 
administration of the national language issue. In 1983 when the League & City Organization Reform 
was carried out by the IMAR government to streamline government administration, most Mongolian 
Language Commissions at league and banner level were either cut or merged with other governmental
93Interview with Mr. Arya, researcher at IMAR Nationality Language Committee, July 1993, Huhhot.
94 Shenamjil, “Mongolian Language and Modernization”, IMAR Nationality Study Society First 
Annual Conference Paper Collection (1981) p. 13.
95Shenamjil, Ibid.
96Interview with Mr. Enkhe, Cadre in Nationality Committee of Ike Zuu League, Aug. 1993.
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departments. IMAR’s Mongolian Language Commission has become seriously understaffed97. 
Compared with other government departments, Mongolian language commissions are more like homes 
for destitute old people. The general practice concerning the Mongolian language commissions is that 
when a cadre becomes senile or is proved to be incapable of other work, he is most probably assigned 
to a Mongolian language commission. On the other hand, such Mongolian cadres who may have a 
genuine interest in national language work are accorded no such privilege. Even in the work of 
Mongolian language, the cadres are promoted mainly by the merit of their command of the Chinese 
language rather than of Mongolian.
The IMAR Mongolian Language commission’s work was for a long time directed by Wang Duo who 
had been a party secretary of IMAR before he was retired to the IMAR Mongolian Language 
Commission. Ironically, Wang Duo was an ethnic Chinese who had graduated from the former 
Manchuria University where he studied frontier affairs and administration in the 1930s. As seen by 
some Mongols, the appointment shows a centric consistency between the CPC’s national policies and 
that o f the colonialist policies of the previous warlord Chinese regime98.
After 1979, the IMAR government did some work to restore dual language(Mongolian and Chinese) 
in the government and party administrations of all levels. But the practice lags far behind the policy.
In 1982, the IMAR government issued “The IMAR Administrations Translation Work Regulations” 
and “The Notice on Gate Signs in Both Mongolian and Chinese Languages”. The purpose of the first 
document is to implement dual language system in the party organs, government and people’s 
congress and to urge those organs to issue documents in both the Mongolian and Chinese languages. 
The latter document was aimed at urging all governmental and non-governmental organs, businesses 
and institutions to use Mongolian language on their gate signs, and official seals abreast with Chinese 
language. The document also covered the use of Mongolian on railway timetables, trade marks, 
advertisements, ID cards, road signs, and tables of ticket prices, etc. 99 
The IMAR government set up some goals in national education in its 8th 5-year plan: By 1995,
IMAR’s education quality and management level should have achieved an advanced level among all 
non-Chinese regions; IMAR was going to extend national primary education; admission rates in 
middle school and high school were set to reach 30% and 50% respectively; and “bilingual” and 
“trilingual” education would be encouraged. All these vague promises, however lacked the support of 
concrete plans and policies, and as a result they could not give Mongols any sense of relief.
The newly resumed Mongolian translation work that was begun again in 1979 in the IMAR 
government and party administrations was cancelled after 1983. The documents being issued have 
ceased to be translated into die Mongolian language and Mongolian interpreting was no longer being 
provided during work. The procuratorial organs and courts were no longer being provided with
97Interview with Mr. Arya
98Interview with Mr. Arya. Also see Wang Duo, My Fifty Years in Inner Mongolia (Inner Mongolian 
People's Press, 1994) p.4.
99 Shenamjil, “To Imporve Mongolian Language Work Under the Guidance of the Party’s Basic Line”,
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Mongolian interpreters. The situation was highlighted by the case of Ulanshovoo. Ulanshovoo, a 
Mongolian researcher in the Inner Mongolian University, was jailed for his nationalist belief in 
1 9 9 1 1 0 0  After two years in prison without a trial, he finally got a chance to receive a trial in 1993. 
Because he insisted on the right to have the trial conducted in the Mongolian language, a right 
prescribed by the state constitution and the laws of national autonomy, the planned trial was postponed 
again and again. This was because in the whole IMAR judiciary system it was very hard to find 
enough people who were both legally qualified and proficient in the Mongolian language to function 
in the court101.
Another example to show the difficulty of implement the existing policy is the name spelling on 
passports. It is very difficult for non-Chinese people to spell their names in their own language. The 
usual practice is that their names have to be spelt in hanyu pin yin, Latinized Chinese, i.e. the non- 
Chinese name is to be transliterated into Chinese first and then spelt in han yu pin yin. By this system, 
a name such as Genghis Khan and Mohammod could be spelt as Cheng Ji Si Han and Mo Ha Mo De, 
well known place names such as Inner Mongolia and Ordos could be written as Nei Menggu and Er 
Duo Si. The Chinese authorities must have noticed the frustrations expressed by non-Chinese about 
this practice. As early as 1990, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a proposed regulation confirming 
that non-Chinese passport applicants have the right to have their name spelt according to the 
pronunciations in their own language. In 1992 the document was issued as a formal directive, 
Document No. 12. But the situation has not improved much. Due to ignorance or prejudice, Chinese 
personnel handling passport applications seldom spell non-Chinese names according to their own 
languages. They only do it as favors for graft and guangxi(connections)102.
4.3. Bilingual Policy
The decline of the use of the Mongolian language is caused by the socio-economic environment in the 
reforms as well as by government policy. The bilingual policy is the most prominent among the 
numerous language and cultural policies carried out by the IMAR government and the policy to be 
“bilingual in both Mongolian and Chinese” is now being reiterated by the IMAR government. 
Originally the policy of being bilingual in both Mongolian and Chinese was intended to emphasize the 
importance of the Mongolian language and it was designed mainly for Chinese cadres to learn 
Mongolian in Inner Mongolia and to ensure the equal treatment of the two languages103. Now the 
slogan has been used by the government to encourage Mongols to learn Chinese. The same slogan has
1990, IMAR Nationality Study Society First Annual Conference Paper Collection (1981) p. 102.
100 Ulanshovoo was accused of providing an internal document of the IMAR party to Andrew Higgins, 
a journalist working for Independent, a British broadsheet newpaper. The charge has never been 
sustantiated with solid evidence and denied by Ulanshovoo. See Asian Watch, 1991.
101Interview, Mr. Baoin, Inner Mongolian Intermediary People's Court, July 1993.
102Interview with Mr. Anwar, an Uighur official in State Council, Dec. 1994 in London.
103Chulunbagan, "Nationality Language's Equal Status",_IMAR Nationality Study Society First Annual 
Conference Paper Collection (1981) p.130.
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been inteipreted differently by Mongols and Chinese.104 Usually Mongolian cadres emphasized it 
differently from Chinese. To Chinese, the bilingual policy is simply an excuse so that Mongols who 
can only speak Mongolian should learn Chinese. To Mongolian cadres, the bilingual policy means not 
only that those Mongolian cadres who cannot speak Chinese should learn Chinese, but also that 
Chinese cadres should learn to speak Mongolian.
In a situation in which Mongols have become greatly outnumbered many times by the Chinese in Inner 
Mongolia, the result of this bilingual policy is simply that Mongols learn Chinese, but never the 
opposite. The Mongol people have learnt a lesson from reality that the “bilingual Mongolian and 
Chinese” policy is disastrous for the Mongolian language. Mongols find it hard to believe that all 
nationalities are equal when in Inner Mongolia, Chinese do not need to learn Mongolian, but 
Mongolians have to learn Chinese.
The arguments made by Mongolian intellectuals against the bilingual policy are both theoretical and 
factual. For Mongols, the safe way to made the point without being accused of being a nationalist or a 
splittist is to make their point in the Marxist and Leninist tradition105. Another way to provide counter 
argument against the bilingual policy is to quote Chinese leaders in the early period of the PRC when 
the early policy prevailed. Mongols’ harking back to Marxist argument, rather than a matter of 
ideological faith, can be regarded as a reaction to the popular thinking among Chinese intellectuals 
which negates Marxism and favors Chinese nationalism106.
Some Mongolian scholars trace the root of the bilingual policy to the theory or slogan once overtly 
advocated by the Chinese, i.e., “Unifying the languages of the motherland”. The assumption 
underlying the slogan is that the proletariat class needs a common proletariat language and the 
socialist state needs a common socialist language. Another assumption of “unifying the languages of 
the motherland” is that the language of each nationality or ethnic group is categorized into advanced 
or backward levels of different degrees according to the perceived socio-economic development stage 
of the nationality or ethnic group in question. The presumption that the Chinese language is the most 
advanced among all the different ethnic languages in China also echoes the old Chinese-centric view 
held by the pre-Communist Chinese regimes before 1949.
104Shenamjila, "Mongolian Language and IMAR's Modernization", IMAR Nationality Study Society 
First Annual Conference Paper Collection (1981) p. 120.
105Lenin, “Those who refuse to recognize the nationality and nationality language equality, those who 
do not fight against nationality oppression and inequality, are not Marxists, not even democrat.”,
Lenin, “Critical Opinions on Nationality Issues”, Complete Works by Lenin, Chinese version, Vol.20, 
p .l 1, Shenamjil, ’’Marxist Theory on Nationality Language and the Party’s Nationality Language 
Policy”, Language and Intellectual Development (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1990) p.58.
106 The so-called neo-conservatism among Chinese intellectual in 1990s emphasizes on state power 
and capacity rather than ideological principle, traditional confucian values rather than communism.
The representative figures of the neo-conservatism are Xiao Gongqin, Wang Huning, He Xin, etc. See 
The Department of Ideology and Theory, China Youth Daily(Zhgonguo Qingnian Bao), “China’s 
Realist Response and Choice of Strategy after the Drastic Change of the Soviet Union”(Sulian Jubian 
Zhihou Zhongguo de Xianshi Yingdui yu Zhanlue Xuanze), internal publication, September 1991. 
Xiao Gongqin, “Nationalism and the Ideology of China in Transition”(Minzu Zhuyi yu Zhongguo 
Zhuanxing Shiqi de Yishi Xingtai), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management) No.4, 1994.
They argue that a language can only be belong to a nation or cultural group rather than the proletariat 
class or a political group. The Common language is not a prerequisite for the proletariat class and 
there is no way for the Chinese to prove that Chinese is a proletariat language. There can be an 
unitary language for a nation, but there should not be a unitary language for a multi-ethnic state like 
China. They argue that the Chinese centered view on language is both anti-Marxist and anti-ethnic 
minority.
A favorite quote of Chinese leaders on national languages by those arguing for language equality is 
what Zhou Enlai once said at a Qingdao conference, ”In national autonomous regions, the major 
nationality’s language should be the first language.”107 The Organization Articles of the IMAR 
People’s Congress and Government of All Levels (Article 20 and 48) read that “IMAR people’s 
congress at all levels should conduct conferences in common Mongolian and Chinese languages, and 
necessary translators should be ready for other nationalities. ””A11 committees and administrative 
levels of government should carry out their office both in Mongolian and Chinese language”108. 
Argument Against Bilingual Teaching
The factual evidence used by Mongols to argue against the bilingual policy is that as applied to 
education the Mongolian students’ performance at secondary schools has been affected and their 
chance of going into higher education reduced.
During the Cultural Revolution, Mongolian children in some regions who did not know Chinese were 
nevertheless compelled to listen to lectures in Chinese as soon as they entered primary schools. And it 
was precisely in those regions, that in 1977 when the state restored the national college entrance 
examinations, examinees had comparatively lower marks and the college enrollment ratio was much 
lower than that of other regions. Conversely, in those areas where the teaching in Mongolian language 
was restored earlier, the college enrollment ratio was higher for Mongolian students. One example is 
Kulun Banner in Jerim League, where among the 30 students in a specialized school, only 1 or 2 
student were from the classes taught in Chinese.
Another example is in a secondary school, among the 43 students in a class, 38 entered college simply 
because teaching in Mongolian had been restored comparatively earlier. By contrast, it should be 
noted that for Mongolian students taught in Chinese in the pasture land or countryside, the entrance 
rate was drastically lower. One disastrous result of the “direct transformation into Chinese language” 
policy was that in the countryside and especially in the pastureland, the illiteracy rate amongst youth 
increased drastically. In some places the illiteracy rate amongst youths between the ages of 15 to 30, 
accounted for 50-60% of the local Mongolian population. In Shinebargud Banner of Hulun Beir 
League, in some sumu(Mongolian for the administrative unite below the banner/county level) it is
107Zhou Enlai, "Several Issues On Our Country’s Nationality Policy", Speech on Qingdao Nationality 
Work Conference, 4 August 1957, Selected Works On Nationality Policy, Xinjiang People’s Press, 
1985. p. 97.
108Chulunbagan (op. cit.)
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difficult to find an accountant who can read a Mongolian newspaper109.
4.4. Worsened Social Economic Environment for the Mongolian Language
Although the right to use and learn the Mongolian language is written in the state Constitution, it 
cannot be guaranteed in practice. The practice and the implementation of policies has lagged far 
behind what is prescribed in government policies and laws, which reflects the harsh socio-economic 
realities facing the Mongolian language, education and culture. Everywhere in the IMAR Chinese 
people account for the majority of the population, even in Shilingol League, which is normally 
believed the best preserved Mongolian land, the government documents are issued in Chinese without 
the parallel in Mongolian. This negligence happens at all levels of the Inner Mongolian government: 
Directives issued by the IMAR government are in Chinese to all levels, leagues, banners and further 
below. In most places, there are no translators and interpreters. As to those documents issued to the 
levels lower than banners, few of them have Mongolian parallels. It is also a serious problem in 
Judiciary departments. The Mongolian right to sue and defend in their own language has never gone 
beyond something written on paper.
In a largely Chinese society in which Mongols constitute a small minority in the IMAR, command of 
the Chinese language is a prerequisite for Mongols to make a living outside their traditional profession 
- animal husbandry. Because there are no interpreters and there is a shortage of bilingual cadres in 
most of the unites in cities, Inner Mongolian metropolises are as inconvenient as foreign cities to 
Mongols from pasture lands110. Mongols from the countryside who move to and settle in cities and 
towns have to speak Chinese. The depth of the problem may be seen from what actually happened in 
Hohhot, the capital o f the IMAR, when Mongolian playwrights wrote plays in the Mongolian language 
and the Mongolian plays were finally put on after many rehearsals by Mongolian actors and actresses. 
The plays were closed down after only one or two shows, as the plays could no longer attract 
audiences because few people could understand their language.
It has become more difficult for the next generation to pick up the Mongolian language and more 
difficult for them to cope with the two languages. It is extremely difficult for them to be proficient in 
both Mongolian and Chinese. The situation has been made worse by the fact that Chinese is an 
extremely difficult language to command. Even for those Chinese who spend half of their life learning 
their language, it is hard for them to say that they have truly mastered the Chinese language. So it is 
easy to imagine the difficulties with which Mongols have to cope.
In Inner Mongolia, most of those Mongolian professionals, who have a good command of the 
Mongolian language and one or more foreign languages like Russian and Japanese, are very 
competent in their profession. But they have to spend a great deal of extra time learning the Chinese 
language. They are usually treated unfairly because of their relatively lower command of the Chinese
109Shenamjil (op. cit.)
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language111. Those professionals with a lower command of Chinese are often discriminated against in 
their career development, for example, the chance of further study and on-job training. The negative 
effect of the bilingual practice for Mongolian children is that the absence of a linguistic environment 
of their own made it extremely difficult for them to grasp their own language whilst struggling to learn 
difficult Chinese. Therefore in becoming bilingual they usually end up having grasped neither 
language well enough. In the middle schools in Hohhot, Mongolian students who learn Chinese and 
Mongolian at the same time are usually noted for their poor marks.
The decline of Mongolian literacy together with other factors in the reform period, such as profit 
orientation in Mongolian press houses, has led to the drastic decline in Mongolian publications. In 
terms of content, Mongolian publications have become more and more like simple copies of Chinese 
publications.
In the past there was a government subsidy for national publications in the Mongolian language. 
Although formally the policy has remained in the reform period, in practice the subsidy has ceased.
The demand for publications in Mongolian is small and therefore they are not as profitable as Chinese 
publications.
On the grassland, Mongolian herdsmen do not have access to the newspapers, radio and television 
broadcasts they like to read, listen to and watch even though there are Mongolian-language 
newspapers, radio broadcasting and lately television programs in Mongolian language which started 
since May 1st, 1987. The truth is that Mongolian language media is mostly translated versions of 
Chinese originals. Moreover there are no technical books of a popular kind available on the grasslands.
4.5. Attitudinal causes
The causes of the decline of the Mongolian language are both attitudinal and socioeconomic. At first, 
the painful memory of the long-lasting leftist policies and practices by the Chinese government have 
made many Mongols pessimistic about the status of the Mongolian language. Secondly, the current 
socioeconomic situation in many ways has reinforced their pessimism on the matter of a national 
language.
As a result, there is a wide-spread belief among Chinese as well as among Mongols that Mongolian is 
a useless and dying language. The negative perception of the prospects for the Mongolian language is 
supported by the following facts. The first is that in the IMAR, the Mongolian language environment 
has been shrinking all the time. The second is that higher education in the Mongolian language is both 
limited in its scope and future. The third reason is that because Mongols are terrorized by their past 
sufferings, they are afraid of being accused of being Mongolian nationalists and being prosecuted 
again in the next political movement, therefore they more often than not take the same stance as the
110Interview in Davhart Sumo, Shilingol, Sept. 1993 
1 "interviews, summer of 1993, Inner Mongolian Medical College.
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Chinese, believing that the sooner the Mongolian language is assimilated, the better because it is going 
to be assimilated anyway.
4.6. Mixture of Optimism and Pessimism
Not all Mongols are pessimistic about the unfavorable socio-economic environment for the Mongolian 
language. Many Mongolian scholars argue that the demand for equal status of the Mongolian language 
in the IMAR is not as unrealistic and unfeasible as some say. It is only a misconception that the 
sinicization of the Mongolian people is so severe that the Mongolian language is no longer useful.
The fact is, although there has been a drastic decline in the number of Mongolian speakers after 1957, 
especially during the Cultural Revolution, there nevertheless still remains an overwhelming majority 
who speak Mongolian among the Mongols. There are 2.3 million Mongolian speakers among the 2.74 
million Mongols in Inner Mongolia, 83.9% of all Mongols can still speak Mongolian112.
According to optimistic statistics given by Shenamjila, amongst 2.8 million Mongols who are located 
in the IMAR, Xinjiang autonomous region, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, jilin, Qinghai and Gansu 
provinces, 2.5 million, the majority, are in the IMAR, Xinjiang autonomous region and Liaoning 
province. Mongols who live among or with Chinese(share a village) only account for 15% of the 
whole population, 85% of Mongols live together in their own villages and hots(Mongolian for 
“residential areas” in grassland). A living environment is a prerequisite for the survival of the 
Mongolian language. Among 2.02 million Mongols in the IMAR, only 150,000 Mongols lost their 
mother tongue. Those Mongols who only speak Chinese account for only 7.4% of all Mongols and 
they mainly inhabit Huhhot and Baotou and the surrounding suburban areas, Dalat Banner and Zungar 
Banner of Ikh Zuu League, Chahar Front-right Banner and Zhuozi County of Ulaan Chab League, 
Tuquan county of Xingan League, Auhan Banner, Harqin Banner and Chifeng Municiple o f Jo-oda 
League. 92% of Mongols live in the vast expanses of countryside and pasture land, where Mongolian 
is the only language of communication113.
But such optimism may be weakened by the character of the Mongolian speaking populations as they 
are mostly rural with the occupations of farming and animal husbandry. Generally speaking, the 
population in the rural areas has a much lower level of education and higher illiteracy rates. Urban 
Mongolian speakers who use Mongolian in their professions are mostly language workers in 
government organs, academic institutions, cultural and media organizations. Mongolian language 
newspapers, radio and TV broadcasting are in fact merely functioning as translating machines, 80% 
of their Mongolian employees’ work has nothing to do with Mongolian language research or study and
112 Shenamjil,’’Marxist Theory on Nationality Language and the Party’s Nationality Language Policy”, 
Language and Intellectual Development (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1990) p.45.
113Shenamjila, Ibid.
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continues to be more weighted towards general administrative work. Therefore Mongolian language 
culture is more rural than urban with a lower level of education. On the other hand there is the 
scholastic study o f the Mongolian language and culture in city academic institutions which has little to 
do with Mongols’ daily life.
The gap between the rudimentary and higher education in Mongolian language and the high rates of 
illiteracy in Mongolian language have reduced the readership for Mongolian publications and there is 
a severe shortage of writers from the younger generation. There is even a shortage o f Mongolian 
writers including those who write in Chinese. Many of the so-called literaiy achievements in 
Mongolian literature are actually the works written in Chinese language on Mongol-related subjects or 
works in Mongolian that in content reflect Chinese rather than Mongolian concerns.114 Many of those 
Mongolian literary achievements mentioned by the Chinese authorities were mostly literary criticism 
and studies rather than literary works.
The gap between rudimentary education and higher education of research, and the problems resulting 
from that gap illustrates a potentially fatal problem that exists in Mongolian national education, i.e., a 
lack of independence and too much incoherence. There is an urgent need to set up a Mongolian 
designed and run system of education from pre-school level to higher education.115 In national 
education, common education is the foundation of all other areas of education. Mongols argue that 
native/Mongolian language teaching should be guaranteed in Mongolian primary Schools. In colleges 
and universities, specialized schools, Mongolian should be set up as majors and minors available for 
all students. Only once the Mongols have grasped the basics of their own language, should a second 
language be possible. And for Mongols, the second language should not necessarily be Chinese, it 
could be English, Japanese, Russian, German or French, since the trilingual emphasis, which requires 
Mongolian students to learn Chinese and one foreign language(English, Russian or Japanese) besides 
the Mongolian language, is more impractical than the bilingual policy.
Out of nationalist sentiments, many Mongols expressed the view that if they have to lose their national 
language, they would lose it for a foreign language rather than the Chinese language. Some quote 
Deng Xiaoping to jusfify the view. Deng Xiaoping once said that China was lagging behind the most 
developed counfries of the world by almost three centuries or at least one century.116 And it is a 
known fact that the Mongols’ development lagged behind the Han Chinese considerably, therefore it is 
justifiable according to Deng’s logic that Mongols should do everything to catch up. Naturally to learn 
the language of more advanced foreign countries such as English and Japanese instead of Chinese
114Interview with Mr. Ge San-tong, young Mongolian poet in Shilingol League, Sept. 1993.
115Interview with Mr. Chibaabar, senior lecturer in Inner Mongolian Normal University and Mr. Tavan 
delev, former lecturer in Inner Mongolian University, Mongolian student leader in 1981 nationalist 
demonstrations, now an individual entrepreneur. Also see Shenamujila, Ibid.
116Deng Xiaoping, "Current Situations and Our Tasks", Selected Works O f DengXiao-ping (People’s 
Press, 1983) pp.203-237.
197
would be a more direct way for Mongols to be exposed to modernization and to catch up more quickly. 
Accordingly it is not necessarily a splittist view to argue that foreign languages should be treated 
equally, if not more importantly, than Chinese. The CPC has described itself as great, glorious and 
always correct. Many Mongols argue that the CPC should prove its “correctness” by allowing more 
space for Mongolian development, which might then allow hope for mending the unity between the 
Chinese and the Mongols117.
As private schools appear in Chinese areas, Mongolian intellectuals and entrepreneurs who are 
concerned about national education have begun to combine their forces to set up their own schools.
The motivation for setting up those private schools is to find alternatives to a modernized education 
other than in the Chinese language. In those schools, it is intended that, Mongolian and English 
teaching should come before Chinese118. Many Mongolian entrepreneurs have showed enthusiasm for 
Mongolian education by giving financial assistance. The Mongolian donors often demand to have a 
say in school or academic institution’s policies. Accordingly, some state-run Mongolian middle 
schools at banner level have begun to receive financial support from Mongolian entrepreneurs119. At a 
higher level, Mongolian studies in the Inner Mongolian University have also been financially 
supported by Mongolian entrepreneurs.
Conclusion
The above account as related through both statistics and some anecdotal evidence has revealed that the 
situation in Inner Mongolia related to Mongolian education, language and culture is indeed 
complicated. Both sets of evidence could be interpreted in different and even opposite ways. 
Nevertheless the Mongolian-speaking environment is shrinking, and education in the Mongolian 
language is unbalanced as there is a huge gap/vacuum between the pastureland culture and the urban 
academic culture.
As seen from a wider perspective, the Mongolian language is becoming little more than an affiliation 
or even a decoration of the Chinese language. Neither the efforts of individuals nor that of even most 
of the Mongolian speaking population seem able to change the tide.
What accounts most for the Mongolian language’s continuing decline is the socio-economic reality of 
the whole o f Inner Mongolia rather than direct government policy. Mongolian language and cultural 
development formerly suffered from Chinese leftist policies, but now they suffer even more deeply 
from the effect of market forces.
Due to their lower level of literacy and the limited availability of training and publications, it has
117Interview with Chibaatar, Aug. 1993 Huhhot
118Interview with Mr. Chebaatar in Aug. 1993, who resigned his lectureship and set up a Mongolian 
boarding school.
119Interview with Mr. Tavan Delev, Aug. 1993 in Ike Zuu League.
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become more difficult for Mongols to use some basic technologies to process their animal products 
and to improve their management. Therefore national education can directly influence their incomes 
and the development of the economy. Under such circumstances, most Mongols have little choice but 
to learn Chinese.
The shrinking language environment for Mongolian also reinforces the cultural division of labor 
between Mongols and Chinese. It further facilitates the sinicization of the Mongols by creating the 
impression that Mongolian-ness is equal to backwardness.
Zhou Enlai once said: ”in the national autonomous regions, the language of the major/main nationality 
should be the first language”.(Qing Dao Conference, August 4, 1957)120 The main nationality in the 
national autonomous regions is an unspecified term, especially in Inner Mongolia. It is obviously 
unrealistic to assume that Mongols who account for only 14% of the whole population or even less, 
can be the major nationality. Nor can it be assumed that Mongolian is the first language.
Although the Chinese have always been the major nationality and Chinese has been the major 
language in Inner Mongolia, because of nationality policies or propaganda, that has never been 
publicly acknowledged because of the regime’s declared policy and propaganda on nationality affairs. 
The IMAR has long become an misnomer as far as the IMAR population is concerned. Perhaps it is 
only a matter of time before some clarification will be made by the Chinese that the Chinese instead of 
the Mongols constitute the major nationality in the IMAR and that Chinese instead of Mongolian is 
the major language in the IMAR. The Chinese could always use the argument of the democratic 
principle against the so-called national autonomy in Inner Mongolia though China would unlikely do it 
before unification with Taiwan.
5. Intellectual Content of Mongolian Nationalism
For Mongols, the negative changes in socio-economic, political, ideological and cultural aspects 
during the reforming decades is only a small part of a much longer historical decline of the Mongols’ 
territorially-based identity. The rise of Mongolian nationalism during the reform period must be 
understood as more of an intellectual phenomenon rather than an openly avowed political program or 
a wide spread political movement. To be sure there are more and more instances of openly expressed 
dissatisfaction such as student demonstrations against Chinese migration and the highhanded treatment 
of Mongolian intellectuals. Moreover there is even a nationalist party in existence outside the PRC 
with the independence of Inner Mongolia as its ultimate goal. Nevertheless the articulation of 
Mongolian national sentiments within the IMAR is sharply limited and is confined to a few 
intellectual concerns as outlined above.
120 Shenamjil, ’’Marxist Theory on Nationality Language and the Party’s Nationality Language Policy”, 
Language and Intellectual Development (Inner Mongolian People’s Press, 1990) p.45.
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Mongols in the reform period face a dilemma, i.e., to be modernized and become assimilated, or to 
remain Mongolian and become marginalized. As the reform continues and the national economy 
becomes more marketwise, the economy will bring greater pressure on the capacity of ethnic cultures 
to maintain that diversity.121 Normally, according to the economic theories of nationalism, the 
pressures of development will reduce cultural diversity and create a new cultural identity. However, 
Mongolian nationalist sentiments have risen during the period partly as a reaction to the increased 
pressure to conform to Chinese culture. Therefore Mongolian nationalism is a case outside the model 
of economic integration nationalism, a materialist explanation is not enough to account for the rise of 
Mongolian nationalism.
This chapter has explored the inter-linking between economic and cultural environments and the 
development of a Mongolian self-identity including the perception of national autonomy. Firstly it 
outlined the perception of the interrelation between national economy and national culture. The 
emergence of a modem cultural identity of the Mongolian people depends on the development of their 
own economic center and metropolis. In theory a Mongolian cultural development would facilitate 
economic development and the modernization of a Mongolian nationality. Secondly the chapter 
sketched out the links between national culture, identity and autonomous rights, i.e. territorially-based 
rights. Territorial integrity is a condition for national culture and identity, but the Mongolian territorial 
integrity was sabotaged by the Chinese, be it intentional or not, by economic means. The perception of 
the situation is bound up with different aspects of economic, cultural and political factors and the 
interrelations between them. To change the unfavorable economic and cultural situations would 
require political power. But the political representation of Mongols in government is too small to be of 
substantial help. Once Mongols should reach such an understanding that the guarantee of the territorial, 
economic and cultural rights boils down to a matter of political power(or lack of power), there is an 
intellectual consensus/basis for nationalism.
Nationalism, according to the theory that emphasizes the significance of economics argues that 
industrialization or economic development demands a political shell to protect the community based 
economy and in turn the political shell, the state, in order to strengthen the common culture and 
provide a standard education for the sake of economic development of the community122. The case in 
Inner Mongolia makes the same point in a negative sense: I.e., the lack of economic development, lack 
of common culture and standardized education highlights the lack/absence of protection from a 
political shell.
121 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Basil Blackwell, 1983)
122 Ibid.
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5.1. National Economy And Modern National Identity
Historical Lesson: The Lack Of Cities As Economic Centres
Nomadism has been the sole economic system for Mongols throughout history and it is the main 
reason for the absence of an economic center or a metropolis in Mongolia. For most of the time that 
has worked to the disadvantage for the political integration of Mongolia. The above is a century old 
argument which has been used by many modem Mongolian leaders in history, such as Prince Gung123, 
Te Wang and even Ulanhu.
The independent State of Mongolia since 1911 has developed a metropolitan Mongolian culture which 
is in sharp contrast to Inner Mongolian cities where the culture can only be said Chinese.
In the present period of China’s economic reform, the concern for the desire of a Mongolian economic 
center and metropolis has been voiced again by Mongolian intellectuals. Clearly the establishment of a 
Mongolian city that could serve as that kind of economic center would require ethnic segregation and 
that would stand in sharp contradiction with the notion of national unity and a single Chinese nation as 
advanced by China’s leaders and intellectuals..
The lesson that Mongolian people may now draw from their history is that, even at their peak, the 
power and prosperity of Mongolian ancient states lacked a solid foundation for the establishment of a 
stable community. The absence of a solid community in itself is a characteristic of the Mongolian 
nation, but it is also its weak point.124
The problem, the absence of the nation’s own economic center and own metropolis, has always been 
there and it has become even worse. The reason, from an economic perspective, is the practice of a 
single economic form that of Mongolian nomadism. The Mongolian traditional nomadic economy 
demanded little division of labor and forms of internal economic co-operation. Historically, the self- 
sufficient herdsmen economy without specialization of labor needed no trade and commerce amongst 
Mongols, and therefore it did not generate an economic demand for a national market or for an 
economic center, therefore in the end no national metropolis has been set up.
123The Mongolian leader in the earliest modernization efforts in the modem Mongolian history, see 
Jagchid Sechin, Essays in Mongolian Studies, Vol 3 in Mongolian Series of the David M. Kennedy 
Center for International Studies, (Birghim Young University, Provo, Utah., 1988) pp.207-234.
124Chindamni, "On Mongolian People's Modernization", IMAR Nationality Study Society First Annual 
Conference Paper Collection (1981) p. 87.
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It seems that Genghis Khan and Owgodai Khan had in fact realized the importance o f the metropolis, 
and there were at their times the cities like Khara Khorum, the so-called Upper Capital, and the 
Middle Capital. However those cities were built out of the ruler’s will and to serve strategic concerns 
rather than due to the needs of Mongolian economic activities. The Chinese Ming Dynasty that 
followed the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, in a negative way, proved the importance of a metropolis for 
Mongolian people. The Ming’s northern military expeditions that were launched by the Ming 
Emperor Hongwu deep into Mongolia constituted several strategically-fatal attacks that destroyed the 
few existing Mongolian cities to such a degree that the ruined cities could never be rebuilt. That has 
proved to be disastrous for the Mongolian nation.
The single economic mode of Mongols made it necessary for them to maintain trade links with the 
Chinese since the nomadic economy has to rely on agriculture and the handicraft industry. When 
Chinese dynasties placed trade embargoes on Mongols, the trade itself served as a cause for Mongols 
to take military action against China. An example is that of Altan Khan (1507 - 1582), who tried to 
mend relations with the Ming Dynasty for the sake of trade, but he was refused repeatedly. The Ming 
dynasty even put a price on his head and killed his envoys twice. As a result of these rebuffs, he had 
to resort to war, but even when he surrounded Beijing, he still decided to make peace with the Ming. 
The Chinese Ming dynasty engaged in trade with Mongols only as a result of force.125
The historic of lack of an economic center is a counter-example of the economic thesis on nationalism 
as it shows that the lack of a common economic basis is directly related to the absence of an economic 
motivation for political unification in Mongolian history.
Lack of Development in Education
Because of the age old antagonism between Mongolian herdsmen and settled Chinese farmers, 
Mongolian people traditionally had a very strong bias against agriculture and handicraft which 
continues to exist even to this day. The attitude is reflected in the vocabulary of Mongolian herdsmen. 
In the 4 banners of Hulun Beir League and northern Shilinggol League, “peasant”, “layman” and 
“merchant” in herdsmen’s vocabulary still have a derogatory meaning. In the Mongolian State, the 
derogatory meanings of certain words is even more directly related to the Chinese.126 The traditional 
bias against trade and commerce is a psychological barrier to the commercialization of the pastureland 
economy.
125 Here again Mongols and Chinese have different view on the same historical events._According to 
Chinese historians, the wars launched by Altan Khan against Ming was unjustified because of looting 
and Altan Khan was simply an invader. See, Bai Shouli, History o f  Nationality Relations in Northern 
China (Chinese Academy of Social Science Press, 1987)
126 the meaning of Mongolian word for “merchant”...
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The nature of the pastureland economy tends to discourage people to gather together and to form a 
metropolis. In the Shilinggol League, where the Mongolian traditional economic form is best 
preserved, the places with a relatively larger concentration of population such as League, Banners and 
even sumu, tend to be made up of Chinese immigrants who constitute 80% of the population.127 As 
the population of Chinese increases in particular places, Mongolian herdsmen tend to move away 
taking their livestock with them. That is determined by the character of the nomadic economy. For 
the same reason, two Mongolian families both herding sheep cannot live together, they should locate 
separately at least more than 10 miles away from each other, lest the flocks of the 2 families should be 
easily mixed together, which would be a disaster.
Education is a much more difficult task in the sparsely populated pastureland than in cities and towns. 
There were once so-called “Horseback Schools” which were advocated by the Chinese government in 
the 1970s. The “horseback school is one in which teachers rode horses over long distances from one 
family to another in the sparsely-populated grassland to teach. Usually a family was visited by a 
teacher once a week. However, when the teacher came the following week, the pupils had already 
forgotten what they had learnt in the previous week. It showed that effective national education could 
not be properly developed on the grassland. Now things have become even worse for Mongolian 
children’s education in remote areas because even the teachers on horseback are no longer there. 
Mongolian herdsmen face the dilemma: to pay much more for their children to be sent to far away 
boarding schools to receive Chinese style education or to keep them at home to be uneducated 
Mongols128. In the Mongolian Republic, there are enough boarding schools in cities and townships to 
accommodate the children from the pastureland.
The difficulties concerning Mongolian education relates to the particular economic mode which in 
return limits Mongols’ participation in the modem economy. Some Mongols have said that the state 
has only paid attention as to how to exploit the natural resources of the IMAR. It has not shown any 
concern about how to develop Mongolian human resources and how to improve the Mongolian 
people’s level of science and technologies129.
127 Interview with Mr. Honchin in Davhart Sumo near Shilin Hot, Sept. 1993
128Interview with Mr. Honchin, Sept. 1993, Davhart Sumo.
129 The point was told in the interviews with some Mongolian intellectuals and cadres in Inner 
Mongolia.
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The relationship between the Mongolian nationality’s education and its economic development is 
obvious: when a people’s education and culture are highly developed, they could more easily promote 
the utilization of natural resources and the development of their economic potential to the fullest 
extent. According to many Mongols, if a state neglects this, as it has already done, it violates the 
objective law and it also deviates from the principles of Marx-Leninist theories on nationality issues. 
Without the proper development of Mongolian language and education, the Mongolian people in the 
future at best face sinicization rather than national modernization. They further argue that other 
nationalities with their own languages in China are in the same boat as the Mongolian people in having 
to rely on their own language as a means of grasping modem science and technology130.
National language is about Political Rights
Mongols see the right to use their own language as a matter of political right. The real right of 
autonomy in the Mongolian view is the right to decide their nationality’s internal affairs which should 
mainly include the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region’s fiscal and economic matters, territories in 
which Mongols can live; the respect for their living customs and the right to use their own language. 
Those autonomous rights are closely linked to the Mongol-Chinese relationship. Among the 
violations made to Mongolian autonomous rights during the Cultural Revolution, those to national 
language came first. Among those so-called nationality rightists who were persecuted, a considerable 
number were linguists131.
And still, the most convenient way to counter the bias from the Chinese and the malpractice in Inner 
Mongolia is to cite Marxist and Leninist doctrines, especially those on national rights. Lenin once 
pointed out: ’’those who do not admit national equality, equal status of national languages, do not 
defend against national oppression, inequality, are not Marxists, and also not even nationalists.”132 
After the Soviet government was set up, Stalin spoke on strengthening the significance of the principle 
by which each republic using its own language should “speak and work in their own 
language,(referring to organization of non-Russian republics), the Soviet government must not only 
become a Russian power, but it must also incorporate the power of other nationalities and the powers 
with which the oppressed peasants of other nationalities have close links.”133
5.2. Nationality’s Territorial Basis And Political Equality
130Shenamjila, (op. cit.) p.77.
131Interview with Mr. Arya July. 1993 in Hohhot.
132Lenin, "Criticization and Opinions on Nationality Issues", Works O f Lenin, vol20, p i 1. quoted by 
Shenamjila, (op. cit.) p.30.
133Stalin, "Report on Nationality Issues in the Construction of Party and State" April 23,1923. quoted 
by Chulunbagan in "Nationality Language's Equal Status", IMAR Nationality Study Society First 
Annual Conference Paper Collection (1981) p.130.
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A common territory is regarded by Mongols as a necessary condition for the development of a 
national economy. Stalin’s definition of nationality is well known in China and it seems to be a 
favorite quote of Mongols.134 One of the four criteria prescribed for a nationality is a common territory, 
but Mongols argue in the opposite way that since Mongols are a nationality, they are ipso facto 
entitled to a common territory. The argument is aimed to address both the long-existing problem and 
the continuous deterioration in Mongolian territorial integrity.
Mongolian common territory began to be disintegrated in the late Qing dynasty. The situation 
deteriorated to an unprecedented degree during the Republican period, when Mongolian dukes and 
princes in neighbouring Chinese territories were either forced or lured to sell the public land of 
Mongolian banners to Chinese warlords for military cultivation. As a result Mongols constantly had 
to retreat further to the northern frontier of more arid land and the Gobi desert. What brought still 
greater damage was the large number of Chinese migrants invited in the late Qing period into the 
Mongolian interior to farm and to set up Chinese counties. That was fatal to the preservation of a 
Mongolian common territory, which was the very condition for the survival of the Mongolian people. 
For example, the newly Chinese populated Linxi, Lindong and Jingpeng(Dolonor) areas functioned as 
barriers separating eastern Mongolia from western Mongolia. Wuchuan county separates the Turned 
Banner from Damao Banner and the Four Prince Banner. The rear irrigation area near the bend of the 
Yellow River(“huo tao”) again separates the Ikhe Zuu League from the Ulaan Chab League. Chinese 
counties have been set up everywhere, which has led to the reality of a co-existence of Mongolian 
banners and Chinese counties. Those counties are like “sharp daggers thrashing deep into Inner 
Mongolia” and more over, they “take roots and blossom”135.
As a result, the degree of Mongol-Chinese co-inhabitation has been increasing all the time whilst the 
characterization of a Mongolian common territory exists only by name. The situation of internal 
separation in Inner Mongolia, in the Mongolian view, has reinforced a long-existing fractionism and 
localism amongst Mongols.
134 “A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture”, Joseph Stalin, Marxism And The 
National And Colonial Question, (London, 1936), p. 8.
135Qindamuni, "On Mongolian Nation's Modernization",
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Some Mongolian intellectuals have said that a common territory for the Mongolian people is a 
prerequisite for an equal national relationship between Chinese and Mongols. There is never a 
shortage of criticism and attacks by the CPC on previous Chinese regimes for their oppression of the 
Mongolian people. The argument of the CPC itself is available for Mongols to use that the ethnic co­
inhabitation is indisputably the result of national oppression, in Zhou Enlai’s own words, it is 
the ’’result of Chinese nudging minority people”136
The process o f losing common territory, argue Mongolian scholars, will continuously deprive a nation 
with a common territory of its national characteristics i.e., the nation’s political virility and of its 
means to preserve itself. The result is that “Mongolian people easily fall prey to any domestic and 
foreign reactionary rulers”137.
Mongols now account for only a marginal minority in the IMAR, and economically they are affiliated 
to the Chinese. The question now is whether the two decade reform process can provide a solution in 
any way to the above predicaments in the Mongolian people’s modernization. The answer is negative.
In the early 1980s many Mongols still placed much hope on the Chinese reforms. They suggested that 
Mongols let bygones be bygones, and they expected Mongolian people to be given some real 
autonomy and freedom to develop in the future. In this scenario, Mongols would be willing to let 
others[e.g., the Gang of Four, or whatever] bear the blame of the fact that all advanced industries and 
profitable natural resources have been occupied by the Chinese, even the fertile pastureland has been 
farmed by Chinese. All the blame could be put on the Fascist, feudalist national oppressive policy 
before the CPC or during the Cultural Revolution. When Mongolians speak out about their 
dissatisfaction and anger towards the past Communist rule, the safest way is to blame the Gang of 
Four and Lin Biao.
The suggestion from Mongols is to ethnicize/nationalize the metropolis and so help to form a stable 
Mongolian community. In accordance with the new spirit of forgetting bygones and looking forward 
as advocated by Deng Xiaoping, many Mongols voiced that Mongolian people should not blame the 
past and should not compare Chinese Mongolian policies to that of Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor 
of the Chinese Ming dynasty, who massacred and assimilated Mongols by force in the Ming dynasty. 
Mongolian people should look to the bright future promised by Chinese reform and pay attention to 
setting up new cities with Mongolian characteristics. One example then was an open cut coal mine in 
Holingol, a place which would be set up as a city with a population of 5-600,000. Holingol is located 
between Xingan, Jerim and Shilingol Leagues and is surrounded by a Mongolian population. It was 
well placed to be Mongolianized and there were sufficient reasons to do so. In Jerim League, there is
136Zhou En-lai, "Several Issues On Our Country’s Nationality Policy", Speech on Qingdao Nationality 
Work Conference, 4 August 1957, Selected Works On Nationality Policy, Xinjiang People’s Press, 
1985.
137Chindamni, "On Mongolian People's Modernization", IMAR Nationality Study Society First Annual
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a Mongolian population of 650,000 among which 300,000 inhabit semi-desert and desert areas. The 
desertification was the result o f over-farming. The life of the Mongols there is miserable. The welfare 
of the 300,000 Mongols may be seen as a test of the CPC’s nationality policy and its capacity to solve 
the problem in a right way that can also alleviate environmental problems. Holingol’s development 
would have needed an immigrant work force and it should have considered those 300,000 Mongols in 
the desert. This was the least that the Chinese authorities should have been able to do for the Mongols 
to be “the master of their own house”. In the end, it turned out to be another disappointment for the 
Mongols.
5.3. Development at the cost of national identity.
It is ironic that the only seemingly effective guard of Mongolian identity is some undesirability related 
to being Mongols. For example the harsh natural environment and the simple and poor living 
conditions in the pastureland discourages the Chinese from going there and it is that which has 
reduced the Chinese influence.
In 1962, Mongols constituted a majority in 22 out of the 49 banners of Inner Mongolia. But by 1982, 
only one banner in Inner Mongolia has a Mongolian majority.138 It can be concluded that in almost all 
townships at banner level Mongols are in a minority. During the past four decades since 1947, 
Mongols have witnessed a massive Chinese population influx along with many new industries set up 
in the IMAR. Mongols’ suspicion towards those modem industries persists, although there is an 
obvious need to establish their own processing industries of fur and leather, etc.. In this sense, a 
cultural division of labour is reinforced, industries in cities and townships are mainly for ethnic 
Chinese, while animal husbandry on pastoral land are a Mongolian’s domain. It seems that the only 
guarantee for Mongols to keep their traditional occupation is the disadvantageous character of that 
occupation, such as, a return o f low profit.
When certain circumstances arose which made animal farming more profitable, Mongolian herdsmen 
soon faced the danger of losing their traditional jobs to the Chinese. The point can be seen from the 
so-called “cashmere rush” from 1988 to 1989 when cashmere prices soared unreasonably high 
because of speculation. In that period, many Chinese peasants in Ikhe Zuu league began raising 
cashmere producing goats and became dealers between the Mongol and Chinese textile industries, 
especially those outside the IMAR. The later collapse of cashmere prices was partly due to the 
dishonest dealings by Chinese merchants in the area. They mixed white cashmere they bought from 
Mongols with sand or some kind of very heavy white powder which was called by Chinese peasants 
“heavy metal powder”).139 As a result, the much reduced profitability of cashmere trading 
discouraged Chinese peasants from going into the same trade as Mongolian herdsmen.
Conference Paper Collection (1981) p. 87.
1380rchelan, “Inner Mongolian Population Issues”, The Research On Inner Mongolian Nationality 
Issues (Inner Mongolian Education Press, 1993) p. 43.
139Interview in Ikhe Zuu League, Aug. 1993.
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5.4. Inadequate Political Representation
Mongols and Chinese have a different attitude as to Mongol representation in government and whether 
Mongols should enjoy a higher quota of cadres. By regarding the IMAR just as another Chinese 
province, the Chinese attitude to the issue of national autonomy has become ahistorical. Chinese are 
much less concerned than Mongols about history before 1947 which showed that in principle the 
founding of the IMAR resulted from a compromise of the two principles. The Mongolian demand for 
national self-determination and the Chinese for territorial integration. The criterion o f choosing 
Mongolian cadres is also related to the issue of national cultural identity. The assignment of ethnic 
cadres inevitably reflected the nationality’s economic position in general, therefore the issue of the 
Mongolian political representation is related to cultural and economic issues. The difference of 
opinion on the proportion of ethnic cadres between Chinese and Mongols also reflects the two 
different principles: An ahistorical democratic principle; and an historical principle on Mongolian 
rights. The Chinese favor a democratic principle based on proportionate representation according to 
which Mongolian cadres in government should not exceed 1/8 of the total since Mongols only account 
for 1/8 of the whole the IMAR’s population.
As seen by Mongols, Mongolian rights are part of the historical package upon which the IMAR was 
founded, and the Mongolian rights have been written in the state constitution and laws which should 
not be affected by the population changes. According to the Program Of People’s Republic Of 
China’s National Autonomy and the Laws of Nationality Regional Autonomy, the nationality in whose 
name national autonomy is granted, appoints mainly their own cadres, use their own language, and at 
the same time to some degree run their internal affairs according to their national form. The three key 
elements in national autonomy are ethnic(minority nationality) cadres, national language and national 
form. The scope of ethnicization of cadres should include all the power organs in autonomous regions: 
administrative organs, executive organs, juridical organs, procurators’ offices, political consultative 
organs, business organizations, schools and colleges, public security, party organs and other non­
governmental organizations such as the trade unions, the Youth Leagues and Woman’s Associations. 
Among so many organizations, the leading role is played by the state power organizations. The 
degree of the ethnicization in these power organs represents the degree of nationality autonomy.
Since the Mongolian population is not concentrated in one area but is located in many areas and is 
inter-mingled with the Chinese population, it seems that the only feasible way to ensure the Mongolian 
people’s autonomous right is to ethnicize the cadres in the IMAR, i.e., to increase the proportion of 
Mongolian cadres in the People’s Congress and the government councils. Mongols could not be 
convinced that they have any say in the government and national autonomy in any sense if their cadres 
accounted for less than 50%. The Communist party organs in the IMAR are of course the key part of 
cadres’ ethnicization. Mongolian members of the party committees and directors of those committees 
should be more than 50% of the total so that it is possible for Mongolian cadres at the party’s top 
organizations to hold vital office and to exercise power so as to play the due role. A Mongolian 
scholar has suggested in a published article that the proper proportion of Mongolian cadres should be
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50% at bureau level; 40% at section level; 20% at lower level.140
Mongols see majority representation in government as the key embodiment of national autonomy. It is 
very clear, however, that the Mongolian cadres or the current ethnicization of cadres in Inner 
Mongolia serve only decorous roles rather more than governing functions. Ulanhu once said that the 
IMAR autonomy should not be merely a badge and Mongolian cadres should be more than 
decorations141. In the 8th Party’s Congress, he also reiterated the importance of the ethnicization of the 
autonomous region’s party: ’’Merely to nationalize the government of autonomous regions but not to 
staff party’s organizations with minority cadres is to fail to completely adhere to the principle of 
national regional autonomy making it difficult to carry out the Party’s leadership among minority 
nationalities. Therefore the fundamental task is to carry out gradual ethnicization of the party’s 
leadership.” In the Mongol view, the core and essence of nationality autonomy and the only way for 
Mongols to be the master of their own house is the ethnicization of the IMAR cadres and that is also 
the only way in which Mongols could develop some emotional ties with the Chinese government142.
Chinese cadres in the IMAR like to say nationalization should be carried out according to the ethnic 
population proportions. Usually they oppose the idea that Mongols should account for more than 50% 
of IMAR cadres on the grounds o f the inequality between Chinese and Mongols. One particular point 
usually cited by Chinese is that the IMAR is different from Xinjiang and Tibet, Mongols cannot copy 
the above two regions to ask for majority representation in leadership of all organizations. Facing the 
situation that in Inner Mongolia Mongols only account for 12% of the IMAR population, Chinese 
have tried to emphasize that it is a regional autonomy rather than Mongolian people’s autonomy. The 
official position that the autonomy is a national regional autonomy instead of a national autonomy 
denies Mongols of their historical right to Inner Mongolia and nullifies the exact reason for setting up 
the IMAR’s national autonomy. Autonomy with emphasis on the region where the Chinese are 8 
times more than the Mongols is autonomy which has little to do with Mongolian nationality, and it 
negates the reasons why the IMAR was set up.
Another important matter besides the question of the ethnic proportion of IMAR cadres is the criteria 
for choosing ethnic cadres. Without any exception in the IMAR cadres are chosen, first of all on the 
grounds that they should be good party members(more in the sense of loyalty to the party and central 
government than in the sense of the ideological beliefs). Most Chinese and even some Mongolian 
cadres, when asked about the autonomy issue, usually respond that “I am a Communist, I do not care 
about those nationality issues”, or “nationality issues are too complicated, the farther from it, the 
better”143.
The above view is not widely shared by Mongolian cadres. Some Mongols argued in published
140 Orchelan, (op. cit.) p.32.
141 Ulanhu, "The Glorious History o f Nationality Regional Autonomy", People's Daily, July 14, 1981.
142Interview with Mr. Batu, secretary to the president of IMAR People’s Congress, July 1994.
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articles that for an ethnic cadre, the first obligation is to reflect his own people’s opinions and needs, 
to work and breathe together with the people of his own nationality and to share the same fate with 
them. Should they fail to do this, they are nihilists in terms of nationality issues, and they cannot meet 
the standards set not only by the Mongolian people, but also by the Communist party according to the 
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Therefore the most important standard forjudging nationality cadres 
should be whether they are active and courageous enough to reflect and represent their own 
nationality’s opinion and needs, and not their command of the Chinese language, their level of 
sinicization or the degree of their total political identification with the Chinese144.
It is a fact that proportionate to their numbers in the population as a whole Mongols constitute a larger 
proportion of cadres than Chinese. But other non-Chinese enjoy an even higher representation rate 
than Mongols.145 Including Mongolian professionals in translation organizations, in the whole of the 
IMAR Mongolian cadres account for only 20-25% of all the IMAR cadres. The situation is different 
between regions. Shilingol League is the place with the highest rate of Mongolian cadres because in 
that league Mongols account for 77% of population. There Mongolian cadres number 795(1981), 
equivalent to 82% of all cadres. 23 out of 25 government councilors are Mongols and Party 
secretaries and heads of the League and banners are all Mongols.146
Over 10 years after 1971, 20,000 Mongolian cadres were promoted, accounting for 15.4% of the 
whole. Now Mongolian cadres at bureau level account for 24.3%.147 Significantly, there are 
relatively fewer Mongolian cadres with an economic and technological background. This has led to 
an unbalanced location in different governmental offices. The economically important departments 
are mainly occupied by Chinese cadres.
143Interview in July 1993 in Hohhot.
144Chindamni, (op. cit.) p. 87.
145
Chindamni, (op. Cit.)p. 88.
146 Wang Duo, My Fifty Years in Inner Mongolia (Inner Mongolian People's Press, 1994) p.418.
147 Chindamni, (op. cit.) p. 87.
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5.5. Conclusion: external differentiation
If nationalism is explained as a matter o f collective opinion and of a sense of external differentiation, 
Mongolian nationalism has exhibited different external differentiations at different periods. The 
external differentiation came from the Chinese mainly because of Chinese warlords and their brazen 
seizure of Mongolian land before 1949. In the communist period after 1949, the external 
differentiation was obscured by the rhetoric of socialist internationalism and the fact that Mongols 
suffered from leftist policies together with other ethnic minorities and Chinese as well. In the Chinese 
reform period after 1978 the external differentiation for Mongolian nationalism was heightened as 
result of a shift in ideology and the socio-economic changes that took place in the IMAR.
Formerly both Chinese nationalism and non-Chinese nationalism could be repudiated by universalist 
Communist ideology which supported the idea that the stage of the nation-state was an interim one. 
The integrationist view that applied to all nations and states, non-Chinese as well as Chinese, until 
their submergence in the historical stage of Communism was more easily accepted by non-Chinese 
peoples than the present assimilationist view in which Chinese nationalism constructs an external 
differentiation of the Chinese nation versus the rest of the world, especially the West. When 
development and progress was no longer explained in terms of class struggle but according to China’s 
national destiny when the official view of the outside world was no longer depicted in terms of 
imperialism versus socialism and the Chinese nation suddenly became an enthusiastic participant in 
globalization that had formerly been regarded as the hostile capitalist world, the former class-based 
bond between different peoples in China ceased to be valid any longer. To non-Chinese peoples, the 
meaning of state as a protecting shell to non-Chinese peoples against the perceived hostile capitalist 
world was no longer as convincing as before. When international relations are no longer interpreted in 
terms of class struggles, Chinese statehood become a barrier to the equal participation in the global 
economic system by non-Chinese peoples.
211
CHAPTER VI. EXTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION AND NATIONALISM
Nationalism, though summarized as one political principle, differ from case to case. There are
»
different ways to explain national identity and nationalism, such as economic, intellectual or historical 
explanations, but all none of these ways of explaining the evolution and character of nationalism in 
specific cases is comparable with others. For example, the economic causes for Chinese nationalism 
and Japanese nationalism are different, China and Japan each has different traditions of thought and 
their histories differ. However, among different factors contributing to nationalism, the only cause 
which is common for all nationalism in different cases is the sense of external differentiation, i.e., the 
exclusiveness from other or, put differently, the self-realization of being merely one among many 
other nations and states.
The self-identity of a nation, according to the different explanations of nationalism, is possible 
because of socio-economic, intellectual or cultural basis, etc.. However a national identity and 
nationalism are unthinkable without a shared sense of external differentiation, i.e., perception o f many 
other groups in contrast to the we-group and the understanding that we-group is just one of many 
groups.
Imagine a people on an island which provides a geographical whole for the people. Even if the 
islanders were to speak the same language, but had no knowledge of any other people except for those 
on the island, they would likely be conscious of their different group identities rather than of a shared 
common island identity. That would be true even if they could form a single government. It is like 
human kind on earth today being divided into different nations and cultural groups, can earth people 
have a common(intemational) society like the societies within national boundaries, and have a sense 
of solidarity superseding the different national consciousnesses? Separate nations need an external 
differentiation to form a sense of solidarity of mankind, earth people would need an extraterritorial 
differentiation to make national difference unimportant. That is why a world government only appears 
in the science-fictions in which human being are busy combating hostile aliens.
Chinese views of the outside world provide an important sense o f external differentiation to contribute 
to Chinese self-identity and modem Chinese nationalism. Perceptions of the world and o f the 
international system affect Chinese nationalism as well as non-Chinese sub-state nationalism. 
Corresponding to the different external differentiation, the way in which Chinese define their self- 
identity can be analyzed in different time scales: a 5000-year Chinese nation; a 100-year Chinese 
nation and a Chinese nation with an ideological basis after 1949. The external differentiation is 
crucial to modem Chinese national identity and nationalism, it is also important for non-Chinese sub­
state nationalism for which the Chinese nation is usually the external differentiation.
National identity is a matter of a self-consciousness of belonging. In the version of the 5000-year
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nation, there is no appeal to self-consciousness, nor a sense of external differentiation. This is because 
it is expressive of a Sino-centric view in both geographical, cultural and moral terms. The “5000-year 
China” is associated with a Sino-centric view of the world. The ancient Sino-centric view, strictly 
speaking, was not an external differentiation as that provided by a modem state system because it 
could not give Chinese a sense that they were just one of the many cultural groups. Their view of the 
world was universalist rather than nationalist, therefore the so-called 5000-year nation is not a nation 
in modem sense(territoriality, citizenship and sovereignty). Therefore the contemporary assertion of 
myth, the “5000-year nation”, is more a fiction than reality.
The 100-year Chinese nation is more valid in terms of external differentiation, i.e., the modem state 
system. The modem state system characterized by political saturation in the territorial sense, is a world 
of states in which every individual or group has to choose its national and political identity. In this 
sense, national self-consciousness is generated by this external differentiation. The 100-year Chinese 
nation began from mid 19 century when the Western intrusion made Chinese realize they were just 
one of the many states and nations in the world system. The Sino-centric universalistic view of the 
world was replaced by a pluralist view of the world. It was the beginning of modem Chinese 
nationalism.
However according to that Chinese official view a Chinese nation has existed for thousands years even 
though it lacked self-consciousness. The Chinese nation only became a self-conscious entity in the 
last one hundred years since China faced western intrusions. Fei Xiaotong, the P.R.C.’s top theorist on 
nationality issues, calls the former stage without self-consciousness as the existence without 
realization(zi zai), the latter as existence with self-realization(zi jue) *.
The 50-year nation after 1949 for the most of the time was based on political ideology and a socialist 
system. In principle, national identity was regarded as a transitional rather than permanent, and the 
view of the world was again universalist and internationalist. The way in which external 
differentiation was determined in the course of the 50-year nation varied in accordance with the 
different periods'of Chinese foreign policy, i.e., China in the socialist camp in 50s, Sino-Soviet schism 
and egoist isolation in 60s, tripolarity in 70s and 80s, pragmatic nationalism in 80s and 90s. The 
various forms of external differentiation affected Chinese self-identity and indirectly affected the 
domestic ethnic relations. There is a link between the external differentiation and the nationalism of 
Chinese and the non-Chinese at sub-state level.
During the reform period since 1978, when the international relations was no longer viewed in terms 
of class struggle, the course of international relations and its various conflicts were no longer regarded 
as leading to the final success of a world communism. China was no longer regarded as a leading force 
of this historical progression and China’s leaders began to develop a pragmatic and non-ideological 
view of the world. This pragmatic view of the world no longer encompassed the old Sino-centric
L Fei Xiaotong, Zhonghua Mingzu Duoyuan Yitihua Geju (The Pattern o f  Chinese Nation: Unity With
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universalist paradigm; nor did it share the Communist ideological view of the international system; but 
it assumed that international relations consisted of a basic competition for survival and development.
If we can call it a 19 century realist view of the world, then the idea of Chinese nation also regresses 
from the ideological and political nation to the historical and cultural nation. The reunification issues 
of Hong Kong and Taiwan are often addressed within the framework of this cultural and historical 
Chinese nation. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 50-year political nation was replaced by the ideas of 
5,000-year and 100-year nation are in ascendance.
1. Different Chinese nation and different external differentiation
1.1. Sino-Centric View and the Idea of the 5,000-Year Chinese Nation
For a long time after 1949 in the PRC, Chinese conceptions of nationality were dominated by Stalin’s 
definition according to which a “nation is a historically evolved, stable community o f language, 
territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture”2. According 
to this view, a nation could exist free of statehood and free of a goal to achieve a statehood, therefore 
the nation in question is not necessarily a modem phenomenon.
Chinese also categorized nations as pre-capitalist nations (ancient nations), capitalist nations and 
socialist nations.3 Chinese scholars maintained that the Chinese nation had existed throughout the 
stages of historical progress and that the Chinese nation is as old as Chinese civilization. Because of 
earlier history recorded in Shang Shu( by Confucius) about Wu Di (five Kings), the legendary period 
from 2600 BC to 2200 BC, Chinese like to say China is a civilization, a state and a nation of 5,000- 
year history.
The view draws no distinction between civilization, state and nation. Nation is regarded as a perennial 
phenomenon. Fei Xiaotong calls it as a nation without self-consciousness(“zi zai” in contrast to “zi 
jue”). National identity is a matter of self-consciousness, therefore the 5000-year nation is a nation 
without self-identity and a nation without nationalist principle.
The 5,000-year Chinese nation is an aprioristic notion. Since the concept of 5,000-year Chinese nation 
in cultural sense is not congruent with all the peoples within the PRC and in historical sense it 
stretched back and include all the previous Chinese dynasties, it is incompatible with the modem 
national ideas that a nation is a community of equal individuals.
When the idea of the 5,000-year Chinese nation is applied to modem state politics the modem China
Plural Origins) (The Central Institute of Nationalities' Press, 1989)
2 “A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture”, Joseph Stalin, Marxism And The 
National And Colonial Question, (London, 1936), p.8. also quoted in the Nationality Theory and 
Nationality Policy Writing Group, Nationality Theory and Nationality Policy (People Press, 1988) 
Collected Works o f  Stalin, vol 11, p286.
3 Sun Xianfang, Sun Zhonglin, ed., Study On Nationality Regional Autonomy Law (Inner Mongolian
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as a nation state, it adds historical and cultural dimension to Chinese state nationalism (ai guo zhu yi) 
in its normal meaning which is love of state and devotion to the welfare of one’s state. With the 
historical and cultural nation as the basis of the state sovereignty and the object of people’s loyalty, 
Chinese patriotism, or rather nationalism, has well exceeded the normal sense of 
nationalism(congruence of state and nation). Because in theory, this 5,000-year Chinese nation is both 
a notion permeating throughout the history and including all different peoples within the state, 
accordingly Chinese can always invoke the name of the whole Chinese nation to nullify a local 
secessionist demand. In this view, the opinion of the nation has to include the nation both at present 
tense and at past tense, which means not only all those currently included in the perceived nation 
should be consulted, but also the dead in history should be consulted4. Therefore how to interpret the 
opinion of the cultural nation is an anti-empirical matter since a national plebiscite5 in the normal 
sense is irrelevant as it is impossible to include a nation both at present and in the past.
The aprioristic view of the cultural Chinese nation is often used by the Chinese government to stress 
the sovereignty and reunification issues. One example is the justification of Taiwan as an unalienable 
part of China. According to this view of 5000-year Chinese nation, whether Taiwan could be 
independent has to be decided by all Chinese rather than the population on Taiwan island.
Qian Qichen once said that the future of Taiwan cannot be settled by the 21 million people there it can 
only be determined by all the 1.2 billion peoples of China of which it is a part.
If the historical dimension of the Chinese nation is considered, even the 1.2 billion Chinese could not 
represent the entire Chinese nation because they are only the Chinese nation at present tense. There is 
also the Chinese nation in the past tense.
By the same reason, anthropological and archeological evidence is used by Chinese government to 
reach a political conclusion. When some genealogical evidence produced in a piece of academic work 
suggested that the ancestors o f Taiwanese most probably came from Chinese mainland, the work 
together with its author were paid great attention by the Department of United Front6. With this view
University Press, 1990) p.25.
4 The peculiar view of Chinese nation and sovereign are often expressed in numerous articles 
condemning Taiwan separatist intentions. For examples, Liu Wenzong, “China Has indisputable 
Sovereignty Over Taiwan”, People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, 25 May 1996; Zhu Xiangyang, Zhong 
Tingyu, “Philosophical Basis of China’s Unification”, People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, 29 March 
1996.
5 Mayall mentioned this unfeasibility o f plebiscite in national self-determination, ”As a method for 
establishing that the right of national self-determination has been exercised that plebiscite has two 
obvious weaknesses. First, it assumes that a collective identity already exists - otherwise, who or what 
would decide which people to poll; secondly, it discounts the agenda problem - that is the problem 
which arises because of the fact that whoever controls the questions on which a particular population 
is to be asked to vote, is in a very strong position also to control the outcome”. Mayall, James, 
Nationalism And International Society (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.52.
6 It is a Ph.D. Thesis produced in the University of Tokyo. The title of the Ph.D. thesis is “A 
Genealogical Study Of Earlier Inhabitants At Taiwan” and the thesis drew a conclusion that “there is a 
close link between Taiwan inhabitant group and those on mainland China, the ancestors of Taiwanese
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of a timeless Chinese nation, Chinese leaders sometimes said if they gave in on the matter of 
unification and claiming back lost territory, they would be too shamed to face their ancestors.
For the thousands of years, the Sino-centric view could not provide an external differentiation as 
provided by the modem state system. The saturated modem state system has included all territories 
and peoples on earth, therefore all peoples have to made a decision about their national identity, i.e., 
they either identify with one of the UN member states they happen to live in or deny it and assert their 
own identity. In the pre-modem and pre-sovereign state world, the relationship between various 
territorialities was not well defined as today’s state relationship and there were more political vacuums 
and ambiguities between states. With the territory loosely defined, there was always room in between 
big powers which made it possible for peoples in between to be at ease with their cultural and political 
identity. There might have been more room for the peoples in the past not to make either-this-or-that 
choice. It was especially hue with nomadic peoples such as Mongols. In the past they could migrate, 
detached from any of their neighboring powers. In the modem state system in which borders are 
accurately defined between sovereign states, communities either declare their own nation state, or 
choose one of the states they happen to be in, since there is no man’s land left in the saturated modem 
state system.
The idea of a 5,000-year Chinese nation is equivalent to defining China as a civilization or a culture. 
The world outside this 5,000-year nation would consist of non-Chinese civilizations, or of uncivilized 
non-Chinese because for the most part of the pre-modem history, Chinese regarded themselves as the 
only civilization in the world. For some period the distinction between the “civilized” Chinese and the 
“uncivilized” non-Chinese was blurred by an assimilationist attitude according to which the non- 
Chinese who adopted Chinese culture were accepted as Chinese or the semi-civilized(shou fan). The 
periodic conquests by the non-Chinese did not destroy the Chinese sense of centricity. The external 
differentiation provided by nomadic powers was unstable and temporary which did not produce an 
international consciousness among Chinese that China was only one of many in the state system. 
Therefore the centric view is different from that of a modem nation in any sense(sovereignty, 
territoriality, citizenship, etc.). The Chinese didn’t have this modem sense of external differentiation 
until 19CC when western power posed an over-whelming challenge to the Sino-centric view and to the 
Chinese sense of cultural superiority.
The historically and culturally based Chinese nation is an exclusive conception of ethnic Chinese 
(Han), but not non-Chinese peoples. For the ancestors of those non-Chinese were despised as alien 
barbarians by Chinese until even late Qing period, it needed a drastic re-interpretation of Chinese- 
centric history to convince non-Chinese peoples that they too shared a common origin with Chinese up
mostly came from Chinese mainland”, “there were ethnic Miao in the mainland, close brothers with 
Miao”. Both the author and his work are highly valued by the Department of United Front. Wang 
Xiaohui, “Blood Origin”, Minzu Tuanjie (Nationality Unity Magazine), April, 1996.
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to 5,000 years ago. Apart from the difficulty in historical explanation, the present nationality reality is 
also contradictory to the conception of the 5,000-year nation. The 5,000-year nation is incapable of 
explaining those territories and peoples which have been artificially been separated out by political 
force and many of those cross-border minorities, especially those who have a sovereign state across 
the border such as Mongols, Koreans, Kazakhs, Kyrgys, Uzbeks and Tajiks.
The Chinese nation in the perenialist view is a historical cultural-community but it lacks the legal- 
political dimensions of modem nationhood. According to A.D. Smith, the modem nation at least in 
theory incorporates all strata o f the perceived nation, whom as citizens enjoy certain rights and duties 
with regard to their fellow citizens and the modem nation is conceived as a part of a larger 
international system.7
1.2. State System as an External Differentiation and Modern Chinese Nation 
During the roughly 100 years from mid-19 century to the founding of the PRC in 1949, a modem 
sense of Chinese nationhood and modem Chinese nationalism developed mainly as a response to the 
external differentiation of the modem state system.8 The new national identity together with the 
modem external differentiation can be called the “100-year Chinese nation”, different from the 
perenialist view of the “5000-year Chinese nation”.
Chinese communists regarded the period starting 1840 until the May Fouth Movement in 1919 as the 
period of “old democratic revolution”, i.e. anti-imperialist movement without communist leadership.9 
According to Fei Xiaotong, Chinese since mid-19 century has become a self-conscious nation(zi jue in 
contrast to zi zai)10.
The external differentiation o f modem state system made Chinese national ideas change to adapt to the 
modem international environment, Chinese anti-Manchu nationalists began to see China as one o f the 
many nations in the world(shi jie min zu zhi lin), and to conceive a Chinese nation(zhong hua min zu) 
with the imported notions of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship which are originally European.
The gap between an identity based on Chinese culture and a modem identity based on the territorial
7 A. D. Smith, Nation And Nationalism In A Global Era (Polity Press, 1995) p.57.
8 It is 109 years from 1840 when the first Anglo-China war(Opium War) broke out to 1949 the 
People’s Republic was founded. According to Chinese official view of modem history, during the 
109-year period, imperialist powers invaded China and China remained a colony, semi-colony and 
semi-feudal state; Chinese feudal ruling class gradually colluded with comprador bourgeoisie, and 
they became the walking dog of imperialist powers; Chinese people, including working class, peasants, 
petite bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and other patriots, began to unite; during the period the latter 
engaged in nationalist and democratic struggle against the former. See Li Weihan, “Nationality Issues 
in Chinese Democratic Revolution”, Several Issues On Nationality Theory and Policy (People’s Press, 
1980) p.22.
9 Li Weihan, Ibid.
10 Fei Xiaotong, (op. cit.)
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state is huge. Accordingly the conceptual transformation from the cultural nation into new modem 
national identity is problematic. Because Chinese culture was emphasized more than ethnicity as the 
basis of dynastic successions in the past, Chinese ethnic identity was not emphasized by the ancient 
Chinese states as much as a Chinese cultural identity. Along with the dynastic changes, the names of 
Chinese people also changed. In Han dynasty, Chinese were called “Han people”, in Tang Dynasty, 
“Tang people”, etc. For the early Chinese nationalists at the end of Manchu dynasty, there was not 
even a proper name for China as an ethnic entity. Liang Qichao said that “Indeed, there was not even 
a serviceable word for the historical and ethical community of “China”. Among the many faults which 
Liang Qichao attributed to the “Chinese people” was the inability to put a name to their own country 
in the world for several thousand years.” The word “‘China’(zhong hua) is what people of other races 
call us. It is not a name the people of this country have selected for themselves”.11
“zhong hua”(as in zhong hua min zu) appeared as early as in Wei Jin period(AD 220-420).12 Zhong 
hua was first used in political mobilization by Zhu Yuanzhang, the Chinese founder of the Ming 
Dynasty, who was the first to rebel against the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty. In 1367 he ordered Xu Da, 
his general to “ expel barbarians and restore zhong hua”. He said that “those who surrender can live in 
zhong hua, those who are defiant live in the north of the Wall”, “zhong hua” was here used as a 
geographical term same as “zhong yuan”(middle plain, China).
In 19th CC “zhong hua” again was used by Chinese nationalists, “zhong hua” and “minzu” (nation) 
used together in the beginning of the century. “Min zu” was borrowed from Japanese at the turn of the 
century. Zhang Taiyan in his article “zhong hua min zu” explained:” Zhong guo(China) is a 
geographical terms to distinguish China and foreign territories, near and far; zhong hua(Chinese) to 
distinguish hua and yi(barbarians), the higher and lower culture.”13
Still, “zhong hua min zu” then mainly referred to Chinese in a cultural sense, i.e., Han Chinese. Liang 
Qichao tried to give “zhong hua” a more inclusive meaning beyond Han Chinese by a standard of 
subjective identification. In 1922, Liang Qichao in his “Study Of Chinese Nation In History” pointed 
out that “zhong hua min zu usually refers to Han Chinese, at the same time, it also included each 
people which identified themselves as Chinese. He also said, “ when you meet other peoples, when he 
thinks he is a Chinese, he is a member of zhong hua min zu”. and also ’’Manchu is a member of zhong 
hua min zu”.14
Sun Yat-sen emphasized that the state and nation should be one. He used race and nation
11 Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo Jiruo zhi Yuanyin” (On the Origin of China’s Weakness), Yin Bing Shi 
Heji (Zhonghua Shuju, 1941) Vol.l, p.99.
12 Chen Lian-kai, zhongguo huayi fanhan zhonghua zhonghuaminzu -- a inherent development of 
cognition. Fei Xiao-tong, Unitary Chinese Nation of Pluralistic Origins, the Central Institute of 
Nationalities Press, 1989.
13 Zhang Tai-yan, Zhang Tai-yan Xuanji (Zhong Tai-yan collections) (Shanghai People’s Press, 1985) 
extra, Vol 1. p.252.
14 Ibid. p.252.
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interchangeably and said that assimilation would make a homogeneous Chinese nation within the state. 
He believed that through assimilating non-Chinese into Chinese, China could be transformed into a 
nation congruent with the state. According to Fitzgerald, Sun Yatsen’s view of Chinese nation, 
different from Liang Qichao’s, is more based on race than individual citizenship. He rather viewed 
Chinese people as a distinctive race, “China, since the Qin and Han dynasties, has been developing a 
single state out of a single race, while foreign countries have developed many states from one race and 
have included many nationalities within one state.”15 According to Sun Yatsen, the Chinese nation is 
strictly based on the state, ethnic Chinese within the state constitute the so-called state nation(guo zu) 
and other non-Chinese peoples will be eventually absorbed into Chinese. Chiang Kaishek, Sun’s 
successor, in his “China’s Destiny” also put forward the same assimilationist view, believing all non- 
Chinese are merely sub-branches of Chinese nation.16
Because Chinese nationalists conceived of a modem Chinese nation which was congruent with the 
preceding Manchu dynasty in terms of territory and ethnic constituents, the Chinese nation is regarded 
not so much as a nation in its original meaning, i.e. nation as a self-conscious community. Lucian Pye 
regards China as a civilization pretending to be a nation-state, and ’’China today is what Europe would 
have been if the unity of the Roman Empire had lasted until now and there had not been the 
emergence of the separate entities of England, France, Germany, and the like.” 17 However, the 
external differentiation of modem state system is cmcial to modem Chinese nationalism and Chinese 
self-identity of a nation rather than a culture.
The idea of 5000-year Chinese nation is associated with cutluralism and the 100-year nation with 
modem Chinese nationalism. Joseph Levenson termed pre-modem Chinese sense of centricity and 
identity as culturalism. He observed that the high culture, ideology and identification of the mandarin, 
were principally forms of cultural consciousness, an identification with the moral goals and values o f a 
universalizing civilization.18
The transformation from culturalism to modem nationalism involved changes in political legitimation, 
territoriality and a new external differentiation. The former dynastic prescriptive sovereignty was 
changed into a popular sovereignty, at least theoretically. The nation-building process also 
territorialized the imperial rule. One important part of the territorialization of imperial rule was to
15 Sun Yat-san, “The 1st Speech on Nationalism”, Sun Zhong Shan Xuan Ji, (People’s Press, 1981) p. 
617.
16 Jiang’s close colleagues, Chen Guofu, Chen Lifu brothers in the language reform in 1930-40s, 
elaborated the same view. Chen Guofu believed “China’s ability to achieve unity is entirely dependent 
on having a unified written language”, Chen Lifu even had a plan for compulsory instruction in 
Chinese script for all minority peoples on the frontiers. See John De Francis Nationalism and 
Language Reform in China{Princeton University Press, Princeton 1950).
17 Lucian W. Pye, “How China’s Nationalism was Shanghaied”, Chinese Nationalism (M.E. Sharpe, 
1996) p. 109.
18 Joseph R. Levenson .Confucian China and its Modern Fate: the Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p.96.
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internalize the former distinction of Chinese and barbarians19. When the former uncivilized aliens 
under the Manchu imperial rule together with their territories became part of the modem Chinese state, 
the external differentiation for modem Chinese was no longer non-Chinese such as Mongols and 
Manchus but the western imperialist powers.
With the modem external differentiation, the former Sino-centric view gave way to a modem 
international outlook, i.e., China is fitted in the world state system. The former universalist view of 
Chinese centricity changed into a pluralist view of the world, i.e., nations and states in the world 
coexist and compete with each other. One lesson Chinese drew from Chinese international experiences 
in 19CC and early 20CC was “luo hou ai da”(to be backward is to be beaten) which reflected the 
relations between China and the European powers during the period.20
It is a realist lesson about international outlook that Chinese drew from the 19CC international 
relations. The realist understanding of “luo hou ai da” is also understood by Chinese in reverse order 
as “ai da luo hou” which means “being beaten leads to lagging behind”. Therefore the lesson of 
modem history also generate a redemptionist attitude toward the West.
As to the reason why China lagged behind, liberals and anti-traditionalists blamed Chinese tradition, 
but the anti-imperialist nationalists tried to find causes from outside. Scientism and populism in May 
Fouth Movement was associated with the former attitude. It is the anti-imperialist view that caters the 
belief that China only lagged behind the West in modem time and it is the redemptionist view that 
adds substantially to the modem external differentiation of modem Chinese identity. Chinese 
communists’ interpretation of modem Chinese history depicts imperialism as a major enemy for 
Chinese people and also constructs a myth that China’s progress did not lag behind European 
countries, nor lost its superiority status until modem time.21
One Chinese Communist view embraced by Mao claimed that capitalist shoots emerged in China 
before the Opium War independent of western influence, and it was crushed and disrupted by the 
western intrusion. In other word, the independent development and progress of Chinese history was 
interrupted by the west.
This Chinese Marxist historical view was regarded as contradictory by Joseph Levenson22. Chinese
19 The internalization of Chinese-barbarian distinction is not very complete, many old symbols 
associated with the distinction are still being used by average Chinese mass, but also by Chinese 
authority. Maybe the most prominent example is the Great Wall, often used to symbolize Chinese 
national spirit and defense. Whether by mistake or deliberate intention, it at least shows the difficulty 
in obscuring and compromising the ethnic distinction in the internalization process.
20 “luo hou ai da” is a household phrase, widely used by Chinese leaders from Mao Zedong to Deng 
Xiao-ping, and is easily found in the People’s Daily’s editorials on China’s reunification issues and 
reflection on historical humiliations imposed by Western powers.
21 Hu Sheng, Cong Yapian Zhanzheng dao Wusi Yundong (From Opium War to May Fouth Movement) 
(People’s Press, 1985) p .l, also see Guo Moruo, Zhongguo Shigao (Chinese History Draft) (People’s 
Press, 1962) pp.4-5.
22 Levenson, Joseph R, Confucian China And Its Modern Fate, vol.3, The Problem o f  Historical 
Significance (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965) pp.48-52.
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Communists, following Marxist historical materialism, equate Chinese history with the West’s by 
periodization, e.g., slave, feudal, capitalist, communist societies, and thus deny to China any highly 
individual character. By periodization, Chinese history is put into a liberal and Marxist universal 
history, a Western system. But on the other hand, Chinese insist Chinese historical changes have their 
own internal causes and developed independently, e.g., the view of Chinese indigenous capitalism 
developed independently before the Western intrusion.
In contrast to the view that China’s backwardness arose in modem times as a result of external 
causation, there is an argument that China’s backwardness or weakness have its roots far back to 10* 
Century23.
Before 10CC Chinese dynasties were more open and more confident. In Tang Dynasty(618-906), 
foreign merchants, preachers, trade were encouraged. Zoroastrians, Nestorians, Manichaens, Jews and 
Muslims(Persians, Arabs and Turks) came and live in China. Even if China still claimed as centric 
view, it at least did not come to conflicts with dealing with outside world.
After 10CC China became weak and defensive. Until 13CC and after Chinese sense of superiority was 
greatly weakened because of the weakening political and military strength. And Neo-Confucianism 
with its introspection functioned to restrict China’s adaptability.
In 1276 the Mongols conquered China and for the first time the whole China was under an alien mle. 
Later the Ming Dynasty took Neo-Confucianism and the Han and Tang as model of orthodoxy. After 
an early interest in the external maritime world, the Ming focused on defense in Inner Asia and closed 
the doors to the outside. For the first time, foreign trade was forbidden. China’s decline took place 
long before the advent of the Manchu Qing Dynasty( 1644-1911).
Starting from the Opium War in 1840, Chinese nationalist efforts led to the founding of the Chinese 
Republic and to China becoming a permanent member of UN security council in 1945. And if the 
communist revolution leading to the PRC founded in 1949 is regarded as a part of the nationalist 
revolution and the modernization drive24, the People’s Republic since 1949 together with its rapid 
industrialization and its effort to be a big power, can be understood as a part of continuous nation- 
building process reaching back to the 1840s.
The modem nation-building process from 1840 to 1949 which lasted about 100 years, stands in 
contrast to the version of the 5,000-year Chinese nation, and should be seen as an 100-year Chinese 
nation.
In terms of external differentiation, the 100-year Chinese nation has a pluralist view of the state system 
different from the Sino-centric universalism in the concept of 5,000-year Chinese nation. But 
domestically, it is still an assimilationist view in the concept of 100-year Chinese nation.
23 Wang Gungwu, China and the World since 1949 (The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977) p.9.
24 Wang Gungwu, “Openness and Nationalism”, Jonathan Unger, ed. Chinese Nationalism 
(M.E. Sharpe, 1996) p. 114.
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Since the 100-year Chinese nation is a concept bom out of the 5000-year national idea and imperial 
heritage of Manchu dynasty, accordingly it is believed that the peoples formerly ruled by the Manchu 
dynasty should be assimilated into the 100-year Chinese nation. For example Mongols, Tibetans and 
the Moslems in Xinjiang were regarded as part of this national concept. Therefore the independent 
Mongolian state in 1911 and after the revolution was not recognized by the 100-year Chinese nation.
The following are two points made on the 100-year nation. Firstly, the 100-year nation contains the 
contradictory ideas of the 5000-year nation as well the legal character of modem nationhood. 
Secondly, modem Chinese nationalism has a redemptionist character because of the external 
differentiation provided by aggressive western powers.
1.3. The Political Nation after 1949 and its External Differentiation
The response of Chinese intellectuals towards the external differentiation of outside powers varied. 
The main responses were to emphasize a need to engage in self-strengthening and to focus on national 
salvation. There also developed a belief in democracy and scientism. Self-strengthening and national 
salvation became the main theme of modem Chinese nationalism, which democracy and scientism 
became central to what is called Chinese Enlightenment starting from the May fourth Movement in 
1919. Chinese Communism in some way addressed the two different ideas because it claimed to be 
scientific with its origin in European enlightenment tradition and it claimed to be the only way to save 
the country. In the development of Chinese communism both before and after 1949, the theme of self­
strengthening and national salvation was never replaced by communist internationalism. Nationalism 
and Communism became two interwoven themes, one as the means, the other as the end.
The new China that was proclaimed in 1949 could be called another phase of Chinese nation which 
was based on the state and political ideology more than on common history and culture. But through 
the half century after 1949, the position of the political ideology and nationalism have changed. By 
the reform period, nationalism become the dominant theme as communist ideology lost its appeal.
The identity of the Chinese nation began to be justified more with reference to claims to a common 
history and to a cultural rather than a political ideology. The different modes of self-perception of the 
Chinese nation have corresponded to the changes in the form of external differentiation.
In the different periods after 1949, the Chinese international outlook may be characterized as limited 
internationalism during the period of Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950s, egotist radicalism during the Sino- 
Soviet schism in 1960s and the so-called tripolarity period in 1970-80s, and more pragmatic 
nationalism in 1980-90s. But the quest for a strong and powerful Chinese state has been a persistent 
theme throughout.
Ideological radicalism never excluded considerations of realpolitik and the promotion o f national 
interests from the Chinese international outlook of China’s leaders. Leaning to one side with the
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Soviet Union was not totally motivated by proletarian internationalism25, the outlook of the three 
world was not merely an analysis of international pattern in terms of class struggle and capitalism 
versus socialism, it also served as a theoretical basis for China’s international united front strategy.
The 50-year political Chinese nation characterized by the changing external differentiation at different 
times is an important period of the development of modem Chinese nationalism. The revolutionary 
radicalism and the egotism, apart from the meaning of negating tradition and national culture, 
nevertheless has expressed confidence and belief which in the same way as the traditional Sino-centric 
view put China in an unique and central position again. This is why the period of radicalism is 
cherished by many Chinese in spite of the suffering it caused to Chinese people.
The revolutionary state founded in 1949 changed the former concepts of Chinese nation drastically in 
terms of state legitimacy, the basis of nationhood and international outlook. Mao Zedong proclaimed 
the emergence of a new Chinese nation which differed from those envisioned by Sun Yatsen and 
Chiang Kaishek. The powerful combination of ideology and nationalist claims set up a new orthodoxy 
in place of battered Confucianist culture26. The revolutionary state after 1949 may be regarded as an 
important part of modem Chinese nation building, and for the purpose of analysis I have called the 
new post 1949 national ideas as constituting a 50-year Chinese nation which, as far as non-Chinese is 
concerned, is based more on political ideology rather than a common history and culture. During the 
period the term Chinese people(zhong guo ren min) was more frequently used than the term Chinese 
nation(zhong hua min zu).
Although “zhong guo ren min”(Chinese people) and “zhong hua min zu”(Chinese nation” are often 
used interchangeably. “Chinese people”(ren min)27 has class connotations. As used by the CPC the 
concept of people was an important element in the blueprint of the united front strategy. The term of 
“people”(ren min), apart from proletariat class of industrial workers and socialist peasants, also 
included sympathetic bourgeoisie and intellectuals who had supported the CCP at various critical 
stages. The rank of intellectuals were upgraded as part of proletariat working class in the post Cultural 
Revolution period. The outside contrast of the people is the people’s enemy, i.e., the KMT 
counterrevolutionaries, big bourgeoisie, the reactionaries who tried to resist the historical progress 
represented by the CCP, certain class of unrepent landlords, compradors and common criminals28.
25 Wu Xiuquan, who went to Moscow together with Zhou Enlai to sign the China-Soviet alliance 
treaty in 1951, wrote in his memoir, My Eight Years in Foreign Ministry, “the ‘Leaning on one 
side’(policy) is intended to dispel Stalin’s suspicion towards the CCP and to counter the United States’ 
policy towards China. My Eight Years in Foreign Ministry: 1950-58 (Shijie Zhishi Press, 1983) pp.17- 
20.
26Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: The Problem o f  Intellectual Continuity, 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p.97. One of his argument is CPC set up a new orthodox, a sense of 
mission in the place of Confucianism
27 It is important to note that some non-Chinese officials prefer to say “Zhonghua ge minzu”(Chinese 
peoples/nationalities), while ethnic Chinese like to say “Zhonghua minzu”(Chinese nation).
28 Wang Gungwu, “Openness and Nationalism”, Jonathan Unger ed. Chinese Nationalism 
(M.E.Sharpe, 1996) p. 118.
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In terms of its class basis, the 50-year Chinese nation has a supranational pretense. The relation 
between supranational and nationalist nature of the new regime since 1949 is paradoxical. In 
appearance they contradict to each other, but the 50 years since 1949 proves that Chinese nationalism 
or nation-building process could not have been fulfilled without the supranational political ideology. 
The supranational political ideology, in theory, helps to legitimize Chinese incorporating non-Chinese 
people into the new socialist nation in the sense that the integration and disappearance of different 
nationalities, including Chinese, in the future communist society is more easily justified than the 
straightforward assimilation and Chinese chauvinism.
Chinese nationalist revolution in 1911 aimed at converting imperial subjects(“scattered like sands” in 
Sun Yatsen’s phrase) in China into politically conscious citizenry and set up republic.29 But the KMT 
regime founded by Sun Yatsen never succeeded in establishing the control of the whole country and 
never made non-Chinese peoples within the state conscious nationals before 1949.
At the time, non-Chinese frontier areas such as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria were under 
the control of local Chinese warlords, Chinese modem nation-building did not affect those areas in 
the same way as in Chinese provinces. Some areas, notably Tibet and Manchuria for some time were 
not influenced at all.
During the Sino-Japanese war when Chinese people were mobilized on an unprecedented scale and 
anti-Japanese warfare as mainly conducted by Chinese in inland China. The Japanese in Inner 
Mongolia and Manchuria tried to appear as liberators or allies to Mongol and Manchu peoples. 
Japanese met less challenge in setting up local government in those areas than in Chinese areas.
In Inner Mongolia in 1940s, even in KMT controlled Mongolian forces, Mongol soldiers did not know 
the meaning of Chinese flag and anthem, they preferred to salute the portrait of Genghis Khan than the 
Chinese flag and to sing Mongolian folk songs than the Chinese anthem.30
De Wang, the head o f Inner Mongolian autonomous movement and government1936-46), described 
vividly how he still felt a bond of loyalty between him and Puyi, the Manchu emperor, when he met 
him in 1935.31
Since Mongolia, as compared with Tibet and Xinjiang, was then more tightly controlled by Chinese,
29 Wang Gungwu, “Openness and Nationalism”, Jonathan Unger ed. Chinese Nationalism 
(M.E. Sharpe, 1996) p. 115.
30 Qi Tian Xiang, Qi Tianxiang’s memory ofZungar, Inner Mongolia Historical Materials, (IMAR 
Political Consultative Council, 1987). P.30.
31 Tovshin, ed.) Demchukdungrub’sMemoir, Issue 13 (IMARHistorical Materials 1984) pp.37-38.
Pu Jie, recorded by Ye Zufii, Autobiograph o f  Pu Jie (Fanrong Press, 1994) In 1945 Te Wang visited 
the brothers and said to Pu Yi:”We Mongols only have autonomy on appearance, no real power at all. 
You are descendent of the Great Qing Dynasty, how can you be so weak? We Mongols always respect 
the Emperor Pu Yi as our own lord. Because you are the direct descendent of Manchu royal family. 
But you invite Japanese tian zhao da shen and treat it as your own ancestor, which confuse us. Now 
Manchuria become Japan’s colony, you the emperor do nothing but watching, don’t you become 
Japan’s puppet, do you? What are you going to do about it?”
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it can be said that Tibetans and Uighurs must have felt even less attached to Chinese state than 
Mongols.
In those non-Chinese frontiers controlled by local Chinese warlords or Japanese, there were strong 
local non-Chinese nationalism which were mainly reactions towards local Chinese warlords’ 
oppression and KMT regime’s assimilationist policy. The CCP’s supranational ideology helped to 
reduce the suspicions of the non-Chinese and to win them over.
The 1949 revolution had different meanings for Han Chinese and for non-Chinese nationalities. For 
Chinese, the 1949 revolution was the successor of the 1911 revolution in salvation for China as a state 
and a nation. Therefore the nature of the 1949 revolution was primarily nationalist. This was 
especially so as all the non-Chinese peoples were incorporated into the nation at an unprecedented 
degree.
To non-Chinese peoples, especially those who regarded CCP as an ally or liberator, the new socialist 
state was perceived as a revolutionary state rather than a nation-state, the political mission of socialism 
and communism rather than a Chinese culture was regarded as the basis of the state.
To Chinese nationalists, the communist revolution was just a means for a Chinese nationalist end; to 
CCP’s non-Chinese followers, the end is nothing other than the goal of the revolution, an ideal society 
free of national oppression.
In this new phase of nation-building, Chinese nationalism, together with the Communist ideological 
fervor, made Chinese regard their individual sufferings as a sacrifice which could be tolerated.
Within several decades after 1949, China was transformed from a semi-colonial country, a mere 
geographical expression, into a unified, independent, modem civilization-state: products and services 
increased at a steady rate for more than four decades; the infrastructure of the country(e.g. irrigation, 
sanitation, transportation, and communication) improved significantly; the equality and spread of 
public health virtually doubled average peasant life expectancy; the Chinese workers, farmers, and 
soldiers have maintained a respectable living standard among developing nations.32
Those achievements have generated so much nationalist pride among Chinese that to some extent they 
have tolerated the CCP regime for most o f their wrongdoing, e.g., prosecution o f intellectuals in anti­
rightist campaign, the 3 hardships years, and later massive deaths33 in the later Great Leap Forward 
and the Cultural Revolution.
But the non-Chinese peoples, who do not necessarily share Chinese nationalistic sentiments and do not 
identify with the 5,000-year and 100-year Chinese nation as do the Chinese, therefore may have a
32 Tu Weiming, “destructive Will and Ideological Holocaust: Maoism as a Source of Social Suffering 
in China”, Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, winter 1996.
33 According to Tu Weiming, Ibid., 43 million Chinese were starved to death. The source is an internal 
CPC report of 1961, based on Chen Yizi’s analysis, yet to be verified, Shanghai University Journal, 
Society in 1993, the number quoted was 40 millions, the issues were immediately confiscated.
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lesser degree of tolerance towards the miseries resulted from the CCP leftist policies after 1949. 
Among different peoples, such as Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols, their sense of identity and 
involvement in the 50-year Chinese nation are different, not only because they were incorporated into 
the political nation at different times34(Mongols in 1947 and Tibetans in 1951), but also because they 
were incorporated into the PRC in different manners.
The Mongols had a longer history of being involved in the politics of Chinese nationalism and 
revolution than Tibetans; the IMAR was set up in the name of Mongolian people by CCP’s Mongolian 
collaborators; and Tibet was taken over by the PLA from the outside.
2. 50-year political nation and external differentiation
2.1. Ideological Radicalism: Two Camp, the Great Schism and Ideological Radicalism 
Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1958Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1958
The external differentiation of the 100-year Chinese nation entails the pluralist view of the outside 
world in which nations compete for survival. From 1949 until the beginning of the 1980s the outside 
world was perceived by the “new” China in ideological terms. The Chinese international outlook in 
terms of imperialism versus socialism was strengthened by the United State’s cold war rhetoric and its 
containment policy in the Asian-Pacific.
To Chinese, the Sino-Soviet alliance was justified by proletarian internationalism as well as by 
strategic needs; and the alliance together with its internationalist emphasis temporarily blurred the 
traditional national ideas of common culture and history. In that period, the Chinese authority even 
tolerated the Inner Mongolian leader talking about the possible merger of Inner Mongolia with the 
MPR, because publicly proletarian internationalism and the socialist camp were more important than 
the traditional national idea.
One year after Chinese communists gained power in 1949, anti-Communist propaganda ran rampant in 
the United States when McCarthism relentlessly hunted the so-called domestic traitors. In July, 1949, 
Mao Zedong publicly encouraged hostility towards the United States, proclaimed his adherence to the 
Soviet Union and Liu Shaoqi was secretly sent to Moscow. In December 1949 Mao went himself to 
Moscow to negotiate an alliance that was eventually signed in February 1950.35
“The Korean War put an end for a long time the possibilities or an accommodation between Beijing
34 Inner Mongolia was declared as part of PRC as its first nationality autonomous region by CCP’s 
Inner Mongolian prot£g6 in 1947; Xinjiang was controlled by CCP in 1949 after some negotiations 
involving PRC, local non-Chinese nationalists and the Soviet Union; Tibet was under the control of 
PRC in 1951 when PLA marched into Tibet.
35 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.25.
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and Washington”.36 By the time the Korean War broke out in June 1950, China was already in a 
position of siding completely with the Soviet Union and in an irreconcilable position with the United 
States.
During the Korean War, at least one million Chinese soldiers died.37
To contain the perceived Communist threats in the Asian-pacific, the United States made a series of 
security arrangement in the region. In early 1951, John Foster Dulles as the special envoy, who 
visited Japan in early 1951 was unable to persuade the Japanese to rearm and settled instead for a 
policy of economic co-operation by which Japanese productive capacity would be used in support of 
the war effort.
American ideas of establishing a regional Pacific Pact also included on a Mutual Defence Treaty with 
the Philippines signed on 30 August 1951, the United States, Australia and New Zealand Security 
Treaty signed on 1 September. The Japanese Peace Treaty was also signed in September in San 
Francisco. Japan and the US signed a Mutual Defence Treaty38.
As part of its containment policy, the United States also promoted the order of a multilateral security 
arrangement in the region. On 8 September, 1954 the Manila Pact, the Collective Defence Treaty for 
Southeast Asia, was signed, and in the following year the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation(SEATO) 
was established in Bangkok.39 On 2 December, 1954 the U.S. signed with KMT government in 
Taiwan a Mutual Defence Treaty. On 24 February, 1955 Baghdad treaty was signed between Iraqi and 
Turkey.40 NATO, SEATO and the bilateral treaties signed by the United States in the Asia-Pacific 
formed a ring of containment against the Communist threat from the Soviet Union and China, and 
local communist insurgencies. As seen by the Chinese leaders, the new China was encircled by this 
political and military strategic alliance arranged by the United States.41
However during the period of siding with die Soviet Union, China’s traditional national idea was not 
completely replaced by communist internationalism. The Soviet Union during the period never 
dominated China as it controlled the East European countries, since “the PRC was too big, 
independent and proud to be dominated in that way especially as it proved itself to be a major power 
on the battlefields of Korea where for the first time in modem history Chinese forces had fought a
36 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.28.
37 According to Jon Halliday and Bruce Commings, 2 million North Korean civilians and 500,0000 
soldiers, and at least 1 million Chinese soldiers died on the communist side. They estimated that 1 
million South Korean civilians died. See Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.41.
38 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.29
39 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.50
40 Legal Teaching Material Editorial Department, ed. Collection o f the documents o f  the History o f  
International Relations (Wuhan University Press, 1983) Vol.2, pp.296-7.
41 Wang Jisi, “An Appraisal of Untied States Policies Towards China 1945-55”, Yuan Ming and Harry 
Harding ed. Sino-American Relations 1945-55, A Collaborative Reassessment o f  Troubled Time 
(Peking University Press, 1989) p.465.
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modem Western army to a standstill”42. The nationalist side of the PRC of the period might have been 
underestimated by the United States which failed to take advantage of the traditional Sino-Russian 
antagonism.
“John Lewis Gaddis, the principal historian of containment, has faulted the Eisenhower 
Administration particularly for lacking confidence in its own supposed reliance upon the 
independence and nationalism of Third World countries especially”. As early as in 1954, General 
Ridgeway, who had succeeded MacAuthur in Korea, had pointed out that that would require bringing 
“Red China to a realisation that its long range benefits derive from friendliness with America”. That 
was mled out by Eisenhower himself on the grounds that the requisite diplomatic contracts were 
unacceptable as they would pose problems with allies, destroy Chiang Kaishek and be resisted by an 
American people still ‘emotional ‘ about China 43
The Chinese ideologically based international view was strengthened by the containment policy and 
the cold war rhetoric of the west, and Chinese nationalist thinking with the emphasis on independence 
and Sino-centricity had to take the second place to the international view of ideological struggle which 
then seemed to be closer to the international situation. From the 1950s to the 1960s, China changed 
from a close ally of the Soviet Union to its adversary which showed that Chinese considerations of 
their national interests always competed with their ideological belief. It was indicated in many ways 
that Chinese nationalism was an important cause of the Sino-Russian schism.
*The Great Schism and Opposition to Both Superpowers1959-69*
Behind the ideological debates between the Soviet Union and China from 1959s to 1960s, there was 
the conflict of different national interests and ego of the two big states with different cultural and 
historical traditions.
Ideology was at the heart of the legitimacy of Communist Party rule in both the Soviet Union and 
China and the Sino-Russian disagreement were mainly expressed in ideological terms. Therefore, 
according to Yahuda, in the early 1960s both Chinese and the Soviet Union leaders were condemning 
the other as traitors to the communist cause. For China and Russian leaders, there was only one 
genuine Marxism-Leninism44.
Besides claiming to be the genuine heir of Marxism and Leninism, China by repudiating the Soviet 
Union as revisionist and social imperialist put itself again in a central position in an ideological and 
moral sense. During the Sino-Soviet alliance, especially early on when Stalin was still alive, the 
Soviet communist party had the authority over all the brother communist parties including Chinese
42 Yahuda(op. cit.), p.29
43 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.49
44 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.58
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communist party. Since China did not occupy a central position in the socialist camp, the new 
orthodox of Marxism did not put the CCP at a central position as Confucianism did to the old China.
45
After Stalin died, the CCP began to challenge the Soviet party’s leadership position. The CCP first 
showed disagreement on the ideas of “peaceful co-existence” and ’’peaceful competition” in 
Khrushchev’s report in the 20th Party Congress held in February, 1956. The CCP’s disagreement with 
the Soviet communist party and Khrushchev’s secret report caused confusion among Eastern European 
countries and damaged the prestige of the Soviet party in the international communist movement. In 
the First Congress of the World Communist Parties convened in November, 1957, Mao disputed with 
the Soviet party on the issue of war and peace, guidelines of the relationship between the brother 
parties. The CCP emphasized “the principle of unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist and proletarian 
internationalism and the principle of consensus through consultation”, and repudiated the distinction 
of the so-called “superior party” and ’’subordinate party”.46
After the CCP denounced the CPSU as revisionist (of Marxism and Leninism) and splittist (of the 
international communism), it regarded itself as the true champion of communist cause in a leadership 
position of the international communist movement, “the Soviet Communist Party’s Leaders are 
Contemporary Biggest Splittists”, the seventh article of the Sino-Soviet open debate published in the 
People’s Daily on 2 February 1964, quoted Lenin as having said in 1919, ‘the leadership of the 
revolutionary proletarian international was temporarily in the hands of Russians(naturally it is within a 
short period of time)’. The article argued “if a party in the forefront position is on the road of 
revisionism, it will inevitably lose its forefront position even though it is the biggest and the most 
influential party”.47
The confidence showed by the CCP in its leading role in international communism was not only based 
upon its revolutionary experience (the CCP’s revolutionary success was achieved independently), but 
also based upon its long pre-modem history of Chinese centricity.
The breakdown of the alliance and differences about international politics and strategy decided more 
by national interests than ideological difference. “As the senior ally, the Soviet Union could not allow 
China to place its global strategic interests in jeopardy. For its part, an independent China could not
45Joseph Levenson’s regarded Marxism as the state ideology replaced Confucianism as the new orthodox. 
But with the Soviet Union as the senior party, the new orthodox of Marxism did not give the new China 
the same confidence of being the center as Confucianism gave to the old China the sense of sino- 
centricity. Joseph R. Levenson, The Past And Future Of Nationalism: China. One of his argument is CPC 
set up a new orthodox, a sense of mission in the place of Confucianism
A6The Debate on the Line o f International Communist Movement, Voll, (People’s Press, 1965) p.44- 
45. See Jun Qingyao, Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Diplomacy (Youshi Wenhua Shiye 
Gongsi, 1985) p.231.
47 The Debate on the Line o f International Communist Movement, Vol2, ( People’s Press, 1965) 
p.357-8. See Jun Qingyao, Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Diplomacy (Youshi Wenhua 
Shiye Gongsi, 1985) p.235.
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expect to subordinate itself to the degree of compliance demanded by its Soviet ally”48.
From a Chinese point of view, Khrushchev thwarted China’s endeavor to become an independent big 
power and maintained Soviet-US detente at the cost of Chinese sovereignty. In 1957, the United States 
deployed nuclear tipped missiles in Taiwan which evoked a strong protest from the PRC. Although in 
1957 there were already disagreements between China and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union 
nevertheless agreed to assist the PRC in developing nuclear weapons.49 In April 1958 Khrushchev 
proposed to the United State to sign a treaty for a nuclear test ban, and this was seen by Chinese as 
aimed at constraining their nuclear bomb program. In the summer of 1958 Khrushchev suggested to 
China the establishment of an allied naval force with joint naval and air communications in China and 
Mao refused. The Sino-Soviet relationship further deteriorated. On August 23, PRC began the 
bombing campaign targeting Quemoy, the off-shore island in the Taiwan Strait occupied by KMT 
force, which openly showed a Chinese independent approach to war and the United States. According 
to an Chinese official view, the bombing showed Taiwan was a domestic issue o f China in which 
interference by foreign forces was not allowed. It also showed that the United States armed with 
nuclear weapons was just a “paper tiger”.50 But Khrushchev accused Mao’s reckless campaign as “to 
test the international stability by force”.51 In 1959 the Soviet Union refused to supply China with a 
sample nuclear bomb to assist China’s nuclear bomb program. In September Khrushchev visited the 
United States and talked with Eisenhower at David Camp. The talk which was labeled the “Camp 
David Spirit” pointed up the contrast between the Soviet Union’ peaceful approach to the United 
States and the belligerent stance taken by the P.R.C.
The quarrel on international strategy and ideology also freshened Chinese memory of national 
humiliations imposed by imperial Russia. The most nationalistic view expressed during the quarrels 
between China and the Soviet Union was about the historical relationship between the two countries. 
China’s leaders regarded the Soviet Union not only a revisionist of Marxism and traitor to the 
Communist cause, but also an imperialist successor of the former Czarist Russia. And automatically, 
when it regarded China as a victim of the imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, the P.R.C. 
automatically took a position of being the successor of the imperial China. The quarrel revived 
memories of the past when imperial China was a victim to imperial Russia’s encroachment, it also 
revived the unpleasant memories about what the Soviet Union did to China and the lack of 
wholehearted support to the Chinese communists during their struggles before 1949.
From mid-nineteenth century. Czarist Russia exploited China’s involvement in war with Britain and 
France to seize the land between the Amur, the Ussuri, and the Pacific, and to set up a naval base 
Vladivostok (‘Star of the East’). The Aihui Treaty signed on May 28, 1858 ceded the land east of 
Ussuri to the coast to Russia. Since the treaty was signed by Heilongjiang General Yishan, a local
48 Yahuda, (op. cit.) pp.57-58.
49 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p. 197.
50 Zhang Jiliang, The History of Contemporary International Relations, 1982}
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official, therefore it was an illegal treaty. Two years later Tianjin Treaty was signed between China 
and Russia basically to confirm Aihui Treaty. Later Beijing Treaty signed ceded land in China’s 
western frontier to Russia.52
According to the Chinese, Russia through illegal and unequal treaties occupied Chinese territory in 
the northeast to the extent of 1.5 million square kilometers, an area equivalent to the size of the 
nineteenth century Germany and France combined together plus the size of China’s Zhejiang province.
Russia tried to seize Korea, a tributary state of the Manchu dynasty, and its plans were defeated, not 
by China, but by Japan. In Manchuria, through a treaty signed with Shengjing General Zeqi, Russia 
tried to take over the whole Manchuria but failed because it was not accepted by Manchu dynasty as 
well as other powers.53 But nevertheless Russians still gained privileges and influence in Manchuria, 
even after their defeat by the Japanese in 1905, they kept their Chinese Eastern Railway, a fortress of 
political and military as well as economic value. When the Bolsheviks took the place of the Czar, 
Lenin first talked of handing the railway back to China, but the Soviets did not repeat the promise 
when they were in a position to implement it. (They kept the railway until 1935, and then sold it to the 
Japanese.)54
On the occasion of Mongolian independence in 1911, Russia appeared as protectors of the Mongols 
against the Chinese. In 1919 the Bolsheviks repudiated the privileges held by the Imperial 
Government in Mongolia, but in 1921 they sent the Red Army to guarantee Mongolia’s independence 
against Chinese and the subsequent political revolution led by Mongolian revolutionaries. 
Xinjiang(Chinese Turkestan) was also an object of contention between Imperial Russia and China. 
Here, too, in the 1930’s, Soviet Influence was strong, at the expense of the Chinese government55.
The story of relations between the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and China is not one of 
happy comradeship. In 1920s the Soviet Union advised the Chinese Communists to form the anti­
imperialist united front with the Kuomintang even after Chiang Kaishek had shown himself to be an 
enemy. Insistence by the Comintern (which meant Stalin) that the Chinese Communists should take no 
action against Chiang led to the massacre of Communist workers in Shanghai in April 1927, and to 
further humiliations and repression by the Kuomintang later in the year. Mao never forgot those 
disasters and Stalin’s preference for his rivals within the party56. There is no evidence of any 
significant Soviet material support for the CCP during the Chinese war against Japan. One Chinese 
historican describes the total amount of assistance as three to five planeloads of blankets and
51 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.59.
52 Zhang Jiqian, zhongguo tongshi jianggao (Script o f  Chinese History), vol.2, (Beijing University 
Press, 1984) p.76.
53 Zhang Jiqian, zhongguo tongshi jianggao (Script o f  Chinese History), vol.2, (Beijing University 
Press, 1984) p.79.
54 Hugh Seton-Watson, ’The Great Schism’, Nationalism and Communism: Essays, 1946-1963, 
(Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1964) p.223.
55 Hugh Seton-Watson,(op. cit.) p.223.
56 Hugh Seton-Watson, (op. cit.) p.224.
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medicine.57 In 1945 Stalin had secured the interests of the Soviet Union by a treaty with the KMT 
government which had given him control of the Manchurian railways, Port Arther(Lushunkou) and 
Dairen. These were not given back to the Communist until well after their victory - the railways in 
1952 and Port Arther in 195558. By the treaty Stalin recognized Chiang Kaishek’s KMT government 
as the only legitimate government in China, hardly giving the CCP any help they need. The Soviet Red 
Army in Manchuria did not recognize the CCP army’s right to control Manchuria.59 Stalin admitted to 
the Yugoslavs in 1948 that he had ‘underestimated their chances’60. In 1945 the industrial equipment 
of the factories built in Manchuria by the Japanese since 1931 was removed to Russia, which regarded 
today by Chinese almost as looting.
2.2. International United Front, Three World International View, Tripolarity and the External 
Differentiation
China broke with the Soviet Union between 1958-63, in the following period up to 1966 Chinese 
regarded the Soviet Union as revisionist but still recognized its socialist nature. After 1966 China 
regarded itself as a bastion of socialism and the leader o f an International United Front against 
American imperialism, hence once again, China had the Sino-centric view of the world revolution. 
The period from 1969 to 1979 can be called tripolarity, within that period China developed their 
international outlook o f “three world”61.
Although CCP’s ideological division of the “three worlds” theory was often blurred by power politics 
of the tripolarity and the later realism of Chinese nationalism, the “three worlds” theory is the most 
systematic model of the UF policy which has the major influence on Chinese foreign policy.
The “intermediate zone” view of international politics in 1960s was the precedent for “three world” 
theory. Mao Zedong believed that the struggles of the “intermediate zone” could counter the world­
wide offensive of imperialism62.
The three world theory is an application of CCP’s international united front policy. The united front
57 Hua Qingzhao, “Truman’s China Policy as Viewed Through Chinese Eyes” Paper presented at the 
annual conference of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, December 1989. p.4.
58 Hugh Seton-Watson, (op. cit.) p.224.
59 Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet American Rivalry and the Origins o f  the 
Chinese Civil War, (Columbia University Press, 1993) p.83.
60 Hugh Seton-Watson, (op. cit.) p.224.
61 About periodization of the CCP’s international policy, see Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in 
World Affairs (Croom Helm Ltd., 1978)
62 In 1960s, China’s diplomacy operated at a variety of levels. In the “first” intermediate zone -  the 
third world- while it supported some revolutionary movements the main weight o f its efforts went into 
developing relations with existing nationalist govemments(often in open rivalry with the Soviet 
Union). In the “second” intermediate zone, as it began to be defined, of most of the capitalist world 
except for the United States, China’s trade expanded rapidly as it shifted the burden of this economic 
relations away from the Soviet bloc. See John Gittings, The World and China 1922-1972, (London: 
Eyre Methuen, 1974) p.261.
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thinking behind the three world theory, as strategy and tactics to realise the ideological goal, is also In 
nature a compromise on the ideological principle. According to Lenin, for communists to take over 
state power, they must abandon their sectarianism and use united front strategy. He said that “to reject 
compromise on principle is childish”.63
The intellectual root of the united front strategy can be found in the Manifesto o f the Communist Party. 
Section two of the manifesto, “Proletarians and Communists”, sets out the relations of the 
Communists to the existing working-class parties64. Section four, “Position of the Communists in 
Relations to the Various Existing Opposition Parties”, suggests “the Communists fight for the 
attainment of the immediate aim, for the enforcement of the momentary interests o f the working class; 
but in the movement of the present they also represent and take care of the future of the movement”. 
Then it suggest in different countries such as France, Switzerland, Poland and Germany, proletarians 
should ally with different political forces, social-democrats, radicals, etc., against different immediate
65enemies.
The united front strategy is one of the contributions Lenin made to Maxist/Communist theory. What is 
known as the “Oriental Strategy” put forward by Lenin in 1916 Lenin to support anti-colonial 
nationalism against imperialism is a more recent source of the CCP’s united front policy.66 In March 
1919 Lenin set up the Comintem(the Third Communist International), the purpose of which was to 
organise world revolution. Later in the 3rd Comintern congress of 1921 “united front” tactics were 
formally introduced. The united front required the communists to establish contact with the masses 
either by collaborating with the leaders of non-communist organisations(“united from above”), or by 
appealing to the rank-and-file members of such organisations over the heads of their leaders(“united 
front from the below”).67 The united front strategy was a strategy for world revolution.
The “Intermediate Zone” view in 1960s was the origin of the later “three world view which formed the 
analytical basis of the CCP’s international united front policy. As early as 1946 “middle area” was 
mentioned by Mao Zedong in his meeting with Anna Louis Strong, Mao said “in the vast middle areas 
in between the United States and the Soviet Union, there are many capitalist countries’ colonies and 
semi-colonial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Before the American reactionaries subdue 
those countries, they are in no way to invade the Soviet U nion,} , we believe that very soon those 
countries will realise who is the real oppressor, the Soviet Union or the United States.”68 in his
63' Lenin, Selected Works o f  Lenin, II, p.618. See, R.N. Carew Hunt The Theory and Practice o f  
Communism (Penguin Books, 1978) p.193.
64 Karl Marx, “Manifesto o f the Communist Party”, Eugene Kamenka, ed. The Portable Karl Marx 
(Penguin Books, 1983) p.218.
65 Karl Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, Eugene Kamenka, ed. (op. cit.) p.240.
66 Lenin, “Summary of the Debate on Self-Determination Issues”, Collected Works o f Lenin, Vol. 22, 
People’s Press, 1961, p.337. also, “The Draft Program of the Russian Communist Party’s 7th 
Congress”, Vol. 27, p. 14., See, Jun Qingyao, Chinese Communists’ United Front Diplomacy {You Shi 
Cultural Co.(youshi wenhua shiye gonsi), 1985) p. 14.
67 R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice o f  Communism (Penguin Books, 1978) p. 195.
68 Mao Zedong, “Talk with Anna Louis Strong”, Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol.4, p. 1089-
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meeting with Anna Louis Strong. In 1965 Mao said to Edgar Snow, “’the third world’ is a term used 
by French to refer to the underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, former 
colonies and present colonies of capitalist countries. France is a developed industrialised country, it 
does not belong to the ‘third world’”.69
China formally proclaimed the theory of “three World” in 1974. In February Mao said to Kenneth 
David Kaunda, the visiting Zambian president that the United States and the Soviet Union are the first 
world, the force in the middle such as Japan, Europe and Canada belong to the second world; 
“we(China) and you belong to the third world”.70 CCP’s view of three worlds was first expounded to 
the world by Deng Xiaoping on the 6th Special Session of the United Nation General Assembly in 
1974.71
In the practice of their third world united front, the Chinese employed both united front from the 
above and the united front from the below. Whether the united front was implemented from above or 
from below mainly depended on Chinese global strategic considerations, i.e. anti-superpowers and big 
triangle power politics.
In Africa in the early 1960s, China spent huge amount of money and supplied large quantities of arms 
to support the overthrowing of US-backed leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. But later when 
China regarded the USSR as a much more serious threat to China, China began to make friends with 
Mobutu. China’s involvement in Angola is another example of how its untied front policy was swayed 
by its position in global power politics. In the 1960s Chinese had switched their support away from the 
Soviet-backed MPLA to the weaker National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola(UNITA). In 
1974, when China was improving its relation with the US, Chinese delivered a large consignment of 
weapons to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola(FNLA), which had its headquarters in 
Zaire. In 1975 civil war broke out between the Soviet-backed MPLA and the Chinese-backed FNLA 
in Angola. The FNLA’s light weapons were no match for the MPLA, so the Chinese once again turned 
their attention to UNITA.72
Before the Bandung conference in 1955, China’s policy towards Asian neighbours was an united front 
from below, advocating that the masses rebel against their bourgeoisie governments. After the 
Bandung Conference, China began to cultivate ties with the nationalist governments of the newly 
independent Asian countries(united front from above), and the attitude of China’s leaders toward their 
communist comrades in those countries was not no longer as supportive as required by their 
internationalist ideology. China regarded itself more as a big power player than the champion of 
world communism.
1090, People’s Press. See Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) p.45.
69 Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) p. 130.
70 Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) p. 130.
71 Peter Van Ness, “China As A Third World State: Foreign Policy And Official National Identity”, 
p. 197 See also Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) pp. 133-134.
72 Dick Wilson, Mathew Grenier, Chinese Communism (Paladin, 1992) p.98.
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According to Alexander Haig, Secretary of State of Carter administration, when he met Zhou Enlai in 
Beijing in 1972, he was told by Zhou Enlai that (US) “don’t lose in Vietnam; don’t withdraw from 
South East Asia.’73. China’s third world united front was stretched so far that an anti-Communist 
government could ask China for advice on how to crush the communist rebellions in its country. In 
1975 the visiting Thai Premier Kukrit Pramoj asked Mao Zedong how to crush the Thai Communist 
Party, Mao replied: ’you don’t have to worry about the Communist Party of Thailand. It has existed 
for more than ten years but not a single Thai Communist has come to see me here.’74
China’s border war with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979 shows that the third world united front 
and communist comradeship meant very little as against the solid national interests concerning 
territory. Sino-India relations deteriorated drastically after China’s repression in Tibet in 1959, Mao 
began to distrust Nehru, the former third world ally. In 1962 border war broke out over the 
controversial McMahon Line, which was regarded as a legitimate border by India, but illegitimate by 
the Chinese because they regarded the McMahon Line as the result of an unequal treaty forced upon 
imperial China by British imperialists. China’s quick military success served as a warning to India not 
to interfere in China’s internal affairs in Tibet. The war also showed when national interests was 
involved, the good will between the fellow third world countries was simply not enough for forming a 
third world united front.
The shared communist ideology did not prevent China from going to war with Vietnam in the excuse 
of border issue, although the real issue was wider, involving Vietnam’s alliance with the USSR and its 
invasion of Cambodia. The Vietnamese argument that the Sino-Vietnam border should be realigned 
according to the treaties drawn up between the French and the Manchu dynasty and the demand to 
settle the border on the old French terms were simply an insult to Chinese nationalist feelings since 
China regarded those as unequal treaties and national humiliations in modem history.
During the border war, the Chinese nationalist attitude toward Vietnam, the former tribute state of 
imperial China, echoed the old Sino-centric view. Deng Xiaoping said the war against Vietnam was to 
“teach Vietnam a lesson”.75
The CCP’s international united front policy in the 1960s was intended to make alliance with the third
73 John Pilger, Heroes(London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), p. 183. Pilger criticizes Zhou’s role in the Indo- 
China conference at Geneva in 1954, saying that he preferred a divided Vietnam. According to 
Anthony Barrett, Zhou secretly told the French that ‘he recognized the reality o f the South Veitnamese 
government they were trying to create’ (ibid., p i83), see Dick Wilson, Mathew Grenier, (op. cit.) 
pp.107,179.
74 Dick Wilson, (op. cit.) p. 108.
75 Chang Paomin, The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute (The Washington Papers, 1986), p.52. The 
fighting lasted for seventeen days, with only troops being set into battle. According to Chang, “unlike 
any nation engaged in a military operation of such a scale, Beijing made it clear from the beginning 
that the Chinese action would be limited in both scope and duration, that China did not want “a single 
inch” of Vietnamese territory, and that Chinese troops would be withdrawn as soon as they had 
administered the punishment Vietnam deserved and accomplished their mission’(Chang, p.55)
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world and the second world against the two imperialist super powers76. In the tripolarity period in the 
1970s when the United States, still the No. one imperialist power according to China’s leaders, was 
regarded as a temporary ally against the Soviet Union, the united front was stretched further, the 
element of power politics further compromised the ideological principle. In the 1980s and 90s 
political ideology was completely replaced by pragmatism and nationalism in China’s international 
policy.
In the history of the CCP’s united front, during the Sino-Japanese war, CCP began the policy of 
united front from the above and made peace with KMT, nationalism then was a card that was used in 
tactics played by CCP against KMT regime. In the 1980s Chinese nationalism, which formerly 
seemed only a tactical purpose in the CCP’s united front, finally became an end in itself.
The new period of pragmatism and nationalism during the reform period put an end to the ‘three 
world’ outlook and also put an end to the united front policy in its original meaning, i.e., united front 
as tactics to ideological goal. From 1960s to 80s, the external differentiation for China changed from 
that of the ideological enemies and of imperialism to that of powers hostile to China’s national 
interests in which no ideological consideration is involved.
New External Differentiation, New Self-Identity And State Legitimation
Deng Xiaoping put an end to the tumultuous ideological politics of the Maoist era in favor of the 
mundane tasks of economic development. Deng Xiaoping made fundamental changes in foreign 
policy according to the changed domestic and international circumstances and reasserted the 
independent foreign policy of China as a big country.77 Chinese foreign policy had the following three 
adjustments.
The first adjustment was the reassertion of China’s independent position in the world. Deng 
said:”(China) with big size and heavy weight has become an important force independent of the 
United States and the Soviet Union”. There has been a detente in the Soviet-US 
competition/confrontations, there are both confrontations and dialogues between the two. If  China 
shall form an alliance with either of them, it would tilt the global strategic balance, detrimental to the 
world stability.78 He said Chinese foreign policy should be independence and self-reliance, genuine 
non-alliance, Chinese do not play American card, nor the Soviet card, and also “do not allow others to
76 after the “Czechoslovakia Incident” in 1968, CCP regarded the Soviet Union had degraded from 
revisionism into social imperialism. “The Total Bankruptcy of the Contemporary Revisionism of the 
Soviet Union”, People’s Daily of August 23,1968., See, Jun Qingyao, (op. cit.) p.236.
77’• Tian Zengpei, ed ., Chinese Foreign Policy Since OpenningAnd Reform, (World Affair Press, 
1993) p.4.
78 Deng Xiaoping, “The China’s Diplomacy Since the Reform”, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 
Vol. 3, p.41,
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play China card”.79
At the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982, Hu Yaobang, CCP party secretary, made it clear 
that China had changed the “one line” strategy of anti-Soviet Union hegemonism.80
The second change was to revise the view that war is inevitable. Deng Xiaoping said, “Although the 
threat of war still exists, the factors constraining/preventing war have increased considerably”, “It is 
possible that during a long period of time there will be no large-scale world war, there is hope in 
maintaining the world peace.”81 Deng said that in a considerable period of time, at least within this 
century, there is unlikely a world war. He listed reasons for the possible world peace. The first, those 
capable o f engaging/launching world war, i.e., the US and the USSR, are deeply engaged in arms race 
and “ deterrence balance”. Secondly, the global deployment of US and USSR is in stalemate and it is 
difficult for both to complete their strategic deployment. Thirdly, peace elements, i.e., the third world 
with Va world population(China has 1.1 billion population), is increasing; the second world too does 
not like war. Therefore the idea that “the war is inevitable” can be abandoned and the idea that the 
peace is the main trend can be promoted. He pointed out that “the genuine problem facing the world 
today, the problem of the global strategic importance, one is about peace, the other is about 
development”.82
The third change was to abandon the standard of social system and ideology in international affairs.
To speed up modernization and catch up Western developed countries. China began to open to outside, 
especially to the West. The willingness to learn from the West and to be integrated into the world 
economic system, formerly regarded as capitalist system, diminished the role o f ideology. The 
diminishment ideology can also be seen from the so-called “one country two system” as reunification 
formula. The idea was put forwarded by Deng Xiaoping in September 1982 as a means of extending 
PRC sovereignty over HK, Macao and Taiwan, allowing different economic and political system, and 
the idea was passed by the National People’s Congress in December and added as Article 31 to the 
new constitution: ’’special administrative regions” may have different economic systems”. 83
The changes of Chinese foreign policy during the period reflected the conceptual changes of external 
differentiation and Chinese state and nation, i.e., the change from ideological to more pragmatic and 
national. Even after China was exposed to international condemnation over the Tiananmen massacre 
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China did not go back to take up the old ideological view.
After the changes in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe, Deng pointed out in the post-cold war
79 Deng Xiaoping, “The China’s Diplomacy Since the Reform”, Selected Works o f Deng Xiaoping, 
Vol. 3, p.57,
80 Yahuda, (op. cit.) p.207. Also see, Su Ge, “Holding High the Banner o f Deng Xiaoping’s Theory to 
Promote China’s Diplomacy into the Next Century”, The Contemporary International 
Relatiorts(No. 11,1997), p.40
81 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works o f  Deng Xiaoping, Vol.3 , pp. 105, 127.
82 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p. 105
83 Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across The Taiwan Strait, Westview Press, 1993.
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era: “no matter what the world pattern will be, tri-polar, quodru-polar, penta-polar, whatever, “, “many 
of our judgment about the world affairs in the past are still sound and well-advised.” The view of 
“peace and development” made on the general trend of the new international situation is not 
outdated.84
The goals of Chinese foreign policy have departed from ideological ones to more pragmatic and 
realistic priorities, i.e., to create peaceful international environment for China’s development; to be 
Independent and self-reliant. The emphasis that state capacity and economic development are above 
everything else echoes the themes of modem Chinese nationalism over the hundred years, i.e., self­
strengthening and national salvation.
As another aspect of modem nationalism, foremost importance is put on independence and 
sovereignty. Deng Xiaoping said that the “sovereignty issue is not an issue to be discussed”85; “State 
sovereignty and security should be always the first priority.” “some countries in the west use human 
rights, unreasonable and illegitimate social system as excuse, they actually damage our sovereignty”.86 
He also said, ’’independence and self-reliance, in past, present and future, was, is and will be our 
standing point. Chinese people cherish their right of independence and self-reliance which gain after 
long term struggle”.87
To champion the cause for the South and against hegemonism and the cause for the new world order88 
put China back to a centric position in moral sense. Mentioning goal of Chinese foreign policy, Deng 
said, “there are two points in our foreign policy, the first is anti-hegemonism and power politics, to 
guard world peace. The second is to set up new international system and new economic pattern”.89
Facing the new international pattern in the post-cold war era, which in the Chinese view is largely 
dominated by the US and the west, China’s leaders claimed they have a moral responsibility to 
contribute to a just world order which is different from the present one. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European communism, Deng Xiaoping said “probably one cold war has 
ended, another two has started. One is against the whole south, the third world; the other is against 
socialism. Western countries are waging another smokeless the third world war. Smokeless refers to 
the socialist countries are made to have peaceful evolution.”90
84 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.353.
85 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p. 12.
86 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.348.
87 Deng Xiaoping (op. cit.) p.3.
88 Since September 1988, Deng Xiaoping in many occasions porposed to the visiting foreign 
politicians, “(we) now need to set up a new international economic order, and also need to consider 
setting up new international political order.”, . .. !the general international situation is changing, every
country is considering proper new policy and setting up new international order”,  the new
international order in the post-cold war period envisioned by Chinese scholars in the book is an 
alternative to “the peace dominated by the US”. , See Shen Qurong, ed., The Issues on the New 
International Political Order (Current Affairs Press, 1991) pp.2,4.
89 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.353.
90 Deng Xiaoping, (op. cit.) p.344.
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Therefore the nationalist ideas in Chinese foreign policies can be summarized as the following points. 
The first is the nationalist pride derived from history and culture; China as a great nation with long 
history and glorious culture. The second is the redemptionist attitude derived from modem Chinese 
nationalism and modem Chinese history: i.e., China should be accorded compensatory treatment from 
those powers which insulted or injured it in the past. The third point is that China, as a great nation of 
historical, cultural, economic and political importance, must be treated as a great power. China’s 
national sovereignty must be respected absolutely, and such respect precludes and forcing criticism of 
China’s internal politics. The fourth point is the claim to moral superiority. China’s special virtue in 
international affairs consists in the fact that its foreign policy is based not on expediency but on 
immutable principles that express universal values such as justice and equity.
New National Identity, New state Legitimation and Contradictions
Chinese foreign policy changes correspond to the changed perception of the international world, i.e., 
changed external differentiation in terms of national identity. The international view of two camps, 
three world are both class-based analysis, the tripolarity strategic balance added more realist politics 
into the class politics, but after Chinese leaders publicly abandoned the role o f political ideology in 
their foreign policy, the external differentiation was constructed on a cultural and an historical basis. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the thesis of cultural confrontation such as Huntington’s thesis91 has 
been taken seriously by Chinese scholars in the circle of international studies92. In particular the 
following points can be made: post-Cold War politics emphasize ethnic nationalism over ideology; 
modernization does not mean westernization. Those who are usually labeled as neo-authoritarianist 
and neo-conservativist scholars advocate Confucianism to restore moral values in the post-Communist 
China and cultural nationalism against the anti-Chinese intention of the west.93 Without ideology in 
Chinese foreign policies, the Chinese international united front strategy simply degenerated into an 
unprincipled realpolitik tool.
The new external differentiation for the cultural Chinese nation is the international hostility which is 
not just anti-Communist, but anti-Chinese in general. Cultural differentiation between the west and 
China is emphasized over the ideological difference. Chinese national ideas are at the same time
91 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3(Summer 1993).
92 About Chinese scholars’ response to Huntington’s thesis, see Wang Jisi(ed.), Wenmingyu guoji 
zhengzhi: Zhongguo xuezhe ping Hengtingdun de Wenming chongtu lun(Civilization and 
International Politics: Chinese Scholars on Huntington's Clashes o f  Civilization) (Shanghai People’s 
Press, 1995)
93 For analysis of neo-conservatism in China, see Joseph Fewsmith, “Neo-conservatism and the end of 
the Dengist eraf  Asian Survey, Vol.35, No.7, July 1995, pp.635-651.
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associated with 5000-year, 100-year and 50-year nation, but the change is discemable that basis of 
Chinese nation changed from the political to cultural, from the basis o f political state and political 
system to historical and cultural, with more emphasis on the past than the communist future. Chinese 
nation is more backward looking in the sense that Chinese identity depends more on the past than the 
future envisaged by the former political ideology.
With the external differentiation changed from ideological to cultural, Chinese self-identity also 
changes, from the nation bound by social system and ideology to the nation defined by common 
culture and history. The idea of one country two system, besides showing the lack of confidence in 
communist ideology, shows that the nationalist principle is more important than those of the political 
system and ideology. The implication lessens the credibility of the former political nation. The 
national idea based on common history and culture is reactionary in the sense that it in many ways 
reverses to the pre-communist Chinese national ideas, the idea of 5000-year nation in which Chinese is 
in the central position and non-Chinese in peripherals. According to the new culturally-based national 
idea, the future of non-Chinese peoples is no longer the disappearance into some supranational future 
identity but rather assimilation and becoming incorporated into the Chinese people. The Chinese state 
is no longer regarded as merely a vehicle for revolution, but an end itself and the Chinese nation is no 
longer regarded as an interim but as a permanent phenomenon with a historical destiny. The state with 
its nationalist legitimation become the external differentiation for the more alienated non-Chinese.
The legitimacy of China as a nation state also changes as the emphasis shifts from political basis to 
cultural basis, but the state legitimation shift is not completed yet, therefore Chinese state is still led by 
the CPC which cannot divorce itself from its ideological roots. In terms of the political nation, in 
theory, China as a socialist state was not an end itself but only a vehicle o f interim nature for the 
ultimate end of Communism. The revolutionary state as revolutionary agent is justified by historical 
materialism. When Marxism-Leninism lost its appeal to Chinese, a more conventional approach has 
been used to justify Chinese state as a nation state. A state justified by other than communist 
ideology is meant to preserve physical peace and security for its citizens and their property against 
external or domestic disorder. A state is also meant to foster economic prosperity and security. Apart 
from the economic-political function, state has also spiritual functions. “State is supposed to provide 
its citizens with a source of pride, awe and idealism - or at least emotional and psychological 
satisfaction - a function that grows in importance when traditional religions are in relative decline”.94 
Therefore by becoming the most important source to provide emotional and’psychological satisfaction 
for Chinese, Chinese nationalism replaces Communism and becomes an important part of Chinese 
state legitimation. And the new external differentiation related to Chinese nationalism is the part of 
state legitimation.
94 David P. Calleo, “America’s Federal Nation State: A Crisis of Post-imperial Viability?”, John Dunn, 
ed. Contemporary Crisis O f The Nation State? (The Political Studies Association, 1995)
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In Marxist-Leninist theory, national issue is not of ultimate importance, but of interim and tactical 
importance. Theoretically speaking, national culture, either Chinese or non-Chinese, does not have a 
place in the ideal society Chinese strove for. Therefore in the years of ideological fervor, there was 
comparatively more freedom for various interpretations of non-Chinese nationality’s past. They could 
somehow extol their own national heroes which were not necessarily Chinese national heroes. Chinese 
authority did not mind so much some non-Chinese dynasties to be called “alien dynasties” or 
“conquest dynasties” as it does now. The political nation is more inclusive a notion in terms of internal 
ethnic nationalities than the present nation in cultural and historical sense. In terms of handling 
domestic ethnic relations, Socialist nation appeared more confident and forward-looking the 
backward-looking cultural nation.
Assimilation or integration of non-Chinese was carried out in a supranational name - Marxist theory of 
social progress. When the cultural and ethnic side are emphasized, the traditional justification is not 
supranational, but straightforward assimilationist, without the intellectual content of the political 
ideology. Historical and cultural Chinese nation is more challenging and antagonistic to internal 
ethnic nationalism. There is more room for non-Chinese identities in the Chinese nation based on 
political ideology than in the nation bounded by history and culture. Some Chinese scholars already 
expressed the view that non-Chinese nationalities form an inconvenient factor for present Chinese 
nationalism which in their view is vital for the state stability and future in the post-Communist 
China.95
Chinese nationalism is indeed restricted by the tensions between the different national ideas, i.e., the 
one associated mainly with the political state after 1949, and the one in traditional sense, mainly 
associated with history and culture. By emphasizing the historical and cultural Chinese nation, China 
can claim Hong Kong and Taiwan as part of Chinese nation and thus as part o f Chinese nation state. 
Any attempt of Hong Kong to claim separate international identity and attempt of Taiwan nationalists 
to claim separate nation is contradictory to this idea of historical and cultural nation held by Chinese, 
i.e., the national idea linked with 5000-year Chinese nation and 100-year Chinese nation.
The Chinese communist government’s appealing to the Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas 
who were formerly regarded as being outside, or at least in the periphery of, the Chinese people(ren 
min), was part of the so-called united front policy, which was a revolutionary tactics, a means rather 
than an end. As the identity of the Chinese nation has shifted from its class basis to a cultural and 
historical basis, the appeal to those outside(or in the periphery of) the class nation can no longer be 
regarded as a part of the united front policy as the CCP still pretends. This is because it is no longer a 
means to a revolutionary goal. The goal Chinese government envisioned beyond all the present united
95 A Chinese historian said that usage of nationalism is restricted by non-Chinese nationality factor, 
and patriotism limit the room for the development of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Xiao 
Gongqin, “Nationalism as a Cohesive Centripetal Force”, Ming Bao Monthly, March 1993.
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front work is no longer a communist society, or the eventual success of communist system in Hong 
Kong or Taiwan when it is some day reunited with the mainland China.
Deng Xiaoping and Chinese government made it clear that one country two systems would remain a 
long-term basic state policy. When the CCP no longer emphasized the communist society as its goal 
but instead a stronger and prosperous Chinese nation state disregarding its social system, it was more 
than a ’’compromise of principle”, as what Lenin said on united front policy.96 By doing so, Deng 
Xiaoping postphoned the realization of Communism into the very distant future. Though Communism 
was not abandoned by Deng Xiaoping as a goal altogether, it is no longer a practical goal to be 
reached in the foreseeable future. Chinese business tycoons from Hong Kong, formerly regarded as 
big bourgeoisie or compradore, now are welcomed by the CCP as great patriots and some of them are 
even appointed to leading positions in the National People’s Congress.
The tension between the cultural nation and political nation in increasing and it is a problem for 
Chinese state to accommodate the different national ideas, i.e., 5000-year, 100-year and 50-year 
Chinese nation, esp. when China is regarded as a nation state.
After 1949, rhetorically Chinese nationalism against non-Chinese peoples was condemned as Han 
Chauvinism by the CCP and the legitimacy of the political state including non-Chinese was built on 
the negation of the pre-Communist nationalism. The CCP regarded itself as the eliminator of the 
previous Chinese oppression and the liberator of all nationalities in China. In the post-Communist 
period when Chinese nationalism is increasingly relied upon as a means of state legitimation, new 
external differentiation of the international world is constructed as in non-ideological terms, e.g., 
conflicts between national interests, cultural confrontation, the west versus China97.
The cultural Chinese nation and its new external differentiation alienate non-Chinese peoples. In 100- 
year national idea, non-Chinese as an outside contrast of Chinese identity was already internalized in 
front of the western imperialism and colonialism as the new external differentiation. In the idea of 50- 
year political nation, non-Chinese difference from Chinese is blurred by the ideology of common 
future and class interests. Now with the cultural and historical emphasis in Chinese national ideas and 
the new external differentiation for Chinese nationalism, it is a tendency that non-Chinese nationalism 
is again externalized since China as a nation state can not accommodate the two contradictory national 
ideas, political nation and cultural nation at the same time.
96 Lenin said that “to reject compromise on principle is childish” when he referred to the “immature” 
sectarianism of communist parties. See, Selected Works o f  Lenin Vol.2 (Lenin Institute, Moscow, 
1936-39) p.618., The major guideline written by Lenin on united front is “Left Wing Communism: an 
Infantile Disorder”, Selected Works o f  Lenin, Vol.2, p.803, see R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and 
Practice o f  Communism (Pelican Books, 1978) pp. 192-3.
97For systematic description of this China versus with views expressed by Chinese scholars, see, 
Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Intellectuals’ Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in 
1990s”, The China Quarterly (Winter 1997)
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At first, the resurgence of non-Chinese nationalism is usually identified as a historically consistent 
hostility against Chinese because Chinese authority tends to regard the present non-Chinese 
nationalism in a historical view rather than to understand it by the current changes, i.e. discrepancies 
in the regional development between Chinese inland and non-Chinese areas, resurgence of traditional 
Chinese nationalism, etc.. Secondly, in a horizontal way, non-Chinese nationalism has always been 
regarded by Chinese as being linked with the wider international hostile forces and international 
conspiracies against Chinese nation. Chinese authority is always ready to believe there are foreign 
links in the major non-Chinese nationalism such as Tibetan, Uighur or Inner Mongolian.
Formerly the nationality problem was regarded as the contradictions within people(ren min nei bu mao 
dun) and only class struggle was regarded as a contradiction with the enemy(di wo mao dun), Chinese 
nationalism has two different dimensions in terms of the two contradictions. The former is inward 
nationalism, the superior attitude towards non-Chinese peoples; the latter is the outward nationalism 
which shows an redemptionist attitude toward the capitalist and imperialist west. Now with the two 
contradictions blurred, the two dimensions of Chinese nationalism tend to merge into one. This 
Chinese nationalism based on historical and cultural belief is less tolerant to non-Chinese nationalism, 
and as the external differentiation for non-Chinese nationalism, it is the main cause behind the 
resurgence o f non-Chinese nationalism.
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CONCLUSION
Central Question
Since China’s reform began in 1979, socio-political changes initiated by the reform have led to a 
revival of modem Chinese nationalism that now draws on traditional attributes. At the same time 
there has been a resurgence of Mongolian nationalism. The rising Mongolian nationalism poses 
challenges to Chinese state legitimacy as Chinese state legitimacy more and more relies upon 
nationalist justifications.
Historical Method
Modem Mongolian nationalism in China and Mongol-Chinese relations cannot be fully understood 
without exploring the complex inter-relationship between the Mongols and the Chinese state in history. 
Mongolian self-rule, the struggle for autonomy, and the titular regional autonomy in history have been 
reviewed to show that the resurgence of Mongolian nationalism has been partly caused by the 
deterioration of the political and economic situation of Mongols in China.
1. CONTRIBUTIONS
The thesis aims to provide an insight into how ethnic nationalism of Mongols in China challenges the 
legitimacy of a multi-ethnic Chinese State, and how the ethnic nationalism at sub-state level can have 
international implications.
To understand those issues, I use the concept of external differentiation. Together with other major 
explanations of nationalism, my approach is to analyze nationalism in 4 dimensions, i.e., how 
nationalism is understood by its historical roots, ideologies about a common future, internal 
mechanisms of social and economic rationalism, a sense of external differentiation.
Problems in the Reform Period
China’s transition towards a market economy since 1979 has created many problems: an increased 
development gap and inequality between different regions and within regions. Economic change has 
sabotaged the previous structures of community without replacing them with new ones. Another 
problem is that the transition of a communist economy to a market economy exposes a vacuum in state 
sectors which has led to both extensive and epidemic official corruption, social unemployment, and 
dislocations. Against this background there continues to be a deepening deterioration of the 
Mongolian economic and political situation.
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Ideological and Legitimacy Shift
During the period of reform, the political ideal of a socialist nation that had provided a framework for 
promoting the integration of ethnic and non-ethnic Chinese in the early years of the People’s Republic 
was weakened. The decline of Marxist ideology has reduced the supranational nature of Chinese 
statehood with the result that the formal identity of the Chinese state has become more nationalistic. In 
this sense China has changed from being a supra-national empire to a nationalist state.
In opposition to the ideal of socialist unity, the old traditional view has re-emerged. According to this, 
the identity of the Chinese nation is defined principally by the cultural, ethnic, and historical ties that 
bind the Chinese people together in the state.
During the period of reform since 1979, an important shift occurred in the basis of state legitimacy of 
the Chinese State is claimed. This shift paralleled the decline in significance of Communist ideology 
both in China and the world as a whole and the corresponding rise o f Chinese nationalism officially 
designated as “patriotism”.
“Ai guo zhu yi”, patriotism, is Chinese state nationalism used as a state legitimization principle with 
emphasis upon the state rather than upon the nation: Since all peoples live in one state, therefore they 
are of one nation, and by the nationalist principle, they should be loyal to state.
Since this view is dominated by the perspectives and interests o f the Han Chinese, the developments 
since the beginning of the reforms have combined to weaken the authority that the Chinese 
government has exercised over what the Chinese call “national minorities” (shao shu min zu). This 
weakening of authority has resulted in the more overt use of force, which shows power of coercion 
replacing political authority.
These developments have shaped the re-emergence of Mongolian nationalism in China, which in turn 
has challenged aspects of the basis of statehood as asserted by China’s Communist party rulers.
Changes in Chinese State Legitimization
The question of Chinese state legitimacy involves the changing relationship between Chinese 
nationalism and Chinese statehood, and how the changes in the justification o f Chinese state authority
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affect Mongolian nationalism.
The autonomy of Inner Mongolia in the 1950s was relatively more acceptable to Mongols since it was 
based on the Soviet influenced doctrine of the CCP, with Ulanhu as a Mongolian leader who was 
acceptable to Beijing. In the beginning there was a possibility of establishing some meaningful 
national autonomy in Inner Mongolia, i.e., recognition of Mongolian rights in local government, the 
economy and cultural affairs in Inner Mongolia, but the leftist policy and the Cultural Revolution 
destroyed that chance.
The leftist policies from late 50s obliterated Mongolian rights emphasized in earlier periods and 
emphasized a supra-national ideology.
The Chinese government of the reform period after the cultural revolution continued to ignore the 
interests and the demands of minorities in Inner Mongolia. With the former ideology declining, the 
Chinese government failed to introduce a new supra-nationality and all encompassing ideology. The 
legitimacy of the Chinese state, apart from Marxist justifications, relies more and more on national 
ideas with more historical and cultural meaning. At the same time, occasionally during the reform 
period, Mongols and other non-Chinese peoples have had more opportunities to express their 
grievances and dissatisfactions.
More active non-Chinese nationalism during the period, highlights the legitimacy problems of China 
arising from its character as a multi-ethnic state. Chinese state legitimacy relies more and more on 
national and cultural standards rather than the former political ideology. The legitimacy problems and 
rising non-Chinese nationalism illustrates the problems and dilemma facing many post-communist 
countries searching for new political legitimacy. With all of its flaws the Soviet example provided a 
model for integration, the nationalist and market driven approach of the reform period is 
assimilationist. The former allowed a degree of space for non Chinese nationalities, the latter allows 
little or none.
Dual Principles in State Legitimacy
Because legitimacy and illegitimacy are not matters to be quantified, it is difficult to find a point 
beyond which legitimacy becomes illegitimacy. Like a sinking boat, there may be some crucial 
moment before and after, when people on the boat would make totally different decisions on whether 
to abandon ship or not. The same can also be said of people’s judgement of state legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to list certain conditions to qualify the matter of legitimacy or illegitimacy. 
Mongolian nationalism, among other non-Chinese nationalism, highlights some conceptual 
weaknesses of Chinese state legitimacy.
Chinese state legitimacy has many origins: the imperial legacy, the nationalist past and Marxist 
ideological influences. For example, Chinese state nationalism partly originates from the sino-centric
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past and culturalism1, assimilation before 1949 and it also finds justification in historical materialism.
The Chinese reform period witnesses a transition from the ideological politics of state to nationalist 
politics. China as a multi-ethnic state is increasingly pretending to be a nation state by reinforcing a 
common Chinese national identity. Of course there are still theoretical ambiguities which become 
confused in nationality policies and theories, hence the Chinese state is regarded as both.a multi-ethnic 
state, and a nation state on different occasions. Positive nationalism is helpful to the legitimacy of a 
nation state, but detrimental to the legitimacy of a multi-ethnic state as far as minorities are concerned.
As both a nation state and a multi-ethnic state, China’s state legitimacy relies on nationalist principles 
and democratic principles at the same time. The nationalist principle is about a single Chinese nation 
encompassing all different peoples in the PRC, and the democratic principle is about all the different 
ethnic groups being equal citizens. But the idea of a single Chinese nation meets the challenge from 
negative non-Chinese nationalism, and the claim to provide equal representation to all ethnic groups is 
also contested on democratic and liberal grounds.
National principles are cultural and historical, while democratic and liberal principles neither 
historical nor cultural. Yet they are interrelated. For example, strong Chinese nationalism makes the 
Chinese more tolerant of a lack of political representation and personal freedom when Chinese 
authorities try to champion a nationalist cause. Positive nationalism supporting state legitimacy really 
fends off democratic and liberal principles. On the other hand, the lack of political representation also 
alienates not only non-Chinese, but some Chinese as well. As the Chinese economy is more integrated 
into the world market, Chinese nationalism will meet more pressure.
Negative nationalism as an opposition, has allied itself with democratic and liberal principles to 
challenge positive nationalism, for example in IM, and other areas of non-Chinese nationalism, the 
Dalai Lama is more associated with democratic and liberal principles than supposedly more 
progressive Chinese communism.
Two Types O f Nationalism In State Legitimization
However, nationalism as a legitimization principle is a two-pronged sword. While nationalism can be 
used to justify state legitimacy, it can be also used to defy a state and justify a separatist movement.
The imposed national identity can evoke both positive(supporting) and negative(defying) responses
1 Joseph Levenson referred to pre-modem Chinese centrism as culturalism to distinguish it from 
modem nationalism. See Joseph R. Levenson.Confucian China and its Modern Fate: the Problem o f  
Intellectual Continuity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p.96.
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from different ethnic groups. Chinese nationalism is positive in the sense that it supports a Chinese 
national identity and justifies statehood. Non-Chinese nationalism, usually intensified by the 
attempted imposition of a Chinese identity, is negative in the sense that it denies Chinese identity.
While Chinese nationalism and Mongolian nationalism are in constant conflict, die former upholds a 
unitary concept of Chinese statehood, and the Mongolians reject Chinese view of them and their 
history and therefore by implication their concept of statehood. While Chinese nationalism, since its 
beginning in modem history, is associated with various political ideologies that share in common the 
striving to establish a powerful and modem Chinese state, a unified and powerful Chinese nation 
including all non-Chinese peoples has always been the basis of statehood. Hence Chinese nationalism 
is assimilationist.
Both ancient Chinese political thinking about statehood and modem nationalist ideas (even including 
Chinese communism with its nationalist bent) emphasize strong state authority. Throughout history, 
Confucianism has been utilized by ruling dynasties to extol the virtue of their subjects’ obedience and 
loyalty towards the monarchy. Modem nationalist thinking, initially motivated by self-strengthening 
ideals and competitiveness between western imperialist powers, also emphasizes a strong and 
powerful state, which sometimes worships state power so much that it resembles European fascism.2
The National ideals of Mongols rely heavily on the history of independent Mongolian powers, 
especially the empire started by Genghis Khan, which historically was in conflict and confrontation 
with the Chinese dynasties. In pre-nationalist times, Mongolian self-consciousness as a cultural and 
ethnic group was strengthened by external differentiation provided by Chinese Ming and Manchu 
Qing. Examples: Modem Mongolian nationalism in Mongolian independence in 1911 was also 
related to the external differentiation provided by either Manchu Qing or Czarist Russia.
Throughout history, the Mongolian group identity was often a negative or reactive identity in the sense 
that it was opposed to the identity o f an imposing alien group. Mongolian nationalism in China is 
especially related to, and can be regarded as, a reaction to Chinese influence and assimilation. The 
rising Mongolian nationalism in the period of Chinese reform is a reaction towards the increasingly 
manifested Chinese nationalism and towards a China that increasingly relies on Chinese nationalist 
ideas to justify itself. Mongolian nationalism promotes a view of pluralism in nature and differs from 
Chinese assmilationist view, thus Chinese leaders regard it as a threat.
2 Sun Yatsen, The Selected Works o f  Sun Yatsen (idem) p.674.
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International Outlook
The relationship between Nationalism and state legitimacy arguably has been an important source of 
tension in international relations since the 19* Century. But it has acquired even greater saliency in the 
1990s following the end of the cold war. Most international conflicts have stemmed from intra-state 
rather than inter-state wars. And these conflicts have hinged on which national groups has the right to 
exercise state power or what should be the territorial basis for new states upon the break-up of multi­
national states.
These issues have acquired greater significance. Firstly, because the end o f bipolarity has removed the 
constraints exercised by great powers involvement in local conflicts. Secondly, the collapse of 
Communism as an alternative economic system and as radical ideology has removed a system that 
once ever-rode national divisions for many of the Eurasian peoples.
China too has not been exempt from these changing currents. The increasing nationalistic basis on 
which the identity of the Chinese people is based, together with the problems this raises in regard to 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, have profound implications for the international identity of the Chinese state. 
Consequently, the way in which Chinese “national minorities” have emerged as a problem within 
China also has clear international implications.
In the international environment, Mongolian nationalism fits into the general trend in post-communist 
states agenda, i.e., raising nationalism following the abandonment of communist ideology. Moreover, 
Mongolian nationalism has implications for China’s foreign relations with other countries of Northeast 
Asia, especially in the post-cold war era.
Having witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European communist bloc, an inevitable 
question is whether China will follow the example of the former Soviet Union; Whether Mongolian 
nationalism, together with other non-Chinese nationalism, can pose a feasible challenge to Chinese 
state.
Nationality issues in China are different in many ways. As far as Mongols are concerned, they now 
account for only 3.56 million among 23 million people in Inner Mongolia (The population of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic is 2,096,5003). Considering the fact that many Chinese are registered as
3 Erden Bukh, ed., Zhong Meng Jingji Jiaoliu (The Study o f Sino-Mongolian Economic Exchanges) 
(Inner Mongolian Social Academy, 1990) p. 2.
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Mongols to enjoy some “benefits” allowed to minorities, the avoidance of the one-child policy in 
particular, the real number of Mongols is actually smaller.4 Therefore prospects o f secessionism for 
Mongolian nationalism are small, and because of their small population, even a meaningful autonomy 
for the Mongols is doubtful.
But considering the existing problems of Chinese statehood, if Mongolian nationalism persists, it then 
contributes to the weakening of the Chinese state, because the leaders of the Chinese state cannot 
construct a legitimate public philosophy which can accommodate peoples such as Mongols. In this 
sense, the Chinese state remains an empire rather than a nation-state or a hue multi-national state.
Moreover, Mongolian nationalism, like other non-Chinese nationalism such as Tibetan and Uyghur, 
questions state policy and asks for diversity . All these contribute to the diversification and 
disintegration tendency in the statehood and nationhood of China.
It is also possible that Chinese economic development could provide further chances for Mongolian 
nationalism. As China joins the WTO, and Chinese society is more subject to a legal framework and 
international conventions, Mongols and other non-Chinese minorities would have more chances to 
realize some of their demands in education, liberal rights and more autonomy.
This gives China’s leaders a sense of vulnerability and makes them fear the implications of the 
Kosovo crisis, i.e. international intervention in the ethnic affairs of a sovereign state in name of human 
rights. Non-Chinese nationalism, such as Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian, in a sense would become a 
contributory factor in undermining the Chinese state. China’s leaders’ sense of vulnerability was 
added to by non-Chinese nationalism in peripheral areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang and even Inner 
Mongolia. This suggests that the problems of Chinese statehood come from within, not from without.
2. SUMMARY 
Method: 4 Dimensions
Various theories on nationalism range from the intellectual and ideological origins, historical 
conditions and socio-economic mechanism. These different theories can be categorized as studying 3 
dimensions of nationalism, i.e., a sense of a common past provided by historical explanations, 
sometimes a sense of common future and fate by intellectual and ideological approaches, and some 
inner mechanism of a nation provided by socio-economic models, especially a functionalist approach.
I found it is extremely useful to add another dimension to those 3 dimensions, i.e., external 
differentiation which is vital to national consciousness and national identity.
The sense of external differentiation is vital for both Mongolian nationalism and Chinese nationalism.
4 ditto.
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Chinese perception of the international world provides a vital external differentiation for Chinese 
nationalism, and modem Chinese nationalism gives Mongolian nationalism a sense of external 
differentiation. By the same approach we can better understand the international implications of sub­
state ethnic nationalism.
Chapter Summary
The chapters are arranged to show the four dimensions of both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism.
The 2nd chapter looks at the two dimensions(past and external) of Chinese nation and the 
transformation from historical nation to modem nation. I have disputed the common Chinese view 
that the continued existence of a Chinese nation since ancient times is an objective fact.
Chinese and Mongols view both their own and others’ history very differently and hence, their 
respective accounts of a historical relationship also differ. Nationalism needs an “invented tradition”5 , 
and a common past is invented to justify modem nationalism. The modem Chinese nation can be 
regarded as a constructed entity based on certain historical and cultural roots. The invented and 
regenerated Chinese culture and tradition involve particular interpretations of history, national heroes, 
ethnic relations in history, etc..
In the same way, modem Mongolian nationalism also links itself with the pre-modem history of 
independent Mongolian powers. In the 3rd chapter, Mongolian views of history and historical ethnic 
relations are presented which differ from the standard Chinese view. 1911 Mongolian independence 
traced its origin to Mongolian independence in the pre-Manchu period.6 Even in Communist China, 
the enlargement of IMAR was related by Ulanhu to Mongolian unification in history.7
Apart from their association with the past, both Chinese and Mongolian nationalism in the 1940s and 
1950s were strengthened by a strong sense of a shared future, especially by their close association with 
Communism. Communism added ideological politics into nationalism to convince people of a
d
common future and destiny. The 4th chapter shows how Mongolian nationalism and Chinese 
Communism accommodated each other and autonomy as a result o f the compromise of the two 
different political principles.
Elie Kedourie used the term “ideological politics” in contrast to constitutional politics. He defined
5 Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, ed. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions, and Mass-Producing 
Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, in The Invention O f Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 1983) 
pp.13-14.
6 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims its 
Independence in 1911 (E.J. Brill, 1989) pp.72-73.
7 Ulanhu’s speech at the founding ceremony of the Joint Committee of Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Movement, Archive Collection O f The Joint Committee O f Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement 
(Archive Press, 1989) p. 19.
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ideological politics as “concerned with establishing a state of affairs in society and state such that 
everyone, as they say in old-fashioned novels, will live happily ever after” 8.
In the past a human commonwealth was envisaged in Confucian classics9, in modem times a 
communist society free of all human evils was envisaged by the Chinese communists, according to 
which Chinese and non-Chinese relations in a future society would be so harmonious that the ethnic 
and national borders were no longer necessary.
Mongolian communists, under either Russian or Chinese influence, envisaged a picture in which their 
powerful neighbors, either Chinese or Russians, were transformed not only into harmless neighbors , 
but also into unselfish friends by supra-national class solidarity.
The 5th chapter explains why Mongolian nationalism experienced a rise in the period of reform from 
1978 when some fundamental ideological changes took place in China, i.e., the rise of Chinese 
nationalism and decline of Communist ideology in Chinese politics. Chinese nationalism and 
communist ideology both play important parts in modem Chinese nation building. In terms of 
incorporating a multi-ethnic state, communist ideology is vital to providing some common political 
ground for the construction of the new Chinese nation in a political sense. The decline of communism 
is also diminishing the already weak common ground shared by Chinese nationalism and Mongolian 
nationalism. The rise of Chinese nationalism incites more antagonism amongst Mongols by reminding 
them of the more ostensibly oppressive Chinese nationalism in pre-1949 period.
The alleged Chinese nation also needs to be supported by some inherent mechanism which is invented 
on the basis of some historical and cultural evidence to justify the togetherness and uniqueness of the 
nation.
Apart from finding a common past and “invented tradition”, the Marxist view on social development 
and the liberal view on social progress were used to support the concept of the Chinese nation. Despite 
their different views concerning the social agent that will lead to the emergence of a universal identity, 
Marxists and liberals agree on the prospect of a final international identity beyond nation and state. 
Hence both the above views regard the Chinese national identity in nature is at an interim stage of 
social and historical development.
The functionalist view by contrast, that has predominated since 1978, finds an inherent mechanism 
behind the Chinese nation in the historical, territorial and social dimensions of China. According to
8 Elie Kedourie, “Introduction to the 4th Edition”, Nationalism, 4th Edition, (Blackwell, 1993) p.xiii.
9 Confucius, “Chapter Hongfan”, Shangshu Jiyi (Shu King), ed. by Qu Wanli (Lianjing Publishing 
Co(Lian Jing Shiye Chuban Gongsi), 1983) p. 120.
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the functionalist view, all different ethnic peoples both in history and in the present PRC are all bound 
together by a rational mechanism such as the need for development and economic necessities. 
Accordingly, the Chinese nation is regarded as a perennial phenomenon that has survived from a very 
remote and distant past to an infinite future, hence obviously there is no room in this view for social 
progress and revolution which would finally erase ethnic and national differences.
The 6th chapter in a larger time scale and an international scope provides different external 
differentiation’s for different concepts of the Chinese nation, i.e., 5000-year Chinese nation, 100-year 
Chinese nation and the 50-year political nation.
To envisage an external differentiation is also vital for both Chinese nationalism and Mongolian 
nationalism. Again, the above elements, both historical and political ideologies as well as the claim to 
an inherent uniqueness can be used to justify an outside contrast. The external differentiation for 
nationalism, which varies at different times, can be a foreign nation, culture and civilization 
consisting of a group of countries. For most of modem history, the Chinese nation and state have 
served as an important external differentiation for Mongolian nationalism. The modem state system, 
especially industrialized western powers, were the external differentiation for modem Chinese 
nationalism.
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